

war in the family

nicole loraux, translated by adam kotsko

“Our war at home (*ho oikeiōs ēmin polemos*) was fought in such a way that, if people had to engage in internal strife, no one would pray for his city to be stricken in any other way. In fact, the citizens from the Piraeus and the city mingled among themselves with such a wholly familial joy (*hōs asmenōs kai oike kai oikeiōs allēlois sunemeixan*)...! And the sole cause for all that was their genuine kinship (*hē tōi onti xungeneia*), which provided them, not in word but in fact, with a friendship of those from the same stock (*philian bebaion kai homophilon*).”¹

In other words: because it takes place in the family, civil war tends irreversibly toward fraternization. Or more exactly—since, in this development, the historical account is put in service of a generalizing goal—this is how the *stasis*-model is rolled out in Athens in 404 BCE. It is Plato who affirms it in the *Menexenus* and, to go by what he says, the Athenians carried out a civil war among themselves solely in order to better encounter one another in the joy of a family celebration. Just as if talking about military operations among fellow citizens amounted to describing the final reconciliation, *polemos* has no sooner been named than the citizens are mingling with one another with an entirely familial fervor.² Lest we be mistaken, however: before kinship (*xungeneia*) and belonging to the same stock (*homophilon*) come in to explain the miracle of this war in the form of fraternization, one word, the verb *sunemeixan*, has condensed in itself the entire ambiguity of the development. “They mingled among themselves”: in reconciliation, certainly. This

is what the text gives us to understand. But, if one dares to seek in *sunemeixan* a commentary on the preceding phrase, as the introductive particle *gar* (“Our war... was fought... In fact...”) moreover invites us to do, it will be necessary to resign oneself to giving this verb a completely different sense, frequently attested in the language of Greek historians: “they mingled [*se mêlèrent*] among themselves” then means “they engaged in the *mêlée*,” which is to say, “hostilities.” In an entirely familial fashion, certainly; it remains to give some sense to this familial manner of joining arms. Doubtless we are invited to choose the first reading, the edifying reading: the *oikeios polemos* is a war in name only since, as Plato will again tell us in the *Republic*, one engages in it “like people who know that one day they’ll be reconciled.”³ It is a paradoxical war that is carried out as a family celebration; but, by virtue of the Platonic ruse, nothing prevents us from seeing in the hostilities themselves a familial manifestation.

That the city is a family is an open-and-shut case in the *Menexenus*. Still it would be advisable to determine at which moment this family most completely manifests its essence: at the instant when hatred changes into reconciliation or that of the unrelenting battle that confronts kinsmen with their own kinsmen. Is “family” latent in the city—and only revealed by the bitterness of *stasis*? Or should one see in the familial dimension of the city a model (an ideal, perhaps a dream) conceived to remedy this malady of civil war? Beyond its Platonic version, which is condensed to better express ambivalence, this alternative deserves to be deployed on its own terms. This is what I will be attempting in what would be a simple mapping of the ways of thinking war in the family, without pretending that there would be material there for an exhaustive survey of familial figures of civic ideology.



In opening this study with some lines from the *Menexenus* concerning a *stasis* that stands out in Athenian memory, I intended to insist at once on the rupture that the year 404/403 introduced in the time of the city and on the ambivalence constitutive of the notion of *oikeios polemos*—with the firm project of examining the question from that starting point, while choosing not to decide between two fully marked out lines of exposition.

The first would be diachronic. It would be a matter of recording, from archaic Greece to classical Athens, the successive forms of the familial representation of the city. From the political poetry of an Alcaeus or a Solon (where for the first

time, civil war, designated as *stasis emphylos*, is grafted onto the generic kinship links of the group) to the emergence, in Xenophon or Plato, of an irenic model of the city as a great family, the route would consist of some obligatory steps: such as Aeschylean tragedy where, toward the middle of the fifth century, the civic order proclaims the reign of an Ares of lineage to be a thing of the past, and the historical writing of Thucydides, who made *stasis* the necessary consequence of the reversals of the Peloponnesian War and the family the principal victim of the disorders of *stasis*. And we would reconstruct a coherent evolution, beginning with a prestigious but incomplete series.

The second way, as one has guessed, would by contrast opt for the intemporal-ity proper to all those pairs of oppositions in which a cultural system thinks its identity. To be specific, to the idea of a connaturality of discord and family, one would oppose the praise of familial *homonoia*, as two antagonistic paradigms, two mirrors offered to the city. The risk would then be that of blurring differences and tensions beneath the reassuring verisimilitude that characterizes structural sketches.

But I have chosen not to decide—to hold simultaneously to the two lines of exposition, because, in this case, reversals and delays could very well give the evolution a zigzag course; because, above all, the share of interference in it is largely equal to that of the clear-cut opposition. This assumes that one is especially interested in intersections and encounters, because they demand an analysis that can respect the multiplicity of levels of pertinence of a single figure.

To anticipate my topic, it will be the example of the war between brothers, which furnishes to thought one of the privileged metaphors for *stasis*. Before every figurative usage, there is no doubt that the theme enjoys in itself an autonomous existence, imparting more than a word circulating from one place to another: there it gains harmonics that resonate in the discourse on civil war. The war of brothers: a theme in evidence first of all in tragedy, from the rivalry of Atreus and Thyestes to that of Eteocles and Polynices; it is to a verse from Euripides that Plutarch, following Aristotle, has recourse to establish that “cruel are the wars of brothers,”⁴ and in the *Poetics* it is the hatred of brother for brother that opens the enumeration of the familial “events” that make up the material of tragedy.⁵ But one finds that in the fourth century this tragic motif becomes—in a bourgeois fashion, one could say—the refrain of judicial pleas where, for an estate, brothers summoned one another to court, where such a litigant advances as a bold gambit the harmony

that unites him to his brother (“I never had a quarrel with him,” he proudly proclaims.)⁶ Behold the tragic transformed into the quotidian. Let us not rush too quickly to note that in the same epoch, Aristotle, unconcerned about metaphorical thought, gladly derives *stasis* from the process of inheritance and familial wars that are all too real, “like the one that happened in Hestiaea after the Persian wars when two brothers quarreled about the distribution of their inheritance.”⁷ For the same fourth century sees the war of brothers, so threatening to the city, inverted into the most positive of relations: the same holds for the developments of the *Menexenus* on reconciliation and, more generally, for Platonic speculation on the subject of the fraternity that is foundational for civic peace, against the background of autochthony or in the context of the generalized kinship that in Book V of the *Republic* unites the perfect citizens among themselves.⁸ And what are we to think when the “reality” of epigraphic documents goes further than the philosophical fiction, when, in the third century before our era, in an obscure village in Sicily, the reconciliation of citizens proceeds by way of a redistribution ceremony of the civic body according to the principle of fraternity?⁹

When metaphor is incarnated in social practice, who will still be able to distinguish the real from the figurative in this case? Assuming that, from one to the other, the boundary had not always been more virtual than actual.

The city as family: a support for the representation of politics, but a support that only lets us apprehend an unsteady terrain. At the very most one will attempt to immobilize a few of the figures, recurrent or new, under which it imposed itself as the best instrument to think *stasis*, in the short time of action or the *longue durée* of *topoi*. Which means that the route will be essentially Athenian—with the crucial reference which is the *stasis* of the end of the fifth century—and textual, because the *topoi* of living eloquence are forever inaccessible to us.

SOME SYNTAGMAS

Stasis emphylos, haima homaimōn, oikeios polemos: to characterize civil war as it affects that family which is the city, the Greek language uses a few syntagmas where the family is in the predicate position, which does not entail that the relationship between the substantive and the adjective is the same in the three cases.

Take for example *stasis emphylos*. If one acknowledges that on its own, the noun *stasis*, considered in the most common of its social usages, evokes an *internal* con-

flict, one can judge that the adjective *emphyl(i)os*, because it characterizes the conflict as interior to a group that is a lineage (*phylon*), simultaneously supplies a redundant explanation and an important piece of information: *em-* names the internal character of the process, thus explaining an essential connotation of the term *stasis*, and *phyl(i)os* makes the city a *phylon*—a natural reality, a group defined by a common birth. With *haima homaimōn* (the murder of a blood relation; literally: blood of the same blood), pleonasm triumphs so conspicuously that one begins to suspect, behind the obvious sense, a more secret intention: is the goal of such a redundancy to emphasize a scandal or, on the contrary, to pronounce a law, paradoxical but necessary, governing the relation of kinship? *Oikeios polemos*, by contrast, does not harbor any redundancy; much to the contrary, this syntagma draws its efficacy from being constructed on an opposition: *polemos* designates war in general—that is to say, for a Greek of the classical epoch, external war—and it is solely to the modification supplied to this noun by the adjective *oikeios*, derived from *oikos* (house), that the whole owes the fact that it designates “civil war.”

Thus, far from considering these three syntagms as synonyms, it is important to determine with precision for each of them the rules of its functioning.



Stasis emphylos first of all: the oldest of the three syntagms, the most difficult to translate as well.

Let us suppose that the meaning of *phylon* is clearly established, following a semantic specter that runs from the “race” to the “tribe,” passing through lineage and all the forms of the group as it thinks of its closure as a natural given.¹⁰ To be *emphylos* or *emphyl(i)os* would then amount to being “in the group,”¹¹ and in fact, it is indeed this sense that, in a very official fashion, the word presents in a Cretan inscription of the third century.¹² But chance (or necessity) would have it that this example, where the term has, it seems, its normal and peaceful meaning, is unique in its genre, in a corpus that extends from the seventh to the third century before our era.

For, from Alcaeus (indeed from Homer) to the classical epoch, there is no occurrence of this term that does not mark it down on the disquieting side of conflict, indeed of murder, as is attested by the list of nouns with which, as an adjective, it forms a syntagma. There is first of all *haima*, as a noun for spilled blood: the crime

of Ixion (the first murderer, first to spill the blood of his race), the parricide of Oedipus, familial murders of the tyrant, so many varieties of *emphulion haima*.¹³ Next comes *phonos*, the noun for murder, which those *emphuloi ponoi andrōn*, those murders of fellow citizens that, for Theognis, are part of the sinister procession of *stasis*—that civil war that Alcaeus had already designated as *emphulos machē*.¹⁴ And with Solon there appears the syntagma *stasis emphulos*, which one encounters again in a Herodotus or a Democritus.¹⁵



When the time comes to mention even the Ares *emphylios* evoked in the *Oresteia*,¹⁶ we wonder: if only the most bloody forms of conflict truly merit the qualifying *emphyl(i)os*, must one deduce from this that conflict alone can be called “of the *phylon*”? Which amounts to admitting that, in being so regularly associated with nouns of destruction, *emphylos*, from its root, is forever marked by a sinister connotation—and this from its earliest occurrences. Unless, taking a step further, one supposes that, in the very notion of *phylon*, there would be inscribed the fatality of murder and dissension. Or that, by making *emphylos* a doublet with *emphuēs*,¹⁷ one proclaims the “inner” character of *stasis*, thus naturalized in the city. But there is another way of understanding the syntagma, which consists in seeing there the brutal pronouncement of a shocking reality: then, by its very presence, the reference to *phylon* would have the goal of orchestrating the scandal that resides in a war between combatants of the same stock.

Stasis: a natural reality; *stasis*: the scandal of a confrontation contrary to nature. Here is the alternative formulated in its nudity. We have not finished with it, and we are far from choosing in favor of one of the two pronouncements.

Is *emphylos* substantivized? The same situation awaits us. What mysterious law holds, then, from Homer to Plato, that “the man of the group” is never to be named as such except in the position of a victim, object of a verb meaning “to kill”?¹⁸ Thus, in the *Laws*, the murderer of a fellow citizen will be designated as “one who by his own hand kills an *emphylioi*,” as if *phylon* were on this occasion the most pertinent term to designate the city.¹⁹

We must resign ourselves to it: occurrences of *emphylos* in a peaceful context are extremely rare.²⁰ As if the word was never relevantly employed other than to qualify the blood relationship that the city, as stock and, as such, thought in its closure,²¹ entertained with itself. Leaving the word there, without following it in

the later steps of its destiny (from Polybius to Dio Cassius and from Porphyry to Eustathus, one would see in profile the occurrences up to the point where *ta emphylon* comes to designate civil struggles on its own),²² we will then content ourselves with the unanswerable questions that an analysis of the corpus of the archaic and classical usages irresistibly stir up: why this sinister vocation of a term that, in itself, should only qualify a process as internal to a group? What destines the city, when it is thought as *phylon*, to welcome conflict? Would *stasis* be con-natural to city life?

In poetic language first of all, then also in prose, *emphyl(i)os* would traverse the totality of Greek literature. To mark out the semantic field of war in the family, we will now tie together a purely poetic expression and a syntagma very commonly used in prose.

On the side of poetry, the material is mythical, and *stasis* really takes hold in the family, which is not a reason to invalidate what the poets say about it. From tragedy, we will retain essentially the identification of civil war with the blood that it spills. A second series of syntagmas is then centered on *haima*, the noun for blood.

Haima: blood. And by metonymy: 1) murder and 2) kinship. In this way we could summarize the article that every Greek dictionary devotes to this word. In fact, the two “figurative” usages are well attested: *haima* interferes more than once with *phonos*, and from Homer to Aristotle and beyond, the word frequently designates the element of kinship, indeed kinship itself.²³ One can always go quickly if necessary and declare that, in this second acceptance, the metaphor, “which is not the exclusive possession of Antiquity,”²⁴ is banal. But, beside the fact that such a widely shared figure would at least merit noting down a comparative study,²⁵ there is in *haima* a paradox so glaring that one hesitates to formulate it.

The logic is in fact very strange for a word whose two dominant figurative usages are in principle rigorously exclusive of one another. And insofar as it founds kinship, blood should in no case be shed: the one who spills familial blood provokes the outpouring of a “forbidden blood”²⁶ and causes language to play on itself to give simultaneously to the same word two significations that thought declares hostile to one another. This is what, more than once, happens in tragedy, where *haima* is undecidably kinship and spilled blood. See for example Apollo’s oracle to Laius, in Euripides’ *Phoenicians*:

if you beget a son, that child will kill you
and all your house shall wade through blood (*di' haimatos*).

Di' haimatos: through blood. That is to say, by the spilling of blood. But one must also be able to understand: from the deed of your blood—from your descendants, from your son.²⁷ It is thus that the tragic genre abounds in expressions like *metrōion haima* (maternal blood) which, extracted from their context of violence, would denote only kinship—but it is precisely the context that causes the two senses of the word *haima* to play off one another.²⁸ The examples would be numerous in those tragedies of blood that, such as the *Oresteia*, the *Seven Against Thebes*, or the *Phoenicians*, install dissension at the heart of the family. To render an account of them, it is necessary to simultaneously hold two propositions: insofar as it is blood—and as blood is life's vehicle—murder gives birth; it is because it is blood to the highest degree that forbidden blood is doomed to flow before all others.

That murder gives birth, the *Oresteia* declares ceaselessly. Thus when, in *Libation Bearers*, the chorus, evoking the preparations for Clytemnestra's murder, salute “the child of ancient blood” who is entering the house,²⁹ in this circumlocution we recognize Orestes, son of the blood, spilled long ago, of Agamemnon and of the maternal blood that he is going to spill; but there is also the question of the murder to come, which the ancient murders have given birth to as if, in *haima*, even understood in the sense of “murder,” the other meaning, latent, must always manifest itself.

But the inverse proposition is also just as true: the blood of kin is blood to the highest degree, but because the language never forgets that *haima* designates first of all spilled blood,³⁰ forbidden blood finds itself paradoxically destined to flow most of all. It is this logic—at work in the expression *haima sungenes*, by which Euripides denotes *haima emphyliōn*³¹—that one can detect in the syntagma *haima homaimōn*. “Blood of the same blood”: this could be the most redundant of designations for kinship, but in reality it always designates the murder of the same, particularly in Aeschylus. Thus, in the *Suppliant Women*, when King Pelasgus fears that “*homaimōn haima* may come to pass,”³² or in the *Seven Against Thebes*, with the reciprocal murder of the sons of Oedipus, which the choir glosses by stating that they are of the same seed since they are of the same blood, which amounts to saying that they have spilled the blood that they had in common.³³

What affinity, we ask, does such a syntagma suggest between murder and family? For Aeschylus again, the Erinyes give a response, affirming that only *haima homaimōn*—the shedding of kindred’s blood—can unleash them against the guilty party: they have not pursued Clytemnestra, but set themselves against Orestes.³⁴ A tragic way of expressing what the Greek tradition recounts in the form of a myth: that Ixion, the first murderer, was also the one who first murdered a kinsman.³⁵ Translated into juridical terms, this means that there is not murder in the full sense of the term except within the family.³⁶ Of course, from this familial specificity of murder, tragedy and law do not draw the same conclusions, and the tragedians doubtless endeavor less to define murder in itself than to present the family as a privileged site of spilled blood. But, more than the gap between these two bodies of thought, their conjunction constitutes a fact: the familial dimension of murder was—is always—at the center of a lively debate among historians of Greek law, which should forbid anyone from classing the tragic reflection on blood as murder or as kinship under the rubric of purely literary speculations.

Of course, tragedy plays on the word *haima*—or, more exactly, whether flanked by the qualificative *homaimōn* or not, the word plays on itself. But we will see there something other than a formal investigation or a baroque point.

With *oikeios polemos*, we find ourselves, it seems, finally on stable ground: frequently used in classical prose from the end of the fifth century, this syntagma would characterize *stasis* as a familial war in the simplest and most neutral manner.

Oikeios polemos: war in the *oikos*, or among *oikeioi* (among kinsmen).³⁷ We are on familiar terrain. Except that in this syntagma, to judge from the majority of its occurrences, the family seems to be envisaged less as a place of concord than as origin of all dissension. Thus in the *Menexenus*, Plato, not without irony, concluded from the familial character of the war the necessary reconciliation which, for good measure, he rooted in an authentic consanguinity (*syngeneia*).³⁸ And the definition that he gives of *stasis* in Book V of the *Republic* comes forward to corroborate, this time in a serious mode, the association of *oikeion* and *sungenes*. As though to gloss the absent syntagma *oikeios polemos*, it is affirmed there that hostilities, because they take place between kin (*oikeioi*), are conducted as between “people who know that one day they’ll be reconciled,”³⁹ which obviously aims to efface from familial war all the sinister things that the notion could entail. To speak of *oikeios polemos* rather than of *stasis* would be to suggest that, in the city, violence has no future.

So much for *oikeion*. Now let us turn to the side of *polemos*, by which another modality is introduced. To designate dissension as a “war,” one avoids the word *stasis*, and therefore all those which are associated with it, first among which there is *phonos*, murder; and one accomplishes above all a fruitful ideological operation by substituting for the irreconcilable opposition of *stasis* and *polemos* the notion of a confrontation which would be only one of the species of war, the familial species. In any case, a process that would still fall under the category of order, under which Greek prose thinks *polemos*.

With regard to this operation, two steps of the Platonic reflection will clarify my point. The first, in the *Republic*, maintains between *stasis* and *polemos* an insurmountable gap: “It seems to me that if we have two names, ‘war’ and ‘discord,’ so there are two things and the names apply to two kinds of disagreements”; this amounts to putting the word *oikeios* first by pushing back *polemos*, so as to preserve the respectability of the latter term:⁴⁰ omnipresent on the horizon of the reasoning, the syntagma *oikeios polemos* is nonetheless always refused. The next step will be taken in the *Laws*, where *polemos* is subdivided into two species: exterior war and that which takes place in the city “and which one calls *stasis*.”⁴¹ Thus there is inscribed in one and the same work the movement, discernable in all Athenian literature, by virtue of which an opposition, of capital importance in the texts of the fifth century,⁴² has ceded place, without for all that being completely effaced, to the pairing of two notions.⁴³ It turns out that for Athens the phenomenon can be dated very precisely from the dark years of the end of the fifth century when one dared to think *stasis* as a war, doubtless because the experience of a long war had somewhat tarnished the glamour of the word *polemos*.⁴⁴ Still it is with some reluctance that one ranges civil war under the category of *polemos*, the latter being qualified as “familial”: Plato’s reticence in the *Republic* attests to it, as does the effort taken by Thucydides to speak of the effects of *stasis* on the family without passing by way of the word *oikeios*.⁴⁵

So everything would be clear: from *stasis emphylos* to *oikeios polemos*, a double substitution—of *oikeios* for the questionable *emphylos* and of *polemos* for *stasis*—would have contributed to the taming of the notion of war in the family. It could nonetheless be the case that things are not as simple as they seem to be when one chooses, as we do, a Platonic point of entry to interpret *oikeios polemos* in the figure of a war between *oikeioi*. For it is not certain that one can accomplish with full legitimacy the operation which consists in glossing an adjective (*oikeios*) by substituting its substantive form for it, placed in a complement position (*es*

oikeious). In fact, the language tends to mark a distinction between the substantivated usage of *oikeios* and its use in an epithet position: in the first case, *oikeios* speaks of kinship; in the second, referred to a thing or to a notion, it would merely point out what belongs to the sphere of the subject.⁴⁶ Understood in this way, the syntagma *oikeios polemos* would therefore not designate, for the speaker, anything but “the war that personally concerns him,” “the war where one is among one’s own” (rather than confronting foreigners): in short, a war that concerns at the same time the values of the private and the reflexive.⁴⁷ Only a play on words consequently seems to be able to make *oikeios polemos* a war between *oikeioi*. We will add that, even understood in its familial meaning—for example in an orator like Isaeus—*oikeios*, whether substantivated or not, has nothing like a stable meaning. Oscillating ceaselessly from the sense of “kind” to that of “one’s own,” passing by way of “familiar” and “close by,”⁴⁸ *oikeios* would denote, among the consanguine (*sungenēs*) and friends (*philos*), the hardly specifiable position of intimacy that would be less kin than consanguine, but closer to kinship than *philos*.⁴⁹

Yet it is precisely because the value of the word is fluctuating that all the plays of meaning are possible: it is sufficient to appeal to slight distortions. So the Athenian orators use the margin of indecision that is linked to *oikeios* to resemanticize this term more and more in the direction of the family. In a discourse of Isaeus concerning an inheritance, the statement “he found no relative closer [*oikeiōsteron*] than us” must be understood as a way of suggesting that the litigant belonged to the “house” of the deceased; and in another such discourse, the juxtaposition of “close ones” (*oikeioi*) and “servants” (*oikētai*) appeals to the *oikos* to insinuate that the closest ones are indeed kin.⁵⁰

All things considered, I therefore confine myself, finally, to the Platonic reading of the syntagma *oikeios polemos*. For it is a safe bet that its users, the political orators of the fourth century, did not deprive themselves of a resource which allowed them to reinterpret *oikeios* in the context of ambient familialism. Nothing is easier, from this perspective, than to slide from war where one is personally implicated to war in the *oikos*.⁵¹ In favor of this hypothesis there plead at Athens some remarkable usages of the adjective *oikeios* in the political context of the myth of autochthony, when, in the *Menexenus*, the citizens who have died in the war are said to “lie *en oikeiois topois*, among the familiar (or familial) places of her (the earth) who gave them birth, nourished them, and received them as her own” or when, in the *Panegyricus*, the autochthonous Athenians alone are credited with the possibility to call their city “by the very names which we apply to our nearest

kin” (*tous oikeiotatous*), namely “nurse, fatherland, mother.”⁵² Consequently, there would be nothing properly Platonic in these *oikeia onomata*, these “familiar/familial names” that, on the basis of a generalized kinship, the citizens of the *Republic* are given among themselves, or in the expression *oikeios politēs*, not far from the reference to the Zeus of the people of the same stock (*Homophylos*):⁵³ there I see instead something like the most widespread of Athenian idioms.

In that Athens of the fourth century where one agrees to valorize the reality of the family, everything indicates that *oikos* swings to the side of kinship. *Oikeios polemos* is therefore—and durably remains—a designation of “familial war,” but a designation that is virtually edifying.



War in the family: a scandal which it is necessary to quickly remedy / a destiny or a nature. The first statement is implicit in *oikeios polemos*, the second is embodied in *haima homaimōn*. And between them both, there is *stasis emphylos*, which we could pull indifferently toward one side or the other. For anyone who wants to historically appreciate the incidences of such an alternative, the study of words could not of course provide any definitive response; at least it allows one to extricate the questions that the familial representations of the city unfailingly raise when they are used for thinking *stasis*. Because the three syntagms intersect without being superimposed on one another, we find ourselves introduced to a shifting dossier, made of gaps and hesitations between neighboring figures that are connected but are neither homologous nor clearly defined, and which the notion of “family” unifies under a translation that is convenient while not always satisfactory.

The affair will play out between three terms: *stasis*, city, family. To enumerate the familial figures of the city invites us to a combinatory where it is sometimes the family that induces war against the city, sometimes the *stasis* installed in the city that destroys the family, sometimes the city as family that pushes back *stasis*. Three terms of which one must always be menaced by the other two, linked together by a necessary relationship, of alliance or affinity: thus is the space to think civil war in Greek delimited.

HATRED IN THE FAMILY

The first figure will be tragic. It installs war in the family. By assimilating the *oikos* to the time of myth, conceived as a past at once bygone and always menacing,

tragedy, in the same movement, exalts the city and confronts it with its most vital problems.

Of this ancient connaturality of family and discord, the *Oresteia* is the most beautiful dramatization. Everything commences within the *genos* in the *Agamemnon*, where the palace of the Atrides is inhabited by the Erinyes of the family line or by Eris (Discord), unless it is—which anyway comes down to the same thing—by the avenging genius of the race, which exhausts it in the succession of family killings (*thanatois authentaisin*), always categorized under the madness of reciprocal murders (*allēlophonous manias*).⁵⁴ And it comes to an end, in the *Eumenides*, only at Athens, with the foundation of the Areopagus, a tribunal of blood destined to judge the murderer god Ares when, “domesticated,” he struck out at the one who had taken him in;⁵⁵ then, installed at the foot of the hill to which the god gives his name, the Erinyes will preserve the city against the Ares of the *phylon* (*Arēs emphylios*),⁵⁶ who is unleashed in civil war. The civic order has integrated the family within itself. Which means that it is always virtually menaced by the discord that is like a second nature to kinship and that it has always already gone beyond that menace.

Strong in this conviction, moved by this inquietude, the tragedians make the familial *stasis* of the myths a privileged material for dramatic representation. Yet, of this discord internal to the family, the most pronounced is doubtless war between brothers. In the beginning, the rivalry of brothers: and the *Oresteia* designates the distant past which saw the quarrel of Thyestes and Atreus as the origin of the interminable giving birth of murder by murder.⁵⁷ But also, at the end, for the annihilation of the family, the fratricidal war of the sons of Oedipus, in an *allēlophonia* that Pindar puts under the authority of the terrible Erinye.⁵⁸ Then, in what remains of the lineage of the Labdacides, there occurs what in Thucydides comes to pass in a city torn apart by civil war, within a group of partisans encircled and reduced to despair: mutual putting to death and recourse to hanging as the ultimate escape.⁵⁹ A victory as “Cadmean,” to be sure, as that of the sons of Oedipus: victory without victor or vanquished, graver still than what, in the *Eumenides*, was characterized as an “evil victory” because it assured the triumph of the same over the same, graver also than what, for Democritus, made the *stasis emphylos* in every way a calamity because, he said, “there is similar destruction for both the winners and losers.”⁶⁰

I will not accumulate examples: obviously, for the tragedians, the family engenders *stasis*. It falls to the city to contain the one by preventing the other, to the tragic poet to push discord back into the mythical past the better to offer its representation to the Athenians of the present, to the citizens of Athens to know how to guess that long ago hides now.



It is in the present that Thucydidean historiography notes the installation of *stasis* in the city and the destruction of familial relations that ineluctably result from it.

This begins, or rather it has already begun with, the dissolution of all bonds of sociability, those very bonds that alone could check the progress of subversion if *stasis*, working latently, had not already destroyed them: in Thucydides' historical analysis, the circle is perfect. And so, in book VIII, if in 412 the oligarchs could seize power in Athens without encountering opposition, it is because no one in the city "knows [*connaît*]" anyone any longer; suddenly everyone in the *demos* distrusts all the others—quite normally for those one does not know, but for those as well whom one knows, knowing them too well. Distrust is general,⁶¹ and the city has lost that blessed familiarity of *oikeioi* among themselves, which is founded on reciprocal familiarity [*connaissance*] and confidence.⁶² In fact, under the historian's gaze, *stasis* brings to its conclusion a movement that the plague had already made a start on, by emptying houses and loosening the bonds between neighbors.⁶³ All sociability seems now to have taken refuge in the relationships between faction members who are marvelously familiar with one another and, from this point of view, indeed merit being designated as "comrades" (*hetairoi*). But this implies that the intimacy of comradeship has changed sign: it was positive and constituted one of the bases of city life,⁶⁴ but here we see it become a simple association for death. It is true that already, in the general reflection that he devotes to the seditious phenomenon in Book III, Thucydides had noted that all familiarity has henceforth passed to the side of faction: to say that blood kinship itself has become more "foreign" (*allotriōteron*) than the factional bond was to suggest clearly that, for everyone, this bond was now more intimate than all familial relation.⁶⁵

When faction supplants kinship, familial intimacy is dissolved and civil war is installed in the very bosom of the *oikos*. What Thucydides expresses concisely yet clearly, the political eloquence of the fourth century, from Lysias to Demosthenes, will make into a *topos*. Thus, for Demosthenes, the massacres at Elis were

characterized “by such delirious insanity” that the country’s inhabitants “stained their hands with the blood of their own kindred and fellow-citizens” (*syngeneis hōtōn kai politas miaiphonein*). And Lysias evoked the tyranny of the Thirty, who constrained the Athenians to “wage against their brothers, their sons and their fellow-citizens” (*adelphois kai hyesi kai politais... polemein... polemon*).⁶⁶

Their brothers, their sons: in other words, in time of *stasis*, brother is killed by brother and son by father. Anyone who would want to go further, who would wish to draw up, in the Roman way, an exhaustive nomenclature of relatives who kill each other and of familial relationships really destroyed by civil war would doubtless be quite disappointed. For, in giving what looks like a succinct list of the principal victims of *stasis*, Lysias’s text breaks with a corpus where, as in Demosthenes, generalities on the murder of *syngeneis* are dominant. Of course, the “list” has all the markings of a sketch, and one can suspect that the reality had been more diversified; but, to discern the nature of those bonds of kinship that the Greek imaginary assigns to *stasis* the particular property of dissolving, it will be necessary to resign oneself to generalizing starting from Lysias. We will notice then that the orator is not the only one to name brother and son.

Let us return to Thucydides; we find there the father who kills the son, which the historian presents as the absolute point of horror: a beyond of disorder.⁶⁷ From Hesiod to ancient comedy, the Greek order of disorder held in effect that it was the son who attacked the father, and not the contrary,⁶⁸ and tragedy does not contradict this law, judging by Aristotle’s enumeration of the familial murders that make up tragic events, “such as when a brother kills a brother, or a son a father, or a mother a son, or a son a mother,”⁶⁹ where only the figure of a father who is murderer of his son is “forgotten.” By proceeding to such a remarkable reversal, it could then be possible that the historian intends to suggest to what degree *stasis* is contrary to nature: the father who kills his son does not only annihilate in the latter the city to come—a goal to which only the tyrant is reputed to aspire, when he suppresses the youth—above all he annihilates his own lineage, he annihilates himself in this murder where Greek thought generally saw a woman’s crime⁷⁰—and in fact in Aristotle’s enumeration, the murderous mother actually takes his place.

In the murder of the son by his father—which could have been the historical reality of a parallel episode in such and such a city—I would therefore gladly see something like a symbol: the extreme paradigm of the abomination that is *stasis*.

As to fratricide, it could indeed, as a theme, represent ordinary civil war. On this point, from tragedy to prose genres, no significant rupture is observed:⁷¹ it is the murder of brother by brother that opened Aristotle's list of tragic events and, out of the number of familial crimes, this murder is the only one that Plato declares virtually "pure," on condition that it is carried out in the course of a *stasis* and in a state of legitimate defense. Then, as if the confrontation of citizens among themselves finds its most perfect expression in fratricide, the text passes without transition from the murder of brother by brother to that of citizen by citizen:⁷²

If a brother kills his own brother in a sedition or some similar circumstances, in self-defense when his victim had struck first, he shall be regarded as free of pollution as though he had killed an enemy (*kathaper polemion apokteinas estō katharos*), and the same applies for a citizen who kills a citizen in the same conditions (*kai ean politēs politēn, hōsautōs*).⁷³

Son, brother: it is so much as to say that every time, in the outburst of civil hatred, it is the closest of one's kin that one kills and, as if one measured the ravages of civil war by the narrowness of the kinship circle that it affects, it is the nuclear family that that *stasis* dissolves by dividing. Real family in the city,⁷⁴ family as metaphor of the city: by tearing apart the bonds of kinship, civil war saps one of the essential foundations of city life. *Stasis* is contrary to nature.

Between innate *stasis* and its contrary-to-nature form, it would still be necessary to make room for *stasis* as a secondary effect of hatred in the family, the figure of which is evoked here and there by fourth-century thinkers. Again, as in tragedy, discord has its place in the *oikos*, except that it takes on its full magnitude only when generalized to the dimension of the whole city. From a disagreement between kinsmen to division in the civic body, this model is sometimes Aristotelian, and Book V of the *Politics* enumerates a *stasis* derived from a conflict between brothers and some civil wars resulting from broken marriages. From being menaced, as it was in a Thucydides, the family has become menacing; but between familial discourse and civic dissension, the essential relay—the nerve center of these affairs—is therefore the tribunal: trials are what stir up hatred between citizens, for Aristotle⁷⁵ as in Book V of the *Republic*,⁷⁶ and Plato goes further in the *Laws*, affirming that humanity after the flood was ignorant of both the arts of war and of those conflicts, interior to the city, that one calls "trials and civil wars" (*dikai kai staseis*).⁷⁷

It is thus that, among theorists of the fourth century, the family comes to the fore as the source of civil war.⁷⁸ We could hold forth on what this return suggests about the vitality of dark representations of the bonds of kinship. We can also attempt to interpret this figure in the precise context where it is produced. We will therefore read these texts in comparison with what private litigants, pronounced on the occasion of actual trials, say insistently about hatred in the family.

In this discourse, it is good form to deplore the hard necessity that constrains one to come to the point of controversy and struggle against kinsmen (*pros oikeious diapheresthai, agnōnizesthai*); no litigant ever denies that, when kinship is changed into hatred, it is indeed a question of war.⁷⁹ Then the father shows himself to be relentless against his son; but it is above all of the hatred setting brother against brother that these discourses speak, which enumerate all its variants.⁸⁰ Thus the trials call into question those very bonds that, in Thucydides or Lysias, civil war dissolved.

When dealing with judicial rhetoric, it is always necessary to make allowances for amplification: indeed, litigants who, while attacking their brother in court, lament having been constrained to do so, remain the most hackneyed of *topoi*. But there is no *topos* that does not express the truth of a situation and, from all these declarations, it appears, in a hardly paradoxical fashion, that if the family is the place where hatred is the most terrible, it is because one must see in it the source of all value. Thus, one client of Lysias intends to move the judges by affirming on the subject of his adversary that “he is reducing all men to such a state of suspicion towards their fellows that neither living nor dying can they place any more confidence in their nearest relations (*tois oikeiotatois*) than in their bitterest enemies.”⁸¹

Whether putting forward familial hatred was still a way, albeit an indirect one, of proclaiming the preeminent value of the family, it is doubtless only one of the dimensions of what we can call the “crisis of the fourth century,” by which, in the Athenian city, there was brought to light the temptation to give the family the lead over the city. To measure the force of such a temptation, it would again be necessary, leaving aside the prose of judiciary eloquence, to return to that of political orators. There we would see a Demosthenes justifying the law on adultery—which allows one to kill the lover caught *in flagrante delicto*—“because in the defence of those for whose sake we fight our enemies, to save them from indignity and licentiousness, he permitted us to slay even our friends ...” Adding: “Men are not born our friends or enemies (*sugenos estin philōn kai polemiōn*): they are made

such by their own actions.”⁸² “Friend” is another way of naming the fellow citizen: one will deduce from this that everything is permitted in the name of family, even killing another Athenian. Even more significant is an affirmation of Aeschines, in the heat of a political trial aimed at Demosthenes. When Philip died, the latter did not fear making a sacrifice of thanksgiving, although he had just lost his daughter; a situation that, in his address to the Athenians, inspires in Aeschines this indignant flight of rhetoric:

The man who... does not love the persons who are the nearest and dearest to him (*ta philtata kai oikeiotata sōmata*) will never care much about you, who are strangers (*tous allotrious*) to him.⁸³

“You who are strangers to him”: apparently Aeschines is expecting it to go without saying, for his auditor as for himself, that such is the definition of fellow citizens. Obviously all value has taken refuge in the family.

Doubtless I have somewhat departed from the familial *stasis* that constitutes my object. But it would be important to put forward the gravity of the accusation tirelessly raised against civil war, which imputes to it responsibility for destroying the family in the city. Of course, it is on the real family that affect is concentrated, and this doubtless contributed to dissuading the orators from taking the plunge toward the figure that would make the family a metaphor for the city. But all the elements of this more theoretical reflection are there, ready to hand.

After *stasis* against the family, the time has come to study the inverse figure—kinship against civil war—in this dossier where opposed representations are defended with an equal conviction.

Then, after the civil war, the city will become a family.

AGAINST CIVIL WAR, CIVIC KINSHIP

Because the family is one of the essential foundations of the city, against *stasis*, there would be no more effective ideological weapon than the appeal to kinship. Such is, to hear it from Xenophon, the tragedy that, in the Athens of 403, presided over the reconciliation at the bosom of the civic body.

Very significant in this regard is a discourse—real or fictive—delivered by a democrat on the issue of the battle of Mounichia where, for the first time, the Thirty had met with a bloody defeat after which they were exiled. Advancing between the two fronts of citizens, Kleokritos, herald of the Eleusian initiates and a fighter for democracy, then addressed himself to the oligarchs' troops. After having enumerated the shared activities that made up Athenian sociability, it is on an appeal to bonds of kinship that the orator concludes, as if among citizens, only this theme could prompt the healthy start that puts an end to *stasis*:

In the name of the gods of our fathers and our mothers, in the name of blood kinship, of marriage and comradeship—for all these bonds many of us share among one another—cease... to sin against your fatherland, and do not obey those most accursed Thirty.⁸⁴

This is all that makes up Athenian kinship. The reference to the gods, first of all—“the gods of our fathers and our mothers” (*pros theōn patrōōn kai metrōōn*)—which will be surprising: the collectivity of the Athenians highly venerated *patrōoi* gods (at the highest rank of which is Apollo, protector of the patrilineal line) and, on the Agora of Athens, an edifice called *Metrōon* is consecrated to the Mother of the gods, but we do not know of any official cult of the *metrōoi* gods. Must one understand that, to present the city as a great family, it is important to reestablish at any price, even fictively, for each citizen the equilibrium between the two lines, paternal and maternal, of his ancestors?⁸⁵ In fact, it is to citizens insofar as they are also individuals that Kleokritos addresses himself, and his harangue aims less at the collectivity taken as a whole than at the intertwining of those personal and singular relations that make up the tissue of city life.⁸⁶ Then comes the triad *syngeneias kai kēdestias kai hetairias*. *Syngeneia* is blood kinship: in other words, the most natural of all relations, which does not need to be codified to be lived in the immediacy of everyday existence.⁸⁷ *Kēdestia* designates marriage, where Aristotle sees an element very necessary to the city as community of living-well.⁸⁸ *Hetairia*, finally, is not surprising: how can the orator who is preaching in favor of the end of hostilities forget the factious meaning of this word in order to assign it a resolutely positive value? But in posing this question, we underestimate the will to forget that is precisely that of Kleokritos in this address to oligarchs: to forget *stasis* and the questionable sense that he gives to the word⁸⁹ in order to think back to the happy times of life in peace when the *hetairoi* were only strongly united comrades, often bound among themselves by relations of marriage⁹⁰—such is the goal of the discourse.

Syngeneia, kedestia, hetairia: it is in Athenian kinship, envisioned in its widest and most extended sense as place of concord,⁹¹ that an impromptu orator is supposed to find the sole argument strong enough to transform the seditious into citizens enamored with civil peace. We are very far from Aeschylus and the eminently negative representation of the family, when the latter was identified with the *genos* of a bygone past. But it could be that in elaborating a model of kinship that was endowed with all virtues, the restored democracy simply accomplished its essential ideological task: it was a matter of repairing the social tissue that *stasis* had torn, and nursing the trauma inflicted on Athenian identity by the scale of the dissension.

One step further, and one would assimilate the city entirely to a family.



It suffices for this to proclaim all citizens kinsmen among themselves. The idea was not absolutely new in 403, but it gained ground. It can pick up from the rhetorical procedure where the litigant tells the judges that to him they “must act as my father and my brothers and my children.”⁹² This is above all a *topos* of political eloquence, which gives rise to the exaltation of civic *syngeneia* in general.⁹³ Unless, by translating in terms of kinship the relation that unites the citizens to the city, the orators assimilate it to the love that one feels for a father⁹⁴ or, more often, for a mother, as in Pindar.⁹⁵

If one is aiming at a general interpretation of parallel declarations, one will affirm that “the Greeks always conceived the union among citizens making up part of a group, a village, or even of several villages on the model of blood kinship.”⁹⁶ Preferring for my part to confine myself once again to classical Athens, I will recall that the civic imaginary was nourished there on the myth of autochthony, terrain par excellence for the elaboration of a generalized kinship, uniting the citizens among themselves by virtue of the bond that they all maintain to the city, of which they are the “legitimate children” and which, for them, is mother, nurse, and fatherland.

The consequence that such a link is supposed to prevent any risk of war is self-evident, although the idea often remained implicit. It falls, however, to Isocrates, in a remarkable passage from the *Panathenaicus*, to develop it at length.⁹⁷

To show “from the very beginning” the superiority of the Athenians over all the other Greeks, the custom is to oppose Athens to other cities; in this case, in place of denouncing an excess of alterity in the other cities, Isocrates delights in characterizing them, in the tragic mode, by the catastrophes of the same that the great familial crimes of the myths constitute. And to enumerate: murders carried out on brothers, fathers, or strangers (see Thebes, Argos, many other cities); on mothers (one recalls Orestes and Alcmeon, Argos again); incest (Thebes once more); parents devouring their children (Thyestes’ feast brings us back to Argos); sons exposed by their fathers (Laius, Oedipus, and Thebes); drowning and blindness (see Thrace, with the history of Phineas...). In other words, at the origin of the cities of Greece there are the murders that “each year, the Athenians present in the theater”: Isocrates could not more clearly indicate that he borrows from tragedy this litany of hatred in the family. And on the good side are found the autochthonous Athenians, neither mixed blood nor immigrants—a way of implicitly linking together in the other cities the excesses of the same and the intrinsic flaw that alterity constitutes. The Athenians, therefore, show their nurse the affection that the elites have for father and mother, as if, because it is metaphorical, the familial love that they bear toward their land had held them separate from the horrors of the family.⁹⁸

In this way Isocrates renews in its themes the obligatory praise of autochthony without, however, modifying its content. But his contribution is above all important in that it works to integrate into one mythico-historical perspective the two opposed figures of the family: as place of hatred, the family presides over the birth of other cities; as place of generalized kinship, the Athenian City is ignorant of *stasis*. The tension between two models that alternate in dominance has ceded its place to a very distinct opposition, between two types of origin and two types of city.

And we could show that it is still from the same source—this Athenian ideology of kinship—that that the reflection of a Plato on the city draws, on an incomparably more theoretical level. To found the city on nature, there is no other solution but to constitute—really, in the sense that ideological formations are real—a generalized kinship uniting all the citizens among themselves. We know how, in order to insure cohesion among the guardians, a “noble lie” turns out to be necessary, which, in many ways, is a myth of autochthony: and here they are all brothers, because they have the earth in common, which to them is a mother and a nurse.⁹⁹ Then one will be able to eliminate all property, thus every nuclear family (for

property and family are what the word *oikia* designates) in order to people the city entirely with kinsmen.¹⁰⁰ More than a private *oikeion*, the *oikeion* will be common to all, so much so that “mine” will no longer have any meaning other than “ours,”¹⁰¹ and then one will avoid *stasis*. For such is indeed the aim of this construction: destroying families amounts to suppressing the trials and quarrels of which “money, children, and families are the occasion,” which is to say suppressing all civil war since the trial was already a *stasis*.¹⁰² Destroy families, but found the city as a great family and civil peace will be assured. In short, one model has edged out the other, which Plato intends to definitively strike down with invalidity. And the tension that Isocrates immobilized into an opposition is here reabsorbed: at once explained on its own terms and evacuated.

By summarizing in broad outline these very well-known pages of Plato, I wanted only, at the end of a long journey through the Athenian representations of *stasis*, to show with what insight the philosopher can play one figure of kinship off against the other. But I also find there the occasion to return to two points where we have stopped along the way more than once: the notion of *phylon* and the logic of fraternity.

On the side of *phylon* as fact of nature and as a stock envisioned in its closure, it would be necessary to associate the qualificative *homophylos* because, entirely (it seems) on the site of concord, this happy word escapes the sinister connotations that surround *emphylos*. We recall the Athenian kinship in the *Menexenus*, one designation of which was *philia homophylos*, “friendship of those belonging to the same stock.”¹⁰³ We will add to it the marriages in the *Republic*, founded in necessity because coupling men and women as much as possible “of the same nature” (*homophyeis*).¹⁰⁴ And, still in a Platonic milieu, it would again be necessary to evoke the Zeus *homophylos* of the *Laws*, witness of the marker of friendship, who ensures that no conflict among relatives opposes the *oikeioi politai*, the fellow citizens that everything brings together.¹⁰⁵ And one could even make an incursion into Aristotle who, against Plato, never stopped proclaiming that one does not make a city with those who are alike, but who, when he reflects on the conditions of a city’s survival, willingly recognizes that, to avoid *stasis*, belonging to one same stock (*to homophylon*) turns out to be effective.¹⁰⁶

However, in its recurrence on the side of united kinship as well as that of the family torn apart, it is the model of brothers that will retain us for the longest time. At the same time that Aeschylus founded the history of the Atrides in the rivalry

of Thyestes and Atreus, Herodotus was not at all surprised that the traditional misunderstanding between the two royal families of Sparta found its origin in the initial discord of two brothers;¹⁰⁷ but when politics is fantasized in the form of kinship, it goes just as much without saying that the citizens are “all brothers” (*pantes adelphoi*), as in the *Republic*.



Adelphoi, these are blood brothers¹⁰⁸ and, in fact, the appellation *syngensis* specializes more than once in the designation of those consanguines par excellence.¹⁰⁹ Whoever believes in the *syngeneia* of all citizens among themselves will therefore declare them brothers. When Lysias, evoking the Athenian democrats of 403, says that those among them who reentered the city manifested “the kinship of their counsels” (*adelp̄ha ta bouleumata*) with the acts of those who had died in combat for liberty, perhaps he is only employing a well-worn metaphor, from which one could not infer that the theme of fraternity was actually at the heart of the democratic restoration.¹¹⁰ By contrast it is explicit in Plato that fraternity is a figure of autochthony, when the latter, envisioned from a political point of view, is assimilated to democracy: the Athenians, “all brothers sprung from one mother” (*mias mētros pantes adelphoi phuntes*), are supposed to practice equality completely naturally, as opposed to citizens of other regimes, which can easily be divided into “masters” and “slaves.”¹¹¹

When it is a question of relations of fraternity, we have certainly not finished with Plato, whose predilection for the theme is obvious. From the proverb, cited at the beginning of the *Republic*, that makes a brother the first helper,¹¹² one passes without difficulty to the imperative, codified in law, of coming to the aid of a fellow citizen as to a brother,¹¹³ to the noble lie of the *Republic* by which all citizens are *adelphoi*,¹¹⁴ and to the reflection of the *Laws*, where the word “brother” is again the most proper to designate precisely the relationship of fellow-citizenship.¹¹⁵ And everything indicates that the notion of fraternity, even beyond its political implications, occupies an essential place in the philosopher’s speculation.¹¹⁶

At the moment, we are far from the political life of classical Athens.

And yet, to follow the recurrence of this theme in Plato, we are not far at all from the reality of social representations that make the city a family. At least it is necessary, in conclusion, to allow us to leave Athens and make an incursion into the beginning of the Hellenistic era. It is in Sicily, in the small city of Nakōnē in the

third century, that reality is made Platonic, so to speak, when, following civil troubles, the citizens solemnly reconcile among themselves by becoming brothers: a procedure that is certainly remarkable but of which, at the end of this journey, we will no longer rush overhastily to proclaim that it is a *hapax*¹¹⁷—exceptional with respect to real social practices, it is obviously less so if we refer it to the familial and fraternal imaginary of the city whose coherence we have tried to suggest here.

Hence the “brothering” of Nakōnē. The course of the operations is now something well known, since the publication of the inscriptions of Entella,¹¹⁸ and we will content ourselves with commenting on the essential methods. A conflict (*diaphora*) took place, which there is every reason to compare to a civil war.¹¹⁹ Calm having returned, it was a question of organizing reconciliation (*dialysis*). In this case, it consisted in dividing in order to better unite: distributing the city as a whole into groups of five brothers, this procedure aiming at an ultimate end, which is to reunify the civic body through the force of fraternity alone.¹²⁰

It is thus that, by drawing lots, groups of “elective brothers” (*adelphoi hairētoi*)¹²¹ are constituted. In itself, such a pronouncement will not fail to surprise the historian of institutions, accustomed to the very strong opposition that Greek political thought marks precisely between election and drawing lots. But is it indeed a question of a problem of institutions? Of course, in this case, both drawing lots and the title of elective brothers make sense: it is necessary to rely on the random chance of drawing lots to avoid the outcome that, in each group of brothers, the ideological hostility separating two “adversaries” (*hypenantioi*) is redoubled by a solid personal hatred,¹²² but at the same time everything has to suggest to the citizens so designated that they are “chosen”—chosen by one another, in view of an unshakeable fraternity. If nevertheless one persists in being astonished that the product of a drawing of lots draws its name from election, we will be able, in clarifying the expression *adelphoi hairētoi*, to make use of a passage from the *Menexenus* where Plato opposes an elective (*hairētos*) title to the one that one holds from birth (*ek genous*).¹²³ Let us assume that, in this opposition *ek genous/hairētos*, birth is the marked term, *hairētos* finally having no function other than to suggest that there was a procedure of designation: by relation to *genos*, which speaks of nature, *hairētos* designates nothing more than a recruitment of a political, and thus contractual, type. If we now return to our third-century Sicilians, it turns out that the inhabitants of Nakōnē—decidedly Platonistic—through the title of elective brothers doubtless want only to oppose to natural fraternity that which, by virtue of a human decision (I would say: a fiction?), associates five citizens among them-

selves. The problem is therefore not one of institutions, but of a representation of kinship (natural or fictive: that of the *adelphoi* is fictive, and recognized as such). Which invites us to look more closely at what of the family, in this inscription, is real and metaphorical.

Under the codified form of legal kinship (*angisteia*), the real family is kept in the background. In two rounds, at the time of the first thirty groups' casting of lots,¹²⁴ then when the rest of the city is divided according to the same model, it is specified that the five "brothers" must maintain among themselves none of the kinship relations that define *ankhisteia*, which are excluded from this extraordinary procedure just as, in customary law, divisions of tribes are.¹²⁵ By so radically separating the *adelphoi* from their natural kinship, the community of the Nakōnaioi recognizes that the *stasis* in fact passed through familial relations,¹²⁶ and proscribes the family the better to found reconciliation. By the same token, it affirms the autonomy of entirely new fraternities.

Adelphoi hairatoi: a fictive kinship, civic through and through, but which, in any case, could not constitute an institutional structure in the city.¹²⁷ And if the decree takes care to organize the future in order that, each year at the same date, the citizens celebrate "according to their brotherings" (*kata tas adelphothetias*), doubtless one must understand that the groups of brothers have no purpose but a festive one¹²⁸—and thus a symbolic one, since the very fabric of the festival is constituted by the bonds of reciprocity that unite among themselves the old enemies who have become brothers and been mixed with the other citizens.¹²⁹

A kinship as entirely symbolic as that of the *adelphoi hairatoi*. And nevertheless it is the paradox (and the interest) of the decree of Nakōnē that it is thought as consanguine, and not simply classificatory: they are not *phrateres*,¹³⁰ but indeed *adelphoi* that the procedure institutes. *Adelphoi*, like the autochthones of the *Menexenus*, like the citizens of the *Republic*. And it is not surprising, consequently, that the annual ceremony instituted by the decree should include a sacrifice to the ancestors at the same time as to Concorde: the cult of Homonoia is political,¹³¹ that of the *Genetores* joins all the members of a lineage in the celebration of one same mythical past.

Brothers, therefore: a fiction, but a true fiction. The "creation of a consanguinity," a "factual kinship,"¹³² this is the same thing that Plato founded on a convincing lie. A generic consanguinity to put real familial relations in their right place in the city:

outside of the symbolic, in any case. A civic fraternity to forget division. Very far from Homeric fraternities which were constituted by and for vengeance,¹³³ much closer to Hellenistic “kinships”—I am thinking of those communities which call themselves *syngeneia* and give their members the title of “brothers”¹³⁴—but above all: directly in line with a thinking of the city under a familial metaphor.



It is time to put an end to this journey, already quite long even if we have contented ourselves to point out some figures of a combinatory in three terms between *stasis*, family, and city; even if we have only raised questions of which each one would merit an investigation unto itself.

The same applies for that model, so recurrent, of brothers—the worst enemies, the surest friends—to which one will have to give a detailed grounding in the classical city. This presupposes that we systematically follow the order in which the nearest relatives are traditionally enumerated. If, as the texts studied here suggest, the tendency is indeed, in a political context, to name brothers first of all,¹³⁵ that fact merits interrogation in itself, and this would be the case only with regard to a logic like ours, where it is understood that one starts from ancestors (those whom we call, in the Roman way, “parents,” and who give their name to the entirety of the familial network; and it is thus that we speak of kinship [*parenté*] where the Greeks speak of *syngeneia*, generalizing to the whole of the family what relates properly only to consanguinity). If it would turn out in fact that, in reflection on the city, *syngeneia* takes precedence in this way over *genos*—which is to say over lineage¹³⁶—one would still have to explain this choice, whether one seeks to clarify it through the Greek structures of kinship; whether one supposes it to be determined by the status of citizens insofar as they are ideally *en hēlikia*, of age to bear arms, neither too old nor too young, and thus inclined to privilege the horizontal relations between peer, within the same generation;¹³⁷ or whether one sees in it the imaginary realization of a desire for equality, in the face of the specter of division in the city and the continually reborn menace of *kratos*.¹³⁸

But I return once again to what my subject was, to the triad *stasis*/family/city, to state anew that these notions are articulated along lines of force where recurrence and superposition prevail for a long time over the whole continued process of evolution. Hence paradox and ambivalence, encountered more than once. May the historian of kinship be able to find there an occasion to reexamine the received idea of an irresistible overshadowing of the *oikos* by the city. The historian

of politics, for her part, will perhaps draw from it strength in the conviction that ambivalence presides over Greek reflection on the city as soon as one must integrate *stasis* into it: for internal conflict must henceforth be thought as effectively being born within the *phylon* instead of being, as a comfortable solution wishes it, imported from outside. Here begins the interminable confrontation of *stasis emphylos* and *oikeios polemos*....

It is necessary, with the Greeks, to try to think war in the family. Propose that the city is a *phylon*: it follows that *stasis* is its revelator. Turn the city into an *oikos*: on the horizon of *oikeios polemos*, a feast of reconciliation looms. And admit finally that between these two operations, the tension is not one of those that are resolved.

NICOLE LORAUX (1943—2003) was the author of *The Invention of Athens: the Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (MIT 2006), and other influential works on Greek antiquity.

ADAM KOTSKO teaches in the Shimer Great Books School of North Central College. He is the author, most recently, of *The Prince of This World* (Stanford) and the translator of many works by Giorgio Agamben.

NOTES

Author's note: An initial version of this text was the subject of a conference at the Instituto Gramsci (Rome, January 1986) and was submitted to a long discussion in my seminar at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales. I am eager to thank all those who, on one occasion or another, lavished remarks and advice on me; my recognition goes above all to Yan Thomas, whose friendship, knowledge, and lively questions have been infinitely precious to me, throughout the elaboration of these pages.

1. Plato, *Menexenus* 243e2-244a3. [*Translator's note:* All quotations from the works of Plato are based on those found in Plato, *Complete Works*, eds. John M. Cooper, D.S. Hutchinson, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997. These and other published translations have been revised, sometimes considerably, to conform to Loraux's usage. Translations for classical texts are only cited in cases where Loraux quotes them directly; in all other cases, the reader may consult any standard edition using the reference given.]
2. Within a funeral oration, even if a parodic one, the repetition *polemos... epolemēthē*, which aims to present this *stasis* as a war, is a means of effacing the ideologically problematic separation between *stasis* and *polemos*; on this separation, see precisely in connection with the events of 404/403, Nicole Loraux, "Thucydide n'est pas un collègue," *Quaderni di storia* 12 (1980, 55-81, note 63), as well as *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, trans. Alan Sheridan, Cambridge: Zone, 2006, 255-56.
3. Plato, *Republic* V, 471a4.
4. Plutarch, *On Brotherly Love*, 480d (cf. Euripides, fragment 975 in Nauck, also cited by Aristotle, *Politics*, VII, 1328a). [*Translator's Note:* Translation based on *Plutarch: Moralia* (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 6, trans. W.C. Helmbold, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939.]
5. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1453b19-22. [*Translator's Note:* Translation based on Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Joe Sachs, Newburyport: Focus Philosophical Library, 2006.]
6. Isaeus, IX, 30: *oudepote diaphoros egenomēn*. [*Translator's Note:* Translation based on *Isaeus* (Loeb Classical Library), trans. Edward Seymour Forster, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.]
7. Aristotle, *Politics* V, 1303b31-37. [*Translator's Note:* Translation based on Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Joe Sachs, Newburyport: Focus Philosophical Library, 2012.]
8. Plato, *Menexenus* 239a1-5.
9. I have in mind the inscription of Nakōnē, published by D. Asheri, in G. Nenci (ed.), *Materiali e contributi per lo studio degli otto decreti da Entella*, Pisa, 1984 (= *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 13.3 [1982]), 771-1103.
10. According to the *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grec*, by P. Chantraine, s.v. *philon*, "the primitive meaning must be: 'what has developed as a group'" (my translation). On the root **bhu-*, "push, grow, develop," see *Ibid.*, s.v. *phuomai*.
11. And not "of the same race" or "of the same tribe," as Chantraine proposes (*Dictionnaire*, s.v.), followed by D. Roussel, *Tribu et cité*, Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1976, 161 (who goes so far as to assimilate *emphyloi* to *homophuloi*).
12. H. Collitz et al., *Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt Inschriften*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1884-1915, no. 5040, l. 15: *hosoi eōnti emphuloi par' ekaterois* (all those who will be registered on one or the other side in a group [a tribe]).
13. Hesiod, fr. 190 in Merkelbach-West, 2; Pindar, *Second Pythian*, 32 (Ixion); Sophocles, *Oedipus Rex* 1406 and *Oedipus at Colonus* 407 (Oedipus); Plato, *Republic* VIII, 565 and 4 (the tyrant). See also

- Apollonius of Rhodes, *Argonautica* I, 865 and IV, 717.
14. *phonos*: Theognis, 151; see also Ephorus, *FrgHist*, fr. 100. *Machē*: Alcaeus, fr. 70 in Lobel-Page, 11 (also Theocritus XXII, 200).
15. Solon, fr. 4 in West (cited by Demosthenes, *De Falsa Legatione*, 255), v. 19; see Herodotus VIII, 3 and Democritus, fr. 249 Diels-Krantz.
16. Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 863. [Translator's Note: All translations from Aeschylus are based on those found in *Aeschylus* (Loeb Classical Library), trans. Herbert Weir Smyth, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.]
17. If *homophylos* and *homophuēs* are, as for example in Plato, more or less interchangeable terms, must one follow the same reasoning in connection with *emphulos* and *emphuēs*?
18. *Odyssey* XV, 272-73 (where it is important, against Bérard's correction, to maintain *emphylon*); Sophocles, *Antigone* 1264; Plato, *Laws* IX, 871a2.
19. Plato, *Laws* XI, 871a. On the link of equivalence between *polis* and *phylon* or *phulē*, see G. Nagy, "The Indo-European Heritage of Tribal Organization: Evidence from the Greek Polis," in *Proto-Indo-European: The Archeology of a Linguistic Problem. Studies in Honor of Marija Gimbutas*, ed. S.N. Skomal and E. Polome, Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Man, 1987, 245-266.
20. Other than the inscription cited in note 12, we will mention two exceptions: Euripides, *Ion* 1581 (foundation of Attic *phylai*: one will note that *emphylon* appears on the side of the warlike *phylē*); Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 1385 (but the word figures in the pronunciation of a scandal: to conquer with the spear *gē emphylios*, the land where one was born, is to confound war and *stasis*).
21. On the closure of *phylon*, see G. Nagy, *op. cit.* The *emphulos* / *othneios* opposition (Apollonius of Rhodes, IV 717) doubles the opposition *oikeios* / *otheneios* (in connection with which see J.-P. Vernant, *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece*, trans. Janet Lloyd, New York: Zone, 1988, 31).
22. Beside the words already mentioned (*haima*, *phonos*, *machē*, *stasis*), *emphylios* can qualify *polēmos*, *tarachē*, *dichostasia*, *nikē*, *kinēsis*, *sphagē*, *thorybos*, *diasphora*, *kakon*, *miasma*. *Ta emphyilia* designates civil struggles in Dio Cassius. One will note that, for Eustathus, the conflict of Achilles and Agamemnon in Book I of the *Iliad* is an *emphylios machē* (*ad loc.*).
23. *Haima* as murder: see for example Aeschylus, *Libation Bearers* 66-67, 520, 650. *Haima* and kinship: *Iliad* XIX, 111; *Odyssey* IV, 611 and VIII, 583; Pindar, *Sixth Nemean*, 34; Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*, 141 and *Eumenides*, 606; Sophocles, *Ajax*, 1305 and *Oedipus at Colonus*, 245; Aristotle, *Politics* II, 1262a11.
24. F. Bourriot, *Recherches sur la nature du génos*, Paris: Librairie H. Champion, 1976, pg. 251, note 42.
25. See F. Hériter, "Le sperme et le sang," *Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse* 32 (1985, 111-122).
26. Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*, 694: *haimatos ou themistou*.
27. Euripides, *Phoenicians*, 19-20; see also 1051 and 1292, as well as 790. [Translator's Note: Translation based on Euripides, *The Phoenissae*, in *The Complete Greek Drama*, Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, vol. 2, New York: Random House, 1938.]
28. See Euripides, *Orestes* 285 (citing Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 230, 261, 608, 653). Conversely, if "the blood of a mother" is the murder of a mother, at verse 89 of the *Eumenides*, *autadelphon aima* (the true fraternal blood) designates only kinship.
29. Aeschylus, *Libation Bearers*, 650.
30. See H. Koller, "Haima," *Glotta* 15 (1967, 149-155).
31. Euripides, *Suppliants*, 148.
32. Aeschylus, *Suppliant Women*, 449. One will observe that the overdetermination of kinship is obvious in this verse: *haima homaimon* is for the king the blood of his fellow citizens; for the Dan-

- aides, Argosian blood; for the Argosians, the blood of the Egyptiades.
33. Aeschylus, *Seven Against Thebes*, 681 and 934-940.
34. Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 653, which one will compare with 210-212 and 605 (the murder of Agamemnon by Clytemnestra was not *homaimos authentēs phonos*: therefore they do not pursue her).
35. Pindar, *Second Pythian* 32: *haima emphyllion*. One will note that, for Apollo, Ixion is only the first murderer (*Eumenides* 717-718; in 439-441, Athena compared Orestes to Ixion).
36. Among historians of Greek law, the debate is centered around the word *authentēs*: one will find the bibliography in N. Loraux, “La main d’Antigone,” *Mètis* 1 (1986, 165-96). From the Roman side, where there exists no neutral word to say “homicide,” see Y. Thomas, “Parricidium. Le père, la famille et la cité,” *Mélanges de l’Ecole française de Rome (Antiquité)* 93 (1981, 643-715).
37. See for example Euripides, *Phoenicians* 374.
38. *Menexenus* 243e-244a. On *syngeneia*, the most generic noun for blood kinship, see D. Musti, “Sull’idea di *syngeneia* in iscrizioni greche,” *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa* 32 (1963, 225-239, notes 226-227).
39. Plato, *Republic* V, 470b-c, 471a.
40. *Republic* V, 470b; cf. V, 471a1-2: “between kinsmen, they consider it a *stasis* and do not even call it war.”
41. *Laws* I, 628a-b.
42. Besides Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 858-869, 903-915, and 976-987, we will cite Herodotus, VIII, 3.
43. See for example Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 55 and Isocrates, *Against Callimachus* 31.
44. On the avatars of *polemos* in the works of Thucydides, see N. Loraux, “Thucydides et la sédition dans les mots,” *Quaderni di Storia* 23 (1986, 95-134, notes 98-100). The shift in the years 404/403 concerning the use of *polemos* is perceptible in Xenophon, *Hellenica* II, 4, 22 (“the war that we wage against one another”) [*Translator’s Note*: Translation found in *Xenophon* (Loeb Classical Library), vols. 1 and 2, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985-86] and Isocrates, *Against Callimachus* 45.
45. In III, 82, 6, Thucydides affirms that “the bond of kinship became more foreign [*allotriōteron*] than the factional bond”: a way of inverting the phrase “the factional bond became more intimate [*oikeiōteron*] than the familial bond,” which was the most “natural” formulation of this idea. [*Translator’s Note*: Translation based on Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, New York: Penguin, 1954.] The syntagma *oikeios polemos* is nonetheless not foreign to Thucydides; see below, note 47.
46. See P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique*, s.v. *oikos*.
47. If *oikeios* is in this way “opposed to *allōtrios*, close to *idios*” (Ibid.), one will recall that *idios* is related to the Indo-European root **swe* (see E. Benveniste, *Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, vol. 1, Paris: Minuit, 1969, 328-332). The usage of the syntagma *oikeios polemos* by Thucydides (I, 118, 2; IV, 64, 2) supports a parallel analysis.
48. I borrow these diverse translations from P. Roussel, in his edition of Isaeus’s *Discourses* (CUF).
49. Just as a close analysis of the usage of the word in Discourse I (*Succession of Cleonymus*) could show: see in particular §§4, 21, 31, 33, 41-42; see also IX (*Succession of Astyphilus*), 30. At any rate, *oikeios* leans toward kinship, and the translation by “friend” is thus always insufficient, just as Earnstman observes in *Oikeios, hétairos, épistèdeios, philos*, Groningen, 1932, 132.
50. See Isaeus II, 11 (and 23); VI, 15. A similar play brings together, in Herodotus IV, 148, the verbs *sunoikeō* (which concerns colonization) and *oikeioō*.
51. When the Athenians fined the tragedian Phrynichus for having made them cry after the representation of *The Capture of Miletus*, for reminding them of *oikeia kaka* (Herodotus VI, 21), they

designate as “national misfortunes,” misfortunes that concern Athens in itself, evils that affected them by means of their kinship with the Ionians.

52. *Menexenus* 237c1-2; *Panegyricus* 24-35 (cf. *Panathenaicus* 124-125) [Translator’s Note: Translation based on *Isocrates* (Loeb Classical Library), trans. George Norlin, 3 vols., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.] On these developments, see N. Loraux, *The Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas About Citizenship and the Division Between the Sexes*, trans. Caroline Levine, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, 63-64 and *passim*.

53. Plato, *Republic* V, 463a8 and c1-2 (with Aristotle’s commentary in *Politics* II, 1262b15-20); *Laws* VIII, 842e8.

54. Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 1190, 1460-1461, 1571-1576.

55. Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 354-355: “*Arēs tithasos*” is Ares domesticated—in other words, “domestic” or “internecine” murder: a familial variant of the *emphylios phonos*.

56. *Ibid.*, 862-863. See N. Loraux, “L’oubli dans la cité,” *Le temps de la réflexion*, I (1980, notes to 228-237).

57. In line 1585 of the *Agamemnon*, we will note the juxtaposition of *adelphon* and *amphilektos* (which relates to controversy).

58. Pindar, *Second Olympic*, 45-46.

59. We here compare Sophocles’ *Antigone* with what Thucydides describes in III, 81, 3.

60. See Plutarch, *On Brotherly Love* 488a (Cadmean victory); Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 903 (*nikēs mē kakēs*); Democritus, fr. 249. [Translator’s Note: Translation qtd. in James Warren, “Democritus on Social and Psychological Harm,” in *Democritus: Science, the Arts, and the Care of the Soul: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on Democritus, Paris, 18-20 September 2003*, ed. Aldo Brancacci and Pierre-Marie Morel, Leiden: Brill, 2007, 94.]

61. See VIII, 66, 3-4: *tēn allēlōn agnōsian, ... ē... agnōta... ē gnōrimon apiston*.

62. The *oikeioi* are in a relationship of knowing [*connaissance*]: see for example Isaeus XII, 6 (and IX, 30), as well as Plato, *Laws*, V, 738d-e.

63. See Thucydides, II, 51, 5: whether people come near (*prosiēnai*) one another or not, they are lost in both cases, and even *oikeioi* have renounced all their duties; for the verb *prosiēnai*, see VIII, 66, 5 (*allēlois gar apantes hypoptōs prosiontes hoi tou dēmou*) and Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II, 4, 19 (where coming near one another is the sign of a decline in dissension).

64. In VI, 30, 2, the *hetairoi*, for each Athenian, belong, alongside the *xungeneis* and sons, to the group of “his own” (*spheterous autōn*); see again VII, 45 (*ē hetairōn ē oikeiōn*). On the efficacy of bonds between *hetairoi* in Book VIII, see 54, 5 and 65, 1.

65. III, 82, 6: see above, note 45. A dramatic version in Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 111: “they honored the assassins and murderers of their fellow citizens more than their own kinsmen.”

66. Demosthenes, *De Falsa Legatione* 260 [Translator’s Note: Translation based on *Demosthenes: Speeches* (Loeb Classical Library), trans. J. H. Vince, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930]; Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 92 [Translator’s Note: Translation based on *Lysias* (Loeb Classical Library), trans. W.R.M. Lamb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930]; see again Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 174.

67. Thucydides, III, 81, 5: *...kai eti peaitērō. Kai gar patēr paida apekteine*.

68. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 185-188 and 331-332, speaks only of violent words. The figure of parricide—or of its euphemism, the son who “strikes his father”—is recurrent in Aristophanes.

69. Aristotle, *Poetics* 1453b19-22.

70. See Euripides, *Hercules* 1016-1024 (where, after Hercules’ murder of his children, the choir evokes “crimes of women”). In contrast to the Roman father, the Greek father does not seem to

- have legally had at his disposal the power of life and death over his son; in Rome, it is therefore not the murder of the son by his father, but parricide which is the height of seditious violence: see Y. Thomas, “Vitae Necisque Potestas. Le père, la cité, la mort,” in *Du châtement dans la cité*, Rome-Paris: École française de Rome, 1984, notes to pp. 545-548 and “Parricidium,” *op. cit.*, 714, note 36.
71. Even if it is with good reason that R. Parker (*Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Early Greek Religion*, Oxford, 1983, 137) highlights the gap between the indignant development of the Seven on fratricide and the legislation that, in the *Laws*, Plato assigns to this crime.
72. On this point, see the commentary of L. Gernet, *Platon. Lois, Livre IX. Traduction et commentaire*, Paris, 1917, pg. 140.
73. *Laws* IX, 869c-d. We will note that the Platonic legislator, far from thinking *stasis* as a familial war, makes it by contrast the sole circumstance that allows one to declare the murderer of a kinsman pure and safe from all pursuit; and the clause in *kathaper* suggests that it is despite everything not absolutely obvious to consider a brother as a public enemy.
74. In a way that is less menacing for its integrity but also entirely destructive, the family is equally affected by *stasis* from the point of view that Glotz calls its “passive solidarity” (*La solidarité de la famille dans le droit criminel en Grèce*, Paris: Fontemoing, 1904, 456).
75. Aristotle, *Politics*, V, 1303b31-1304a13 (and 1306a33-34). The lesson of such episodes is that “when there are factions among prominent people, they make the whole city participate.”
76. Plato, *Republic* V, 464d7-e2. But it is in generalized kinship, which dissolves nuclear kinship relations, that Plato sees the means of avoiding the *dikai* that are generative of *stasis*.
77. Plato, *Laws* III, 679d.
78. Book VIII of the *Republic* could be studied from this perspective: it is within the nuclear family that the passage from one constitution to another is plotted.
79. Controversy, struggle: Lysias XXXII (*Against Diogiton*), 1; Isaeus I, 6-7, 34; war (*polemein*): Lysias XXXII, 22; Isaeus I, 15, IX, 37. Hatred: Isaeus I, 9, 10, 33 (where *echthra* is opposed to *oikeiotēs*), II, 29 (brothers become *echthroî*), V, 30.
80. The father against the son: Isaeus VI, 18 and 22. Brothers: it is the theme of speeches I (*Succession of Kiron*; see 9-10), II (*Succession of Menekles*; see 29, 40); speech IX (*Succession of Astyphilos*) sets cousins against one another, but refers to a hatred among brothers (16-17, 20, 23, 31) even if, one of them having passed by adoption to another family, the word *adelphos* is carefully avoided on this subject; the hatred between uncle and nephew of speech VII (*Succession of Apollodoros*) is still a version of hatred of brothers.
81. Lysias XXXII, 19.
82. Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates* 55-56.
83. Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon*, 78. [Translator’s Note: Translation based on Aeschines (Loeb Classical Library), trans. Charles Darwin Adams, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919.]
84. Xenophon, *Hellenica* II, 4, 21.
85. I put forth this hypothesis in *Athena’s Children*, pg. 119.
86. On the personal character of the relation denoted by *patrōios*, see the remarks of E. Benveniste, *Vocabulaire*, vol. 1, 272-273.
87. On *synguneia* in its opposition to *anchisteia* (kinship codified according to the law of inheritance), see for example Isaeus XI, 17, as well as 1-2, 6, and 13; IV, 17 (and II, 20-21 and 37). It is because he is discussing the generalized kinship of the *Republic*, fictively held to be consanguine, that Aristotle can use *syngeneia* as a generic designation of kinship: *Politics* II, 1262a10-11 (*kat’ allēn tina syngeneian ē pros haimatos ē kat oikeiotēta kai kēdeian*).
88. Aristotle, *Politics* III, 1280b36-38.

89. A passage from Lysias (*Against Eratosthenes* 43: “the so-called *hetairoi*”) seems to indicate that the “normal” sense of the word is peaceful. “What made the *hetaireia* a revolutionary element in Athenian politics?” asks S.C. Humphreys, *The Family, Women, and Death*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983, 27.
90. On *hetairos*, related to the root **swe*, see E. Benveniste, *Vocabulaire*, vol. 1, 331. *Hetairos* and *hetairia* as positive relation: in Books VI and VII of Thucydides (see above, note 64) and, for example, in Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 174. *Heteireia* and kinship bonds in Athens: S.C. Humphreys, *ibid.*, pp. 26-28.
91. Family and *homonoia*; see Plato, *Alcibiades* 126c and e.
92. See Andocides, *On the Mysteries*, 149 (peroration), as well as Antiphon I, 3-4 (where the word used is *anankaioi*, which can designate kinsmen; see Earnstman, *Oikeios...*, pg. 20). [Translator’s Note: Translation based on that found in *Minor Attic Orators* (Loeb Classical Library), vol. 1, trans. K. J. Maidment, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.]
93. See Demosthenes, *Against Aristogiston* 87-89.
94. Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 48. We will note that the object of affection here is *patris* and not *polis*.
95. *Mētēr*: already in Pindar, *First Isthmic*, 1ff.; *8th Pythian*, 98. On the figurative use of *mētēr*, “more developed than that of *patēr*,” see P. Chantraine, “Les noms du mari et de la femme, du père and de la mère en grec,” *Revue des Etudes grecques*, 59-60 (1946-1947, 239). *Trophos*: Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, 53, 85.
96. Citation from G. Glotz, *La solidarité de la famille*, 90.
97. Isocrates, *Panathenaicus*, 120-125.
98. Sparta illustrates historically what Isocrates developed as a mythico-tragic model: there everything begins with dissension to the highest degree (*Ibid.*, 177); Spartan *oikeiotēs* is at ones the kinship relationship that unites the citizens to the mass and the ironic expression of a relationship of violence (182); the Spartans are criminals who dare to kill their brothers and their *hetairoi* (184); they did great evil to their kinsmen (207, 220).
99. Plato, *Republic* III, 414d-415a: *pantes adelphoi...*, *mētēr kai trophos*.
100. For the rules for the usage of the names of kinship, see *Republic* V, 461d.
101. The linguistic foundation of this theoretical construction consists of completely voiding the ordinary usage of possessive adjectives and pronouns: see *Ibid.*, 462b-c, 463e3-5, 464c-d. It is a question of avoiding the situation, dramatized by Sophocles in *Antigone*, where the pronunciation of “mine” is exclusive of everyone else, beginning with the city (see for example v. 48).
102. *Republic* V, 464d-e. See also 459e, 465a-b.
103. *Menexenus* 244a.
104. *Republic* V, 458c, with the synonymy *homophulos* / *-phuēs*, mentioned above, note 17.
105. *Laws* VIII, 842e-843a.
106. Aristotle, *Politics* V, 1303a25.
107. Herodotus VI, 52: we will note that the translation of *adelphous eontas* must choose between “although brothers, they were in discord” or “because they were brothers, they were in discord,” while the Greek text leaves both possibilities open.
108. See Benveniste, *Vocabulaire*, vol 1., 212-214; *adelphos* originally designates brothers as issued from the same womb, which has durably contributed to attaching the question of matriarchy to the discussion of the word; see P. Kretschmer, “Die griechische Benennung des Bruders,” *Glotta* 2 (1910, 201-213) and J. Gonda, “Gr. *adelphos*,” *Mnemosyne* 15 (1962, 390-392).
109. See Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*, 1387-1388 and above all Isaeus VIII (*On the Estate of Ciron*),

- 30, with the remarks of F. Bourriot, *Recherches sur la nature du génos*, 219.
110. Lysias, *Funeral Oration* 64. One encounters it again, however, in *Antigone* 192 (*adelphā tōnde kēruyas ekhō*), where the signifier “brother” is anything but neutral.
111. Plato, *Menexenus* 238d-239a, which we will find again in the *Republic* III, 414d-415a. On the opposition *adelphos/doulos*, see again *Antigone* 517.
112. *Republic* II, 362d (see Demosthenes, *De Falsa Legatione*, 238). The idea goes back at least to the *Odyssey* (XVI, 95-96 and 115-116).
113. *Laws* IX 880b5: the brother is enumerated at the first rank of fictive kinship relationships that express fellow-citizenship.
114. *Republic* IV, 414d-415a. We will note that in the *Timaeus* 18d12, the summary of the *Republic* puts sisters and brothers at the head of the enumeration of the *homogeneis*.
115. *Laws* I, 627d9 (“those brothers I’ve just mentioned”). Yet the word “brother” has not yet been pronounced; doubtless it was in filigree in the definition of citizens as “*syngeneis* born of the same city.” See again, for the passage from brother to citizen, *Ibid.*, IX, 869c7-d2.
116. There would be a great deal to say about the Platonic idiosyncrasy of employing *adelphos* in an adjective position to denote the kinship or affinity of two notions. Some examples in a long list: *Phaedo* 108b6 (brother crimes), *Phaedrus* 238b4 (brother desires between them), *Republic* VI, 511b (sister sciences), as well as VII, 530d, which emphasizes the Pythagorean origin of such a metaphor.
117. According to the text’s editor, D. Asheri, this procedure found “no analogy in any other city with institutions of the Greek type,” which drove him to seek models elsewhere (“Osservazioni storiche sul decreto di Nakone,” in *Materiali e Contributi per... Entella*, 1033-1045; citation pg. 1038-5).
118. It is inscription #3 in *Materiali e Contributi*.
119. Is it necessary, as I. Savalli envisions it (“Alcune osservazioni sulla terza iscrizione da Entella” in *Materiali e Contributi*, pp. 1060-1061), to interpret the absence of the term *stasis* as a sign of the limited scope of the dissension? In this way, in Xenophon (*Hellenica* VII, 4, 15), *diaphora* designates a larval *stasis*. I believe rather, like the author, that the usage of *diaphora* is euphemistic (as in *Menexenus* 243d5); but this word can also function just as well as the global designation of the genus “conflict” (see for example *Republic* V, 471a).
120. Constitution of groups of five around the nucleus of two adversaries, then repartition of the civic body entirely according to the same principles: on these two steps, see D. Asheri “Osservazioni storiche,” 1038-1039. We will recall that the number five is a symbol of integration, in a number of Indo-European traditions just as in the philosophical speculation of the Greeks where it is the “nuptial number”: see *Republic*, VIII, 546b-d, as well as Plutarch, *On the E at Delphi*, 388a-b, *On the Decline of the Oracles*, 429b-d, and *Isis and Osiris*, 374a-b.
121. Drawing lots: I, ll. 15-17 and 22-27. Elective brothers: l. 20.
122. As D. Asheri observes in “Osservazioni storiche,” 1037-1038.
123. Plato, *Menexenus*, 238d4.
124. On the constitution of the first thirty groups, drawn by lot on the basis of two lists of thirty adversaries that the two opposed parties drew up, see ll. 13-19.
125. *Ankhisteia* defines in this case the degrees of kinship preventing one from being seated as judge at the time of a trial: see I. Savalli, “La terza iscrizione,” 1063 (with bibliography).
126. It is on the basis of familial relations that were made into memberships in a faction: see for example Xenophon, *Hellenica* V, 3, 17 (*dia philian ē dia syngeneian tōn phygadōn*). At Nakōnē, it was necessary to avoid the reconstitution of a nuclear family, even reduced to a minimum, reintroduc-

ing dissensions.

127. See I. Savalli, “La terza iscrizione,” 1063; *contra*: S. Alessandri, “Sul terzo decreto da Entella,” in *Materiali e Contributi*, 1053-1054.

128. We will evoke the “joy” of reunion in the *Menexenus* (243c: *hasmenōs*) and the evocation of the panegyric of souls in *Republic X*, 614e.

129. I do not believe, as does D. Asheri, that the national reconciliation is the imitation of private ceremonies of brothering (“Formes et procédures de réconciliation,” 141): *kata tas adelphothetias* (l. 33) seems to me to refer to the newly instituted civic procedure and not to a past of private practices; at the same time, the *adelphoi hairatoi* do not seem to me to be destined to an activity other than symbolic (*contra*: Asheri, *Ibid.*, 140-141, who believes that the brothers vote at the age of majority).

130. D. Asheri regrets this (“Osservazioni storiche,” 1043-1044) because *phrateres* always constitute a classificatory kinship (cf. E. Benveniste, *Vocabulaire*, vol. 1, 212-214), which to him would seem more appropriate to the creation of elective brothers. But *phratēr*, which has only an institutional existence, is absent from the ideological constructions in the texts as in the practice of the citizens of Nakōnē.

131. Like that of *Demokratia* which, according to certain historians, would have been instituted at Athens from 403.

132. Citations from G. Glotz, *La solidarité de la famille*, 160-161.

133. We will recall that the two faithful helpers of Ulysses in his vengeance must become for Telemachus *hetarō te kasignētō te* (comrades and brothers): *Odyssey XXI*, 213-216, with the remarks of J. Svenbro on the “minimal familial group” (“Vengeance et société en Grèce archaïque,” in eds. R. Verdier and J.-P. Poly, *La vengeance. Vengeance, pouvoirs et idéologies dans quelques civilisations de l’Antiquité*, Paris: Cujas, 1984, 49).

134. Cf. L. Robert, *Le sanctuaire de Sinuri*, Paris: Boccard, 1945, pp. 93-97. On the development of the vocabulary of kinship in the sphere of international relations, I can only refer to the article of D. Musti cited in note 38.

135. Some examples, of course limited in number: Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 34 and 92 (or 83, where the enumeration “fathers, sons, brothers” is explained from the perspective of the “passive solidarity” of the family, when tyrants want to kill their adversaries with their descendants); Isocrates, *Panathenaicus*, 121, 184; Plato, *Republic V*, 463e5, *Timaeus*, 18d1-2, *Laws IX*, 880b5.

136. *Genos*, from birth to lineage: see F. Bourriot, *Recherches sur la nature de génos*, pp. 212-219.

137. *Syngeneia*, of horizontal relationships between consanguines, to express the bond unifying members of a generation.

138. On *isotēs* as ideal of the fraternal bond, whose reality is *kratos*, we refer to Euripides’ *Phoenicians*.

