MÉCRAIENCE ET DISCRÉDIT have now been translated into English: The Decadence of Industrial Technologies: Disbelief and Discredit Volume One (D&D I), Uncontrollable Societies of Disaffected Individuals: Disbelief and Discredit Volume Two (D&D II), and The Lost Spirit of Capitalism: Disbelief and Discredit Volume Three (D&D III). This series of works sets out to explore a phenomenon described in Bernard Stiegler’s previous and parallel series, Symbolic Misery, as the symbolic and spiritual “misery”—misère: poverty, misery, destitution—manifested when spirited symbol-users, a.k.a. humans, have their modes of expression and individuation co-opted by, constantly correlated with, repeatedly rerouted via, and ultimately converging in a computational system of globally integrated production and consumption […] technologically linked by universal digital equivalence (the binary system) to telecommunication systems and to computers, and, through this, directly articulated with logistical and production systems (barcodes and credit-cards enabling the tracing of products and consumers), all of which constitute the hyper-industrial epoch strictly speaking, dominated by the categorization of hyper-segmented ‘targets’ (‘surgically’ precise marketing that organizes consumption) and […] functioning in real-time.

The four chapters of the first book, five chapters of the second, along with the two chapters and ten-page conclusion of the closing volume (the second volume very much leaning on the first, the first providing key definitions and explanations elaborated in the second, the third a critical reading of The New Spirit of Capitalism in light of the analyses advanced and elaborated in the first two volumes) examine this—our current condition—and explore what could be called tactical techniques for individuation in the “impasse” of this “impossible” state of affairs.

In an era of digital mediation and technical reticulation on a planetary and even post-planetary scale—an era wherein global change is dictated by technical innovation rather than by political deliberation—the reactive
adoption of consumer technologies and consumerist values has led to a crisis: the loss of belief or faith in the positive power of politics. We no longer live in a ‘political’ society, one created by political struggle for a shared civic spirit by people who communicate with each other through words and deeds. Rather, today we live in a hyper-capitalist and technologically-synchronized age of hyper-consumption: one that preemptively and collectively co-opts populations—denying them their power of individuation—for purposes of their socio-economic control through commerce (rather than politics). For Stiegler, this global condition has led to the general impoverishment and even the possible extinction of our capacities for individuation, our savoir-faire and savoir-vivre—that is, our knowing how to live and knowing what constitutes a ‘good life’. In addition, this condition’s instrumentalized view of technology has also presented human beings from understanding and affirming the technical conditions of their existence, as Gilbert Simondon argued—although not with an explicit focus on our present planetary/post-planetary condition—in his treatise On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects (1958). Dísebreel and Discredite can be seen as an exemplary expression of Stiegler’s overall project to re-think ‘the political’ through and as the question of techniques (i.e. his development of a political philosophy of techniques). Our aim is to offer an overview of some key concepts in the volumes of Dísebreel and Discredite (rhetor, negrom, nihilism, proletarianization, struggle, hope, singularity, duplicity, inalienability, individuation and fiction/fabrication) as well as to suggest some additional concepts that support and further Stiegler’s arguments (e.g. hyperstition and mètis transaction).

In the opening pages of the first volume, Stiegler lays out his central message that the dominant global model of ‘industrialization through consumption’ has failed. Today, democracies are facing crises on such a vast scale that neither cavalier attitudes of ‘business as usual’ nor (on the opposite end) serious attitudes about ‘reform’ seem tenable. The only solution, he suggests, is to create a new pathway: to ‘project ourselves into the invention of a new process’ of ‘supranational psychic and collective individuation.’ 10 But right from the outset, Stiegler criticizes those approaches that seek to either indict or absolve the American model of the ‘knowledge society’ and that either naïvely or intentionally produce smokescreens or panaceas for the view that public power is obsolete and in decline. Through propaganda and deception, these approaches send the message that the political power of the public must be replaced with the buying power of the consumer. For Stiegler, “consumption is a rupture in the relation to citizenship” that strategically leads to the disintegration of the political practices of democracy. In contrast to this strategic deception that seeks to capture and control the actions of public power by making consumption the end (tool of all and all human actions, Stiegler offers the idea of ‘invention’: the deployment of a type of tactical duplicity that releases the creative and multiplicative tendencies at work in and every human action. In this way, duplicity also opens up to doubt the splitting, doubling and branching out of (seemingly) programmatically or deterministically. By inventing new ways of practicing democratic politics that do not merely reproduce a programmatic culture of consumption and production, well-used duplicity is transformed into artfulness, that libidinal creativity through called érēthe—towards an always possible best, urera. But even may also turn in the form of public power, provides the means for renewing collective individuations and public struggle—capacities which Stiegler proclaims to lie at the very heart of the power (or “rule”): érēthe of the demos. 11

Duplicitive struggle is the name of the game if there is any hope for humans in the hyper-industrial age, and as far as respect as a positive and productive power) duplicity loses all of its more negative and nihilist connotations, becoming instead a source of hope for Stiegler. Like Friedrich Nietzsche, to whom he repeatedly refers, Stiegler relates the ancient Greek concept of hope or epētheia to érēthe, namely, that “struggle of which war is the extreme version, but that also proceeds more stealthily and silently during peacetime.” For Stiegler (as for the Greeks), struggle can be good or bad, well-directed or ill-directed: “the process of individuation is a state of permanent war, but a war contained and transformed through that psycho-social competition which the Greeks called érēthe—towards an always possible best. érēthe. But even may also turn in the form of public power, and become discord. The érēthe as a motive is therefore duplicitive: the best may contain the worst.” 12 Duplicity, in other words, can be ‘good’ and ‘productive’—rather than merely ‘destructive’—when directed by and towards transformative political struggle. This follows Stiegler’s overall philosophical approach: his thinking about political activity in terms of ‘poisons’ and ‘cures’. 13

Keeping with the language of ancient Greek antiquity—"the Presocratic, tragic style of thought"—to which Stiegler turns throughout his work, duplicity in the sense of transformative political struggle accords with the Greek mètis (cunning craftiness, tricky tactics and turning on redoubled "duplicé") examined in Marcel Détienne’s and Jean-Pierre Vernant’s 1974 Bases de L’Intelligence: la Mètis des Grecs (Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society, 1991). 14 In the spirit of the Greek prometheia and epimeitheia, 15 and hence with a nod to the titans of Stiegler’s Technics and Time, we would like to bring the duplicé of Dísebreel and Discredite to bear on the notion of mètis after which the titans Prometheus and Epimetheus (pro-mètis/méthēkhs/màthēs and epi-mètis/méthēa/màthìs) were named: those two figures/brothers/others at the origin of Stiegler’s chief-d’œuvre and his ongoing analyses—figures in whom Stiegler, like the Greeks before him, finds the gift (‘poison’ and ‘cure’) of hope for humanity.

A ‘hopeless’ condition is one in which there is no space and no time for struggle—hence the terrible threat that hyper-industrial hyper-synchrony presents. By the latter two terms, Stiegler designates the 20th-century emergence of “a new kind of industry” in the United States: an industry functionally dedicated to marketing and publicity, and one in which “culture” becomes “a strategic function of industrial activity” evolving out of analog transmission technologies (especially and initially radio), the program industries (especially and subsequently television), and (ultimately, that is currently) advanced digital technologies 16 which eventually make possible the “real-time” synchronization and mass production of human behaviour with a consequent planet-wide attenuation of desire. 17 The globalization of hyper-synchronized consumerist cultural capitalism directly leads to proletarianization, which Stiegler perceives as the real-time mass-“mechanization” of human perceptions—which he elsewhere calls “the proletarianization of sensibilities” 18—along with a massive loss of human creativity and knowledge resulting from the mechanization of work. “Proletarianization” refers to the loss of workers’ knowledge (“know-how”: savoir-faire and savoir-vivre) altogether and for an entire society: the reality of proletarianization is, more than pauperization, the worker’s loss of knowledge, the worker tend to becoming unskilled pure labor force lacking any motive to work beyond the need to subsist. In this way, the worker becomes a proletarian, which also means that the proletarian causes to be a worker [...]. This is how the globalization of capitalism was completed, by imposing the proletarianization of the consumer [...]. Just as workers-become-proletarian find themselves deprived of the capacity to work the world through their work, that is through their savoir-vivre, so too consumers lose their savoir-vivre insofar as this means their singular way of being in the world, that is, of existing. 19

In the first volume of Dísebreel and Discredite, 20 Stiegler proclaims that “Europe is in the course of transforming itself into a gigantic museum”—this is in a manner not unlike that portrayed in Julian Barnes’s Booker-Prize-winning England, England, we might add. 21 Here Stiegler echoes the vision of the late Terence McKenna, who suggested that culture is being traded in for ‘mall culture’ and ‘shopping by remote’ which amounts to a betrayal of culture and is dehumanizing. 22 This new spirit—or symbolic and spiritual poverty, misery, destruction, destitution, and its ‘mall’ or ‘museum’—isolation of the world—spreads like darkness at the speed of light” thanks to hyper-industrial hyper-synchronized broadcast-media. Consequently, the spaces of public and private life in and for the industrial demos will be reconfigured by tele-tecnics and tele-technologies which are principally tools of “tele-action” (action at a distance) that enable the remote-controlled navigation of information databases in order to access stocks of cultural data (and which are, arguably, no longer cultural at all). For Stiegler, this is the generalization and concertization of a control-society model in which all processes—domestic and professional, as well as military, police, scientific, logistic, and consumer—become remotely controlled and algorithmically governed. 23 As instruments of tele-action, hyper-industrial hyper-synchronized broadcast-media will be the means and method for the digital capture and control of human consciousness:

This is why Microsoft […] has explicitly aimed since 1997 to control digital television: in that year, Craig Mundie, the vice-president of the global corporation, declared that the world contained a
Like the missionaries that Canadian director David Cronenberg had portrayed a decade earlier in Videodrome (distributed by Universal Pictures, Hollywood) as agents of “The Cathode Ray Mission” (cf. Cronenberg 1983 and D&D I, 21), Stiegler also emphasizes that it is very much a matter of missions; “that is, of spiritual war, even if this crusade has, since the illegitimate election of George W. Bush, been transformed into a ‘conventional’ war.”

There can be no aristo (improvement, betterment, amelioration) in and of any condition, and hence no elpis (hope, expectation, aspiration) whatsoever, without eris (struggle, conflict, contention, competition). Hyper-industrial hyper-synchronization, however, “levels” and “liquidates” precisely those points (those times and/or spaces) “where it is a matter of engaging in combat” and individuation through eris,38 where “what Heraclitus called the anelpiston” can arise (the anelpiston, i.e., “the unexpected […] that is nevertheless the object of any expectation, of all elpis”). The first two volumes of Disbelief and Discredit begin with a pair of epigraphs each (the third volume ‘closing’ with three epigraphs at the beginning of its ten-page conclusion),39 and the eris that allows for elpis figures prominently in the second epigraph of both volumes: explicitly in D&D II, where “the wound required by the adversary powers of eris is itself the very incarnation of ‘mad’ (unexpected and incalculable) love—the epigraph taken from André Breton’s Le Moine and—implicitly in D&D I, via José Bousquet’s existential exclamation that ‘my wound existed before me’ and ‘I was born to incarnate it’.40 Bousquet’s exclamation exemplifies for Stiegler the flowering of a bouquet beyond the ‘miserablism’ of present-day ‘populism’ and in a sense the Bousquet epigraph can be seen as an initial indication of the elpisian vision articulated throughout Disbelief and Discredit: that of overcoming otherwise crushing conditions (conditions wherein one might easily ‘give up’ rather than ‘overcome’ and thereby ‘overturn’ them), and overcoming them by being in ‘excess’ of—i.e. exceeding—existing ‘facts’ so as to exist—as Stiegler says, ex-siste—as their ‘incommensurable […] excess’.41 Bousquet’s paralyzing wound could have left him in the position of a “miserable human being […] no longer feeling that he ex-sisted,” (the condition of the miserable Richard Durr described on page 48 of D&D I), but instead he struggled “against that which […] could lead him to no longer be himself, to no longer ex-siste,” deciding to rise up rather than to give up—to escape up to elpis, to make his wound. He, and moreover the rest of us, inherited a bedridden; and yet he did, nevertheless, raise himself: that is, he became a writer and he wrote his wound.”

In an act which elsewhere in D&D—throughout the volumes—Stiegler describes in terms of duplicity (“duplica: the translation as ‘duplicity’ contains an echo not only of duplicity but also of duplication and multiplicity” write the translators.), Bousquet double-dealt the hand he had been given, bringing into play two—throughout the volumes—Stiegler describes in terms of duplicity: ‘Good’ hyperstition is thus akin to the notion of duplicity well-used, that is: hyperstition as operation as an operation that is essential to and definitive of all political engagement.”

“[What] is politics, in fact, if not […] creating fictions [and thereby] transforming the world—‘making’ it within the conditions of teknè, that is, also, potential and of the potential to […] invent?”

This power, this potential, is rendered impotent, powerless, by the displacement and substitution of “inherited potentials” or “pre-individual funds” by culture- and programming-industry “productions” as well as by the public adoption of retentional funds (technological means for recording memory) as conceived by the needs of marketing—“hence the production and promotion of […] bits of entertainment to delight and amuse visitors [and to stimulate the desire to buy]” The problem is that such funds cannot form the object of symbolic participation (i.e. of active fiction-making and/or actual hyperrhetor) for those who are thereby distracted from their own individuation (i.e. “for those who thereby lose the possibility of individualizing themselves”) because they—the latter—“are internalizing the collective secondary retentions produced every day in production-studios and broadcast en-masse by a hyper-synchronic broadcast-system aiming precisely to reduce the differences between primary selections—that is, to intimately control the process by homogenizing individual posts.”

The result of this is, according to Stiegler, the end of the political (nevermind of the individual and individuation) as we know it. This is what he defines as a condition of symbolic and spiritual ‘misery’, namely the absence of the power ‘of’ and ‘to’ fiction (or again, of hyperrhetor) and the regression, in the light—or in the darkest depths—of this individuational inability, toward reactive rather than active behavior: a “regress[ion] toward reactive behaviour and the survival instinct, which induces, in the desiring beings that we are, the reign of the drives qua pulsions/impulses (hence the reign of the impulsive; cf. D&D II, 4). The reign of the drives/pulsions/impulses is the reign of panic: “a becoming characterized by panic, impulsive, transitory, in a variety of characteristic ways: a becoming white-washed (blanc-impulsion), a becoming race (cliché-impulsion), a becoming spirit (the Greek God Pan, all of them typically beset, beset, and rather blithely, blindly, dramatically)” We live under this reign of desire, and moreover, we live under this reign of desire (clearly white-washed by the “all” that is pan (pan, in Greek, meaning “all”); “this ‘all’ is no longer a ‘we’ it is panic […] the loss of elpis (‘hope’, ‘expectation’), the loss of the very possibility of constituting horizons of expectation of a we.50

Invention is the key to understanding the current crisis of individuation. In Stiegler’s analysis, the problem, for which there is no pointing back, is the near-abundance of ‘no-belief’ ‘impotential’ power.51 Reinforced and reproduced by hyperindustrial cultural capitalism, the perpetuation of non-belief has led to a planetary-wide regression and stultification of psycho-physiological energies, cognitions and sensibilities (i.e. “the proletarianization of sensibility”). Today “there is no longer any belief in nor possibility of a pursuit of individuation.”52 Stiegler, here directly following Nietzsche, calls this miserable condition “nihilism”: “everything lacks meaning (the question of power, namely “of a power to believe, of a power to fiction, of a power of fiction, of a potential of conditions that will, but also of an impotential that, as regression, can provoke this fiction.”53 The power ‘of’ and the power ‘to’ fiction is the power ‘of’ and the power ‘to’ will ‘to believe’: ‘willing’ what is fictional into the real and in this way ‘realizing’ (or in the words of Bousquet, ‘incarnating’) it; ‘it is deciding to realize a

BERNARD STIEGLER, DISBELIEF AND DISCREDIT, VOLUMES I-III DAN MELLAMPHY AND NANDITA BISWAS MELLAMPHY —as their “incommensurable […] excess.” Bousquet double-dealt the hand he had been given, bringing into play two
What, then, is to be done? What, in effect, can be done to secure “invention” as the anchor of present and future experiments in living, especially when the Xerox corporation (with its motto of “the best way to predict the future is to invent it”) seems to have already beat us to the punch? How are we to hyperstitch the rifts left in the wake of the capture (monetization) of temporality in which “time is money”? Or, put differently, how can and must we re-will the “pathos of distance” (to use a Nietzschean phrase) between oioio (the time of free play otherwise-known-as leisure) and negotium (the time of monetized labor otherwise-known-as work) which is necessary for any aristocratic ariston (elevation)?" Stiegler warns that eris—the productive struggle characteristic all political relations—can be achieved neither through the politics of resistance, which usually involves resentment and reactivity and is not only futile but ‘obsolete’; nor through the politics of indifferenciation which leads to a worsening of the pandemic de-segmentation characteristic of hyper-synchronized cultural capitalism today. Stiegler’s solution? Invention rather than resistance: the only way to remain un-enasured by nihilistic delusions is to take up the adversary’s tools, but to use them in new and unpremeditated—that is, unforeseen and incalculable—ways. “If[ing] becoming cultural and at the same time hyper-industrial, capitalism is today essentially computational, and as such tends to eliminate those singularities that resist the calculability of all values on the market of economic exchange.”

From the perspective of what kind of schema could in calculability (as the play of singularities) be introduced as a tactic (thus remaining strategically incalculable) of productive political struggle, especially within the context of a global system that is designed to subject everything possible to its computational logic? Stiegler, here again wholly consistent with Nietzsche, rightly turns to the notion of duplicity:

> Becoming is intrinsically duplicitous, and its law is that of struggle. The theatre of this individuation struggle for and against itself […] is capitalism. Capitalism must go to the end of its process, and we remain utterly ignorant about the way this will turn out […]. This process is the expression of becoming insular as it is always duplicitous.

For Stiegler, duplicity evokes both double-dealing and doublebinds, both the necessary act of fictionalization as well as the necessary operation of heterogeneous multiplicity within any and all processes of individuation. Duplication is that which transductively mobilizes forces that are normally deemed contradictory (and therefore unhomogeneous and unintermixable). In this Nietzscheo-Simondonian sense (which characterizes all political relations—one that nevertheless permits the bridging between opposing tendencies without annulling or dissolving them into a ‘new’ form), both the necessary act of duplicity “as the articulation of a dual tendency” in the absence of complete comprehension with respect to these tendencies (where “we remain ignorant about the way [our actions/activities] will turn out”?), but without letting this absence impede the process of individuation—indeed abducting or transducing this absence, this not-knowing, such that “this not-knowing becomes, in a sense, an object of political attention” and tactical action. This practice cultivates, or rather, primarily either strong and active, or weak and reactive. In this Nietzscheo-Simondonian sense (which characterizes all political relations—“this difference is the singular, that is, incomparable, and in this sense inexistent, reality (if by existing one understands calculable)) the practice of duplicity “as the articulation of a dual tendency” is the only way to remain un-enasured by nihilistic delusions is to take up the adversary’s tools, but to use them in new and unpremeditated—that is, unforeseen and incalculable—ways. “If[ing] becoming cultural and at the same time hyper-industrial, capitalism is today essentially computational, and as such tends to eliminate those singularities that resist the calculability of all values on the market of economic exchange.”

Nihilism, however, can be made active through the transductive duplicity of productive struggle (the basis for Nietzsche’s political thinking of Groppepolitik, or “great politics”). Active nihilism is no longer nihilism that resists/reacts to the duplicitous and healthy in calculability of Becoming (the generative matrix of all psychic and collective individuation).

We live in the era of “all” or nothing, which amounts to “the installation of a system of terror,” argues Stiegler. Terror is also an attribute of Pan and of the “panic behaviour” (characteristic of Pan) which Stiegler calls “blu”—that is, blu—i.e., brutish, brutale, hard-like, dimunited and (as it is translated in DAD) stupido. Perhaps for present purposes “dimunited” is the correct term, since Stiegler suggests that the problem with this condition is that we have all lost our Witz, have become willless, without Witz as they say in German (or devoid, as Kant says, of our Mutterwitz). The “cleverness, craftsmanship, wily and witty ways of Prometheus, titan of Techniques and Time—the pro-métis/métriestheos definitio of this ethicnomonic character—is precisely what has existed, or as Stiegler says, been “liquidated,” from our era’s equations by dint, however, of its incalculability: its rather hypotenual disinciliation toward equation and equivocation. The métrie of Prometheus—métis being the Greek word for cunning craftiness—“duplice” or duplicitically, a word which in Greek is being used as a synonym of techne: technique”—operates in “shifting, disinfecting, and ambiguous situations” (such as the emergence qua invention of the human-all-too-human in the myth of Prometheus, “where precise calculation and rigorous logic either fail or lack time to operate” (here quoting a passage from Everett Wheeler quoted in Andréa Vaucr’s essay on “Stiegler and the Hegemony of Techniques”). In his ‘Alternare Triopolaire et Raison Expérientielle’ (1999), Noël Denoyel argues that the ancient Greek métrie (sometime-synonym of techne) should be taken, moreover, as a synonym of Simonvian transduction (which in turn functions in the manner of Charles Sanders Peirce’s abduction: Peirce’s term for fictive realization, a.k.a. again—individualisation). Métrie operates on the principle of duplicity “as the articulation of a dual tendency” in the absence of complete comprehension with respect to these tendencies (where “we remain ignorant about the way [our actions/activities] will turn out”?) without letting this absence impede the process of individuation—which abducts or transducing this absence, this not-knowing, such that “this not-knowing becomes, in a sense, an object of political attention” and tactical action. This practice cultivates, or rather, is the practice of “cultivating the difference between consistence and existence” according to Stiegler—this “difference is the singular, that is, incomparable, and in this sense inexistent, reality (if by existing one understands calculable)” of our difference, itself impertinently, is the opposition between existence and consistence. It requires a maintenance of the distinction between, and hence a double-articulation of, both consistence and existence (a.k.a. the “arche protostatic” of DAD 1.92) and the difference between existence and consistence—beyond mere “sub-consistence” of DAD 1.48 as well as a distinction between the stuff (i.e. labour) of negotium and the pleasure (i.e. useus) of oioio: this double-articulation articulating the “composition” rather than “opposition” of these dualities otherwise dissolved—“liquidated”—in and by the hyper-synchronized hyper-industrial “program society” outlined by Stiegler. “What Luther brought into play was the liquidation of that difference and hierarchy that, hitherto, had constituted negotium insofar as it was defined as that which was not oioio.” The confusion of oioio and negotium eliminates the indeterminate interstice that allows for the hyperetchnic qua hyperstition Stiegler calls “the practice [in italics in the original] of oioio” that which we used to call culture and which that lies at heart of what the Greeks called eris (the practice qua ongoing struggle to “elevate” ourselves that roots in the French word élire, a word used to designate one in the midst of education’s durée) the engine of human, neomorphic Prometheus, invention.

When the processes of individuation and invention become “black-boxed”—as inevitably they have become during the hegemony of hyper-industrialized capitalism—part of the trick becomes to use the tools at one’s disposal to invent ways out (pores) of the “aporia” of hyper-industrial consumerist capitalism and its planet-wide decomputational logic and effects. In Stiegler’s poignant phrase, and this concerns reason: “it involves an aporia lying within hyper-industrial capitalism itself, insofar as the question is no longer only economic: it is the spirit of capitalism, and its rationality—that is, its reason—that here encounters its own limit insofar as it becomes self-destructive. Reason, understood by the spirit of capitalism as ratio and rationalization—that is, as reckoning and rational accounting (as shown notably, by Weber)—tends to
destroy the motives for producing as well as consuming." \( ^{78} \) Stiegler here struggles to resurrect and rearticulate reason (logos) by forcing it outside of a computational paradigm (and the metaphysical project of the Occident) into what he calls "the political economy of singularities," involving the "becoming-symbolic of theiotic sensible." \( ^{79} \) And yet, was it not Nietzsche who described nihilism precisely as the "devaluation of the highest values" in which an active force which initially fortifies a system eventually cannibalizes and destroys it? \( ^{80} \) The aporia of reason is at the heart, it seems, of the problem of psychic and collective individuation today. So how does one have hope of struggling through and getting out of such a seemingly "no-win" (a.k.a. "aporetic") situation? This is a question that Sarah Kofman also asked in Comment s’orirer? \( ^{81} \) But her answer differs from Stiegler's: it is not by way of logos but rather by way of métsis that one must find ways out of untenable situations:

To relate it to métsis is to give philosophy the same soteriological end as [given] to technique: that of inventing poreis to get man out of aporias, [out] of all sorts of difficult situations without exit. It is métsis, indeed, that allows one to push through a poreis, to clear a path, a course through obstacles, to invent an expedient (poreis) to find an exit out of (poreis) an aporetic situation without exit. Where indeterminacy (aporia), reigns (there is) the absence of limit and direction—obscurity; where you are trapped, surrounded, prisoner of inextricable entanglements, it is métsis that intervenes— inventing strategies, expedients, tricks, ruses, machinations, machinis, techin, in order to go from absence-of-limit to determination, from obscurity to light. \( ^{82} \)

Outside the schema of the logoi—of rationalizations, standard measures—established oppositions ("contradictions") find themselves reticulated as elements within a ubiquitous technical network of ongoing modifications, which Simondon characterizes as being in a constant and constitutive process of transduction. Caining intelligence is a mode of duplicity that proceeds by way of skilful handling or, by "tricks [rather] than by general methods" \( ^{83} \) that is, rather than by way of logical—calculate—measures.

As Détienne and Vernet remind us (via the Greeks of antiquity), in the "fraught and unstable time of the agón"—for Stiegler, our present time-period: one in which the failures of hyper-consumptive industrialization can no longer be ignored—métsis duplicity is an "absolute weapon" more precise than any force of arms. métsis gives one a hold without which one would be at a loss. \( ^{84} \) In antiquity, for example, the métsis of Póseidon, in imitation of the sieve (poreis) of the Thracian goddess, by "giving back" because it gives a hold without which one would be at a loss, comes to the service of—in rather than opposes—noetic intelligence (the act of carefully thinking, of thinking with care, of caring to think: that of which we must, in our present crisis, "take care" says Stiegler). Being distinct from logos, the duplice of métsis—which Stiegler calls the "long circuits" of social and collective individuation (Simondonian "transindividuation")—is an "absolute weapon" more precious than any force of arms. métsis is an "absolute weapon" more precious than any force of arms. métsis is an "absolute weapon" more precious than any force of arms.
that itself bore an unprecedented drive-based storm, which then became the principle of a capitalist system devoid of all spirit. In the language of Bernard Gille, one could say that they accomplished an “adjustment” between the evolutions of the technical system and the economic system—but that this came at the cost of “dislocations” in the other spheres and the destruction of many other systems, such as the family, the state, the biosphere, and so on, and especially the psychic system itself and the libidinal economy in which it is formed, inevitably leading to a process of generalized disvalorization” (D&D I, 32–33). “May 1968 [...] was the pre-mutation of changes that lay in embryonic form within capitalist and industrial becoming,” he argues (D&D III, 30).

17. “Automatization”, as in the chapter-heading of D&D III Chapter Two (D&D III, 42).
22. “Culture is [...]: exchanged and traded in for ‘mall culture’ and ‘shopping by remote’ [...] sold down the river by the sorts of people who want to turn the entire planet into an International Airport Arrival-concourse. This isn’t the victory of somebody’s culture over somebody else’s culture: nobody ever had a culture like that: it’s just the victory of schlockmeisterism and crapola over good taste and good sense”, Terence McKenna, “Eros and The Exchistem” (Lecture presented June 17–19 1994 at the Rim Institute, Phoenix Arizona; transcribed by Dan Mellamphy).
23. “Someone said ‘What’s so progressive about media?—It’s the spreading of darkness at the speed of light!’... It...” I, 97
26. Bernard Stiegler, D&D II, 19, 32, 135 n.6, 12, 29, 70-71. This “liquidation” (he explains) “is impeded by the technologies of the automatization process, and in particular by a ‘service industry’ tightly wedded to those dream-industries that are the cultural program-industries” “[T]he latter are themselves already the outcome of the automatization of information—the audio-visual and tele-communications—in the context of networks in the age of the Internet Protocol IP: this exorcizing ways-of-life, moreover, was inscribed in and as the essence of capitalism from its origin” (D&D III, 8).
27. Bernard Stiegler, D&D I, 97; D&D III, 42, 89-90 (it is a matter of polemology, of struggling for the life of the spirit).
29. The two epigraphs that begin D&D I are from Paul Valery and Jose Bousquet, the two that begin D&D II are from Jean-Pierre Vernant and Andre Breton, and the three final epigraphs at the start of the ten-page conclusion in D&D III are from Jean-Pierre Vernant (on Prometheus's identity), Jacques Derrida (on the technical phantasm) and Gregory Bateson (on the pharmacological interrelation of sobriety and intoxication).
30. The other former epigraphs are, as Maurice Blanchot would have said, writings of the disaster, bearing witness to that which is expressed/real “nonsense” in Volume One, an excerpt from Paul Valery, and in Volume Two an excerpt from Jean-Pierre Vernant (Vernant will return once again in and as the first of the final triad of epigraphs at the conclusion of Stiegler’s Para-Simondonian techno-political project (D&D III, 80). This is thus the misery of the [...] remains of the w(e)(beyond the eye) in the epoch of capitalism and especially the era of hyper-industrial capitalism” (D&D III, 11, 10). “The question [at the heart of Disbelief and Discredit] is therefore of spirit,” explains Stiegler (ibid.): “the spirit of capitalism in its age in which capitalism has lost any notion of ‘spirit’; and ‘the question of spirit is in general the question of the w(e)’ — the capitalist socialization of the ‘values of May 68’, along with the ‘re recuperation of the ‘ideas of May 68 and the establishment of the capitalist control-society’; are the focus of Stiegler’s first chapter in the final volume of Disbelief & Discredit ‘In the course of the 1970s’, he explains, ‘certain ‘progressive employers’ started to take an interest in what we could call ‘cognitive capitalism’ and ‘knowledge societies.’” D&D III, 12.
31. Bernard Stiegler, D&D II, 7. “The ‘subversion of May 68’ largely accompanied, if not fed, the transformations of capitalism” (he argues in the first chapter of D&D III) “by having brought to the point of a symbolic and spiritual misery placed entirely in the service of industrial populism and addictive consumption” (D&D III, 6-9). The latter has been achieved, he has been occupied, and the outcome of such a w(e) — would now [should now] be thoroughly free from the get-go.” “The fact from which society suffers is the disappearance of the super-eu-psy,” argues Stiegler: “spiritual misery is thus the misery of the [...] remains of the w(e)(beyond the eye) in the epoch of capitalism and especially the era of hyper-industrial capitalism” (D&D III, 11, 10). “The question [at the heart of Disbelief and Discredit] is therefore of spirit,” explains Stiegler (ibid.): “the spirit of capitalism in its age in which capitalism has lost any notion of ‘spirit’; and ‘the question of spirit is in general the question of the w(e)’ — the capitalist socialization of the ‘values of May 68’, along with the ‘re recuperation of the ‘ideas of May 68 and the establishment of the capitalist control-society’; are the focus of Stiegler’s first chapter in the final volume of Disbelief & Discredit ‘In the course of the 1970s’, he explains, ‘certain ‘progressive employers’ started to take an interest in these ideas, in particular the group Entreprise et Progres, who realized that the ‘ideas of 68’ were not to be rejected in their entirety. It was in this way that the Taylorist and Fordist models were surpassed: it was necessary to ‘break with previous modes of control’ by ‘substituting self-monitoring [...] autonomous’ for control’, s.a.a., ‘the managerial model’ (D&D III, 24, 35). “May 68”... argues Stiegler in this chapter (the penultimate chapter of Disbelief and Discredit), “was the pre-mutation of changes that lay in embryonic form within capitalist and industrial becoming” (D&D III, 30). “[T]he new capitalism, thanks to its new-style management inspired by the ‘values of May 68’, [...] mined desire by producing a ‘social demand’ that is merely an arche which serves generalized poliotechnization and the establishment of addictive forms of consumption. This is depicted as ‘personalization’, but in fact it merely extends calculability by applying it to the control and reduction of singularities, which are thereby transformed into particularities” (D&D III, 22).
35. Nick Land, Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007, eds. Ray Brassier and Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic Press, 2011, 552-553, 579). We are by no means confusing the philosophies of Stiegler and of Land, which are indeed remarkably different, but hyperstitions—“good” and “bad”/“productive” and “destructive”—nevertheless play an important part in each one respectively.
36. Bernard Stiegler, D&D I, 148, 25. “[...] ‘disindividualization’ (he explains) ‘on the basis of the fiction and artificality of techniques’ (D&D III, 80) is ‘a mechanism that is always already phantasmatic and fantastic—that is, ‘fictioning-the-real, inclusive of technical invention’—in sum, what is here being described in terms of fictioing-the-real is none other than ‘the process of psychic i.e. individual, collective and technical individuation’ at the heart of Stiegler’s para-Simondonian techno-political project (D&D III, 44).”
Bernard Stiegler, *Disbelief and Discredit*, Volumes I-III

Andrés Vaccari, ‘Unweaving the Program: Stiegler and the Hegemony of Technics’, in *Disbelief and Discredit*

Marcuse sees very well how new forms of control are established through the functionalization of leisure,” Stiegler notes in *Disbelief and Discredit* (I, 57). 

In the third volume of *Disbelief and Discredit*, Stiegler acknowledges that theorists like “Machince would have us turn back to a discourse of the opposition of tendencies, whereas there are only processes of the composition of tendencies”—the latter understanding being one that “was first rediscovered by Nietzsche” and that “was characteristic of Heraclitus”—constituting “more generally [... the Peisianatic, tragic style of thought” (*D&D* III, 32).

75. “This process is the expression of becoming insofar as it is always duplicitous,” argues Stiegler (*D&D* I, 57).

86. Dètienne and Vernant, 13, 14.
87. “[T]he Titan’s Never always recoils against him in the end: he is caught in the trap which he himself set. Prometheus and Epimetheus represent the two faces of a single figure; just as the prometheism of man is simply the other side to his radical ignorance of the future,” Dètienne and Vernant, 17, 18.