Since Jean-Jacques Rousseau, one of the most widely discussed issues in political debates (and one about which the right and the left traditionally differ) has been whether the human being is naturally good or evil. Yet such a question is philosophically meaningless; when one attributes to the thinker of the social contract the proposition that the human being is fundamentally good, one changes his thought precisely where it is philosophical.

There is no doubt that for Rousseau, if the purely natural human being were to exist, it would necessarily be fundamentally good. But it does not exist. However, we need its fiction in order to think the human being, for Rousseau reveals to us that the human being is a process, and thus becoming. The human being is driven in this becoming by a motive of which Rousseau states as a rule that, because it
tends towards the equilibrium of law through the disequilibrium of facts, and thereby
towards unity through its differences, it affirms an equality of all human beings,
thus affirming, correlativelly, their equal goodness.

What is at stake in the famous Discourse is thinking the human being de jure, that is
to say the human being to come. The human being becomes and this becoming is
not a blind mechanism: it is the exercise of a freedom, the human being’s freedom
to be good or not. In other words, the human being is neither good nor evil,
because it is good de jure and evil de facto. The human being exists between these
two tendencies: the tendency of actual reality and the tendency of the imaginary to
come, founded on the fiction of an absolute past, namely the past of the “purely
natural human being.” And the fiction of this purely natural human being is
projected into the future towards the infinity of a process of individuation that is
essentially never-ending. “Towards infinity” also means that the state of equality
and goodness that defines the purely natural human being “perhaps never existed
and] probably never will exist”2: Rousseau never claimed to realize a paradise on
earth, nor that one ever existed.3 In this respect, even the “good savage” is evil de
facto, however little this may be.

In the end, to ask whether the human being is good or evil is to misunderstand
the nature of a philosophical question: it is to misunderstand the necessity of
distinguishing what is de facto from what is de jure, and to misunderstand that
freedom depends on this distinction, while philosophy depends on this freedom.
If philosophy can make the distinction, and without opposing the terms that are
formed in the process, it is because the philosopher posits—at the very origin of
philosophy and as the foundational question of all philosophy—that the human
being is neither good nor evil but irreducibly both. It is both good and evil.4

This and opens up what Simondon calls a field,5 a term he borrows from Gestalt
theory, which took it in turn from electromagnetic physics. The coordinating
conjunction and in the expression “good and evil” is a conjunction that is obviously
also a disjunction; it is therefore the knot of a constitutive contradiction that
ties together a dynamic principle. This disjunctive conjunction maintains itself
between terms that form a transductive relation; here, it is the relation that
constitutes its terms, and where one term—for example, good—does not exist
without the other—evil.
A transductive relation, such as the one that exists between good and evil (and that is a field), is itself inscribed into a transductive relation of a particular kind (and which opens up another field), one that Simondon calls a dyad, a term he borrows from Plato. A dyad is not a simple transductive relation because its “terms” are themselves indefinite and thus interminable (and indeterminable). They tend towards infinity.

Simondon states that the field in which the and articulates good and evil—in a certain sense constituting them by distinguishing them—is traversed by tendencies that only become actual and concrete in this and. It is in such a field that an individual is formed and transformed as a process of psychic individuation (paired with a collective individuation while remaining distinct from it) in which the individual individuates itself psychically both de jure and de facto. In this way, the individual becomes the center and thereby the middle of this relation, precisely as its disjunctive conjunction. It is from Simondon that Gilles Deleuze borrows, as one of the most recurrent features of his work, this way of thinking the individual: starting from a disjunctive conjunction and inscribing the problems of individuation into the middle of a relation in which, in order to think this relation, one must begin not from its extremities but from its middle.

Such a dynamic relation is a tension. This relation can only exist as tension within a process of individuation that surpasses and traverses the individual like the indefinite terms of the dyad for which this individual is the theater of individuation. To say that the individual is such a theater and that the individuation that plays itself out like a piece of theater is always already at the same time psychic and collective, to say, in other words, that this individuation surpasses the opposition between interior and exterior and that, in this surpassing, tendencies are at play that correspond to what is called, in moral expressions of judgment, “being good” or “being evil” (or “being bad”)—to say all this means that what is played out on the scene of such an individual individuating itself can either be favorable or unfavorable to collective individuation through its psychic individuation. However, when the psychic individuation is unfavorable to collective individuation, it is more like a psychic disindividuation: a loss of psychic individuation.

This explains why Simondon devotes a brief but vigorous analysis to the question of temptation, while at the same time rethinking the question of good and evil from the ground up, not leaving it to gather dust in the storehouse of metaphysical and moral antiques. This also explains why he turns here to Socrates, for to be unfavorable to collective individuation always means, in the end, to be unfavorable...
to one’s own psychic individuation; being unfavorable to collective individuation can only mean to disindividuate oneself.

This is also the meaning behind the *and* that is both conjunctive and disjunctive, not only in the relation of *good* *and* evil but also in the process of psychic *and* collective individuation. Simondon posits as a principle that psychic individuation can only occur through the participation in collective individuation, and that every evolution of collective individuation in turn influences the conditions of psychic individuation.

This is why for Socrates being unfavorable to collective individuation—or, in his terms, being unjust—inevitably means wronging oneself: indeed, this is one of the key issues at stake in *Gorgias*.

Poised as never before between good and evil, the question of the future of humanity stands vertiginously before us today: this question, which is first a moral question, becomes (as is evident in Rousseau) politics itself: it is the question of *philia*.

Simondon allows us to consider these politically charged questions in new terms, reinterpreting and reactivating the foundational questions of philosophical thought through an absolutely original conceptual framework. This framework describes processes of vital, physical, and psychosocial individuation, making use of findings from both contemporary physics and the human sciences. Its explicit aim: the foundation of a reunified human science, precisely through the overcoming of the opposition between the psychic and the social. This opposition is artificial, produced by the division of intellectual labor that gave birth to psychology and sociology at the moment when philosophy, as the power of synthesis, gave up its regional analytic capacities to the positive sciences.

The analytical becoming of different branches of knowledge stems from the methodological separation of intellectual objects into disciplines of thought, and from the industrial division of labor (manual, then intellectual). Psychology and morality became separated in philosophy (a distinction that had no meaning for the Greeks) the moment when categorizations and distinctions entered into intellectual labor, categories that ultimately produced a division between metaphysics (or the critique of metaphysics) and epistemology on one
hand, and between the human sciences on the other, the latter resulting from an analytical division of human and social objects according to methods of observation and quantification creating new domains of intellectual labor.

This division of labor, which led to the explosion of different branches of knowledge (such that philosophy also separated at the same moment from the natural sciences), occurred simultaneously with the discretization of operations of human labor (through a process of grammatization) and with their exteriorization under industrial capitalism in the form of machines.

However, the process that led to extraordinary progress in the different branches of knowledge also produced a sort of enucleation of thought, perhaps even its disindividuation, a state of affairs that various interdisciplinary aggregations are now trying overcome—for example, in the so-called “cognitive” sciences. In spite of these ambitions, we are for the most part lacking the faculty to synthetically link together branches of knowledge that were constructed analytically: Simondon’s oeuvre is the thought of just such a faculty; it is an expression of its necessity as well as a reflection on that which blocks the path to it, not only temporarily, but also structurally. For this very reason, Simondon’s work is that which provokes us to think, and, more precisely, to think of a new critique of thought in the form of an individuating reason.

As Jacques Garelli has underlined, Simondon revives the questions of the Presocratics: the thought of psychic and collective individuation is a magnificent reopening of the inaugural question of the One and the Multiple, and of the hypokeimenon proton—the question at the origin of Greek thought that emerges with, and for, the nascent polis (whose dynamic principle is also, as the tension between the One and the Multiple, the principle of that which puts the polis into danger—a danger of the disindividuation the Greeks called stasis).

By taking up once again the knot of the One and the Multiple, Simondon is attempting to reconstitute a synthetic era of philosophy after several centuries dominated by analytical thought, from the period that began with Descartes and his new conception of method. This project becomes particularly evident in Psychic and Collective Individuation where, beyond its many and powerful reflections on the relation as the first question of philosophy (a question taken up from every possible angle), the work makes explicit its ambition to found a different axiomatic of the human sciences using this new concept of relation (and thus of synthesis),

the uncanniness of thought · 67
a new axiomatic that is capable of founding the human science.

This ambition, this mission to synthesize, once it has been given back to philosophy as that which represents the reunification of one human science (which Simondon compares to the surpassing of the opposition between physics and chemistry in the natural sciences), does not do away with analysis. Much the contrary: rarely has a work of philosophy so scrupulously taken into account the different branches of knowledge of its time, in every domain, and in their most analytical manner (physics, biology, technology, sociology, psychology, social sciences, and management sciences—running each time through the entire history of philosophy for each discipline).

Simondon therefore does not at all propose to abandon analytical considerations of objects of thought, nor the methods that allow for their production; his purpose is not to oppose the sciences, nor to contest their objects, it is to study these objects as closely as possible. Simondon’s approach is also the reinscription of analytical results into a synthetic trajectory, which is to say into a method that is the relation itself, as sun-thesis.

Such a method rests on the primacy accorded to the relation that constitutes its terms and that is called, for this reason, transductive. This primacy is given relative to the a priori deductive relation and to the a posteriori inductive relation: it is a new relation to experience, one which is now thought as being irreducibly inscribed into a dynamic system. Philosophy itself, and the philosophy put forward by Simondon in particular, is a specific case of such an experience and such an inscription. Simondon’s new thought (which does away with the opposition between the a priori and the a posteriori) is that of transduction, as the dynamic relation in a system, in a set of systems that are themselves in transductive relations, and for which we must develop the concept of preindividuality: more precisely of the preindividual environment.

Psycho and Collective Individuation is the work in which Simondon establishes the conditions of possibility and the limits to the knowledge of individuation in all its forms: physical, vital, and psychosocial. It is a critique of knowledge in the Kantian sense.

The conditions of possibility of the knowledge of individuation are relative in Simondon; they are also the conditions of impossibility, or more precisely, they
are the conditions of a limited possibility that is always being raised. They are the conditions of a knowledge that is, for this reason, essentially conceived of as the process of an incompletion [inachèvement] that is also characteristic of individuation as such.

This new critique consists of a new conceptual framework in which the categories that were at the basis of all philosophy, and through which philosophy tried to understand the individual (as tode ti and sunolon, or as subjectum and as subject), become a region of thought in the same way that Newton’s principles or Euclid’s axiomatic are regions of contemporary physics and geometry.

The preindividual must now be thought of as being the environment in which a process occurs whose result is the individual, and for which the categories that allowed us to discern the individual are inoperative. In such an understanding of process, the psychic individual is no longer privileged in any way: social individuals are no more or less individual than physical persons.

The relative conditions of possibility of the knowledge of individuation are thus conditions of impossibility, because it is impossible to know individuation without individuating it, and without individuating oneself: without individuating oneself and at the same time individuating individuation, which is thereby known and becomes for the same reason unknown again, that is to say inadequate. To know means to individuate, and to individuate means to trans-form the known object, to render it unknown, something to be known, to be known anew. This is the case because gnoseological individuation is an instance of psychic and social individuation that leads to transindividuation. It is even the case par excellence in which the individuation of the knowing subject, as a psychic individual, is immediately the individuation of knowledge, insofar as the latter is inextricably both a social reality and a psychic reality.

Psychic and Collective Individuation is this critique, to the extent that it describes the operation of transindividuation through which categorization in general occurs in the process that is individuation, such that the coincidence in the act of knowing between the psychic and the social produces, paradoxically, an irreducible inadequacy between this act of knowing and the result of this knowledge, which is to say, its object. As with Kant, the knowledge of an object is a production of the object; but what emerges through this act of knowledge as a “quantum leap” in the individuation leads to a metastabilization of the knowledge, to a potential instability of this knowledge, and therefore of the object thereby constituted.
This means that knowledge is a never-ending process of participation in a larger collective individuation where the preindividual—the carrier of potentials that are actualized by psychic and social individuals—only individuates itself through the stages of a process of individuation in which one metastable state follows another, always at the edge of a disequilibrium.

It is in this sense that this critique of individuating reason proceeds from the questions that were opened by thermodynamics and quantum mechanics; and this is why it continues on the path of *Critique of Pure Reason*, for which the environment of individuation was Newtonian physics. This continuation, like the surpassing of the opposition between matter and form (the main achievement of *The Individual and Its Physico-Biological Genesis*), suspends at the same time the opposition between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, and individuating reason can no longer be thought outside the couple knowing-individual/known-environment.

As a consequence, knowledge becomes performative: the individual that knows alters the environment through this knowledge, or, in other words, by individuating it. This requires a reform of human understanding such that, like with the opposition between form and matter or between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, the opposition between psychology and sociology must also be surpassed (including all the oppositions that follow in the entirety of the human sciences). It is in this sense that the project of this *critique of individuating reason* that is *Psychic and Collective Individuation* is to lay a new foundation for a human science, that is to say, a knowledge of the psychosocial individuation of which knowledge itself is but one instance.

Such a human science must restore a full and even primordial dignity to spiritual, moral, and ethical questions. The impossibility of knowing individuation without individuating oneself and without, at the same time individuating individuation—which signifies that the opposition of the subject and the object no longer allows us to think knowledge, and which inscribes an irreducible inadequacy in the very heart of the act of knowing—is an example of the *lack* [défaut] that generally constitutes subjectivation as individuation, and which the individuating individual experiences above all as something that is *moral* rather than gnoseological.

It is only from the thought of the individual’s inadequacy to itself, which stems from the fact that the individual always already interiorizes its exterior
environment, and from the preindividual potentials that the individual contains for an individuation to come (such that the individual finds itself always already surpassed by the individuation that traverses and supports it), that the conjunction and, in the process of psychic and collective individuation, being also a disjunction, makes and unmakes at the same time the psychosocial a process of individuation.

Only from this disjunctive conjunction, as a spiritual, moral or ethical schize, is it possible to think the general conditions of individuation as knowledge in a gnoseological schize in which knowledge, insofar as it is always already a psychosocial individuation, and in that sense practical, is also—and irreducibly—political.

How, then, are we to understand the suicide of George Eastmann? This kind of question is a typical example of an individual’s conflict with itself, a conflict that is always individuation. This question is also an example of what is explored by Simondonian human science and of the manner in which this exploration takes place by individuating its object. For Simondon’s goal is to found one human science; a unified science of the human being and human society can only be brought about by reintroducing the high and the low into the psyche and into the social body, that is to say, by turning what it unifies into a dynamic process founded upon dyads that contain multiplicities and divisions, the terms of which are in an originary relation (transduction), but which are irreducible to one another. As a consequence of the intrinsically unfinished [inachevē] character of the process of individuation, the transductive relations are also dynamic couples in which the inadequacy of the individual to itself crystallizes.

As the indefiniteness of the terms between which dynamic fields are formed, dyads engender multiplicities that metastabilize during the collective individuation, such that this collective individuation produces transindividuation, or a “second individuation.” With the term transindividuation, Simondon characterizes the spiritual in the preindividial, a term that is the very experience of the incompleteness of the individual and not merely of the species: the individual’s experience of its inadequacy to itself, which never ceases to divide itself into past and future, or into memory and imagination. (The doctrine of the immortality of the soul finds its meaning here. Generally speaking, one of the greatest strengths of this book is that it shows the necessity, and thus the actuality, of earlier eras of thought, in other words, of earlier stages of collective individuation.)
Thus in Simondon’s work, there exist the superior and the inferior, the high and the low: individuation constantly oscillates between these two terms. *Du mode d’existence des objets techniques* [On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects] describes the experience of the exceptional conditions that provide access to the superior, an experience that is at once first (original) and quotidian. The experience is an attraction to what are called, in this book, “key points”, that is, the exceptional moments and places, the summit meetings and the days of celebration (for example, rituals).\(^\text{17}\) For these extremes, psychology is inseparable from morality and ethics, because we are dealing with the psychology of a spiritual being, which is to say a social and a transindividual being.

Simondon’s psychology, which is an individuation that is always already social and thus also a sociology, is shaped like a cross: on the one hand, it is structured horizontally by relations of perception and affection\(^\text{18}\); and on the other, it is structured vertically by the relations of high and low.\(^\text{19}\) *Psychic and Collective Individuation* is the experience of a permanent horizontal movement that rises and falls, exploring the vertical, and it is in this way that the question of temptation is redefined, *on the basis of which Simondon thinks time*.\(^\text{20}\) The trajectory of the process is no longer determined by the *opposition* of good and evil, good and bad, superior and inferior, but by their *composition*.

From this point forward, two fundamental concepts articulate themselves in relation to one another in Simondon’s oeuvre without, however, being explicitly designated as such: the concept of *circuit*, and the concept of *levels* of elevation. It is through the combination of these concepts that Simondon develops his synthetic philosophy of human science as a process of individuation constituted by transductive relations.

These transductive relations are processes of growth; they develop morphogeneses “from one point to the next,” and the dynamic principle of these transductive relations, the tension that creates them, is the circuit that makes an action respond to a perception and an emotion to an affection.\(^\text{21}\) It is in circuits like these that transductive relations concretize themselves, and it is through this growth and this structuration that these relations produce information and signification. They psychic individual is in turn linked to the collective individual through information and signification, thereby overcoming their difference. The signification that is *traced out* on this circuit is both interior and exterior to the
psychic individual and the social individual; in other words, this signification is unlimited and moves in the indefiniteness of the dyad, as the very indetermination that opens up the possibility of freedom.

In general, all of what Simondon writes is made up of the polarities between which relations appear. These polarities articulate themselves in relation to one another, playing with one another, and in this way, they constitute the process of individuation as a transindividuation that produces the transindividual. Dramas (actions) occur between these polarities, for example, the difficult experience of temptation, which clearly shows that between good and evil, the inferior and the superior cannot be at the same level. The philosophy of psychic and collective individuation that is presented in this book is a philosophy of levels, and of the immanence that constitutes itself, both horizontally and vertically in the course of this process. This immanence is not flat; it is on the contrary amply voluminous. It is this immanence alone that allows us to once again pose the problem of “belief in the world,” and the question of a “new belief,” in a new manner.

This new approach must be articulated through what Simondon has to say on the splitting of personalities: the psyche, through both memory and imagination, continually splits, and as such, temporalizes itself. These splits produce the symbolization of the ego and constitute the possibility of changing levels: it is in this way that Simondon thinks time, starting from the experience of temptation.

It is because we always think in terms of polarities, always between two poles, either horizontally or vertically, one pole incapable of functioning without the other, and therefore incapable of being opposed to the other, that Simondon writes that we must think things starting from their middle. Deleuze took this idea and made it the basis for his perhaps overly famous problematic of the rhizome: overly famous in the sense that it all too often obscures the fact that if there is cardinality in this polarity (east, west, north, and south), there is also verticality. There is no cardinality without a horizon and no horizon without a top and a bottom. It is here that time passes and pierces the horizon with the trajectory of the stars, as the cosmic process affecting the psychic individual, becoming thereby social—this is what Kant calls moral law.

Without this problematic of key points—which are eminent points, summits and exceptional moments—it is impossible to understand the question of the division through which Simondon claims (and this may be one of his weaknesses) to be able to bring together the question of psychoanalysis, or the thought of the
unconscious, with that of Pierre Janet.

The Simondonian theory of psychosocial individuation is to the human sciences and to philosophy what quantum mechanics is to physics.

Simondon’s theory maintains this position not only in relation to philosophy, whose fundamental categories it overturns, but also in relation to the human sciences. It is a critique of the latter in the same sense in which Kant proposed a critique of reason through a critique of metaphysics—even if Simondon’s critique does not consist in limiting the knowledge of the human and the social sciences, but rather in confronting it with the question of the unlimited, such that this critique calls into question the analytical division of labor in the human and social sciences. As a result, ethical and spiritual questions regain their urgency.

For Simondon then, the human and social sciences are not avatars of philosophy; they are not considered a degenerative specialization of philosophy, as was the case for French philosophers after the waning of structuralism, but a new regime not only for philosophy, but for thought in general. If, since Kant, philosophy became separated from mathematical formalisms and science, which itself divided into physics, chemistry, and biology, each specialized in domains of knowledge defining their own ontologies, and then turning the human being and society into objects of scientific studies, thereby separating themselves from philosophy by becoming experimental, positive and methodical, establishing themselves before all else as methods that allow us to ensure that facts can be taken into consideration by thought, the philosophy of Simondon articulates itself closely with the science of its time in its entirety. Simondon’s thought revisits Gestalt theory from its inception in crystallography; it reconceptualizes the categories of the in-group and the out-group that were taken from American psychology: for Simondon, thought begins at the basis of that which science brings to philosophy, and not the other way around; philosophy’s task is to re-synthesize, and thus to re-individuate, what science provides it.

From then on, entering into Simondon’s philosophy is somewhat similar to having a spiritual dream: it is to experience a defamiliarization of the familiar, to encounter the uncanniness of thought where everything is already known, where everything has already been seen, and where everything nevertheless appears suddenly in a radically new light.
In this philosophy, Simondon addresses all of the problems encountered by the human spirit in the course of its history, from religion to suicide. Here, the world is an object of consideration only to the extent that it is a process that describes the very activity of the thought of the person attempting to think it (which is already a kind of dynamic transcendental affinity). This situation describes our mental and individuating (and therefore also social) activity at the very moment in which we read Simondon, who only thinks individuation to the extent that he individuates himself in the very process of thinking this individuation, and who, through this gesture, individuates us as well. Here, as with quantum physics, phenomena no longer appear as we experience them on a daily basis: they necessitate a new type of seeing and, if I may be allowed to use Husserlian phenomenological categories here, a new type of epokhè.
NOTES

1. This text was originally published as the introduction to Simondon, Gilbert. *L’individualisation psychique et collective* (Paris: Aubier, 2007). *Parrhesia* would like to thank Bernard Stiegler and Drew S. Burk for permission to publish this English translation.


3. “It didn’t even occur to most of our philosophers to doubt that the state of nature has existed, even though it is evident from reading the Holy Scriptures that the first man, having received enlightenment and precepts immediately from God, was not himself in that state; and if we give the writings of Moses the credence that every Christian owes them we must deny that, even before the flood, men were ever in the pure state of nature, unless they had fallen back into it because of some extraordinary event: a paradox that is quite awkward to defend and utterly impossible to prove.” in Rousseau, *The Basic Political Writings*, 38.


8. *L’individualisation psychique et collective*, 159, 163, 244, 256.

9. Simondon writes that “Socrates’ reasoning oudeis exon anartanei, according to which no one does evil voluntarily, is remarkably revelatory in respect to the true moral conscience of the individual and of a society of individuals; indeed, since moral conscience is auto-normative and auto-constitutive, it is essentially placed before the alternative of either not existing or not doing evil voluntarily.” cf. *L’individualisation psychique et collective*, 259.

10. The analytical distinction of objects of thought was both a precondition for, and a repercussion of, the industrial division of intellectual labor. This distinction led to the destruction of the Great Psychosocial Synthesis that represented the unity of the object of faith: an Object/Subject (God) produced by monotheism as the result of, and the condition for, the process of psychic and collective individuation known as the West. The Great Psychosocial Synthesis contained, on one hand, knowledge as theoretical reason and, on the other, practical reason as a subjective principle of differentiation between good and evil, good and bad, better and worse, high and low. The death of God was the explosion of this Great Psychosocial Synthesis, as the metastabilization of the contradictions inherent to the psychic and collective individuations inherited from the Greeks and the Hebrews. This resulted in a division of intellectual labor—in the context of the industrial division of labor—at whose boundaries Simondon is working by proposing a critique, in the most philosophical sense, of this division: a critique that both stands firmly in the Kantian trajectory, and yet also breaks from it.


14. Of course, such a synthesis is not dialectical; it calls for a new concept of the conditions of synthesis itself. By “synthesis” we do not merely mean that which unifies, that which produces the One, but also that which relaunches multiplicity by in-dividuating it: as something that is dynamic and more than unitary, what Simondon calls a “resolving transduction,” cf. *L’individualisation*
psychique et collective, 27.
15. L’individuation psychique et collective, 34-35.
16. L’individuation psychique et collective, 172, note 3.
18. This thematic is explored in the first two chapters of the first part of Psychic and Collective Individuation.
19. Du mode d’existence des objets techniques. and also infra, 159, 161, 163 and 140.
20. L’individuation psychique et collective, 168.
22. L’individuation psychique et collective, 125, 197, 199, 207.