
*MORT À DISCREDIT: OTIUM, NEGOTIUM, AND THE CRITIQUE
OF TRANSCENDENTAL MISERABILISM. BERNARD
STIEGLER, DISBELIEF AND DISCREDIT, VOLUMES I-III*
Dan Mellamphy and Nandita Biswas Mellamphy

All three volumes of *Mécréance et Discrédit* have now been translated into English: *The Decadence of Industrial Technologies: Disbelief and Discredit Volume One (D&D I)*, *Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit Volume Two (D&D II)*, and *The Lost Spirit of Capitalism: Disbelief and Discredit Volume Three (D&D III)*.¹ This series of works sets out to explore a phenomenon described in Bernard Stiegler's previous and parallel series, *Symbolic Misery*, as the symbolic and spiritual "misery"—*misère*: poverty, misery, destitution—manifested when spirited symbol-users, a.k.a. humans, have their modes of expression and individuation co-opted by, constantly correlated with, repeatedly rerouted via, and ultimately *converging in*

a computational system of globally integrated production and consumption [...] technologically linked by universal digital equivalence (the binary system) to telecommunication systems and to computers, and, through this, directly articulated with logistical and production systems (barcodes and credit-cards enabling the tracing of products and consumers), all of which constitute the hyper-industrial epoch strictly speaking, dominated by the categorization of hyper-segmented 'targets' ('surgically' precise marketing that organizes consumption) and [...] functioning in real-time.²

The four chapters of the first book, five chapters of the second, along with the two chapters and ten-page conclusion of the closing volume (the second volume very much leaning on the first, the first providing key definitions and explanations elaborated in the second, the third a critical reading of *The New Spirit of Capitalism*³ in light of the analyses advanced and elaborated in the first two volumes) examine this—our current condition—and explore what could be called tactical techniques for individuation in the "impassé" of this "impossible" state of affairs.⁴

In an era of digital mediation and technical reticulation on a planetary and even post-planetary scale—an era wherein global change is dictated by technical innovation rather than by political deliberation—the reactive

adoption of consumer technologies and consumerist values has led to a crisis: the loss of belief or faith in the positive power of politics. We no longer live in a ‘political’ society, one created by political struggle for a shared civic spirit by people who communicate with each other through words and deeds. Rather, today we live in a hyper-capitalistic and technologically-synchronized age of hyper-consumption: one that preemptively and collectively co-opts populations—denying them their power of individuation—for purposes of their socio-economic control through commerce (rather than politics). For Stiegler, this global condition has led to the general impoverishment and even the possible extinction of our capacities for *individuation*, our *savoir-faire* and *savoir-vivre*—that is, our knowing *how to live* and knowing *what constitutes* a ‘good life’. In addition, this condition’s instrumentalized view of technology has also prevented human beings from understanding and affirming the technical conditions of their existence, as Gilbert Simondon argued—albeit not with an explicit focus on our present planetary/post-planetary condition—in his treatise *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects* (1958).⁵ *Disbelief and Discredit* can be seen as an exemplary expression of Stiegler’s overall project to re-think ‘the political’ through and as the question of *technics* (i.e. his development of a political philosophy of technics). Our aim is to offer an overview of some key concepts in the volumes of *Disbelief and Discredit* (*otium*, *negotium*, nihilism, proletarianization, struggle, hope, singularity, duplicity, incalculability, individuation and fiction/fabrication) as well as to suggest some additional concepts that support and further Stiegler’s arguments (e.g. *hyperstition* and *métic transduction*).

In the opening pages of the first volume, Stiegler lays-out his central message that the current dominant global model of ‘industrialization through consumption’ has failed. Today, democracies are facing crises on such a vast scale that neither cavalier attitudes of ‘business as usual’ nor (on the opposite end) serious attitudes about ‘reform’ seem tenable. The only solution, he suggests, is to create a new pathway: to “project ourselves into the invention of a new process” of “supranational psychic and collective individuation.”⁶ But how? Right from the outset, Stiegler criticizes those approaches that seek to either indict or absolve the American model of the ‘knowledge society’ and that either naively or intentionally produce smokescreens or panaceas for the view that public power is obsolete and in decline. Through propaganda and deception, these approaches send the message that the political power of the public must be replaced with the buying power of the consumer. For Stiegler, “consumption is a rupture in the relation to citizenship”⁷ that strategically leads to the disintegration of the political practices of democracy. In contrast to this *strategic* deception that seeks to capture and control the practices of public power by making consumerism the end (*telos*) of any and all human actions, Stiegler offers the idea of ‘invention’: the deployment of a type of *tactical* duplicity that releases the creative and multiplicitous tendencies at work in any and every human action. In this way, duplicity also opens onto duality, the splitting, doubling and branching out of any (seemingly) programmatic or deterministic tendency. By inventing new ways of practicing democratic politics that do not merely reproduce a programmatic culture of consumption and production, well-used duplicity is transformed into artfulness, that libidinal creativity through which humans connect both with each other and with technical objects. Duplicity, when put in the service of public power, provides the means for renewing collective individuations and public struggle—capacities which Stiegler proclaims to lie at the very heart of the power (or “rule”: *kratos*) of the *demos*.⁸

Duplicitous struggle is the name of the game if there is any hope for humans in the hyper-industrial age, and in this respect (as a positive and productive power) duplicity loses all of its more negative and/or nihilist connotations, becoming instead a source of hope for Stiegler. Like Friedrich Nietzsche, to whom he repeatedly refers, Stiegler relates the ancient Greek concept of hope or *elpis* to *eris*: namely, that “struggle of which war is the extreme version, but that also proceeds more stealthily and silently during peacetime.”⁹ For Stiegler (as for the Greeks), struggle can be good or bad, well-directed or ill-directed: “the process of individuation is a state of permanent war, but a war contained and transformed through that psycho-social *competition* which the Greeks called *eris*—the elevation towards an always possible best, *ariston*. But *eris* may always turn into *destructive struggle*, and become *discord*. The *ariston* as a motive is therefore duplicitous: *the best* may contain *the worst*.”¹⁰ Duplicity, in other words, can be ‘good’ and ‘productive’—rather than merely ‘destructive’—when directed by and towards *transformative political struggle*. This follows Stiegler’s overall ‘pharmacological approach’: his thinking about political activity in terms of ‘poisons’ and ‘cures’.¹¹

Keeping with the language of ancient Greek antiquity—“the Presocratic, tragic style of thought”¹²—to which Stiegler turns throughout his work, duplicity in the sense of transformative political struggle accords with the Greek *mètis* (cunning *craftiness*, tricky *tactics* and turning or redoubling “*duplice*”) examined in Marcel Détienne’s and Jean-Pierre Vernant’s 1974 *Ruses de L’Intelligence: la Mètis des Grecs* (*Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, 1991).¹³ In the spirit of the Greek *prometheia* and *epimetheia*,¹⁴ and hence with a nod to the titans of Stiegler’s *Technics and Time*, we would like to bring the *duplice* of *Disbelief and Discredit* to bear on the notion of *mètis* after which the titans Prometheus and Epimetheus (pro-*mètis/metheia/mathèsis* and epi-*mètis/metheia/mathèsis*) were named: those two figures/brothers/others at the origin of Stiegler’s *chef-d’œuvre* and his ongoing analyses—figures in whom Stiegler, like the Greeks before him, finds the gift (‘poison’ and ‘cure’) of hope for humanity.

A ‘hopeless’ condition is one in which there is no space and no time for struggle—hence the terrible threat that hyper-industrial hyper-synchronization presents. By the latter two terms, Stiegler designates the 20th-century emergence of “a new kind of industry” in the United States: an industry functionally dedicated to marketing and publicity, and one in which “culture” becomes “a strategic function of industrial activity” evolving out of analog transmission technologies (especially and initially radio), the program industries (especially and subsequently television), and (ultimately, that is currently) advanced digital technologies¹⁵ which eventually make possible the “real-time” synchronization and mass production of human behaviour with a consequent planet-wide attenuation of desire.¹⁶ The globalization of hyper-synchronized consumerist cultural capitalism directly leads to proletarianization, which Stiegler reconceives as the real-time mass-mechanization¹⁷ of human perceptions—which he elsewhere calls “the proletarianization of sensibility”¹⁸—along with a massive loss of human creativity and knowledge resulting from the mechanization of work. “Proletarianization” refers to the loss of workers’ knowledge (“know-how”: *savoir-faire* and *savoir-vivre*) altogether and for an entire society:

the reality of proletarianization is, more than pauperization, the worker’s *loss of knowledge*, the worker tending to become unskilled *pure labour force* lacking any *motive* to work beyond the need to subsist. In this way, the worker becomes a proletarian, which also means that the proletarian *ceases* to be a worker [...]. This is how the globalization of capitalism was completed, by imposing the *proletarianization of the consumer* [...]. [J]ust as workers-become-proletarian find themselves deprived of the capacity to work the world through their work, that is through their *savoir-faire*, so too *consumers lose their savoir-vivre* insofar as this means their singular way of being in the world, that is, of existing.¹⁹

In the first volume of *Disbelief and Discredit*,²⁰ Stiegler proclaims that “Europe is in the course of transforming itself into a gigantic museum”—this in a manner not unlike that portrayed in Julian Barnes’s Booker-Prize-winning *England England*, we might add.²¹ Here Stiegler echoes (in spirit, at least) not only Barnes but also the late Terence McKenna, who suggested that culture is being traded in for ‘mall culture’ and ‘shopping by remote’ which amounts to a betrayal of culture and is dehumanizing.²² This new spirit—symbolic and spiritual *poverty*, *misery*, *destruction*, *destitution*, and its ‘mall’- or ‘museum’-ification of the world—spreads like darkness at the speed of light²³ thanks to hyper-industrial hyper-synchronized broadcast-media. Consequently, the spaces of public and private life in and for the industrial *demos* will be reconfigured by tele-technics and tele-technologies which are principally tools of ‘tele-action’ (action at a distance) that enable the remote-controlled navigation of information databases in order to access stocks of cultural data (and which are, arguably, no longer ‘cultural’ at all). For Stiegler, this is the generalization and concretization of a control-society model in which all processes—domestic and professional, as well as military, police, scientific, logistic, and consumer—become remotely controlled and algorithmically governed.²⁴ As instruments of tele-action, hyper-industrial hyper-synchronized broadcast-media will be the means and medium for the digital capture and control of human consciousness:

This is why *Microsoft* [...] has explicitly aimed since 1997 to control digital television: in that year, Craig Mundie, the vice-president of the global corporation, declared that the world contained a

billion televisions, enabling just about every consciousness on the planet to be reached. [...] [A] t very nearly the identical moment that Mundie launched his mission for a new television system based on multimedia technology, to be created by *Microsoft* [...], Irving Kristol was declaring that the ‘missionaries live in Hollywood’.²⁵

Like the missionaries that Canadian director David Cronenberg had portrayed a decade earlier in *Videodrome* (distributed by *Universal Pictures*, Hollywood) as agents of “The *Cathode Ray Mission*” (cf. Cronenberg 1983 and *D&D* I, 21), Stiegler also emphasizes that it is very much a matter of *missions*; “that is, of *spiritual war*, even if this crusade has, since the illegitimate election of George W. Bush, been transformed into a ‘conventional’ war.”²⁶

There can be no *ariston* (improvement, betterment, amelioration) in and of any condition, and hence no *elpis* (hope, expectation, aspiration) whatsoever, without *eris* (struggle, conflict, contention, competition). Hyper-industrial hyper-synchronization, however, ‘levels’²⁷ and ‘liquidates’²⁸ precisely those points (those times and/or spaces) “where it is a matter of engaging in *combat*” and *individuation* through *eris*,²⁹ where “what Heraclitus called the *anelpiston*” can arise (the *anelpiston*, i.e. “the *unexpected* [...] that is nevertheless the object of any *expectation*, of all *elpis*”³⁰). The first two volumes of *Disbelief and Discredit* begin with a pair of epigraphs each (the third volume ‘closing’ with three epigraphs at the beginning of its ten-page conclusion),³¹ and the *eris* that allows for *elpis* figures prominently in the second epigraph of both volumes: *explicitly* in *D&D* II, where the “wound required by the adversary powers” of *eris* is itself the very incarnation of “mad” (unexpected and incalculable) love—the epigraph taken from André Breton’s *Mad Love: L’Amour Fou*—and *implicitly* in *D&D* I, via Joë Bousquet’s existential exclamation that “my wound existed before me” and “I was born to incarnate it”.³² Bousquet’s exclamation exemplifies for Stiegler the flowering of a bouquet beyond the ‘miserablism’ of present-day ‘populism’³³ and in a sense the Bousquet epigraph can be seen as an initial indication of the *elpisian* vision articulated throughout *Disbelief and Discredit*: that of overcoming otherwise crushing conditions (conditions wherein one might easily ‘give up’ rather than ‘overcome’ and thereby ‘overturn’ them), and overcoming them by being in ‘*excess*’ of—i.e. *exceeding*—existent ‘facts’ so as to exist—or as Stiegler says, *ex-sist*³⁴—as their “incommensurable [...] excess.”³⁵ Bousquet’s paralyzing wound could have left him in the position of a “miserable human being [...], no longer feeling that he ex-sisted” (the condition of the murderous Richard Durn described on page 48 of *D&D* I), but instead he struggled “against that which [...] could lead him to no longer be himself, to no longer ex-sist,”³⁶ deciding to rise up rather than to give up—to rise up even though he was paralyzed and bedridden (“he never again raised himself up: he finished his life bedridden; and yet he did, nevertheless, raise himself: that is, he became a writer and he *wrote* his wound”³⁷).

In an act which elsewhere in *D&D*—throughout the volumes—Stiegler describes in terms of duplicity (“*duplice*: the translation as ‘duplicity’ contains an echo not only of duplicitousness but also of duplication and multiplicity” write the translators³⁸), Bousquet double-dealt the hand he had been given, bringing into play two otherwise opposed tendencies by their *hyper-stitching* or—in the language of *belief* and *credibility*, *disbelief* and *discredit*, rather than *wounds*-and-*stitches*—by their *hyperstition*. *Hyperstition*, that word that resounds of, yet escapes from (indeed rises above), superstition, defines fictions that make themselves real (the imperceptible crossing where the real and the fictional *meet*, indeed merge),³⁹ and although it is a term foreign to *D&D*, as a *concept* it is far from foreign to it. Indeed, it captures one of the crucial dimensions of its argument—arguably its creative *crux*, its *crucible*—“because decisions rest on fictions” and “a fiction which only lasts as long as people believe in it.”⁴⁰ ‘Good’ hyperstition is thus akin to the notion of duplicity well-used, that is: hyperstition directed towards the enactment of public power and productive struggle. Stiegler’s focus is on the question of fiction as an operation *qua* political performance, which is simultaneously also a “will-of-believing *as fiction*, and the *fashioning* [*fracture*] of this fiction, such that it is always in some way a *manufacture*”, as well as the question of power, namely “of a *power* to believe, of a *power* to fiction, of a *power* of fiction, of a *potential* that *conditions* a *will*, but also of an *impotential* that, as *regression*, can provoke this fiction.”⁴¹ The power ‘of’ and the power ‘to’ fiction is the power ‘of’ and the power ‘to’ will ‘to believe’: ‘willing’ what is fictional into the real and in this way ‘realizing’ (or in the words of Bousquet, ‘incarnating’) it; “it is deciding to realize a

fiction,” writes Stiegler.⁴² This is what Gilbert Simondon, and Stiegler after him, calls *individuation*⁴³—and it is essentially a technical process, a technical operation (which explains why “technics was suppressed as an object of thought”: “precisely because it was declared structurally and irreducibly fictive”⁴⁴). Stiegler’s fundamental claim concerns the relationship between *fiction*, *individuation* and techno-*politics*: “*individuation* on the basis of the fiction and artificiality of *technics*,”⁴⁵ “*technics* as artifice and *fiction*,”⁴⁶ “*fiction as operation*,” and “*operation as political performance*”—that is, performance as an operation that is essential to and definitive of all political engagement.⁴⁷ “[W]hat is politics, in fact, if not [...] *creating* fictions [and thereby] *transforming* the world—‘making’ it within the *conditions* of *tekhne*, that is, also, of *potential* and of the *potential to [...] invent*”⁴⁸

This power, this potential, is rendered impotent, powerless, by the displacement and substitution of “inherited potentials” or “pre-individual funds” by culture- and programming-industry “productions” as well as by the public adoption of retentional funds (technological means for recording memory) as conceived by the needs of marketing”—“hence the production and promotion of [...] bits of entertainment to delight and amuse visitors and to stimulate the desire to buy.”⁴⁹ The problem is that such funds cannot form the object of symbolic participation (i.e. of *active fiction-making* and/or *actual hyperstition*) for those who are thereby distracted from their own individuation (i.e. “for those who thereby lose the possibility of *individuating themselves*”)

because they [—the latter—] are internalizing the collective secondary retentions produced every day in production-studios and broadcast *en-masse* by a hyper-synchronic broadcast-system aiming precisely to reduce the differences between primary selections—that is, to intimately control the process by homogenizing individual pasts.⁵⁰

The result of this is, according to Stiegler, the end of the political (nevermind of the individual and individuation) as we know it. This is what he defines as a condition of symbolic and spiritual ‘misery’, namely the absence of the power ‘of’ and ‘to’ *fiction* (or again, of *hyperstition*) and the regression, in the light—or in the darkest depths—of this individual inability, toward *reactive* rather than *active* behavior: a “regress[ion] toward reactive behaviour and the survival instinct, which induces, in the desiring beings that we are, the reign of the drives” qua *pulsions/impulses* (hence the reign of the impulsive; cf. *D&D* II, 4). The reign of the drives/pulsions/impulses is the reign of panic: “a becoming reactive” characterized by “panic behaviour” and the various characteristics of the Greek god Pan, all of them typically bestial, herdish, and rather bleatishly, blearily, dimwitted.⁵¹ “We live under this reign” explains Stiegler, and moreover this “we” is washed-out (blearily white-washed) by the “all” that is *pan* (*pan*, in Greek, meaning “all”); “this ‘all’ is no longer a *we*: it is panic [...] the loss of *elpis* (‘hope’, ‘expectation’), the loss of the very possibility of constituting horizons of expectation of a *we*.”⁵²

Invention is the key to understanding the present crisis of individuation. In Stiegler’s analysis, the problem, for which there is no turning back, is the near-ubiquity of “non-belief” in political power.⁵³ Reinforced and reproduced by hyperindustrial cultural capitalism, the perpetuation of non-belief has led to a planetary-wide regression and stultification of psycho-physiological energies, cognitions and sensibilities (i.e. “the proletarianization of sensibility”). Today “there is no longer any belief in nor possibility of a pursuit of individuation”;⁵⁴ Stiegler, here directly following Nietzsche, calls this miserable condition “nihilism”: “everything lacks meaning (the untenability of one interpretation of the world, upon which a tremendous amount of energy has been lavished, awakens the suspicion that all interpretations of the world are false).”⁵⁵ The overcoming of nihilism and decadence requires the willing of new symbols and the invention of a new epoch of the individuation process, one that requires “the necessary *leap* from the national to the planetary—without which no political thought is possible today.”⁵⁶ As Stiegler rightly notes, “more than its money or military might, American power consists in the force of Hollywood images and of the computer programs which it has conceived—in its industrial capacity to produce new symbols around which models of life are formed.”⁵⁷

What, then, is to be done? What, in effect, can be done to secure “invention” as the anchor of present and future experiments in living, especially when the Xerox corporation (with its motto of “the best way to predict the future is to invent it⁵⁸) seems to have already beat us to the punch? How are we to hyperstitch the rifts left in the wake of the capture (monetization) of temporality in which ‘time is money’? Or, put differently, how can and must we re-will the “pathos of distance” (to use a Nietzschean phrase) between *otium* (the time of free play otherwise-known-as ‘leisure’) and *negotium* (the time of monetized labor otherwise-known-as ‘work’) which is necessary for any aristocratic (*ariston*) ‘elevation’?⁵⁹ Stiegler warns that *eris*—the productive struggle characterizing all political relations—can be achieved neither through the politics of resistance, which usually involves resentment and reactivity and is not only futile but ‘obsolete’,⁶⁰ nor through the politics of indifference which leads to a worsening of the pandemic de-sensitization characteristic of hyper-synchronized cultural capitalism today. Stiegler’s solution? *Invention* rather than *resistance*: the only way to remain un-ensnared by nihilistic delusions⁶¹ is to take up the adversary’s tools, but to use them in new and unprecedented—that is, unforeseen and *incalculable*—ways. “[H]aving become cultural and at the same time hyper-industrial, capitalism is today *essentially computational*, and as such tends to eliminate those singularities that resist the calculability of all values on the market of economic exchange.”⁶²

From the perspective of what kind of schema could *incalculability* (as the play of singularities) be introduced as a *tactic* (thus remaining strategically incalculable) of productive political struggle, especially within the context of a global system that is designed to subject everything possible to its computational logic? Stiegler, here again wholly consistent with Nietzsche, rightly turns to the notion of duplicity:

Becoming is intrinsically duplicitous, and its law is that of struggle. The theatre of this individuation struggling for and against itself [...] is capitalism. Capitalism must go to the end of its process, and we remain utterly ignorant about the way this will turn out [...]. This process is the expression of becoming insofar as it is always duplicitous.⁶³

For Stiegler, duplicity evokes both *double-dealing* and *doubleness*, both the necessary act of *fictionalization* as well as the necessary operation of heterogenous multiplicity within any and all processes of *individuation*. Duplicity is that which transductively mobilizes forces that are normally deemed contradictory (and therefore illogical or non-sensical). Following Simondon, “transduction” is “this originary contradiction within individuation, that tension constituting it as its dual motive”; it is “what Simondon thinks when he characterizes individuation as a *metastable* equilibrium that is [...] on the one hand partially stable [...] and yet on the other hand partially unstable.”⁶⁴ “Becoming” can be seen as an “originary” albeit duplicitous “contradiction” of tendencies—one that nevertheless permits the bridging between opposing tendencies without annulling or resolving their respective potencies (recalling the ancient principle of *palintonos harmonia*, the “back-stretched connection”⁶⁵ discovered by Heraclitus⁶⁶). As a relation of mutual consistence rather than of subsistence (or of conjugation rather than of subjugation), *becoming*, when freed from the hegemony of *being* by *duplicity*, can be conceived *transductively*—that is, as “form” that “maintains itself” while never ceasing “to become other than what it is,”⁶⁷ which is to say, “incalculable” (or “beyond good and evil” as Nietzsche himself tried to say). Within such a transductively incalculable schema, tensions cannot be ascribed as inherently good or evil, but rather, primarily either strong and active, or weak and reactive. In this Nietzscheo-Simondonian sense (which is at also very much Deleuzo-Stieglerian), reactive nihilism (what Nietzsche associated with “passive” nihilism and its regime of “petty” politics, or *Kleinpolitik*) is the condition in which psychic and collective processes of individuation weaken and become reactive but nonetheless dominant or hegemonic:

a tendency is never bad in itself; it is the condition of the tendency to which it seems to oppose itself, while in reality, it never ceases to compose with it [...]. It is possible, however, that at times runaway tendencies can form, which, becoming hegemonic, tend to eliminate the contrary tendency and, as a result, can destroy the relation through which they constituted themselves, and in so doing, may destroy themselves.⁶⁸

Nihilism, however, can be made active through the transductive duplicity of productive struggle (the basis for Nietzsche’s political thinking of *Grossepolitik*, or “great politics”). Active nihilism is no longer nihilism that resists/reacts to the duplicitous and healthy incalculability of Becoming (the generative matrix of all psychic and collective individuation).

We live in the era of “all” or *nothing*, which amounts to “the installation of a system of terror,” argues Stiegler.⁶⁹ Terror is also an attribute of Pan and of the “panic behaviour” (characteristic of Pan) which Stiegler calls “*bête*”—that is: *beastly, brutal, brutish, herd-like, dimwitted* and (as it is translated in *D&D*) *stupid*. Perhaps for present purposes “dimwitted” is the correct term, since Stiegler suggests that the problem with this condition is that we have all lost our *wits*, have become *witless*, without *Witz* as they say in German (or devoid, as Kant says, of our *Mutterwitz*).⁷⁰ The *cleverness, craftiness*, wily and witty ways of *Prometheus*, titan of *Technics and Time*—the pro-*mêtis/metheial/mathèsis* definitive of this chthonic character—is precisely what has exited, or as Stiegler says, been “*liquidated*,” from our era’s equations (by dint, no doubt, of its incalculability: its rather hypotenusial disinclination toward equation and equivocation). The *mêtis* of Prometheus—*mêtis* being the Greek word for *cunning craftiness*, “duplice” or *duplicity*: a word which in Greek antiquity was sometimes used as a synonym of *technè*: technicity⁷¹—operates “in shifting, disconcerting, and ambiguous situations” (such as the emergence qua invention of the human-all-too-human in the myth of Prometheus), “where precise calculation and rigorous logic either fail or lack time to operate” (here quoting a passage from Everett Wheeler quoted in Andrés Vaccari’s essay on ‘Stiegler and the Hegemony of Technics’).⁷² In his ‘Alternance Tripolaire et Raison Expérientielle’ (1999), Noël Denoyel argues that the ancient Greek *mêtis* (sometime-synonym of *technè*) should be taken, moreover, as a synonym of Simondonian *transduction* (which in turn functions in the manner of Charles Sanders Peirce’s *abduction*: Peirce’s term for *fictive realization*, a.k.a.—again—*individuation*).⁷³ *Mêtis* operates on the principle of duplicity “as the articulation of a dual tendency”⁷⁴ in the absence of complete comprehension with respect to these tendencies (where “we remain ignorant about the way [our actions/activities] will turn out”⁷⁵), but without letting this absence impede the process of individuation—indeed *abducting* or *transducting* this absence, this not-knowing, such that “this not-knowing become[s], in a sense], an object of political attention” and tactical action.⁷⁶ This practice cultivates, or rather is the practice of “*cultivating* the difference between consistence and existence” according to Stiegler—“this difference being the singular, that is, *incomparable*, and in this sense inexistent, reality (if by existing one understands calculable) of that difference, itself *improbable* (that is, which we do not know how to prove), between existence and subsistence.”⁷⁷ It requires a maintenance of the distinction between, and hence a double-articulation of, both consistence (a.k.a. the “archi-protention” of *D&D* I, 92) and existence (a.k.a. the “existence”-beyond-mere-“sub-sistence” of *D&D* I, 48) as well as a distinction between the business (*i.e.* labour) of *negotium* and the pleasure (*i.e.* leisure) of *otium*: this double-articulation articulating the “composition” rather than “opposition” of these dualities otherwise dissolved—“liquidated”—in and by the hyper-synchronized hyper-industrial “program society” outlined by Stiegler. “What Luther brought into play was the liquidation of that difference and hierarchy that, hitherto, had constituted *negotium* insofar as it was defined as that which was not *otium*.”⁷⁸ The confusion of *otium* and *negotium* eliminates the indeterminate interstice that allows for the *hyperstitching* qua *hyperstition* Stiegler calls “the *practice* [italics in the original] of *otium*”:⁷⁹ that which we used to call *culture* and that which lies at heart of what the Greeks called *eris* (the practice *qua* ongoing struggle to “elevate” ourselves that resounds in the French word *élève*, a word used to designate one in the midst of education/*e-ducere*⁸⁰), the engine of human, nevermind Promethean, invention.

When the processes of individuation and invention become “black-boxed”—as inevitably they have become during the hegemony of hyper-industrialized capitalism—part of the trick becomes to use the tools at one’s disposal to invent ways out (*poroi*) of the “aporias” of hyperindustrial consumerist capitalism and its planet-wide computational logic and logistics. In Stiegler’s poignant analysis, the aporia at the heart of the problem concerns *reason*: “it involves an aporia lying within hyper-industrial capitalism itself, insofar as the question is no longer only economic: it is the spirit of capitalism, and its rationality—that is, its reason—that here encounters its own limit insofar as it becomes self-destructive. Reason, understood by the spirit of capitalism as ratio and rationalization—that is, as reckoning and rational accounting (as shown notably, by Weber)—tends to

destroy the motives for producing as well as consuming.”⁸¹ Stiegler here struggles to rearticulate and resuscitate reason (*logos*) by forcing it outside of a computational paradigm (and the metaphysical project of the Occident) into what he calls “the political economy of singularities,”⁸² involving the “becoming-symbolic of the noetic sensible.”⁸³ And yet, was it not Nietzsche who described nihilism precisely as the “devaluation of the highest values” in which an active force which initially fortifies a system eventually cannabilizes and destroys it? “[M] orality was the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism [...]. But among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness: this eventually turned against morality [...].—and now the recognition of this inveterate mendaciousness that one despairs of shedding becomes a stimulant [...]. This antagonism [...] results in a process of dissolution.” The aporia of reason is at the heart, it seems, of the problem of psychic and collective individuation today. So how does one have hope of struggling through and getting out of such a seemingly “no-win” (a.k.a. “aporetic”) situation? This is a question that Sarah Kofman also asked in *Comment s’en Sortir?* (1983), but her answer differs from Stiegler’s: it is not by way of *logos* but rather by way of *mètis* that one must find ways out of untenable situations:

To relate it to *mètis* is to give philosophy the same soteriological end as [given] to *technè*: that of inventing *poroi* to get man out of *aporias*, [out] of all sorts of difficult situations without exit. It is *mètis*, indeed, that allows one to push through a *poros*, to clear a path, a course through obstacles, to invent an expedient (*poros*) to find an exit out of (*poros*) an aporetic situation without exit. Where indeterminacy (*apeiras*), reigns [there is] the absence of limit and direction—*obscurity*; where you are trapped, surrounded, prisoner of inextricable entanglements, it is *mètis* that intervenes—*inventing strategies, expedients, tricks, ruses, machinations, mechanè and technè*, in order to go from absence-of-limit to determination, from obscurity to light.⁸⁴

Outside the schema of the *logos*—of rationalizations, standard measures—established oppositions (“contradictions”) find themselves reticulated as elements within a ubiquitous technical network of ongoing modifications, which Simondon characterizes as being in a constant and constitutive process of transduction. Cunning intelligence is a mode of duplicity that proceeds by way of skillful handling or manipulation, by “tricks [rather] than by general methods”⁸⁵ (that is, rather than by way of logical—calculable—measures).

As D tienne and Vernant remind us (via the Greeks of antiquity), in the “fraught and unstable time of the *agon*”—for Stiegler, our present time-period: one in which the failures of hyper-consumptive industrialization can no longer be ignored—*m tic duplicity* is an “absolute weapon” more precious than any force of arms; “*m tis* gives one a hold without which one would be at a loss.”⁸⁶ In antiquity, for example, the *duplice* of *m tis* was a source (and resource) both for the political cunning of Themistocles and for the pro-*m tis/metheial math sis* qua *pronoia* (foresight) as well as epi-*m tis/metheial/math sis* qua *epinoia* (hindsight) of Prometheus and Epimetheus.⁸⁷ The *m tic* mentality, when directed toward the political task of productive struggle (‘good’ *eris*), comes to the service of—rather than opposes—*noetic* intelligence (the act of carefully thinking, of thinking with care, of caring to think: that of which we must, in our present crisis, “take care” says Stiegler). Being distinct from *logos*, the *duplice* of *m tis*—the *elpis* of cunning ‘hyperstition’ productively rather than destructively employed—duplicitously ‘gives back’ to reason, “giving *and* ‘giving back’ because it gives a *gift* and a *counter-gift*—what I call a *circuit*”:⁸⁸ this latter being the pre-condition for inventing what Stiegler calls the “long circuits” of social and collective individuation (Simondonian “*transindividuation*”).⁸⁹ The *elpis* that is the *duplice* of *m tis* understood as the *eris* of productive struggle (the struggle to cultivate singularities) creates the conditions for transindividuation in which the process of becoming—*devenir*—“is transformed into a *future—avenir*—by its insertion into *psychic* and *collective* individuation.”⁹⁰

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NOTES

1. Bernard Stiegler, *The Decadence of Industrial Technologies: Disbelief & Discredit Volume One (D&D I)*, trans. Daniel Ross and Suzanne Arnold (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011); *Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief & Discredit Volume Two (D&D II)*, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013); *The Lost Spirit of Capitalism: Disbelief & Discredit Volume Three (D&D III)*, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).
2. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 5.
3. Luc Boltanski & Ève Chiapello, *Le Nouvel Esprit du Capitalisme* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1999), trans. Gregory Elliott: *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (London: Verso Books, 2005).
4. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 18, 92, 111; *D&D II*, 27, 41, 120; *D&D III*, 36, 39, 64.
5. Gilbert Simondon, *Du Mode d’Existence des Objets Techniques* (Paris: Éditions Aubier, 1958); the bulk of the book has been translated into English and archived online at Archive.org/details/Simondon--ModeOfExistenceOfTechnicalObjectsinProgress (with notes on the translation at TheFunambulist.net/2013/11/21/the-funambulist-papers-43-av-anthropocosmogonic-vastupurushamanism-by-dan-mellamphy/#9).
6. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 1.
7. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 6.
8. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 6, 7.
9. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 57.
10. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 57. In *D&D III*, this is related to what he calls (after “a seminar on ‘Finding New Weapons: For a Polemology of the Spirit’”) precisely “a polemology” (*D&D III*, 42), for—to lift a phrase from the conclusion: *D&D III*, 89-90—“care is a *combat*,” and “*politics*, understood as the care that a society takes of itself” (*D&D III*, 3), “*is* this combat” (“Politics is this combat, and in order to lead this combat, which the appearance of new forms of hypomnesic *pharmaka* we must find new weapons and forge the arsenal of what I have called a new critique: it is a matter of *polemology*, of struggling for the life of the spirit. This will be possible only if a new system of transductive relations between *pharmaka* and individuals is put in place, in the sense according to which a transductive relation is a relation of dependence, as Bateson showed for the relationship between the alcoholic and the bottle under the eloquent title: ‘The Cybernetics of *Self*: A Theory of Alcoholism’,” *D&D III*, 89-90).
11. Here, for instance, see Bernard Stiegler, *What Makes Life Worth Living: On Pharmacology*, trans. Daniel Ross, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013—especially Chapter *One*, on the ‘Pharmacology of Spirit’, Chapter *Two*, on the ‘Pharmacology of Nihilism’, and Chapter *Three*, on the ‘Pharmacology of Capital’. “It was Jacques Derrida who opened up the question of pharmacology” in and for the present, he explains (pp.19-20); and Derrida lifts the notion from the texts of Plato (specifically Plato’s *Phaedrus*). The *pharmakon* is that *technical* (and/or pharmatechnical) *object* or *prosthesis* which is *useful*, which *helps* us, and upon which one winds up in a relation of *addiction* and *dependence*: it is therefore a ‘cure’ for some problem or other—something that would otherwise (without the *pharmakon*) be more *difficult*—which in turn becomes somewhat of a problem, *e.g.* an *addiction*. “This dependence is also what Plato described in relation to hypomnesis,” explains Stiegler in the third volume of *Disbelief and Discredit (D&D III, 3)*, “that is, in relation to that prosthesis of memory that is writing”—which Stiegler’s late contemporary Friedrich Kittler described as and in terms of a technical “storage medium” and “which Plato referred to as a *pharmakon*” (*ibid.*). Also see the note immediately preceding this one (above), re: the “transductive relations between *pharmaka* and individuals” at work within Stiegler’s proposed “[pharmatechnical] polemology” (*D&D III*, 89-90).
12. Here is the full description: “the Presocratic, tragic style of thought [...] characteristic of Heraclitus [...] and first rediscovered by Nietzsche” (Bernard Stiegler, *D&D III*, 47).
13. *M tis* “operates on a shifting terrain, in uncertain and ambiguous situations. Two antagonistic forces confront each other. Over this fraught and unstable time of the *agon*, *m tis* gives one a hold without which one would be at a loss. During the struggle, the man of *m tis* (compared to his opponent) displays at the same time a *greater grip of the present* where nothing escapes him, *more awareness of the future*—several aspects of which he has *already* manipulated—and *richer experience accumulated from the past*” (Marcel D tienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Les Ruses de L’Intelligence: La M tis des Grecs*. Paris: Éditions Flammarion, 1974, 21; *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, trans. Janet Lloyd. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991, 14). In *D&D III*, Stiegler notes that “what goes on between the so-called ‘*ideas of May ’68*’ and *capitalism* amounts to what could be called a *ruse of history*: the activists of 1968 imagined they were fighting capitalism, whereas in reality they helped it evolve, accompanying and legitimating its transformation while believing they were being transgressive; they helped it *become*, to *give birth* to what was brought-forth as the historical necessity of a cloud

that itself bore *an unprecedented drive-based storm*, which then became the principle of a capitalist system devoid of all spirit. In the language of Bertrand Gille, one could say that they accomplished an ‘adjustment’ between the evolutions of *the technical system* and *the economic system*—but that this came at the cost of ‘disadjustments’ in the other spheres and the destruction of many other systems, such as the family, the state, the biosphere, and so on, and especially the psychic system itself and the libidinal economy in which it is formed, inevitably leading to a process of generalized disindividuation” (*D&D* I, 32-33). “May 1968 [...] was the pre-maturation of changes that lay in embryonic form within capitalist and industrial becoming,” he argues (*D&D* III, 30).

14. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 51, 112, 179 n.15; *D&D* II, 19, 32, 135 n.18; *D&D* III, 60, 62, 66, 72-76/81-84.

15. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 4.

16. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 23.

17. ‘Automatization’, as in the chapter-heading of *D&D* III Chapter Two (*D&D* III, 42).

18. Bernard Stiegler, “‘The Proletarianization of Sensibility”, trans. Arne De Boever, archived online at *LanaTurnerJournal.com/archives/prolsensestiegler*.

19. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 62.

20. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 14.

21. Julian Barnes, *England England* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1998).

22. “Culture is being [...] *exchanged* and *traded-in* for ‘mall culture’ and ‘shopping by remote’, [...] *sold down the river* by the sorts of people who want to turn the entire planet into an International Airport Arrival-concourse. This isn’t the victory of *somebody’s* culture over *somebody else’s* culture: nobody *ever* had a culture like that; it’s just the victory of schlockmeisterism and crapola over good taste and good sense”, Terence McKenna, ‘Eros and The Eschaton’ (Lecture presented June 17–19 1994 at the *Rim Institute*, Phoenix Arizona; transcribed by Dan Mellamphy).

23. “Someone said ‘What’s so progressive about media?—It’s the spreading of darkness at the speed of light!’ ... It *can* be, it *can* be” (Terence McKenna, *op.cit.*).

24. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 20-21.

25. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 21.

26. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 21: the “spiritual war” or—as Stiegler says in *D&D* III, 89—that “struggling for the life of the spirit” which is a veritable “*polemology*” (*D&D* III, 89-90; also see *D&D* III, 42).

27. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 53-54, 72, 86, 108, 114, 128.

28. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 6, 12, 36-37, 72-73; *D&D* II, 6, 8, 22-23, 69-70; *D&D* III, 2-3, 6-8, 12, 29, 70-71. This “liquidation” (he explains) “is required by the technologies of the grammatization process, and in particular by a ‘service industry’ tightly wedded to those dream-industries that are the cultural program-industries” (“[t]he latter are themselves altered by their context within the framework of the digital convergence of information—the audio-visual and tele-communications—in the context of networks in the age of the *Internet Protocol/IP*; this program of reconfiguring ways-of-life, moreover, was inscribed in and as the essence of capitalism from its origin”): *D&D* III, 8.

29. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 97; *D&D* III, 42, 89-90 (“it is a matter of *polemology*, of struggling for the life of the spirit”).

30. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* II, 36.

31. The two epigraphs that begin *D&D* I are from Paul Valéry and Joë Bousquet, the two that begin *D&D* II are from Jean-Pierre Vernant and André Breton, and the three final epigraphs at the start of the ten-page conclusion in *D&D* III are from Jean-Pierre Vernant (on Promethean *technicity*), Jacques Derrida (on the technical *pharmakon*) and Gregory Bateson (on the *pharmatechnical interrelation* of sobriety and intoxication).

32. The other/former epigraphs are, as Maurice Blanchot would have said, writings of the disaster, bearing witness to that which is express[ive]ly “ruinous”: in Volume One, an excerpt from Paul Valéry, and in Volume Two an excerpt from Jean-Pierre Vernant (Vernant will return once again in and as the first of the final triad of epigraphs at the conclusion of Stiegler’s third volume: “The fire of Prometheus is not that of the gods—Zeus’s thunderbolt, the lightning of Athena,” he explains in the epigraph; “it is a perishable fire: engendered, starved, precarious, like all mortal creatures”; *D&D* III, 83-84).

33. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 160-161 + *D&D* II, 12.

34. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 48, 90-91, 125-126 + *D&D* II, 56. “Existence is distinguished from subsistence by the capacity to project itself onto the plane of consistencies [...] which itself must be cultivated through practices—that is, by putting into practice specific techniques—*mnemotechnics*, *hypomnemata*—that cannot be reduced to mere usages” (*D&D* III, 13-14).

35. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 133; also see *D&D* I, 42, where Stiegler makes the claim that “existing only consists as that which *surpasses* its *factuality*,” and *D&D* I, 178 n.74, where he makes reference to the exceeding of restrictive and restricted

economies as these have previously been articulated in *The Accursed Share* of monsieur Georges Bataille (re: the latter, also see *D&D* III, 28-29, and the call to revisit the works of Bataille—“55 years after *The Accursed Share*,” on the occasion of Stiegler thesis defence—in *D&D* III, 105n.14).

36. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 48.

37. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 48.

38. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 37.

39. Nick Land, *Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007*, eds. Ray Brassier and Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic Press, 2011, 552-553, 579). We are by no means conflating the philosophies of Stiegler and of Land, which are indeed remarkably different, but hyperstitutions—“good” and “bad”/“productive” and “destructive”—nevertheless play an important part in each one respectively.

40. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 148, 25 ... “individuation” (he explains) occurs “on the basis of the fiction and artificiality of technics” (*D&D* III, 80): it is “a mechanism that is always already phantasmatic and fantastic—that is, ‘fictioning’ *the real*, inclusive of *technical invention*”—*in sum*, what is here being described in terms of *fictioning-the-real* is none other than “the process of psychic [*i.e.* individual], collective and technical individuation” at the heart of Stiegler’s para-Simondonian techno-political project (*D&D* III, 44).

41. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 139.

42. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 147—“that is, ‘fictioning’ the real,” as he states in the final volume of *Disbelief & Discredit* (*D&D* III, 44).

43. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* III, 80.

44. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 17.

45. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* III, 80.

46. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* III, 80.

47. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 139.

48. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 148.

49. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 113.

50. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 114.

51. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* II, 4; “a reign of stupidity occurring at the same time that people are talking about ‘cognitive capitalism’ and ‘knowledge societies’,” *D&D* III, 12.

52. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* II, 7; “The ‘subversion’ of May ‘68” largely accompanied, if not fed, the transformations of capitalism” (he argues in the first chapter of *D&D* III) “by having brought it to the point of a symbolic and spiritual misery placed entirely in the service of *industrial populism* and *addictive consumption*” (*D&D* III, 8-9). The latter has been *adjusted*, has been *reconfigured*, so that such a *spirit*—such a *we*—would now [/should now] *be thoroughly lost from the get-go*. “That from which society suffers is the disappearance of the *super-ego*,” argues Stiegler; “*spiritual misery* is thus the misery of the [...] remains of the *we* [beyond the *ego*] in the epoch of capitalism and especially the era of *hyper-industrial* capitalism” (*D&D* III, 11, 10). “The question [at the heart of *Disbelief and Discredit*] is therefore that of spirit,” explains Stiegler (*ibid.*): “of the spirit of capitalism in an age in which capitalism has lost any notion of it”; and “the question of spirit is *in general* the question of the ‘*we*.’”

“The *capitalist socialization* of the ‘values of May ‘68’,” along with “the *recuperation* of the ‘ideas of May ‘68 and the establishment of *the capitalist control-society*,” are the focus of Stiegler’s first chapter in the final volume of *Disbelief & Discredit*. “In the course of the 1970s,” he explains, “certain ‘progressive employers’ started to take an interest in these ideas, in particular the group *Enterprise et Progrès*, who realized that the ‘ideas of ‘68’ were not to be rejected in their entirety. It was in this way that the Taylorist and Fordist models were surpassed: it was necessary to ‘break with previous modes of control’ by ‘substituting self-monitoring [—*autocontrôle*—] for control’,” a.k.a. “the managerial model” (*D&D* III, 24, 35). “May 1968,” argues Stiegler in this chapter (the penultimate chapter of *Disbelief and Discredit*), “was the pre-maturation of changes that lay in embryonic form within capitalist and industrial becoming” (*D&D* III, 30). “[T]he new capitalism, thanks to its new-style management inspired by the ‘values of May 1968’, [...] ruined desire by producing a ‘social demand’ that is merely an artifice which serves generalized proletarianization and the establishment of addictive forms of consumption. This is disguised as ‘personalization’, but in fact it merely extends calculability by applying it to the control and reduction of singularities, which are thereby transformed into particularities” (*D&D* III, 22).

53. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 16.

54. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D* I, 96.

55. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), Preface 3.

56. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 31.
57. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 23.
58. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 9.
59. “Marcuse sees very well how new forms of control are established through the functionalization of leisure,” Stiegler notes in *D&D III*, 70: he clearly saw the co-option of all *otium* within and by *negotium*.
60. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 37.
61. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 37.
62. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 37. “[T]he new capitalism, thanks to its new-style management inspired by the ‘values of May 1968’, [...] ruined desire by producing a ‘social demand’ that is merely an artifice which serves generalized proletarianization and the establishment of addictive forms of consumption. This is disguised as ‘personalization’, but in fact it merely extends calculability by applying it to the control and reduction of singularities, which are thereby transformed into particularities,” he explains in the final volume of *Disbelief and Discredit* (*D&D III*, 22).
63. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 57.
64. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 38.
65. —the Heraclitean (and, moreover, Nietzschean) “disjunctive conjunction” repeatedly mentioned throughout *D&D III* (*cf. D&D III*, 14-15, 27, 48, 51, 58, 77, 87-88, 105n.14). “The ‘and’, both conjunctive and disjunctive, constitutes, I believe, *spirit itself*, and does so as the *power of transindividuation* constitutive of a *we*” (*D&D III*, 14); “this ‘and’, which constitutes the *simultaneously conjunctive and disjunctive* relation of the psychic to the collective, is *technics*” (*D&D III*, 48); “*conjunctive and disjunctive*, this ‘and’ is precisely the question of the *passage into action*, of *acting out*, insofar as it is both, *on the one hand*, transgressive and elevating, and, *on the other hand*, that which *connects* pleasure to reality and does so *beyond* what opposes them” (*D&D III*, 58); “Technics” in the end (in the ‘and’) should be understood “as *the condition of conjunction and disjunction* in individuation” (*D&D III*, 51).
66. In the third volume of *Disbelief and Discredit*, Stiegler acknowledges that theorists like “Marcuse would have us turn back to a discourse of the *opposition* of tendencies, whereas there are only processes of the *composition* of tendencies”—the latter understanding being one that “was first rediscovered by Nietzsche” and that “was characteristic of Heraclitus”—constituting “more generally [...] the Presocratic, tragic style of thought” (*D&D III*, 47; also see *D&D III*, 32).
67. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 38.
68. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 38.
69. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D II*, 9.
70. *cf.* Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987), 79, and Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Birth to Presence*, trans. Brian Holmes and Others (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 216-217.
71. Andrés Vaccari, ‘Unweaving the Program: Stiegler and the Hegemony of Technics’, in *Transformations* Issue 17, 2009: Bernard Stiegler and the Question of Technics (http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_17/article_08.shtml#5).
72. Andrés Vaccari, ‘Unweaving the Program: Stiegler and the Hegemony of Technics’, in *Transformations* Issue 17, 2009: Bernard Stiegler and the Question of Technics (http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_17/article_08.shtml#5).
73. *cf.* Noël Denoyel, ‘Alternance Tripolaire et Raison Expérientielle à la Lumière de la Sémiotique de Peirce’, in *La Revue Française de Pédagogie*, Volume 128 (1999), 35-42, and Jean-Claude Beaune, *Le Balancier du Monde: La Matière, La Machine et La Mort—Essai sur le Temps des Techniques* (Seysssel: Éditions Camp-Vallon, 2002), 40, 62, 75-76.
74. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 37.
75. “This process is the expression of becoming insofar as it is always duplicitous,” argues Stiegler (*D&D I*, 57).
76. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 54.
77. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 92.
78. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 73.
79. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 100.
80. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 100.
81. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 64.
82. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 127.
83. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 133.
84. Sarah Kofman, *Comment s'en Sortir* (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1983), our translation.

85. René Thom, *Modèles Mathématiques de la Morphogenèse* (Paris: Union Générale d’Éditions, 1974), 300.
86. Détéienne and Vernant, 13, 14.
87. “[T]he Titan’s *mêtis* always recoils against him in the end; he is caught in the trap which he himself set. Prometheus and Epimetheus represent the two faces of a single figure just as the *prometheia* of man is simply the other side to his radical ignorance of the future”, Détéienne and Vernant, 17, 18.
88. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 137.
89. Bernard Stiegler and Irit Rogoff, ‘Transindividuation’, in *E-flux*, Issue 03, 2010, <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/transindividuation>.
90. Bernard Stiegler, *D&D I*, 11.