Husserlian phenomenology is often rejected as an ultra-rationalistic philosophy which is preoccupied with science, cognition, and theoretical apprehension and unable to analyse the affective and practical relations that tied us to the world and to one another as concrete human beings. In this line of thought, Husserlian epistemology contrasts with hermeneutical-existential phenomenology which works to illuminate the fundamental structures of human life (Dasein) and focuses its inquiries on everyday dealings free from the categories of theoretical knowledge.

My aim in this paper is to show that this picture of twentieth-century phenomenology is facile and that the simple opposition between epistemological-phenomenological explication and hermeneutic-existential interpretation is misleading. Rather than two different philosophies—one of knowledge and the other of life—we have two competing analyses of the relation between scientific knowledge and practical life. Moreover, originally these two analyses were not developed in simple contrast but in mutual exchange and by large-scale redefinition of operative concepts.

The notion of Husserl's philosophy as hopelessly cognitivist stems from the critique that Heidegger launched against classical phenomenology in *Being and Time*. This is the grain of truth that we can find in the usual oppositional notion of phenomenology. Heidegger argued that Husserl's analytical concepts were developed for the purpose of explicating the intentional relations of cognition and theoretical thinking and that they proved inadequate when tackling the more fundamental relations that characterise our practical dealings with entities. In Heidegger's understanding, the privileging of science and knowledge lead Husserl to contend that things are given to us in experience as simply there, present at hand (vorhanden), and available for neutral perception and free observation. By such an analysis, all values and all goals are mere adjuncts attached to or "loaded" or "invested" in neutral natural objects. Instead of affecting, attracting or repulsing us, and instead of motivating us by their forces and powers, the primary objects of experience just stand there before us in stubborn dull inertia.

This, Heidegger claimed, is not a truthful or faithful description of experience, but on the contrary betrays a cognitivist and ultra-rationalistic prejudice which is motivated by an interest in the advancement of modern
natural sciences. In truth, he argued, we encounter entities primarily as usable or serviceable and as ready to hand for multiple purposes and needs:

The Being of those entities which we encounter as closest to us can be exhibited phenomenologically if we take as our clue our everyday Being-in-the-world, which we also call our “dealings” [Umgang] in the world and with the entities within-the-world. … The kind of dealing which is closest to us is … not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use … the entities we shall take as our preliminary theme are those which show themselves in our concern with the environment [Umwelt]. Such entities are not thereby objects for knowing the “world” theoretically; they are simply what gets used, what gets produced, and so forth.

If we take Heidegger’s presentation at its face value, then Husserl’s concepts of thinghood and objectivity seem to repeat the Cartesian idea of res extensa and be unsuitable for the description and analysis of our practical and communal relations with environing things and humans. And worse, we may get the impression that Husserl offered no analysis of practical life but simply focused his inquiries on the structures of theoretical thinking and scientific observation. But this is a mistake. To be sure, Husserl’s investigations were motivated by his serious concern for the unity and progress of the sciences. However, these inquiries demonstrated that scientific objectivity and the exact concepts of the natural sciences rests on the structures of interpersonal practical life. In the second volume of *Ideas*, in the 1920s, Husserl already wrote:

The naturalistic attitude is in fact subordinated to the personalistic, and … the former only acquires by means of an abstraction or, rather, by means of a kind of self-forgetfulness of the personal ego, a certain autonomy—whereby it proceeds illegitimately to absolutise its world, i.e. nature.

He who sees everywhere only nature, nature in the sense of, and, as it were, through the eyes of, natural science, is precisely blind to the spiritual sphere … Such a one does not see persons and does not see the objects which depend for their sense on personal accomplishments, i.e., objects of “culture.” Properly speaking, he sees no persons at all, even though he has to do with persons in his attitude as a naturalistic psychologist.

We know this idea well from Husserl’s late work *The Crisis of European Sciences*. The late publication of this work (1936–1937, 1954) has lead many commentators to assume that Husserl revised his account of the primacy of the theoretical over the practical because of Heidegger’s vehement critique and, by implication, that he accepted Heidegger’s arguments. But this is highly controversial, both in historical and in systematical respects. Husserl had already started to work out an original theory of the primacy of the practical life in the 1920s. The second volume of his *Ideas*, developed in 1912–1928, offers a sophisticated account of the relations between values and goals, on the one hand, and “pure thinghood,” on the other. Here Husserl argues that “pure thinghood” is an abstraction and that the primary objects of experience combine elements of sensation, feeling, and desire. He wrote: “In ordinary life, we have nothing to do with the nature-objects [of natural science]. What we call things are paintings, statues, gardens, houses, tables, clothes, tools, etc. These are all value-objects [Wertobjekte] of various kinds, use-objects, practical objects. They are not natural scientific objects.” In another manuscript, he stated: “Mere sensation-data, and at a higher level, sensory objects, as things that are there for the subject, but there as value-free, are abstractions. There is nothing that does not affect the emotions.”

Moreover, Husserl had sent the second volume of *Ideas* to Heidegger in 1925 and had written in the covering letter: “Ever since I began in Freiburg, however, I have made such crucial advances in the questions of nature and spirit that I had to elaborate a completely new exposition with the content which had been in part completely altered.” Thus, when Heidegger formulated his own account on the primacy of the practical, he knew Husserl's modified new account but ignored it in his discussion of classical phenomenology and based
his exposition on Husserl’s published works, Logical Investigations, the Logos-essay “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” and the first volume of Ideas.\(^{16}\)

So there is truly a contrast between Heidegger’s early approach and that of Husserl, the one formulated by Heidegger himself. However, we should not take Heidegger’s statements at face value, but must study their validity by comparing them to Husserl’s alternative discussion of theory and practice. Three questions must be answered: First, is Heidegger’s presentation of classical phenomenological analyses of thinghood correct? Second, is his critique of this analysis valid? And third, is his own analysis more adequate than the one that he rejects? I will not try to answer all these questions here,\(^{17}\) but focus on the lesser task of preparing for a comprehensive treatment by explicating Heidegger’s and Husserl’s accounts of practical and affective entities and by comparing their analytical and operative concepts.

I will start by presenting the main lines of Heidegger’s account of our practical relations with entities as he presented it in Being and Time. I will then offer an explication of Husserl’s discussion of the valuable and the practical, developed in the second volume of Ideas.

**READINESS AND PRESENCE**

In order to avoid the epistemological preconceptions built into the traditional terminology of thinghood and to overcome the temptation to discuss entities as pieces of inert matter, Heidegger introduces a set of new concepts, the most important of which are the concepts of dealing (Umgang), concern (Besorgen), and equipment (Zeug).\(^{18}\) He calls “equipment” (Zeug) those primary entities that we encounter in our familiar dealings with the world, i.e. in our practical handing, manipulation, use, and production of entities. Examples of equipmental dealings include simple actions as well as complex practices, e.g., the actions of opening a door,\(^{19}\) walking on the street,\(^{20}\) and manipulating sails, and the practices of farming and construction.\(^{21}\) So instead of offering a new competing account of thinghood Heidegger redefines the task and starts with an analysis of equipment.

The chosen terms and concepts are crucial for Heidegger’s analysis of the structures of experiential life. The German term “Zeug,” as well as its English “equipment,” has a general reference. Both denote, not individual things, but collections and types of utensils, tools, and instruments, e.g. clothes, household tools, or military equipment.\(^{22}\) This means that Heidegger’s central operative term, “equipment,” already has as built-in the idea of a multiplicity of useful entities, or better the idea of an organised complex of such entities.

Heidegger’s original analysis is intended to show exactly this: we relate to entities, not as independent or isolated units, but as components of intricate totalities or wholes, bound together by different relations of reference (Verweisung) and indication (Zeigen). Our concerns and dealings outline such structured wholes, and even when we handle particular entities, we relate to them as elements of purposeful wholes: pen, paper, table, room... Heidegger writes: “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it [the one equipment] can be this equipment that it is.”\(^{23}\)

Thus, the being of equipment is contrasted, by definition, to the being of things (res) in the traditional Cartesian sense. Equipment is not encountered as isolated units, arranged side-by-side or in a series, or positioned in front of us for disinterested survey; it appears in complex nexuses and surround us from all sides.

As is well known, Heidegger calls “readiness-to-hand” (Zuhandenheit) the kind of purposeful being that characterises equipments.\(^{24}\) In other words, the objects of our everyday dealings and our common practices are given to us as ready-to-hand. Tools and utensils offer themselves to our working bodies, hands, and arms; they appear to us in the modes of manipulability (Handlichkeit), usability (Verwendbarkeit), suitability (Eignung), serviceability (Dienlichkeit), and conduciveness (Beiträglichkeit). Also natural entities, animals and plants have this sense of being since they are not primarily observed or studied as objects of theoretical knowledge but discovered as materials and forces for production: wool, leather, thread, steel, iron, wood, water, and wind power.\(^{25}\)
Productive work is not just a system of tools, goods, and materials but necessarily includes references to human beings and their living bodies (Leib). People are involved in productive work in many different ways, for example, as co-workers and as suppliers, but Heidegger is not interested in any contingent circumstances of work-life but in the necessary links that prevail between elements of productive work. He points out that even solitary occupations, say that of a traditional cobbler or shoemaker, involve references to human bodies and human persons: the footwear that is manufactured in a workshop is what it is only in relation to potential wearers and users, i.e. human bodies and human beings. Even when goods are produced in great magnitudes or fully automatically, on the assembly lines in factories or laboratories, human bodies are involved in the process as standards and parameters of production. They are not envisioned as unique individuals but are intended in the mode of “the average” (Durchschnitt).

Heidegger defines readiness-to-hand in contrast to presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). This is a term that Husserl used in the first volume of his Ideas when he defined the method of reduction for the establishment of phenomenology as a rigorous science. What needs to be done in philosophy, Husserl argued, is to suspend “the general thesis” of the natural attitude which posits the world as “present at hand.” This natural thesis grounds all our sciences and all our everyday dealings: in each such activity, we presuppose the existence of the world as an unproblematic fact. Husserlian phenomenology starts with a suspension of this general presupposition, and it aims at illuminating its structure and its genesis. A preliminary analysis shows that the natural thesis does not have the form of an isolated act or a predicative or existential judgment:

The general thesis, by the virtue of which the real surrounding world [reale Umwelt] is not just given in consciousness continuously by general apprehension, but is given and familiar as factually existing “actuality” [daseiende “Wirklickeit”], naturally does not consist of a particular act, of an articulated judgment about existence. It is, after all, something during the whole length of the attitude, i.e. something continuously permanent during the natural waking life [directed at the world] [Dahinlebens]. That which at any time is perceived, clearly or obscurely made present—in short, everything from the natural world which is experientially familiar and familiar before any thinking—bears … the characteristic “there,” “at hand” [“da,” “vorhanden”], a characteristic which essentially can ground an expressed (predicative) judgment about existence that is in agreement with this character.

Here and in similar methodological contexts, Husserl characterises our experiential life by the concepts of presence. However, it is important to be clear about his way of making the connection. Hasty readings lead to the wrong conclusion that perceptual experience already has judgemental form and that the world, given in the natural attitude, appears as a theme of predicative or existential assertion. This is not what Husserl claims. Rather he argues that the mode in which worldly entities give themselves to us naturally, i.e. their presence-at-hand, allows the formation of predicative judgments about their existence. So existential judgments about worldly entities are based and rest on the pre-predicative experiential consciousness of their presence in the world. This does not mean that natural experience would have the subject-predicate structure; it merely implies that whatever structure or format such experience has, it must be such that predicative judgments can be founded on it.

In Heidegger’s reading, Husserl’s analysis stays too close to the epistemological setting of Cartesian philosophy. In the Cartesian framework, all worldly entities as well as the world itself are ultimately reduced to “mere things.” They are isolated from the referential contexts of practicality and analysed in terms of substances and properties. Even the subject itself, the one who observes an object and ascertains their being is characterised as “ego-cogitatio”—a spiritual substance with spiritual attributes.

Heidegger confronts the Cartesian tradition, not by rejecting the concept of presence, but by redefining its relation to readiness-to-hand. He argues that instead of functioning as a stable foundation on which varying practical relations can be established, presence is a momentary modification of readiness, disclosed by interruptions or breaks in the nexuses of equipment: “the presence-at-hand of entities is thrust to the fore by
the possible breaks in that referential totality in which circumspection 'operates.'" We get, so to say, glimpses of presence-at-hand when equipments, use-objects, utensils, tools, and materials fail to serve their purposes in our concernful dealings with the world.

Equipment can lose its readiness in several different ways: it can be broken and become useless while still staying in a particular framework of practicality; it can also disappear, vanish, or “go missing” within the boundaries of this framework; and finally the whole framework of equipment can lose its pressing character when another, more urgent task demands our concern and attention. Heidegger introduces new concepts for the analysis of the types of interruptions that allow presence to show or announce itself: ready-to-hand entities can become conspicuous (auffällig), obtrusive (aufdringlich), or obstinate (aufsässig), and when any of this happens, presence-at-hand comes to the fore. The main idea is the same in all three cases: practical connections are torn apart and presence-at-hand is revealed; all this happens, however, within an alternative or more comprehensive context of use, and thus readiness-at-hand is not reduced or overcome.

Heidegger's analysis is intended to show that presence does not have the character of a stable or solid ground but that of a momentary revelation. Moreover, as such breaks can appear only within networks of readiness, presence proves to be a dependent phenomenon. In Heidegger's redefinition, presence-at-hand is not a more fundamental or primary level of being, on which instrumental being would be added or in which it would be invested. Rather than characterising objects of perception, presence-at-hand is the momentary revelation of the “there” which shows itself already before all observation and before all confirmation and verification: “what is thus lit up is not itself just one thing ready-to-hand among others; still less is it something present-at-hand upon which equipment ready-to-hand is somehow founded; it is in the ‘there’ before anyone has observed or ascertained it.”

The momentary revelation of presence-at-hand is actually a double event in Heidegger's analysis: when the referential nexuses of readiness are broken, presence-at-hand shows itself; and conversely when presence-at-hand announces itself, readiness-to-hand “becomes veiled.” We can also characterise the event by saying that the entity becomes isolated from the practical context in which it was originally grasped as a worldly being. Now it stands separate, “it has been cut off from that significance which, as such, constitutes environmentality.”

Thus, presence-at-hand is never discovered in purity but always bears traces of the practical setting from which it emerges. The thing is never given as “something” in general but is always framed as a specific something; it is always, as it were, distilled from a particular practical setting.

VALUES AND MERE THINGS

Husserl's analysis of thinghood includes two principal considerations. On the one hand, he studies the constitution of natural scientific objects on the basis of entities encountered in straightforward experience. He presents an original account of the constitutive relations between these two types of objectivities by arguing that they are not on the same footing, and that the natural scientific objects are one-sidedly dependent upon the objects of the life-world. In his analysis, the objects discovered in the natural sciences—e.g. galaxies, black holes, white drafts, genes, nano-particles, etc.—are constituted by complex processes of abstraction and idealisation.
SARA HEINÄMAA

on the basis of the experiential objects of our everyday practical lives.

In the activity of scientific investigation, the scientist remains dependent on the practical being of her instruments and on the social being of her fellow scientist; she relates, and must relate, to both types of experiential objects while investigating her theoretical objects and while establishing the validity of her statements about them. The sense of the being of instruments and the sense of the being of persons cannot be explicated by any act or activity of theorising since it is presupposed in each one of them. This argument is well-know from The Crisis but it had already been outlined by Husserl in the second volume of Ideas.

On the other hand, Husserl also develops concepts for the analysis of different types of beings encountered in the surrounding world, not just instruments and utensils, but also signs, symbols, pictures, art works, animals, human persons, and communities of persons. These are not given to us as “mere things” but neither do they appear as equipmental totalities or as components of such totalities, i.e. as instruments or instrument users.

Some beings are persons, and as such these beings differ crucially from both things and equipment: they are not given by adumbrations or profiles as things are but disclose themselves “all at once”; they do not belong to the nexuses of our familiar dealings as equipment do but rather establish their own dealings which may remain alien to us; and despite their instantaneous disclosure, they display a peculiar type of infinity or openness.

In addition to instruments and persons, our surrounding world also includes art works, literary works, and political, religious, and juridical institutions. These are expressions of human beings and accomplishments of their individual and communal strivings. Moreover, we may also stumble upon non-human living beings and upon natural elements of the wilderness, outside of all human projects, familiar and alien.

None of these entities are “mere things,” but neither are they equipment, parts of equipment, or modalities of equipment. Rather than exhibiting a thingly or equipmental unity, the world gives itself as a multiplicity of many different sorts of entities:

[The] surrounding world is comprised not of mere things [bloße Dinge] but of use-objects (clothes, household utensils, guns, work tools), works of art, literary products, means for religious and judicial activities (seals, official ornaments, coronation insignia, ecclesiastical symbols, etc.). And it is comprised not only of individual persons, but the persons are instead members of communities, members of personal unities of a higher order, which as totalities, have their own lives.

This conception of the multiplicity of beings and senses of being is an important inheritance of Husserlian phenomenology. The opposition between scientific being and practical-instrumental being is not to be found in his works. Instead of a unity or a duality, the world manifests itself as a plurality: pictures, painting, signs, symbols, expressions, human beings, families, cities... All these types of entities have their own regions in the world, irreducible to one another, and all can be studied scientifically (wissenschaftlich) not by any one comprehensive method but by several specific methods. The task of phenomenology is not to provide a general theory of being or of the sense of being, but to engage in the tedious work of distinguishing and relating elements of experiencing:

Phenomenology ... compares, it distinguishes, it forms connections, it puts into relation, divides into parts, or distinguishes abstract aspects ... It does not theorise or carry out mathematical operations; that is to say, it carries through no explanations in the sense of deductive theory.

The most important analytical concept in Husserl's discussion of our practical and affective lives are the concepts of act, attitude, and founding. In order to sort out different components of the world of experience, Husserl distinguishes between three basic types of acts and between several possible attitudes that we can take toward entities. The basic act-types include the doxic acts of believing, the practical acts of willing, and the axiological acts of feeling. Doxic acts provide the different senses of reality and existence involved in our
VARIETIES OF PRESENCE

worldly dealings; axiological acts contribute the various senses of value; and practical acts are needed for the establishment of ends and means.

Thus, Husserl argues that all sense or meaning that structures human experiences results from the constituting acts of consciousness. This must not be understood by the model of bestowal or transfer; the idea is not that consciousness possess a set of ready-made senses and just transfers these senses to a world empty of meaning. Rather than operating as a stock of meanings, consciousness exercises a formative power. Moreover, in its formative function, consciousness is not a separate spiritual force outside of the world but an essential dimension of human beings and animals involved in the world with other similar beings. The process of constitution is thus not a solitary or otherworldly activity but a communal and generative enterprise.

The basic doxic, axiological, and practical acts combine and become stratified, and thus they form more complex acts and acts of higher order, acts operating on the components of the more simple acts and on their parts. Moreover, the basic acts can be modified both in their temporal character and commitment quality. The class of doxic acts, for example, includes not just the basic acts of perceiving and believing but also all their modifications: remembering, imagining, supposing, doubting, etc.

Concrete experiences include several acts of different types. Depending on the interest and attitude of the person, she or he consciously lives in one of the included acts, i.e., performs or carries out this one act, whereas the other acts, necessary for the appearance of the particular reality or objectivity in question, are merely presupposed. For example, when probing and trying out pencils and brushes in the interest of painting, I live consciously in the practical acts of willing and resolving, but this very activity presupposes doxic acts which give the pencils and brushes as spatial entities lying on the table in different positions and at different distances from my operative hands. If for some reason I fail to seize hold of the chosen brush, then the doxic acts that give the brush at a certain distance from my hand must be performed actively. This is necessary in order to re-establish the spatial relations between the entities, i.e., the instruments and my grasping moving hand. And if my probing hand accidentally hits the point of one of the pencils and is cut open, then my principal activity may change again, I may withdraw from practical and doxic activity and plunge into sensibility and feeling.

As said, the concepts of act and attitude allow Husserl to argue that we can intend worldly entities in several different ways, not just as objects of critical observation or as instruments of concernful usage, but also as pleasing or displeasing, agreeable or disagreeable, enjoyable, admirable, beautiful. And again these different types of interests can combine and form more complex interests. For example, in the realm of aesthetic valuing we can distinguish between the attitudes of the artist, the layperson, the art historian, and the art dealer. In all these attitudes, entities are attended axiologically, but the different acts necessary for the experience of aesthetic value combine in these attitudes in different ways. The layperson plunges into the enjoyment and lives in the act of valuing. The artist necessarily also lives in certain practical and critical acts; and the attitudes of the art historian and the art dealer include further practical and cognitive acts. Moreover, these different attitudes are not exclusionary in human life; we do not need to settle in any one of them but can alternate between them.

In all these attitudes, the object is articulated as a something which delights us, and thus the experience necessarily involves an axiological act of valuing. Husserl however argues that in addition to this axiological component, the experience also involves a doxic act which posits the valued in some modality of being. The valued does not have to be posited as present, actual, or real; it can also appear as imaginary or phantasmic, or else in some other doxic modality. The idea here is that each valuing is a valuing of something, and this something is necessarily given in some doxic modality or other: as present, past, real, probable, presumable, etc. Thus Husserl argues that all experiences, not just perceptual experiences of spatial relations, but also axiological experiences of values and practical experiences of goals and means include in themselves components of doxic acts which posit the experienced entity in some modality of being. This is Husserl’s famous—and notorious—doctrine of the pre-eminence (Bewerzung) of the doxic. He writes:
We encounter noeses (acts) of feelings, of desiring, of willing ... which are founded on "presentations," on perceptions, on memories, on sign-presentations etc., and which, in their structure, show obvious differences in level-by-level founding.56

Husserl's doctrine of the preeminence (Vorzüge) of the doxic is susceptible to two types of misconceptions. One type of misconception confuses the activity of presentation (Vorstellung) with the activities of perception and theoretical cognition. The other set of problems strains the concepts of founding (fundieren, Fundierung). I end my explication in a brief discussion of these mistakes.

As said, one mistake is to confuse Husserl's idea of presentation with his concept of perception. This suggests the wrong idea that value is added on the top of mere presence or value-neutral being, established in perceptual and/or cognitive acts.57 This is not Husserl's analysis. Rather than proposing that valuation is an additive operation, Husserl argues that valuation effectuates a comprehensive transformation of sense:

The new sense brings in a totally new dimension of sense, with it no new determining parts of mere "matters" [blossen "Sachen"] are constituted, but instead values of matters, kinds of value [Wertheiten], in particular concrete value-objectivities: beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness; the use-object, the art work, the machine, the book, the action, the deed, and so forth.58

Moreover, valuation can work on the results on many different types of presentations, not just on perceptions but also on recollections and imaginations. It can also found itself on the neutralised mode of such presentations, a mode in which the doxic positing is cancelled. An aesthetic liking, for example, is founded on the neutralisation modification of perception or recollection.59 As a limit case, we can envisage the case in which no interest whatsoever is directed at the existence or being of the entity in question; all interest is invested in its axiological quality. So Husserl argues that some doxic foundation is needed for both axiological and practical experiencing, but he makes clear that the foundation does not have to be perceptual and not even positing; neutralised modifications serve all valuation types and all types of practical intendings.

Second, Husserl argues that in order to experience the affective character as an object in its own right, consciousness needs to effect an additional theoretical act which explicates the lived affection as an independent objectivity. The simple experience of delight does not as such contain this explicating objectifying act:

In the aesthetic enjoyment, understood as act, the object is, as we said, the object of the delight. On the other hand, in aesthetic judging and appraisal, it is no longer an object in mere delighting abandon but is an object in the special [doxic] sense: the intuited is given with the predicative ... character of aesthetic enjoyableness. This is ... an objectivity peculiar to a higher level.60

Thus the complex experience of a beautiful thing includes, in addition to the simple doxic and axiological acts involved in the experience of valuing, also a higher-order theoretical act which constitutes the elements and results of valuing as categorical objectivities of different types, as predicates, predicate-substrata, etc.

The other mistake is to understand Husserl's idea of founding (fundieren, Fundierung) on the basis of the model of building or construction. This concept was originally introduced and defined by Husserl in the theory of parts and wholes developed in *Logical Investigations*. In *Ideas*, Husserl uses the concept of founding to describe the multiple dependency-relations between simpler acts and their components within complex intentional experiences. It is important to be clear about this concept and to keep it separate from the idea of grounding which suggests the false notion of a stable material formation with a spiritual clothing. This is not the picture that Husserl presents to us.

Rather than rendering human consciousness as a constructor or as a tailor, Husserl's concepts suggest that consciousness operates in a similar ways to a chemist who selects and distils elements and combines ingredients
to form new kinds of wholes. To say that valuing acts and practical acts are funded on doxic acts means that these acts use elements of doxic acts, their senses and their materials, in new operations of sense-forming.

Thus the valuing act and certain elements of a doxic act are both included in the new comprehensive whole. The relation of founding between the two acts means merely that the valuing act needs the doxic act in order to perform its own operation. It does not mean that the doxic element forms a stable or firm ground on which transitory acts of valuing just trespass; the newly constituted whole is not less stable than the act that it requires as its foundation. Further, the doxic act is not self-sufficient or self-founding either, but operates on the foundation of passive aesthetic synthesis and its results.

CONCLUSION

After these conceptual clarifications, we are in a position to draw some preparatory conclusions. For Heidegger, presence reveals or announces itself in anomalous experiences in which our familiar concernful relations with worldly entities are disrupted. It reveals itself, not as any kind of foundation, but as a structural limit of our normal coping with worldly entities and things. For Husserl, presence is discovered by a reflective move in which we turn our attention away from entities and redirect it to their constitutive parts. In his analysis, presence, as all modes of being, refers back to doxic acts, but typically it is discovered as a moment in a complicated constellation of several acts and several senses posited by acts. The reflective attitude which allows the discovery of presence is extraordinary or unusual, but rather than being something that happens to us it is something that we perform.

So there are clear and important differences in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s analyses but this should not lead us to dismiss their common stand. Both argue that presence is an essential but hidden element of experience, and both contend that it can be captured by phenomenological examinations which proceed, and must proceed, independently of theory construction and natural scientific considerations.

SARA HEINÄMAA holds a senior lectureship in theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki, Finland. At the moment, she works as Academy Research Fellow at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki (2008–2013). She has published several articles on phenomenology of embodiment, selfhood, personhood, and intersubjectivity, is the author of Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Beauvoir (2003), and has co-edited Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection (2007) and Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the Soul from Late Scholasticism to Contemporary Thought (2008). Her latest publications include Death, Birth and the Feminine: Essays in the Philosophy of Embodiment (2010), with Robin May Schott, Vigdis Songe-Møller, and Sigridur Thorgerísdóttir.
NOTES


3. Hereafter Hua with German page numbers given first and the translation second.

4. Hua 63–64/91–92, 68/96, 100/132–133. To characterise the cognitivist presumption, Heidegger used the German term “wertbehaftet” which implies that values are not just added to “mere things” but that they stain the purity of such things.

5. Heidegger defines his task by the concepts of *clouseness*: “The theme of our analytic is to be Being-in-the-world, and accordingly the very world itself; and these are to be considered within the horizon of average everydayness – the kind of being which is closest to Dasein [die nächste Seinsart des Daseins] … We shall seek the worldhood of the environment [Umwelt] (environmentally) by going through an ontological interpretation of those entities within-the-environment which we encounter as closest to us.” Hua 66/94. What is at issue is not closeness in terms of spatial distance but in terms of familiarity and practical interests cf. Hua 102–103/135–136, 106–107/141.

6. English readers suffer from divergences in translations: In *Being and Time* the German “Umwelt” is translated as “environment” Hua 66/94ff.; in *IdeasII* the same word is translated as “world” or “surrounding world” Hua 182/191ff. This gives the impression that the two philosophers are discussing different phenomena and different sets of intentional relations. However, if we compare the definitions given to “Umwelt” in both works, then we notice that they do not differ much. Both philosophers define Umwelt by human practices: this is the world that we encounter when we are immersed in our everyday dealings Hua ibid.; Hua 66–67/94–96.


8. Cartesianism must be kept separate from Descartes’ philosophy. In particular, it must be noticed that Descartes distinguished between three different kinds of objects of knowledge: knowledge of the soul as *pure thought*, knowledge of the body as *extension*, and knowledge of the mind-body *compound or union*. These are discovered by three different operations of the soul: the pure soul is known by the intellect alone; the extended body is known by the intellect aided by imagination; but the mind-body union can be known only by engaging in *practical life and conversation* between persons (AT III 691–692; CSM I, 227).

9. In Husserl’s terminology, the attitude in which the world is understood as the *surrounding world* of persons in motivational practical connections is exactly “personal” and “motivational,” but also “practical”: “In a very broad sense, we can also denote the personal or motivational attitude as the *practical* attitude: that is, what we have here always is the active and passive ego” Edmund Husserl, *Ideas zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Hua 3, Band IV, ed. Marly Bimel, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952) 189–190. In English *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenological Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 199. Henceforth *Hua*.


11. Hua 191/204. Husserl’s exposition in the second volume of *Ideas* proceeds from the world of the natural sciences to the practical world of human affairs. He is careful to emphasize repeatedly that the order of exposition is not the order of epistemological or ontological priority. He writes, for example: “Our point of departure was the naturalistic (natural-scien¬tific) attitude, in which nature comes to givenness and to theoretical cognition as physical, living bodily [Leiblich], and psychic [seelisch] nature. This naturalistically considered world is of course not the world. Rather, given prior is the world of the everyday world [Alltagswelt], and within this arises man’s theoretical interest.” Hua 208/219; cf. 171–175/180–184, 181–184/190–193.


15. Husserl’s letter to Heidegger on the 7th of February 1925, G420 168/121, translation modified.

19. §17/158/190/200ff.
20. §18/116–117/152-153
21. §19/63/91–92, 71/101, 75/105
22. This in contrast to the terms “value-object” (*Wertobject*) and “value-perception” (*Wertnehmung*) used by Husserl in an analogue with the terminology of sense-perception (*Wahrnehmung*), e.g. Hua4 9/11.
23. §20/68/97, my emphasis. Cf. to Husserl’s description of perception in *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*: “In every moment of perceiving, the perceived is what it is in its mode of appearance [as] system of referential implications [Vererien] with an appearance-core upon which appearances have their hold. And it calls out to us, as it were, in these referential implications (…) These indications are at the same time tendences, indicative tendences that push us toward the appearances not given. They are, however, not single indications, but entire indicative systems,” *Analysen zur passiven Synthese, Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuscripten, 1918–1926*, Husserliana XI, ed. Margot Fleisher (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 5.
24. §21/69/98ff.
25. §22/70/100. We can also study and characterize animals as tool-users. Both Heidegger and Husserl, however, argue that this kind of interpretation of animals depends on our primary experience of our fellow human beings as tool-users, e.g. Hua15 181.
27. §23/71/100, 117–118/153
30. §24/73–74/101, 75/105
33. §27/74–76/104–107.
34. Heidegger uses the personalistic verbs “to announce” (melden) and “to make oneself known” (sich kündigen) to characterize the way in which presence-at-hand reveals itself to us. §28/73–74ff./103ff.
35. §29/74/104.
36. §30/75/105.
37. §31/158/200.
38. §32/158/200.
39. §33/138/200.
P. Alston and Georghe Nakhnikian, (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer, 1996), 60. Hereafter Hua2. In the second volume of Ideas, Husserl states, for example: “The true nature of the physicist is a methodologically necessary substraction of thinking and only as such can it be constituted, only as ‘mathematical’ does it have its truth. Versus this, it makes no sense as regards motivation … to base it … on something non-intuitive as a mathematical index of an infinite manifold of intuitive appearances, of which the presently given is only one.” Hua4 230–231/242, cf. Bernet et al, An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology 225.


Hua4 299–302/313–316.

44. Heidegger’s account of the surrounding world includes the controversial analysis of signs as a sort of equipment, S&szlig; 77ff./108ff.


48. Hua2 58/46.

49. Husserl distinguishes theoretical acts from doxic acts: doxic or objectifying acts posit existence and reality and they occur, not just in the theoretical attitude which aims at knowledge, but also in the valuing and practical attitudes which concern values, goals, and means. Theoretical acts are doxic acts performed attentively and explicitly in the interest of knowledge, Hua4 3ff./5ff.

50. In Husserl’s account, sense-constitution is not a human privilege; also animals take part in it, e.g. Hua5 177, 165–167. However, the contribution of animals is limited since they lack language and the generative commumality based on speech and writing, Hua5 160 n. 1, 163–164, 168–168, 181, cf. Sara Heinämaa, “Transcendental intersubjectivity and normality: Constitution by mortal,” in Embodied Subjectivity, eds. Dermot Moran and Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Dordrecht: Springer, forthcoming.

51. For example: Hua4; Hua6; Hua5.

52. Hua3 238ff./300ff.; Hua4 3ff./5ff.


56. Hua3 239/301/240, cf. 236–237/299–299/274–275, 241/303/279, 244/306/281–282; Hua4 8/10, 1992 301–302/96–97. Moreover, the valuing itself is lived in some doxic modality or other. Some valuations are experienced in simple positivity, or unmodalized certainty, as Husserl puts it; other valuations appear as merely possible or presumptive: “Every lived experience of feeling, every valuation, wish, and will, is characterised in itself either as being-certain or as being-suggesting, or as a presumptive or doubtful valuing, wishing or willing,” Hua2 243/306/281.

57. The German verb “vorstellen” is not just used for the activities of positioning or arranging things in space but also for the activities of personal and artistic presentation. Thus “Vorstellung” does not just connote mental representations, but also introductions and stagings.

58. Hua3 239–240/301–302/277, cf. 270/336/312. I have chosen to translate Husserl term “blöse Sachen” as “mere matters,” in the line with Gibson’s translation. Both English translations of Ideas are problematic, but here Gibson’s choice seems less misleading to me than Kerstin’s. Kerstin translates “Sache” as “mere thing” (312), a term which associates strongly with the terms “material thing” (Ding) and “mere physical thing” or “mere material thing” (blesse Ding) which in Husserl’s analysis do not denote “value-bearers” but objects of the natural sciences, for example: Hua4 25–27/27–29; cf. Hua3 50/53.

59. For example: Hua3 224–226/285–287/260–262, 239/301/277; cf. Marcus Brainard, Belief and its Neutralization: Husserl’s...
VARIETIES OF PRESENCE


