First, I want to say how grateful I am to Jean-Philippe Deranty, Heikki Ikahaimo, Simon Lumsden and Sean Bowden for giving me the privilege and benefit of their carefully considered views on the direction taken by my work on Hegel and idealism. I also wish to thank Andrew Benjamin for having suggested a session at the 2009 ASCP annual conference at which versions of these reflections and replies were first aired, as well as to Robert Sinnerbrink, chair of the ASCP executive committee, and to Jon Rolfe and the editorial board of *Parrhesia*, for seeing this project through.

As Jean-Philippe suggests in his sketch of my account of Hegel’s concept of recognition, Hegel doesn’t think of self-reflection as basically achieved by “stepping back” and viewing one’s ideas from a type of metaperspective. Rather, self-consciousness comes primarily via engagement with another, differently located subject. (If I had a badge slogan for this, it might read “Other, not Meta”.) While at a theoretical level I’ve held to a dialogical model of philosophizing for a considerable time, it is in contexts such as these that one gets a deeper sense of just how dependent on dialogical engagement any thinking actually is. There is too much in what my four interlocutors have said to respond adequately here to all points, but I’ll try to pick up on what strike me as important issues. I’ll reply to each in turn, but each reply will address issues that overflow the boundaries between separating them.

JEAN-PHILIPPE DERANTY (ON *HEGEL’S HERMENEUTICS*)

Jean-Philippe asks how my recognition-focused account of Hegel relates to others within the larger group of recent broadly revisionist readings of Hegel. This is something I have naturally thought a lot about, but about which I still find difficult to be specific. Here is an attempt.

The first reading of Hegel in the English-language literature to go down this path in a systematic way was, as far as I’m aware, that of Robert Williams. While Williams’s reading was fundamentally from within a
phenomenological framework, and was focused on Hegel's practical philosophy (and, as Jean-Philippe mentions, had definite theological dimensions), in Hegel's Hermeneutics I tended to draw on both hermeneutic considerations and ideas from analytic epistemology. Besides this, I also attempted to apply the concept of recognition more widely, suggesting its applicability to Hegel's logical concerns, and not just his social philosophy. In certain ways, here my approach was closer to the sorts of ideas found in the “non-metaphysical” account of Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard, by which I had been deeply influenced. The proximity of my recognition-based approach to their approaches probably also had much to do with a shared interest in emerging pragmatist and anti-realist strands within analytic philosophy, and the relations of these strands to Hegel.

There is much with which I am in agreement in the approaches of Pippin and Pinkard, and I see myself as generally in that camp, but possibly one thing that has come to separate my own approach has been an increasing tendency on my part to be more comfortable (or perhaps, less uncomfortable) with the language of a type of “idealist” metaphysics. This had been somewhat obscured in Hegel’s Hermeneutics by the dominant epistemological register, but as Heikki points out in his piece, there was nevertheless, also a strongly ontological significance given there to recognition. In short, I portrayed human agents as “recognition-dependent” entities. Qua self-conscious and intentional being, capable in some way of rational thought and free activity, I am an entity dependent on existence within actual patterns of reciprocally cognitive activity. Considered outside of that context, I simply take myself to be just a natural being of sorts, an organism. Recognition dependence is a version of “mind-dependence”, and to this extent the picture I advocate of human subjects is an idealist one.

I must admit that I have never seen this aspect of idealism as “metaphysically” worrisome, nor as being at odds with an otherwise broadly (non-reductionist) naturalistic view of being human. I don’t see this form of idealism as in any way committed to anything like immaterial substances a la Berkeley’s “immaterialist” metaphysics; rather, I have tended to see any worries here as generated from some (to me, unwarranted) naturalistic metaphysical assumptions. To this extent, “idealism”, as I understand it, is close to common sense: after all, on reflection we seem to standardly grant a kind of mind-dependent status to certain arrays of everyday entities (BHP Billiton, for example), properties (e.g., that of being a prime minister), and relations (e.g., that of being married to). I think of these things, properties and relations as the components of what Anscombe called “institutional” (as opposed to “brute”) facts. For instance, a news item in today’s paper concerns a former prime minister with an inflamed gall-bladder. Having an inflamed gall-bladder is, I take it, as “brute” a fact as you can get—that is, is a fact about a natural entity considered as such. But while one can have an inflamed gall-bladder without this fact being recognized by anybody, its hard to see how one could be a prime minister in a way that is entirely independent of the recognition of others in an analogous way.

On my reading, Hegel simply spreads this type of “mind-dependent” status wider than many would. As noted, a thing like myself qua rational and free subject would (along with BHP but not gall bladders) be included in the list of recognition-dependent things, and along with such entities Hegel would include, I think, the objects towards which the intentional states of beings like myself are directed. So in general, I see the idealist movement, following Kant, as tending to treat as mind-dependent the array of traditionally metaphysical objects that had before him been treated as “real” in the sense of having the “there anyway” status a naturalist would give to natural entities. In short, Hegel treats the traditional subject matter of philosophy (rather than natural science) as recognition-dependent. In Hegel’s rhetoric, such entities, properties, relations and so on, are treated as “spiritual [geistig]”, not natural.

In this sense, I see idealism as having something in common with those contemporary forms of naturalism which also don’t give to the traditional objects of “metaphysics” the real “there anyway” status of what populates the universe according to natural science. But, rather than just dismiss the objects of traditional metaphysical approaches, or reduce them somehow to natural entities in the way of a reductionist naturalism, idealism reinterprets them, assigning them a mind-dependent status. This in turn opens up a space for investigating them in a systematic way. My feeling is that “non-metaphysical” Hegelians have been generally happier to talk about the normativity or rule-governedness of practices and about the “norms” governing those practices, and so on,
rather than talk directly in this way about mind-dependent objects, properties or relations. This may come from a worry about being taken to be doing “metaphysics” in the old, outmoded fashion, but whatever the motivation this gives their Hegelianism a more Kantian flavour than it might otherwise have. Nevertheless, I still tend to think of the difference of my approach as one of emphasis. The sense of metaphysics in the idealist metaphysics I attribute to Hegel is not the sense rejected by the “non-metaphysical” approach.

In *Hegel’s Hermeneutics* I think I was likewise anxious to distance Hegel from “metaphysical” thought taken in the old pre-Kantian sense, and that this was expressed in the *predominantly* epistemological*” register in which recognition is discussed there. But besides the more “ontological” aspect of recognition-dependent subjects, there I was also happier, as both Jean-Philippe and Heikki note, to treat the sort of “Schellingian” or “nature-philosophical” features of Hegel’s thought than has generally been the case with the more Kant-Fichte orientation of the non-metaphysical account. I think this fits in with my idea about a realm of recognition-dependent, but otherwise objective features of reality that I allude to above. But besides thinking that such talk is “metaphysically” unobjectionable, I also see a danger coming from another direction—that of the assimilation of Hegelian idealism to what in the analytic world is generally thought of as type of pragmatist “anti-realism”. In relation to this I have been influenced by John McDowell’s criticisms of the anti-realist tendencies of those, such as Rorty, who share his enthusiasm for Sellars. For McDowell, the danger facing a rejection of realism is the *subjectivism* of thinking of the basic features of the world as mere projections of “facts about us”. Thus he sees Hegel’s idealism as rejecting any such “subjective idealism” by achieving what he refers to as an “equipoise” between mind and world, an equipoise which ascribes directional priority to neither side.

Although I worry about some aspects of McDowell’s approach to these matters, I think the “equipoise” idea a very useful way of thinking about Hegel’s idealism. An exclusive focus on the idea of our *behaviour* as normative or “rule-following”, as in the approach of Robert Brandom, can make it sound as if the objects I want to think of as “ideal” are mind-dependent in a much stronger sense than I want—mere projections of our cognitively relevant intentional practices that could be described in a language which itself involves no commitment to the formal objects engaged by those practices. In contrast, as expressed with the “equipoise” idea, I want to think of ideal objects as having a certain independence from us, perhaps one might even talk of such objects as having causal properties which are *only* expressed in the context of our normative practices and not in the natural world. For example, this is how I think Hegel conceives of the ontological status of “right” within the logically based system of “right” that he explores in *The Philosophy of Right*. While there is no sense in which the world would contain “rights” were there no recognizers around to recognize certain things as bearing those rights, the complex system of rights can nevertheless be considered as somehow objective and having a logic of its own, and not as a mere reflection of what “we” happen think about rights.

As Jean-Philippe’s last two questions—about the role of nature-philosophical aspects of Hegel in my account and the relation of my account of recognition to the well-known approach to recognition in the work of Axel Honeth—overlap with questions raised by Heikki, I’ll try to answer them together in the following section.

**HEIKKI IKAHEIMO (ON THE LOGIC OF AFFECT)**

As Heikki points out, the nature-philosophical aspect of recognition comes out more focally in my second book where I tried to trace connections between idealism as I understand it and works of what might be best called “philosophical psychology” from the later nineteenth and early twentieth century, predominantly those of William James and Sigmund Freud. Here I was not arguing for any direct historical influence of Hegel, although there were clearly a strong influences of Schellingian nature-philosophy from the early nineteenth century on aspects of medical scientific thought as it developed during that century. What I tried to suggest, was that James and Freud had both inherited a form of Spinozist “psycho-physical parallelism” that had been transmitted by Schelling’s influence on medical thought about the mind, but that each had been led to modify it in trying to account for features of human intentionality, and that as modified their approaches had distinctly “Hegelian” features. Moreover, such features are recognizable in the work of a number of more contemporary
theorists of emotion and affect, although not usually understood in this way.

One thing I tried to do in *The Logic of Affect* was to develop ideas in relation to the first of the two particular realms of *Sittlichkeit* that Hegel separates in *Philosophy of Right*—the family and civil society—that I had treated in *Hegel’s Hermeneutics* in terms of their characteristically different forms of recognition. Hegel thinks of the family as fundamentally bound together by a generally affect-laden intentional attitude, “love”, and so I took the fundamental form of recognition here to be typically expressed in emotional expressions directed towards one’s intimates. In contrast, the subject of civil society is individuated as a “person” and recognized as an abstract bearer of “rights”—fundamentally rights with respect to access and use of objects of needs and desires. This approach thus involved a further exploration of the “ontological” conception of recognition present in the earlier book. Different sides of our subjective existence, I suggested in *Hegel’s Hermeneutics*, are given recognizable expression in these different contexts. My suggestion there was that a thinker like Adam Smith, who, by treating the subjects as found (and formed) within civil society as “natural”, had, from an Hegelian point of view, confused a “spiritual” entity with a natural one, and had thereby hypostatized one dimension of human subjectivity over others, resulting in a very one-sided philosophical anthropology.

Both Heikki and Jean-Philippe, invoking the work of Axel Honneth, raise the question of the role of “recognition” as a type of *struggled for good* within the public sphere, a good which can be withheld from individuals and groups, with attendant damage and injustice. I have certainly always admired Honneth’s work, and have been keenly interested in the way it has been developed by Jean-Philippe, Heikki and others. More specifically, I have considered the introduction of the theme of recognition into the political sphere in this way to be a great advance, providing a framework for the discussion of forms of injustice and damage which are otherwise difficult to pin down. Furthermore, I have never seen this development as incompatible with my approach, but as simply as the investigation of a different side of Hegel’s idea. While I have stressed the importance of Hegel’s differentiation of the spheres of immediate and mediated recognition—the family and civil society—and tried to relate these to characteristic features of the type of rationality and freedom of subjects formed in such contexts, I have tried to avoid the idea that each sphere rigidly instantiates one form of recognition, and one form alone. Features of the familial form appear for Hegel in civil society, and of course individuals within families can feel and behave as the bearers of abstract “property rights” *vis à vis* each other. But Hegel’s way of thinking of these different spheres in terms of the *predominance* of one of the two forms (“immediate” and “mediate”) of recognition has seemed to me to be tremendously insightful, and as constituting a powerful criticism of the sort of “possessive individualist” approach to subjectivity and sociality that results from the tendency to naturalize and hypostatize the civil sphere after the manner of Smith. Thus the approach to recognition championed by Honneth seems to me to further the investigation of the sorts of pathologies of civil society that Hegel first sketches in the *Philosophy of Right* and that, in many ways, were the starting points for my thinking about these issues.

Heikki raises a worry about my approach—about my treating the expression of pleasurable and displeasurable affects among subjects as aspects of a subject-shaping recognitive processes—but I tend to think that it rests on a misunderstanding. As he points out, for Hegel it is recognition that allows the “Aufhebung of mere desire-orientation”, however, “if it is true that pleasure and displeasure are necessary moving or motivating ingredients in anything humans do even as full-fledged persons” as I suggest, “then it seems that the immediacy of animal motivation is, in fact, not overcome in recognition”.

First, I’m not sure that Hegel’s idea of the “Aufhebung of mere desire-orientation” need imply the “overcoming” of “the immediacy of animal motivation” in the sense that Heikki’s worry seems to suggest. One aspect of Hegel’s critique of Kant that I have always found powerful is his critique is Kant’s tendency to polarize or dichotomize acting on the basis of “inclination” and acting on the basis of that the moral law. It was something of this critique that I was trying to capture by appealing to the role of affective pleasures and displeasures in human interaction, pleasures and displeasures that seem to me, moreover, to function very differently to the pleasures and displeasures that are bound up with desire and its satisfaction and frustration. In *The Logic of*
Affect I looked at the difference between the pleasures of affects and those of desire-satisfaction in the work of the American psychologist Silvan Tomkins, who, among other things, studied the dynamics of smiling between mothers and infants. Tomkins thought the response of smiling to be accompanied by pleasurable affects, and that in turn smiling responses are elicited in subjects by the smiles of others, this generating a type of “félicité à deux” that he likened to the mutually pleasurable dynamics of sexual intercourse. Here I generalized to a wider range of affective expressions the hint in Hegel’s treatment of sex as involving a type of mutual recognition between lovers, a view that Hegel effectively opposed to Kant’s implied account of sex as a type of economic transaction for the satisfaction of individual desires.

Heikki is right, I think, that the giving of recognition can be, in its affective dimensions, unpleasurable in contrast to the receiving of it. (Without the pain of “unrequited love”, there would be no country music!) But construing pleasure and unpleasure in this way sounds like such forms of affective recognition are being transposed to the “economic” realm, the realm of civil society. And while recognition can be treated as a type of good to be desired and understood as something like feelings of self-worth that one is owed, looking at the role of affects in mediating recognitive processes in the context of interaction with intimates gives, I believe, a different picture. Here we find forms of recognition in which the giving can be as equally pleasurable as the receiving. Of course one can be naively Pollyannish about the familial realm, and life there can often be far from all joy and light. The withholding of affections can be crippling within a system in which, in contrast to the economic sphere, access to the goods at issue cannot be earned, but I think of Hegel’s separation of the dynamics of the familial and civil realms, and his insistence on the necessity of “immediate” forms of recognition associated with the former as insightful. Thus I read him as an acute diagnostician of the pathologies that can arise when subjects are denied the forms of recognition beyond those formal ones recognized as needing protection within the framework of liberalism.

SIMON LUMSDEN (ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE RETURN OF HEGELIAN THOUGHT)

In his comments on my third book Simon very helpfully brings out the themes that, somewhat to my own surprise, emerged during the writing. While starting out to write a very affirmative account of the approach of the analytic neo-Hegelianism of Robert Brandom and John McDowell, I found myself digging in my heels concerning their apparent willingness to abandon a very traditionalist Aristotelian strand of thought within Hegel. With the help of hindsight, and Jean-Philippe’s and Heikki’s comments on the earlier work, I can see now that I shouldn’t have been so surprised, and that to some extent I had wanted to preserve a certain sort of traditional metaphysics within the generally “non-metaphysical” approach that Simon helpfully traces through back to the work of Hartmann. The work of Brandom and McDowell, I believe, has been tremendously important for an understanding as well as reassessment of Hegel from a contemporary philosophical point of view, and to this extent I have not been attracted to the often dismissive treatment that they have met at the hands of more traditionalist Hegelians. Hegel had taken contemporary movements in philosophy very seriously, and were we able to somehow clone a present version of him, I can’t imagine him dismissing the one-hundred-year-long analytic philosophical tradition out of hand. And yet there is a degree of truth to the traditionalists’ claims (and the claims of many others more generally in the “continental” tradition) that the analysts are typically “stuck” within the form of the thought that Hegel labeled “understanding” (Verstand), and miss out on the richness of “reason” (Vernunft). It is, however, easier to repeat this as a campaign slogan, than it is to spell it out in detail in an actual argument.

As I have mentioned earlier, one thing I found I had in common with the “non-metaphysical” Hegelians was an interest in and felt proximity to the Sellarsian turn in analytic philosophy. Robert Pippin had some references to the work of Sellars in Hegel’s Idealism but it was Terry Pinkard who more explicitly took his reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in his book of 1994. From the mid-to-late nineties the intersections of these approaches started to become the theme for an increasing number of conferences featuring an array of “usual suspects”: Pippin and Pinkard on the one hand and Rorty, Brandom and McDowell on the other. The deeper
I got into this material, the more worries I had about the distorting effects of certain prototypically “analytic” assumptions was having both on the “Pittsburgh neo-Hegelian” reading of Hegel, and on the substantive conception of philosophy being argued for. This pushed me to thinking further about how I saw the idealist tradition in general, and a reassessment of the idealists’ relation to Plato and Aristotle in a philosophical world that was otherwise happy to cast itself adrift from this tradition. The Fregean revolution in logic at the end of the nineteenth century, which for the most part has been taken as a given by analytic philosophers, I started to see as an extension of anti-Platonist and anti-Aristotelian type of thought running through British philosophy since the seventeenth century.

Related to this, I have come to think of the willingness to completely break with the Greek tradition, and the history of philosophy in general, as one characteristic marking off the analytic approach from the more “continental” tradition. For example, much of what seems bizarre to an analytically trained philosopher in, say, the thought of Heidegger, seems a reflection of certain Aristotelian timbre found in Heidegger’s writing. Even the infamous theme of “the nothing”—the object of many jokes since Carnap’s famous denunciation—makes a certain sense once one looks at it in relation to some of the disputes between Aristotelians and moderns around the time of the impact of early modern science. Similarly Hegel’s logic, with its powerful but confusing use of “determinate negation” becomes much more intelligible when one views it in relation to Aristotelian logic, with its way of ‘treating negation’ that differs from Frege’s.

Somewhat paradoxically, my way back into the Aristotelian aspects of Hegel was prompted by the work of Sellars, suggesting that there is nothing particularly intrinsic to analytic philosophy that gives it the strongly anti-Aristotelian tenor that it tends to have. (Until reading Sellars himself, my thoughts about his famous “critique of the Myth of the Given” had been courtesy of the quite distinctive version found in Rorty and Brandom.)

I have also come to realize that there has been still a considerable, if somewhat subterranean, stream of Aristotelianism running through analytic philosophy, probably most obviously as in the form of Aristotelian “virtue ethics” prompted by Anscombe’s work in the 1950s. Moreover, among the “non-classical” logics beloved of many antipodean logicians, some allow a greater contact with Hegel than is possible within a uniformly Fregean way of thinking.

In my earlier work I tried to get going the idea of a certain “cognitive contextualism” that accompanies the differently recognitively structured conceptions of subjectivity in Hegel. This comes out in Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought as the claim that a generally “Aristotelian” conception of logical form (reflected in Hegel’s “logic of being”) goes with more immediate practical contexts, while that developed in Frege, in which sub-propositional parts are thought of as significant not in themselves but in terms of their contribution to the truth-value of the whole proposition, fits better the reflective thought structures Hegel treats of the “logic of essence”. (The “logic of the concept”, is Hegel’s attempt, I think, to reconcile these two different types of thought within “syllogistically” mappable recognitive relations among thinkers.) Hegel’s thought is in no way fundamentally opposed to the elaboration of “essence” type structures that Frege’s breakthroughs allowed; once again, the argument is against the one-sided hypostatization of such categories at the expense of those of “immediate” cognition that I alluded to in the context of the family and civil society as opposed recognitive realms. While Brandom’s development of Hegel is very much tied to a commitment to the direction of Frege, some helpfully restraining features of Aristotelianism are, I think, found in McDowell and Sellars. Part of my current work is trying to cash out these ideas further.

SEAN BOWDEN (CONTINENTAL IDEALISM: LEIBNIZ TO NIETZSCHE)

In writing the Analytic Philosophy book, I had increasingly felt the need to somehow separate my own reading of Hegel, with its more Aristotelian features, from the ones I was reconstructing. So after it I set about my reconstruction of Hegel’s relation to the idealist tradition as a whole that Sean comments on. Here I’m very grateful to Sean for his illuminating thoughts on how idealism, when understood along the lines I sketch in Continental Idealism, might allow a different relation between the idealist tradition and modern continental
forms of thought to come into view. My reading of Deleuze has been, I must admit, very limited, but I do remember working my way through his book on Leibniz,15 when I first became interested in pursuing issues of the perspectival nature of thought. Of course Leibniz himself plays an important role in the history of perspectivism, with his metaphor in the Monadology of the difference between different perspectival views onto the one city. In Hegel’s Hermenetics I had tried to relate aspects of Hegel’s thought to Leibniz, in contrast with the more popular way of relating him to Spinoza, but it was only later that I came to think of Leibniz as having a much bigger role in attempts to understanding Kant and the post-Kantians. (I distinctly remember hearing a lecture in 2000 by the Kant scholar Henry Allison, and realizing how much of Kant I had been missing by not being alert to the Leibnizian resonances.)

Sean mentions how while Deleuze is traditionally considered a materialist, he thinks that he might be put in the context of the idealist tradition as I sketch it. As he points out, here the tendency to see Berkeley not only as an idealist but almost as the exemplary idealist has been extremely distortive. If one attends to the role of the form-matter distinction in Kant, and understands his idealism, as Kant himself stresses, as an idealism about form, then idealism no longer stands in a binary opposition to materialism, and it is easier to appreciate how for Fichte, for example, “idealism” has to be able to be combined with a type of “realism”. The opposing positions to idealism on my account would be, on the one hand, being an idealist about matter (Berkeley), and being a realist about form. Since Kant, “form” has come to imply logical or conceptual form, as well as spatio-temporal form, and being a realist about form is, I take it, the traditionalist position in metaphysics. For example, Aristotle thought of the categories as capturing the ontological structure of being, and in recent analytic metaphysics, David Armstrong similarly understands being” as having a certain type of conceptual formedness, one that he captures in terms of the notion of a “state of affairs”;16 It is just this objective form that he thinks captureable, as it were, in the form of true propositions about being. I take contemporary anti-realists, like Kant, to oppose these traditional conceptions of “being” as having form, but the Kantian form-matter distinction, which comes from Aristotle, has been largely lost to contemporary analytic philosophy, so what one arrives at when one opposes “realism” of this sort is just “anti-realism”. Many have (to me, legitimate) concerns about the doctrine of anti-realism, and even Richard Rorty in his later writings tried to take this debate beyond the dichotomy of realism and anti-realism. But I feel that when one is not so locked within the analytic framework, with its one-sided rejection of Aristotle’s logic and the type of immediacy of experience which it articulates, one gets more elbow room within which to think through these issues. And if one entertains an idealist attitude to conceptual form, one will be able to be much more of a contextualist as to the most appropriate ways in which to think of the “form” of thought.

In my thinking about Hegel’s idealist approach to ontology, I have tried to reintroduce elements of more traditional thought into the post-Fregean proposition-first ways of thinking that dominate mainstream analytic philosophy. As Sean points out, Deleuze wants to go in the direction of an ontology of events rather than objects or facts, and it is generally true that thinkers within the idealist and continental traditions have always had a very different conception of the role of time than is commonly found in the analytic tradition—think of the way time features prominently in Hegel, Heidegger, or Bergson, for example. Despite their differences, thinkers within this tradition seem to resist the type of “tenseless” ways of thinking about the world more common within the analytic philosophy, ways of thinking in which time is, it is sometimes said, “spatialized”. Again, this issue is part of what, from an Hegelian point of view, is an hypostatization of the cognitive forms peculiar to “the understanding”, and it is linked to the way that the logical form of thought has been conceived in the wake of key analytic thinkers like Frege and Russell.

As was pointed out by Arthur N. Prior in the 1950s, while in the tradition stemming from Frege and Russell, a proposition is thought of as timeless true if true and timeless false if false, this was not the way thought was conceived in ancient or medieval philosophy17 Aristotle, for example, thought of propositions (or his analogue of this notion) as “tensed”, and as, therefore, as liable to change their truth or falsity with time. It is in this way that the future can be thought of as indeterminate and open to the effects of action. Hegel, I think, in his famous master-slave passage in the Phenomenology of Spirit, picked up on this feature of Aristotelian thought in his very
Aristotelian conception of the logical form of the object worked on by the slave. Within these tensed conceptions of thought there seems to me a place for genuine conceptions of human transformative (and thereby self-transformative) activity that cannot be expressed in thought conceived of tenselessly.

What I said earlier about the advantages of antipodean logical thought holds in particular to these considerations. Among the forms of “non-classical” logic developed against the grain within the analytic tradition, was the so-called “tense logic” of Arthur N. Prior. Prior, a New Zealander, before his career in the UK, had been taught at the University of Otago by the Hegel scholar and Husserl translator, J. N. Findlay. Indeed, Prior attributed his interest in tense logic to Findlay, whom he thought of as the discipline’s “founding father”. While Prior had no apparent interest in Hegel or idealist philosophy, his approach to time and the present has been likened to that of Kierkegaard, with whose work he was, seemingly, familiar. My guess is that around the issue of time there are fascinating synergies to be discovered between the work of idealists and “continentals” on the one hand, and areas within analytic philosophy that, to some extent, run counter to its more Russellian directions, on the other.
NOTES

1. The first writing by Williams on this topic I'm aware of was Robert R. Williams, “Hegel's Concept of Geist”, in Peter G. Stillman (ed.) Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). This was followed by two major books, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), and Hegel's Ethics of Recognition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Williams was drawing on the earlier approach of Ludwig Siep. See in particular, Ludwig Siep, Anerkennung als Prinzip des praktischen Philosophie: Untersuchungen zu Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes, (Freiburg: Alber Verlag, 1979).


3. For me, the original source of this was the pragmatist and anti-realist approach of Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), which influenced me greatly when it first appeared. I think my interest in Hegel to some extent grew from trying to hold on to those parts of Rorty's position I agreed with without going down the "anti-realist" path.

4. These are the "formal" objects of intentional existence, such as the "facts" towards which one is directed in knowledge, for example.

5. Kant had been explicit that he was an idealist about "form", and such "forms" were the modern "subjective" descendent of Plato's forms. That is, what Plato had treated unscientifically, Kant treated as mind-dependent—i.e., idealistically.

6. To get a sense of how much of contemporary analytic metaphysics gets eliminated on such a view, see, for example, James Ladyman and Don Ross, with David Spurrett and John Collier, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

7. John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). Here McDowell is worried about the anti-realist "rebound" from the critique of the empiricist "Myth of the Given".


9. This is a version of Kant's "empirical" realism that is compatible with a "transcendental" idealism.

10. McDowell talks of being "responsive" to meanings and normative requirements. Talking of objects as having a causality expressed in the context of intersubjective practices, but not nature, might just be another way of saying the same thing.

11. Here I have always been critical of Kojève for construing the fundamental role of recognition as the object of a peculiar desire, the "desire for recognition". For Hegel, the dynamics of desire and of affective behaviour are importantly different. In Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought, I try to look at the issue here against the background of the "moral sense" tradition found in Hutcheson.

12. One of the works that first got me interested in the theme of recognition was the remarkable reading of King Lear by Stanley Cavell, focused on the withholding of love in the context of a family, and the fatal attempts to try to buy the affections of those around one. See Stanley Cavell, "The Avoidance of Love", in Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

13. For example, one crucial debate was over whether space and time were some kind of substances or attributes (of God, as Newton believed, for example), or whether they were actually nothing (what was left when you took some substance away, as it were). The latter was pretty much the standard Aristotelian view.

14. I'm thinking here primarily of the likes of Richard Sylvan (formerly, Richard Routley) and Graham Priest. It's hard to appreciate Hegel's logic without appreciating the way he uses negation, which is more in line with Aristotle's "term negation" than the uniformly propositional negation of Frege. Non-classical logicians like Sylvan and Priest explore alternatives to the standard Fregean way of thinking of negation. See, for example, Richard Sylvan, "What is that Item Designated Negation?" and Graham Priest, "Why not? A defense of Dialetheic Theory of Negation", both in Dow M. Gabbay and Heinrich Wansing (eds.), What is Negation? (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999).

