

REPLY

Nathan Widder

It is a singular honour for one's work to be read, let alone for someone to take the time to write in response to it, and I certainly do not feel like such an important person not to be deeply humbled by having a review forum devoted to my book. I am grateful to all the reviewers and particularly to Jon Roffe for proposing and organizing this initiative. I appreciate all the compliments they have given me in their reviews, but I will focus my reply on the critical points they have raised. These are many and varied, and they have provoked a great deal of thought in me, as good reviews should. They have given me much to respond to, and I feel they have helped push my ideas further than they had been when I wrote the book, even if my replies will, for the most part, be made through it. I would like to begin with some background of how this project came to me and what I have tried to do in it, before addressing what seem to me the main concerns the reviews have raised: Deleuze's (non)relation to Lacan, the thesis of identity as a simulation and surface effect, the question of time being disjunctive rather than integrative, and the implications of this ontology of time in the realm of politics and ethics.

Reflections on Time and Politics is my second book. The first, *Genealogies of Difference*,¹ drew on ancient, early Christian, medieval, and contemporary philosophy in order to address a number of ontological issues, particularly around infinity, totality, and continuity; negation and internal difference; and equivocal and univocal conceptions of being. There was discussion of time and temporality, focussed primarily on the concept of the event, but my thinking was not particularly developed on those fronts. When I finally turned my attention properly towards these issues, there was already a well-established recent trend towards bringing time and temporality to bear on salient aspects of ethical and political philosophy. Inspired particularly, but not exclusively, by Bergson and Deleuze, many authors were holding time to be creation itself (following Bergson's statement that time is creation or it is nothing at all) or to be the guarantor of positive creativity and change, rather than simply negation and destruction (time being what levels mountains, rusts iron, destroys kingdoms, and so forth). I do not think I suffered from following along behind this trend, as it better helped me to recognize some of the issues I had with it. I rarely found the arguments that linked time to creation very convincing, as they seemed very often to rely on an assumption that simply because time was part and parcel of complex processes of change, the complexity of these processes guaranteed the production of novelty (i.e., the emergence of an event) rather than simple difference (i.e., the banal reality that no two grains of sand or drops of rain can *really* be the

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same). It seemed to me that going beyond a linear notion of time's passage in order to focus on its multiple dynamics – the reflux of the past into the present, the future's hovering over the present and re-inscribing the past, the multiple rhythms of duration – could at best account for the emergence of the new only by default. And this is precisely what I saw Deleuze rejecting throughout his work. Of course, the task of accounting for the emergence of the new in repetition is not particularly easy, especially since an event, as Deleuze outlines it, is notoriously subtle and ambiguous. It marks a becoming that does not necessarily “move anywhere,” one for which the terms of representation are never sufficient, and it is characterized by eternal return, not some radical break and creation *ex nihilo*. I found a potential way forward in Deleuze's view that time must be treated as the unchanging form or structure of what changes, a claim that is partially developed through a critique, familiar in both analytic and continental philosophy, that defining time by its movement leads to the problem of infinite regress, as it begs the question of what is the time in which time moves. I wanted to take seriously the conception of time as a structure rather than a measure of change, and to see where it led. That is what I tried to do in this work.

I did not see this task presenting a problem of unduly privileging time over space or ignoring the spatilization of time, since the notion of structure implies spatialization, as do Deleuze's specific formulations of the irrational cut, the interstice, and the series, and the later Heidegger's formulation of “nearhood” (*Nahheit*), which relates past, present, and future in a four-dimensional temporal structure. A more significant challenge was focussing on time as a structure without losing sight of the various experiences of its passage, including – but not limited to – the ordinary experience of time as a continuum that can be counted off in order to measure movement and change. These invoke distinct “time-images,” as Deleuze says, different portrayals of the same phenomenon. As such, even if time's structure is in a way foundational – at least, it presents a direct as opposed to an indirect time-image – it could not be treated as an empty form pre-existing time's passage, but needed instead to be seen as a schema of correspondence or a diagram that emerged with time's movement and the interaction of dispersed temporal series; conversely, even if time's movement is not grounded in some prior structure, it could not be considered a merely chaotic flux, since time itself is inseparable from a notion of synthesis.² Deleuze's concept of sense as an expressive dimension that is immanent to what is expressed but remains within it as something different, allowed me to link these two aspects of time together. Through the concept, I held time's structure, the various syntheses that make time what it is, to express the sense of becoming as such, of both things that move in time and time's own movement. As several of the reviewers have noted, this structure of sense is also one of non-sense, which perhaps is the reason the only formulation I could find to express it was one that violated the basic rule that one cannot define a concept with reference to its own terms: the structure of time is one of “out-of-sync-ness”; what moves or changes “in time” is necessarily out of sync with itself.

This idea led me to engagements with a range of thinkers, including Plato and Aristotle, Russell and Wittgenstein, Freud and Melanie Klein, Lacan and Irigaray, Hegel, Nietzsche, Adorno, Heidegger, and Foucault. But Deleuze is certainly the figure who appears most regularly, and who is the most obvious source for the thesis at the project's centre: that time, treated as the structure of change, is a discontinuous or disjunctive synthesis of differences, one in which differences are brought together by a second order difference or “differentiator” in such a way that, while they are not simply exterior to one another – it is an “inclusive disjunction” – they nonetheless remain incommensurable, never simply corresponding to or opposing one another. Developing the idea of disjunction, and its corollary conception of internal difference, is also central to the related philosophical project of establishing an ontology of immanence, one that, as I tried to demonstrate in several sections of the book, puts Deleuze's thought on a common terrain with Hegel's, and with many other thinkers, including Lacan, who are similarly critical of but also indebted to Hegelian dialectics. The structure of this disjunctive synthesis is one that ungrounds movement, including the movement of time itself, and thus calls into question the central categories of the subject (the base of change) and spatio-temporal continuity (the medium of change), along with associated notions of sameness, difference, stability, and endurance. I tried to show that while these categories of identity and representation are not simply erroneous, the substantiality of what they delineate is only apparent. I thus adopted Deleuze's thesis in *Difference and Repetition* that identities are the surface effects of difference, that they are simulations or optical effects engendered in a virtual process of “differentiation.”

From this idea followed a structure of time that, though concretely multiple and discontinuous, contours a becoming that, even while engendering the new, nevertheless gives the appearance of simplicity, centredness, and continuity. Even a discontinuous becoming structured by a time out of joint thus presents itself a continuous change, not unlike the way a multitude of muscle contractions and relaxations, working with and against one another, create an apparently simple motion when a person raises his arm or walks in a straight line. It is not that the simple, continuous movement or change is false, but it is only an overall effect, and its simplicity is given only when this microscopic complexity is abstracted away. Nor is it the case that this movement or change lacks unity, but it is the unity of a disjunctive synthesis, a synthesis of disparate, which hides within the appearance of a centred unity held together through a subject. And while these simulations of identity and substantiality are certainly indispensable for the organization of important layers of our political and social life – a social world without such markers would probably be incoherent, although this in no way demonstrates their truth³ – there is a political and ethical point to moving beyond them, and to exploring concrete forms of becoming that they often occlude.

Working out the relationships between Deleuze and several thinkers often held to be his antagonists, and pressing the idea that identities and continuities are simulations and surface effects, are probably the two most controversial aspects of this project, and certainly the two on which I expected to be challenged the most. Regarding the first, as ungenerous as many readers from across the philosophical spectrum have been to Deleuze's work, English-language Deleuze scholarship has often been marked by a stubborn refusal to explore the productive intersections that can be found between, for example, Deleuze and Hegel or between Deleuze and Lacan. There has also been a tendency not to read these and other thinkers independently but instead to take Deleuze's often polemical statements – for example, his harsh attacks on Hegel in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* – as the final word on these matters. Things are, I think, slowly beginning to change, although there is much work to do, and this work requires a willingness to read the likes of Lacan and Hegel on their own terms even if one ultimately sides with Deleuze on the points where he parts with them.⁴ Of course, it is only fair that critics of Deleuze, indebted principally to Lacan, Hegel, or others, are held to the same requirements. Regarding the second, the language of simulacra and simulation, particularly when applied to identity and subjectivity, easily invites critical reactions. On the one hand, the idea of identity as a temporary construct formed through constitutive exclusions that both delineate this identity from what it is not and subvert its unity and purity, remains a central feature of a great deal of post-foundationalist thought, particularly where the political and ethical concern is to reconstitute a notion of the individual or collective subject as an agent of change. Often the theorists who promote the idea of the subject present it through the stark alternative between affirming a coherent form of selfhood or leaving the self a jumbled chaos.⁵ In these circles, the idea that subjectivity is not even a temporary construct but a simulation and surface effect is certainly not welcome. On the other hand, the language of simulation and simulacra suggests the kind of Baudrillardian melting away of reality that was probably behind Deleuze's own decision to leave the terminology behind. It remains the case that critics of Deleuze – most notably Badiou – treat the simulacrum as a difference lacking reality, despite Deleuze's thesis being that it provides a positive principle of difference when Plato's denigration of it as a copy of a copy, as “merely a simulacrum,” is removed. Perhaps it would have been better to avoid this language altogether, but I do remain convinced that it has value, even if it frequently invites preconceptions that are difficult to address and overcome fully.

I examined the relation – or non-relation – between Deleuze and Lacan in terms of their taking different routes away from Hegelian dialectics. Deleuze's critique maintains that speculative contradiction and dialectical synthesis necessarily abstract away incompatible forms of difference and dispersion and as a result Hegel can only complete immanence in abstraction. This leads Deleuze towards “difference in itself” as a second-order differentiator of differences, and to disjunction as a concrete form of synthesis. Lacan follows a similar path in many respects, also articulating a second-order difference irreducible to dialectical contradiction. Nevertheless, as I tried to demonstrate, at key points Lacan's portrayal of this difference remains abstract, such that, even if he cannot rightly be accused of reinstating transcendence proper, he nevertheless fails to execute a complete move to immanence, and this allows him to retain a form of the subject grounded by reminiscence, to hold a sense of

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transcendence to remain an ineliminable aspect of language, thought, and desire, and to maintain that morality must take the form of law. On this point, Justin Clemens seems to have misunderstood my intention – or perhaps I simply put things badly – when I wrote that, “the rather obvious residues of transcendence in Bergson and Lacan lie in the former’s appeals to mysticism and the latter’s use of the language of negative theology and the latter’s use of the language of negative theology with respect to the phallus and the feminine” (61). I meant by this that for the critics who normally attack Lacan and Bergson for transcendence, they find their most obvious ammunition here, but that the real issue lies elsewhere. I believe I made this clear two sentences later, writing that Lacan and Bergson each “disguises a more subtle Platonism within an incomplete move to immanence” (61-62). The problem, in other words, lies precisely in relation to, in Clemens’s own words, “his [Lacan’s] own peculiar form of immanence.” With both Lacan and Bergson, I argued that theirs are forms of immanence that preserve and repeat aspects of Platonism and foundationalism that seem sustainable in the absence of traditional forms of transcendence.

I do not see this difference in Lacan’s and Deleuze’s forms of immanence as a matter of equivocity versus univocity, where univocity amounts to some reworked form of totality, and so I would challenge Clemens’s formula that “equivocity is the cost of trying to think immanence without totality; univocity is the cost of trying to think immanence without negativity.” Deleuze’s form of immanence is one structured through disjunctive synthesis, and what is univocal in it is precisely this disjunction.⁶ It is simply that disjunction does not take the form of a fissure of the type that, in many theories indebted to Lacan, is constitutive of both the subject and the space of politics. Perhaps, from such a perspective – and even though “pure difference” is quite obviously an oxymoron – this univocity of difference must appear to be a reassertion of purity and totality. But whether the claim of Badiou and others that univocity reinvokes totality is an innocent misunderstanding or a red herring (I sometimes suspect the latter), I think it very much occludes a genuine discussion about what is at stake in the shared aspiration towards immanence. First, if disjunction does designate a differentiation – or, perhaps better, a folding – that cannot be put in terms of lack, void, or fissure, it shows that Deleuze’s terminology of affirmation and excess and his opposition to the language of lack and negation are neither feeble efforts “to give yourself a nice warm feeling of being productive and affirmative (because you don’t like the words ‘negation’ or ‘lack?’)” nor attempts to rephrase Lacan’s thought while deflecting some “anxiety of influence” that Lacan supposedly exercised over Deleuze. Rather, they designate precisely a fundamental break Deleuze executes in relation to Lacan – a break that, ironically in light of Clemens’s early remarks, operates on a reconceptualization of space in which disjunction does not take the form of foundational repression or exclusion.⁷ From Deleuze’s perspective, lack and fissure remain abstract portrayals of this disjunction, portrayals that capture only limited aspects of its operations (i.e., those that place the subject on the terrain of the desire of the Other, not those that deterritorialize this formation). Second, if the concept of fissure – and the associated idea of constitutive exclusion – is indeed indispensable for the concept of the subject, then the central question is not whether immanence is achieved at the cost of reintroducing totality or retaining a continuing sense of transcendence, but whether the subject itself is not the cost of immanence, whether immanence might not ultimately be incompatible with a retention of the subject. This is in part an ontological question, but it is above all a moral and political one, and there is certainly a case to be made on both sides of the debate. But it does little good to portray one side of this discussion as being simply apolitical or incapable of proposing a viable conception of politics. Although I am not certain where Clemens stands on the possibility of a Lacanian politics, his conclusion that there is no possible Deleuzian politics, and his counsel that this should be openly acknowledged, seems to overlap substantially with the criticisms of Deleuze commonly made by those who deem the subject to be a political *sine qua non* – and perhaps *this* is what should be openly acknowledged. I would not accept Clemens’s view that I do not go far enough in the direction set out by Deleuze because I seek to retain the word “politics.” I would instead turn the question around and ask whether others might not go far enough because, still linking politics to a subject striving (and presumably inexorably failing) to realize “human revolutions or utopian projections,” they fail to consider what political philosophy could be in the absence of the subject or where the subject is treated merely as a simulation. But I will return to the issue of politics later, after addressing the issue of the simulated status of identity and the consequences of a time out of joint that views the subject as a simulation for the unity of the self.

Jon Roffe is certainly not the first to suggest to me that treating identity as a simulation risks evacuating reality from the actual by leaving actual identities with “no purchase on reality.” But I am not sure this concern is warranted. Firstly, I do not think that holding these aspects of experience to be optical effects or illusions denies their purchase on reality. From the perspective of standing on the earth’s surface, the sun and the moon appear to be approximately the same size. This does not mean they are *really* the same size, but it also does not mean that they do not *really* appear this way. In regarding identities, be they individual or collective, in an analogous way, I tried to show that despite their significance, their reality does not extend beyond the way they appear from a certain perspective. To me, the status of identity as a simulation or an optical effect of difference is a necessary consequence of the Nietzschean perspectivism that characterizes Deleuze’s entire corpus. It certainly does not mean these simulations do not have profound effects or that they do not exercise substantial power in the way they exert claims to truth, but they are no less superficial and fragile for that reason. I do not think that acknowledging their superficiality alongside their staying power is a contradiction: presumably in whatever ways the sun and the moon have organized and will continue to organize our individual and social lives, they have appeared and will continue to appear to be roughly the same size, and this reality will remain a perspective illusion. Secondly, I do not believe Deleuze’s conceptualization of the actual is reducible to a realm of identity or (temporary) fixity, a view held by the likes of Žižek, who takes the virtual to be “the pure flow of experience, attributable to no subject, neither subjective nor objective” and the actual to be a world of “fixed entities, just secondary ‘coagulations’ of this flow.”⁸ Certainly Deleuze speaks of the actualization of the virtual as a process of “differentiation” into “species and distinguished parts,” but importantly he holds that this process remains one of dispersion and positive resonance, so that “the negative appears neither in the process of differentiation nor in the process of differentiation,” but instead appears in actual terms and relations “only in so far as these are cut off from the virtuality which they actualise, and from the movement of their actualisation.”⁹ Simulation, therefore, pertains not to the actual as such, but only to the appearance of coagulation, of a subject enduring through change, of the negative separation of things and parts, and so forth, within the domain of actual entities or events. To refer to an example I give in the preface of the book, someone may have a seemingly stable personality characterized by generosity, a sarcastic sense of humour, and a short temper; however, since no one remains the same over time, it cannot be for the same reasons because he or she is not actually the same person. The stability, in other words, exists in the effect, as a surface effect of processes of becoming, but through an illusion of perspective it appears to be the enduring base – the character – of the person and something persisting through all changes.

Jack Reynolds raises the concern that the disjunctive structure of time rests on unredeemed and possibly just dogmatic assertions that dismiss time’s equally fundamental integrative aspects and its connection to movement in the lived present. He presents this in terms of temporal disputes between post-structuralist and phenomenological accounts of time. But I would not agree that accounts of time out of joint “typically depend upon an opposition between the event and inexorable sameness” or that their criticisms of a phenomenological account lie quite where he seems to think they do. They certainly pertain to the unity of the self, but, I would say, it is a matter of whether this unity must take the form of a subject, and, indeed, whether this subjective unity is really required for the sort of accounts in which phenomenology excels, such as skills acquisitions and experiences that require absorption in the living present. In the twelfth reflection of the book, I drew on Nietzsche’s analysis of the drives and their relation to the ego in order to develop this idea of the self as a dispersed but synthesized being whose agency generates the simulation of an ego acting as a governing centre. This self is not simply lacking in unity, even if it is not centred. But perhaps a better account, and one that speaks more directly to Reynolds’s example of the cricket batsman, is found in Sartre’s early essay, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, which is certainly an important influence on Deleuze and which features prominently in *The Logic of Sense*.¹⁰ Following phenomenology’s basic premise that consciousness is consciousness of an object, Sartre holds that the ego is extraneous to consciousness’s synthesis with its object, and that it only appears in acts of reflection, when consciousness divides itself into reflecting and reflected consciousnesses in order to perceive its activity as if from outside. Thus, much like the cricket player, an unreflecting self might be absorbed in the act of reading, conscious of the book and its activity without any “I” impeding on the immanent unity of the experience; but as soon as this consciousness divides itself and reflects on this activity, it finds itself declaring “I

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am reading.”¹¹ Of course, such reflection is often crucial for many forms of concerted and sustained action, and so, in activities such as writing, deciding what to buy in the grocery store, or practicing so as to absorb into one’s muscle memory all the disparate but interconnected aspects of foot position, posture, grip and swing needed to successfully hit a cricket ball (or baseball) approaching at high speed, the “I” persistently makes an appearance. But while it arises in the coordination presupposed in these activities, it does not function as a governing centre: the “I” does not really organize the individual’s sustained activity, but emerges off of the self-to-self relationship the activity involves insofar as this activity requires consciousness to grasp its moments in a single intuition.¹² Sartre holds the ego to be dubitable but not a hypothetical object,¹³ and in this sense the ego that transcends consciousness’s agency necessarily exists; but he also speaks of it as a semblance and as a false representation that consciousness gives to itself.¹⁴ Greatly in contrast to his later affirmation of Cartesianism, Sartre’s fundamental point in *The Transcendence of the Ego* is that the role of phenomenological reduction is to remove the ego from consciousness, revealing consciousness alone to be concrete agency, but an agency that no longer takes the form of a subject.¹⁵ Far from being opposed to the kind of integration of the living present of Reynolds’s cricket player, the idea of the subject as a simulation affirms it on many points.

In the introduction I wrote that “this consideration of structural ungrounding and the concomitant status of identity as a simulation have profound implications for the entire way in which power, meaning, and resistance – as well as time and change – are theorized for a pluralist politics and ethics” (4). The last third of the book tried to cash out this claim through a series of engagements that explored, on the one hand, how even in a nihilistic condition where fixed markers and truths have lost their legitimacy, these superficial categories of identity continue to organize the distribution of disciplinary power relations; and, on the other hand, how the structure of time as eternal return conditions forms of transmutation that underpin Foucault’s thesis of the care of the self and Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of micropolitics. These transmutations can certainly be collective – there seems to me to be no necessity that they are restricted to the realm of (individual) self-problematizations. They are often subtle and hidden beneath markers of identity that continue to appear stable and substantial, as Foucault demonstrates when he traces the collective ethical transformations that occur in ancient Greece and Rome even while moral codes about sexuality remain fairly constant. What is important is that even while the same processes that produce the appearance of stable truths and identities also constitute the mechanisms of resistance, flight, and transmutation that exceed their terms, these simulated markers do not simply disappear. Whether this is enough to answer Jon Roffe’s concern that an ontology that forcefully shows how identities necessarily dissolve cannot show a point to acting against them or against their reterritorializing effects, I am not sure. But I do not think that a space of politics is denied by the fact that abstract identities and lines of flight are engendered together; on the contrary, I think it ensures such a space. What makes this not only ethical but also a political space is that it involves engagement and negotiation with constitutive and agonistic relations of power and difference that cannot be incorporated into some higher order or simply excluded, making politics something ineliminable. As Lyotard writes in *Heidegger and “the jews”*: “The differend, transcribed as ‘tendency,’ as ‘faction,’ gives rise to negotiations, lies, maneuvers, concessions, denunciations.... If this is horrifying, then one ‘cannot engage in politics.’ One has others do it.”¹⁶ Admittedly, this does not in itself provide “a motivation for political action, either in the form of a general orientation or as a guideline for the choice of specific actions.” Yet I wonder whether providing such a normative standard should really be the criterion for the implications of an ontology moving beyond the ethical and into the political realm. If ethics is conceived in a Nietzschean or Foucauldian sense, as a sensibility that is part and parcel of relations to self and to others, rather than as a set of codes or imperatives, then a political ethics probably cannot entail a particular political position. But I do not think that is sufficient to make it any less a *political* ethics.

There are important political questions that we face in our time, such as how we motivate ourselves and others into political action; how we build effective political movements; how we decide what specific political action should be taken; how we determine when and where it might not be a bad idea to stage a revolution of some sort or another, or at the very least to smash up something fundamental; how we resolve what we ought to keep and what we ought to throw away in a new political future (a question of how we institute rupture and cope with continuity at the same time). I would not claim to have answers to these questions (though I know more than a

few people who would volunteer to provide them). I am sure, however, that they can only be decided collectively (that is to say, politically), that they will differ across the multiple layers that constitute political and social life, and that they are quite specific to time and place. But I think there is a more basic question that also needs to be asked, an ethical question that lies at the intersection of ethics and politics: what is it to be a “political animal,” particularly one that doesn’t suffer (too much) from *ressentiment*? Without providing firm and final answers to the other questions, I think the answer to this one suggests something about what those other answers can and must be. And I do not think the answer to this more basic question can be that to be a political animal is to be as a political subject, whether this is the unconscious subject of desire as lack or the subject whose conscious sense of itself and its identity is constituted through the friend/enemy binaries that characterize practices of hegemonization.¹⁷ I have long felt that the pluralisms built on such conceptions of the subject are actually quite narrow, and that the politics they offer is ultimately not very useful in a myriad of areas where collective solutions always remain temporary, never exhaust the problems to which they respond, and always generate new and quite different problems to negotiate. And so I have tried, through ontological explorations of time and synthesis, to open up a domain where what matters is the capacity to revalue and move beyond a series of crude but still very influential identities and binary oppositions, and to offer alternative formulations of selfhood agency, power, resistance, and sense that speak to this requirement. But there is much more to be done. As I said at the beginning of this reply, I do not feel like such an important person not to be deeply humbled by this forum being organized on my book. I certainly also do not consider myself such a master of these issues not to feel like I have only scratched their surface so far.

Nathan Widder is Reader in Political Theory in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway (University of London).

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NOTES

1. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002.
2. An implied consequence of this view that time's structure arises only alongside its movement is the idea John Mullarkey presents in his review of "time being self-sufficient *in its temporality* (rather than atemporality): we understand it not by thinking it, but by enacting it, by actually 'whooshing about a bit' (and everything else that this condescending phrase might indicate)." I am not sure, however, what one is doing when thinking – certainly in the Deleuzian sense of encountering the outside, but probably also in the austere philosophical sense of schematizing and finding sufficient reasons and even the everyday forms of thought – if not "whooshing about" in time.
3. Nietzsche sums up this point: "We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live – by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles of faith nobody now could endure life. But this does not prove them. Life is no argument. The conditions of life might include error" (Nietzsche, Friedrich, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books), §121).
4. Several important steps forward here have been made by Edward Kazarian's recently completed PhD thesis, "The Science of Events: Deleuze and Psychoanalysis" (Villanova University Philosophy Department, 2009).
5. Consider, for example, the alternative Slavoj Žižek lays out between affirming the subject as a "unique scene of the Self" or denying this thesis and reducing the self to a "pandemonium of competing forces" (Žižek Slavoj, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology*, revised edition (London: Verso, 2008), p. xxiii).
6. Clemens quotes approvingly of a description I give on page 94 of the phallus as a differentiator, but he leaves off the statement two sentences later that "it [the phallus] is therefore univocal across the series, but its univocity is that of an enigma."
7. Admittedly, this point is not overtly thematized in *Reflections on Time and Politics*, but I have addressed it directly in relation to Lacanian-inspired political theories in Widder, Nathan, "What's Lacking in the Lack: A Comment on the Virtual," *Angelaki* 5.3 (2000), pp. 117-138.
8. Žižek, Slavoj, *Organs without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), p. 22.
9. Deleuze, Gilles, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone Press), p. 207.
10. Before going too deeply into this example involving a human self, I would like to respond to a statement Reynolds seems to make in passing, viz. that in referring to my ontology of time as a human but not a humanist ontology, I suggest an idealist position that the condition for anything to change is the human being being out of sync with itself, and that this differs from Deleuze's metaphysics and transcendental philosophy, which makes stronger claims about the temporality of things. On the one hand, I do not see my position as one that centres temporality and change on human experience in this way (and I'm also not sure exactly how the conjunction of four separate sentences from four pages of my introduction demonstrates this). I certainly accept, for example, that soft clay has a memory, that is, a natural tendency to resume its previous shape if it is bent or dented, and more generally that things have a temporal nature independent of us. On the other hand, I cannot see how any ontology, Deleuze's included, could be anything but a human ontology, despite (and I'm not sure if this is motivating Reynolds here) Deleuze's frequent borrowings from the sciences, including from biology, embryology, physics, and geology. Science remains a human construct, even if what science examines is not, and to me, at least, the interesting philosophical questions concern how and where science and the world it studies connect and do not connect, and also how science and philosophy overlap but remain disjointed (so that there really are philosophical questions about time that are simply different from scientific ones, and vice versa). But perhaps I am just one of the few people who take seriously Deleuze's and Guattari's claims that they were never engaged in doing science in the first place. A useful discussion of this somewhat controversial position can be found in Isabelle Stengers's "Gilles Deleuze's Last Message," located at <http://www.recalcitrance.com/dleuzelast.htm>.
11. Sartre, Jean-Paul, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, trans. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: The Noonday Press, 1957), pp. 46-47.
12. "Concerted action is first of all...a transcendent. That is obvious for actions like 'playing the piano,' 'driving a car,' 'writing,' because these actions are 'taken' in the world of things. But purely psychological actions like doubting, reasoning, meditating, making a hypothesis, these too must be conceived as transcendences. What deceives us here is that action is not only the noematic unity of a stream of consciousnesses: it is also a concrete realization. But we must not forget that action requires time to be accomplished. It has articulations; it has moments. To these moments correspond concrete, active consciousnesses, and the reflection which is directed on the consciousnesses apprehends the total action in an intuition which exhibits it as the transcendent unity of active consciousnesses" (Sartre 1957, pp. 68-69).
13. "I do not say to myself, 'Perhaps I have an ego,' as I may say to myself, 'Perhaps I hate Peter'" (ibid.: 76).
14. See ibid., pp. 79, 101.
15. Ibid, p. 106.
16. Lyotard, Jean-François, *Heidegger and "the jews"*, trans. Andreas Michel and Mark S. Roberts (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), p. 57.

17. That these conscious and unconscious forms of the subject are intertwined can be seen in the roles they play in the work of theorists such as Žižek, Judith Butler, and Ernesto Laclau.