INTRODUCTION

A recurring theme of Foucault’s lectures on ‘The Government of Self and Others’ over the two years before his death in 1984 was their reappraisal of the philosophical tradition—indeed of the Socratic opening of that tradition, no less. Rather than reproduce the Nietzschean condemnation of Platonism that, for example in the work of Foucault’s contemporary, Deleuze, had become a staple of the French thought of his generation (“the task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism”), Foucault seemed more interested in a line of Socratic philosophy, a line exemplified in Ancient Cynicism, that he clearly saw as irreducible to Platonism and which he also sought to place Plato in. That Plato was not a Platonist was already a commonplace of Heidegger’s. Even Deleuze demurred that “with Plato the issue is still in doubt: mediation has not yet found its ready-made movement.” Foucault, however, developed this point in new ways. One of these—the subject of the discussion that follows—involves resuming his long-standing feud with Derrida.

Although much has been said about the disagreement between Foucault and his erstwhile student, that Foucault was still engaged in this dispute in his last lectures has not, to my knowledge, received comment. This is partly for the simple
reason that these lectures have only been available (in French, as well as in translation) for the last decade.

Foucault’s often arcane debate with Derrida, which started with a squabble over a few pages of Descartes’ First Meditation, are more important than might first appear. As Boyne notes, they relate to nothing less than “the nature of Western thought,” and, we might add, to how that thought thinks itself. In short: how is a history of reason possible? In Derrida’s anti-historicist reading (with its debt to Heidegger), history is marked not only by the unveiling logos—the reason—that shapes each epoch differently, but more primordially by the veiling of Being, that deeper logos, that is at work in every epoch and that, as Foucault put it in his ‘Reply to Derrida,’ “infinitely exceeds, in its retreat, anything that it could say in any of its historical discourses.”

If Foucault (as we shall see shortly) had identified the exclusion of madness by reason with a particular historical juncture (the “classical age” of the eighteenth century), then Derrida argued that both reason and madness are co-constituted by that logos which is always already implied in any such division (but which, after Heidegger, is destined to be forgotten). Pinpointing a time when reason first “excluded” madness carries the danger of thinking that there was a time, before “the fall” (a time thereby in principle recoverable), when such a differentiation did not occur, when reason was hospitable and madness was at home in a still unified logos. This would be a time when Being was one; a time that, for Derrida, never was and never could be. Being is excessive by way of its withdrawal in an infinite self-differentiation, not in its having an outside. “[T]he question is a self-dividing action, a cleavage and torment interior to meaning in general, interior to logos in general....”

Derrida was in effect accusing Foucault of a metaphysical longing for an originary unity—for an Origin. Given Foucault’s project, this must have stung. That it stung will become clear when we look at Foucault’s main response (the essay ‘My Body, this Paper, this Fire’), which is largely defensive, responding point by point to Derrida’s doubts regarding his reading of Descartes and finishing with a dash of ad hominem. In Foucault’s final rejoinder to Derrida a decade later, however, Foucault is on the front foot. It is now one of Derrida’s central concepts—logocentrism—that is being problematized. Rather than reason excluding madness, it is now a matter of a philosophy that is defined by its exclusion of writing. And while Foucault does not dispute that this exclusion has been constitutive of philosophy,
his bold move is to make this exclusion of writing not only other than logocentric
metaphysics, but even an attempt to avoid it.

DERRIDA’S CHALLENGE

In 1963 Derrida invited Foucault to a lecture, which he attended, at which Derrida
delivered a critique of Foucault’s immense work, History of Madness, which had
been published two years previously. In addition to discussing Foucault’s Preface
to this work (a preface Foucault tellingly removed from the second edition), Der-
rida took Foucault’s brief reading of the first of Descartes’ Meditations to task.¹⁰

In this meditation, Descartes elaborates his method of radical doubt, famously
questioning the evidence of the senses and even wondering whether an evil ge-
nius might have planted his ideas in his head.¹¹ Yet when it comes to those impres-
sions which are not to be trusted because they appear to those who are devoid of
sense’ itself, Descartes seems to draw back from a full and fearless investigation,
passing over this possibility with the seemingly much too-quick observation: “But
they are mad, and I should not be any the less insane were I to follow examples so
extravagant”.¹² Descartes, as Foucault notes, thus seems to expunge madness from
reason by fiat. The Cogito, by its very essence, could not possibly be mad, because
this impossibility “is inherent in the thinking subject rather than the object of his
thoughts.”¹³ Madness is a condition of impossibility for thought and so the man
of reason cannot be mad by definition. While dreams and errors are invalidated
by the structure of truth itself (such that, being outside the knowing subject, they
must remain an ongoing concern), “madness is simply excluded from the doub-
ing subject.”¹⁴ Unlike falsehoods and illusions, madness is no longer Descartes’
concern. While the man of reason, freed from the errors of the senses and guided
by the light of true things, will be able to steer a course through the ocean-scape
of dreams, madness need not be navigated at all. For he who doubts is no more
vulnerable to unreason “than he is of not thinking or being.”¹⁵ Men can go mad,
but thought cannot.¹⁶

Derrida notes the following about this argument.¹⁷ First, in the disputed passages,
Descartes does not in fact circumvent the eventuality of sensory error or dreams.
He never sets aside the possibility of total error for all knowledge gained from the
senses or from imaginary constructions. Second, Descartes only pretends that
(close) sensory experience cannot be doubted without siding with the mad. Actu-
ally, as the case of dreams indicates even better than madness, there are no sen-
sory (only intellectual) foundations of certainty—the sleeper or the dreamer is madder than the madman! It is in the case of sleep, not madness, that the totality of ideas of sensory origin become suspect. Madness is only a case—and not the most serious one at that—among all cases of sensory error.\(^\text{18}\)

Thus, on Derrida’s reading of Descartes, it is only with the evil genius that a total madness threatens knowledge—even those purely intellectual perceptions that had survived the first, sensory, level of doubt.\(^\text{19}\) This, then, is not the exclusion of madness but the welcome of its possibility into the very interior of thought, its inner sanctum. In principle, nothing is opposed to the subversion of reason that is named insanity. In practice, however, this subversion cannot be admitted since all discourse must, of necessity, escape madness—carrying its normality, namely its sense, within itself. This belongs to the meaning of meaning itself. By its very essence, the sentence is normal.\(^\text{20}\)

If madness is the absence of a work then this is not imposed at one moment rather than another (Foucault’s classical era) but is essentially so. The silence of madness is necessarily linked to an act of force and a prohibition which open history and speech in general (Heidegger’s sense of history as the abandonment of beings by Being is clearly at work in this thought). “Like non-meaning [Being], silence is the work’s limit and profound resource.”\(^\text{21}\) But if madness is silent then language is the very break with madness. This means that, and quite contrary to Foucault’s intentions, language adheres more thoroughly to its essence and vocation, makes a cleaner break with madness, as it gets closer to it.\(^\text{22}\) It is not, then, as Foucault says of Descartes, that “I who think, I cannot be mad.” Rather, the Cogito escapes madness only because it is valid even if I am mad. There is a value and a meaning of the Cogito, as of existence, which is beyond the division between reason and madness. Thought need no longer fear madness and has no need to exclude it as Foucault had argued.

For Derrida, Descartes only claims to exclude madness during the hyperbolical moment of natural doubt.\(^\text{23}\) Descartes never interns madness since his mad audacity is that madness is only one case of thought, within thought:

\(\text{[E]xceeding the totality—within existence—is possible only in the direction of infinity or nothingness; for even if the totality of what I think is imbued with falsehood or madness, even if the totality of the world does not exist, even if nonmeaning has invaded the totality of the world, up to and} \)
including the very contents of my thought, I still think, I am while I think.²⁴

Foucault’s claim that Descartes reduces madness to unreason is of course but a small piece of his larger thesis that at the end of the Renaissance and the beginning of the classical age, madness is silenced. Descartes’ method of radical doubt, argues Foucault, is symptomatic of the classical age in refusing any common ground between reasonable philosophical doubt and the delusions of the mad.²⁵

Despite his quibbles over how to read Descartes, Derrida too is really interested in going after this major thesis about the fate of madness in the classical age. And the “infeasibility” of this thesis, for Derrida, is that it seeks to write a history of madness “itself.”²⁶ Foucault wants to let madness speak for itself rather than being spoken of in the language of reason. Despite being the most admirable aspect of Foucault’s history of madness, says Derrida, this is also the maddest. Foucault attempts to write about madness without recourse to the reason that has imprisoned it, arguing that a history of madness, as a history of what has been silenced by reason, is effectively an “archaeology of silence.”²⁷

Derrida asks whether there can indeed be a history of silence and whether an archaeology does not remain a logic, an organised language, a project, an order?²⁸ An archaeology of silence would then be the “restoration or repetition of the act perpetrated against madness “at the very moment when this act is denounced.” “Nothing within this language,” writes Derrida,

and no one among those who speak it, can escape this historical guilt [...] which Foucault apparently wants to put on trial. But such a trial may be impossible, for by the simple fact of their articulation the proceedings and the verdict unceasingly reiterate the crime... Order is denounced within order.²⁹

Given their silence, the misfortune of the mad is that those such as Foucault who represent them the best are those who betray them the most. Whenever a spokesperson for the mad speaks up on their behalf, attempting to convey their silence itself, then this spokesperson “has already passed over to the side of the enemy, the side of order...”:

The unsurpassable, unique, and imperial grandeur of the order of reason, that which makes it not just another actual order or structure (a deter-
mined historical structure, one structure among other possible ones) is that one cannot speak out against it except by being for it, that one can protest it only from within it.\textsuperscript{33}

Thus the exclusion of madness as un-reason is not only a feature of Foucault’s classical age but is found already in Greek logos.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, to assume that reason gets split between reason and unreason only in the classical age is to make the metaphysical move par excellence of assuming an original unity of reason.

FOUCAULT’S RESPONSE

Before looking at Foucault’s resumption of his disagreement with Derrida in his last lectures at the Collège de France, it is important to consider his earlier responses to Derrida. The first of these came in 1969 in a seminar held at the Société Française de Philosophie, under the title ‘What is an Author?’. As Campillo has demonstrated, although Foucault doesn’t mention Derrida in this text, his rejection of the move to give writing “a primal status” must be referring to earlier presentations of what would soon become (in 1974) Derrida’s critique of “logocentrism” (about which more below).\textsuperscript{32} Foucault had this to say about the elevation of writing:

Giving writing a primal status seems to be a way of retranslating, in transcendental terms, both the theological affirmation of its sacred character and the critical affirmation of its creative character. [..] To imagine writing as absence seems to be a simple repetition, in transcendental terms, of both the religious principle of the work’s survival, its perpetuation beyond the author’s death, and its enigmatic excess in relation to him. This usage of the notion of writing runs the risk of maintaining the author’s privileges under the protection of the a priori.\textsuperscript{33}

But it was in ‘My Body, this Paper, this Fire’, an essay included as an appendix to the 1972 edition of History of Madness, that Foucault responded openly to Derrida.\textsuperscript{34} Here Foucault disputed, first, that madness is simply neglected by Descartes in favour of the more radical example of dreaming, as Derrida had argued.\textsuperscript{35} The Cogito might mistake its dreaming thoughts for wakefulness (or vice versa) but it will not mistake itself for a madman. In other words, what differentiates the philosopher’s thinking from that of the madman is established—it does not have to be tested. Imitating madmen will not persuade the philosopher that he is mad
in the way that thinking of dreams will convince him he is asleep. While it would be mad to want to act the madman, to think about dreaming is already to have the impression of being asleep. Since “madness is excluded by the subject who doubts, in order that he may qualify himself as a doubting subject,” there can (no longer) by any truth in madness.36

Second, and against what he saw as Derrida’s Heideggerian pretensions to go beyond any philosophical determination in the direction of Being, Foucault sought to reassign Derrida squarely to the philosophical tradition.37 Understood as a philosopher, Derrida’s stake in madness not being excluded by philosophical discourse becomes clear, since then philosophical discourse would be determined as other than the discourse of madness. This would send philosophical discourse across to the “other side,” into the pure presumption of not being mad. This separation/exteriority, suggests Foucault, is a determination from which the philosopher’s discourse must be saved if it is indeed to be a “project of exceeding all finished and determined totality,” if the philosopher is really to “go directly to the calling into question of the “totality of beingness.”38 The Cartesian exclusion must be excluded because it is determining. This, then, is why Derrida works hard to make it that philosophical discourse is finally excluded from excluding madness. For Foucault, famously, Derrida’s appeal to that which goes beyond any determined history of beings to the nothing of in-determination (Being), with its intimations of Heidegger, is as metaphysical as it gets:

a reduction of discursive practices to textual traces; the elision of events that are produced there, leaving only marks for a reading; the invention of voices behind the text, so as not to have to examine the modes of implication of the subject in discourses [...] I would not say that it is a metaphysics [...] I would go much further: I would say that it is a historically well-determined little pedagogy, which manifests itself here in a very visible manner. A pedagogy which teaches the student that there is nothing outside the text, but that in it, in its interstices, in its blanks and silences, the reserve of the origin reigns; that it is never necessary to look beyond it, but that here, not in the words of course, but in the words as crossings-out erasure, in their lattice, what is said is “the meaning of being”. A pedagogy that gives inversely to the voice of the master that unlimited sovereignty that allows it indefinitely to re-say the text.39
Taking their disagreement up again in his 1982-3 lectures on ‘The Government of Self and Others,’ Foucault’s attack is this time proactive—even as he ceases to mention Derrida by name. No longer defending himself against Derrida’s charges, Foucault will instead broaden the scope of his earlier argument about Derrida efacing the text’s differences to target a fundamental moment of Derrida’s critique of metaphysics: Derrida’s apparent reduction of the philosophical tradition to logocentrism. For Foucault, the elision of textual difference is not just a problem in Derrida’s reading of Descartes’ *Meditations*, but is characteristic of Derrida’s account of the text of the entire philosophical tradition.40

In the name of the differences of this text, Foucault will argue that, from the moment of its Socratic event, philosophy branched into two paths. While Derrida’s accusation of logocentrism might apply to the (more familiar) path which charged philosophy with discovering what is timeless in truth, another (much overlooked) path gave to philosophy, understood this time as way of life, the task of being the true life.41 The truth of life versus the true life as something really to be lived. And this bifurcation, claims Foucault, is visible in Plato’s dialogues themselves, raising the question of whether Plato can be placed in the vanguard of logocentrism.42 While Foucault does not want to say that there is nothing in Plato’s dialogues of this first, metaphysical, path, he does want to say that Plato is also very much of this second way.

And it is the Plato of this second way, argues Foucault (2010: 249), who excludes writing not because of a nascent “logocentrism”—as Derrida had argued in *Of Grammatology* (1967)—but because philosophy as a way of life must precisely be lived and cannot be reduced to doctrines. Given that the Platonic exclusion of writing is central to Derrida’s argument in *Of Grammatology*, we cannot mistake this move on Foucault’s part with a minor footnote to their earlier squabble concerning Descartes. In attacking logocentrism, Foucault is going after a central concept of deconstruction, a concept that we now need to introduce if we are to grasp the substance of Foucault’s objection.

**LOGOCENTRISM**

In *Of Grammatology*, Derrida writes that “From the pre-Socratics to Heidegger,” the history of metaphysics “always assigned the origin of truth in general to the logos: the history of truth, of the truth of truth, has always been the debasement of writing, and its repression outside ‘full’ speech”43:
As was the case with the writing of the truth of the soul, as in Plato, in the Middle Ages too it is a writing understood in the metaphoric sense, that is to say a natural, eternal and universal writing, the system of signified truth, which is recognised in its dignity. As in the *Phaedrus*, a certain fallen writing continues to be opposed to it. A history of this metaphor remains to be written, forever opposing divine or natural writing to human and laborious, finite, and artificial inscription. 

Why is speech always preferred to writing in the philosophical tradition? The metaphysical privilege enjoyed by the φωνή (phōnē) is that, like the signified truth of a divine writing, it points to an originary speech outside of all interpretation or representation. Speech is the “system of hearing oneself thinking” through the phonic substance, which presents itself as a speech that is fully present: the speaker exhibits self-presence, is present to himself. In speech, unlike in writing, I coincide with or am identical with myself.

Speech, then, is privileged over writing because of its proximity to the source of the utterance. In speech, the correspondence between my words and their meaning is guaranteed by my physical presence. Writing, by contrast, separates the speaker from his utterance. It is second-hand, a mere transcript of speech. From Aristotle—“spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words”—to Saussure—“Language and writing are two distinct systems of signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing the first”—a speaking subject is conjured time and again as if its living presence emanated through every text. The full presence of that subject is manifest only in speech, never in postlapsarian writing.

Thus the model for understanding language has long been a phonetic one in which the phoneme retains the presence of the originally speaking subject. This figure of the speaking subject is one of a masterful autarky: the subject speaks for itself, makes itself present, brings itself forth into being. The valorisation of speech is indicative of a wider onto-theology in which only that which escapes re-presentation enjoys full being as presence. In ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ from 1968, we read that

writing appears to Plato (and after him to all of philosophy, which is as such constituted in this gesture) as that process of redoubling in which we are fatally (en)trained: the supplement of a supplement, the signifier, the representative of a representative.
In ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ as in Of Grammatology, Derrida singles out Plato’s Phaedrus as a key early statement of the logocentric exclusion of speech. In the Phaedrus, Socrates recounts a myth concerning the Egyptian god Theuth. Theuth invented number, calculation, astronomy but, “above all,” writing. Revealing these arts to the Egyptian king, Thamous, Theuth tells him that they should be passed on to all Egyptians. In response to the King’s question concerning the use of these arts, Theuth explains that, in the case of writing:

“Your highness, this science will increase the intelligence of the people of Egypt and improve their memories. For this invention is a potion for memory and intelligence.” But Thamous replied, “You are most ingenious, Theuth. But one person has the ability to bring branches of expertise into existence, another to assess the extent to which they will harm or benefit those who use them. The loyalty you feel to writing, as its originator, has just led you to tell me the opposite of its true effect. It will atrophy people’s memories. Trust in writing will make them remember things by relying on marks made by others, from outside themselves, not on their own inner resources, and so writing will make the things they have learnt disappear from their minds. Your invention is a potion for jogging the memory, not for remembering. You provide your students with the appearance of intelligence, not real intelligence. Because your students will be widely read, though without any contact with a teacher, they will seem to be men of wide knowledge, when they will usually be ignorant. And this spurious appearance of intelligence will make them difficult company.”

With writing, then, people call things to remembrance no longer from within themselves but by means of external marks. Derrida takes this as a key statement of the logocentric sense of being that characterises metaphysics: “The Phaedrus would already be sufficient to prove that the responsibility for logos, for its meaning and effects, goes to those who attend it, to those who are present with the presence of a father.” The full presence of the subject of the logos is manifest only in the immediacy of the living spoken word, never in the “cadaverous rigidity” of a writing that is only secondary or derivative—fallen. If metaphysical speech is the originally speaking subject present to, or identical with, itself then writing, by contrast, is present only in the absence of this origin-subject. This is why writing is suggestive, for Derrida, of the trace, his alternative to the metaphysical sense of being as presence.
Foucault acknowledges that many of Plato’s dialogues point in the direction of a metaphysics of presence. In the *Alcibiades*, for example, Plato seeks to answer the question of the care of self (*epimeleia heautou*) by elaborating what the self is in its essence or self-identity. Selfhood, it turns out, is given by an immortal, unchanging soul. Foucault insists, however, that this ontological concern is matched in Plato’s dialogues, taken as a whole, with attention to the ethical question of what the care in the care of self consists in. And here it is no longer a question of human being but rather of human existence. The seemingly metaphysical question: “who are you?” turns out to hinge on the ethical question of: “how do you live?” In support of this argument Foucault points to the end of the *Gorgias*, for example, where Socrates says:

> Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict.

Foucault wants his auditors to see Plato not only as the philosopher of conversion to the Absolute but also as the philosopher of *practices*; not only as the philosopher with a fixed bearing towards external realities but as the philosopher following a path, a way of life. And this way, in Foucault’s reconstruction of it, is marked by an initial choice of a way of life that must be followed assiduously throughout life. This is a principle of movement rather than one of self-identity, of overcoming rather than self-sameness. The philosopher must work on himself rather than contemplate a soul that does not change. Indeed, for Foucault, building on the work of Pierre Hadot, the very reality of ancient philosophy is this “work of self on self.”

Foucault makes his disagreement with Derrida’s charge of Plato as logocentric explicit by way of his commentary on Plato’s letters. Although he never mentions Derrida by name he does say that

> in no way should we see in this Platonic refusal of writing something like the advent of a logocentrism in Western philosophy. You can see that it is more complicated than that. For the refusal of writing here [...] is not at all presented in terms of an opposition between writing and the meaning and
valorization of *logos*. On the contrary, what this letter takes up is precisely the theme of the insufficiency of the *logos*.\(^5^8\)

How does Foucault arrive at this conclusion? Perhaps the most well-known refusal of writing in Plato is at the end of Letter II, where Plato reiterates that his doctrines should not be written down since this way they will end up being demeaned by a wider public that will not be able to appreciate them. The only way to avoid this fate is

> to avoid writing and to learn by heart; for it is not possible that what is written down should not get divulged. For this reason I myself have never yet written anything on these subjects, and no treatise by Plato exists or will exist.\(^5^9\)

Plato signs off by asking his readers to commit his letter to memory before burning it. Foucault reminds his auditors that this letter is later than Letter VII, which he proposes to focus on, and perhaps only a Neo-Platonic summary of Letter VII.\(^6^0\) Besides, at stake in Letter II’s precaution about writing is probably a simple matter of Pythagorean esotericism.

So Foucault turns to Plato’s seventh letter, which was written concerning Plato’s failed enterprise to turn Dionysios The Younger, the Tyrant of Syracuse, into a philosopher (if philosophers can’t be kings, then kings should be philosophers).\(^6^1\) Plato writes in this letter, the authenticity of which is now not generally disputed, that he had heard that Dionysios had written his own treatise of philosophy based partly on Plato’s teachings. Knowing nothing of the contents of this text, and not wishing to know, Plato continues that

> This much at least I can say about all writers, past or future, who say they know the things to which I devote myself, whether by hearing the teaching of me or of others, or by their own discoveries—that according to my view it is not possible for them to have any real skill in the matter. There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject. For it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but after much conversation about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself. Yet this much I know—that if things were written or put into words, it would be done best by me, and that, if they
were written badly, I should be the person most pained. Again, if they had appeared to me to admit adequately of writing and speech what task in life could I have performed nobler than this, to write what is of great service to mankind and to bring the nature of things into the light for all to see? But I do not think it a good thing for men that there should be a disquisition, as it is called, on this topic—except for some few who are able with a little teaching to find it out for themselves. As for the rest, it would fill some of them quite illogically with a mistaken feeling of contempt, and others with lofty and vainglorious expectations, as though they had learnt something high and mighty.  

Arguing that both writing and speech are incapable of imparting philosophy, Plato suggests that those who have no natural kinship with philosophy cannot be brought to it by learning or memory; “for it cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it.”  

Indeed, even kindred spirits of philosophy can only engage the task of truth in a dialectical manner, proceeding together “by question and answer” and “without ill will.”  

For this reason, the writing down of philosophy, in addition to being pointless given that the true philosopher has no risk of forgetting what he has seen, is tantamount to claiming for oneself what can only come to light in the context of a life lived together with others.  

Foucault makes the following points about this passage from the VII Letter. First, Foucault notes that the term used by Plato to denote that which should not be written down is mathémata. Mathémata argues Foucault, should be understood in its double meaning both as particular items of knowledge but also as “the formulae of knowledge.” What Plato is saying cannot be written down, then, is not the content of philosophical knowledge so much as the expression of this knowledge in the manner of formula. Plato, suggests Foucault, is saying that philosophical knowledge is not formulaic or ready-made and that it is for this reason that it cannot be committed to writing as something that can be taught and learned in a prescribed way.  

Unlike technical forms of knowledge, which can be set down, philosophical knowledge is passed on through sunousia rather than mathémata. Sunousia was often used to denote sexual union, but Foucault takes it to mean “live with” in this context. The one who would be a philosopher, then, must cohabit with philosophy rather than learn its doctrines; he must be always alongside philosophy rather than merely familiar with its formulas. Foucault points out that Plato does
not deny that it would be a useful thing for everybody if philosophy could be reduced to a written code; but this would not work, and would in fact be deceptive, because then the truth of philosophy—that it requires constant coexistence with philosophy—would be obscured. By the same token, for those who actually live philosophy, writings are unnecessary.

Foucault’s Plato, then, does not disavow writing because of his speech-centric logocentrism, but, quite the opposite, a certain logos (writing and speech) is de-centred inasmuch as it is separated from a living, a form of life that can neither be taught in the abstract nor lived alone. Writing down philosophy might mislead the one who seeks philosophy that it is only logos when instead it is a way of life—an ewart (work). Contra Derrida, the exclusion of writing means only that “philosophy has no other reality than its own practices”. The exclusion of logos is therefore carried out in the name of something positive, “in the name of tribē, of exercise, effort, work…”:

And in this way two complementary figures are avoided: that of the philosopher who turns his gaze towards another reality and is detached from this world; [and] that of the philosopher who arrives with the table of the law already written.

If it was the Cynics who took this injunction to actually live philosophy most seriously in their rejection of teachings and their recourse to tales of exemplary lives, then at least part of the reason for Foucault’s interest in the Cynics (the focus of his lectures on The Courage of Truth from 1983-84), is that he wants to show that the Cynics, like Plato, were drawing on a contemporary understanding of philosophy as a mode of life. And this understanding is one that a deconstructive reading of “logocentric” texts, a reading that abstract these texts from their wider discursive contexts, cannot but overlook. That the Cynics also took the Socratic injunction to live philosophy seriously—to the extent of producing, like Socrates himself, no writings whatsoever—shows not that they, too, were logocentric but rather that the exclusion of writing was epiphenomenal to the widely shared Socratic concern that philosophy not become fixed and dogmatic but proceed always by questioning. The Cynic Diogenes says this explicitly: “Hegesias having asked him to lend him one of his writings, [Diogenes] said, ‘You are a simpleton, Hegesias; you do not choose painted figs, but real ones; and yet you pass over the true training and would apply yourself to written rules’.”
Foucault goes as far as to say that, far from marking the advent of logocentrism, the Platonic prohibition on writing was “the advent of philosophy itself”:

Of a philosophy whose very reality would be the practice of self on self. It is something like the Western subject which is at stake in this simultaneous and conjoint refusal of writing and logos.\textsuperscript{74}

If philosophy and logocentrism often mean much the same thing in deconstructive readings, Foucault leaves us in little doubt that he does not see it this way. Philosophy—indeed the Western subject—emerges in a certain refusal of logos. Philosophy, from the Cynics to Foucault himself, finds its reality in a self-fashioning that implies no self-presence but rather the ceaseless movement of life in which philosophy is present only in the sacrifice of self, only in the very absence of identity that Dionysian self-overcoming affirms.

Given the significance of Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysics of presence on Derrida’s concept of logocentrism, it is both interesting and important to note that Heidegger’s account of Plato’s exclusion of writing is much closer to Foucault’s than to Derrida’s. In his lectures on Plato’s \textit{Sophist}, Heidegger too takes the prohibition of writing in Plato to be an exclusion of \textit{logos} and not only of writing. Heidegger emphasises that, for Plato, what is said, as much as what is written, “can by itself deliver nothing.”\textsuperscript{75} To take up the logos, whether as speech or writing, one must already know what is spoken of or written about. The true philosopher must “see” matters for himself, in his own soul:

There is a double logos, the living, i.e. the one that takes its life from a relation to the matters themselves, from dialogue, and the written one, in the broadest sense the communicated one [i.e. \textit{including} speech], which is a mere image of the other, living logos.\textsuperscript{76}

Also in support of Foucault’s thesis, we might note that the view that writing down philosophy can be problematic in a pragmatic (rather than a logocentric) sense is still evident in the Neo-Platonism of late antiquity. In Porphyry’s account of the life of his master, Plotinus, we read of a certain Thaumasius who, frustrated by the dialogical nature of Plotinus’s discourse with Porphyry, insisted that Plotinus speak in such a way that it could be written down. Plotinus replied: “But if we could not solve the problems Porphyry raises, we would be unable to say anything that could be written down.”\textsuperscript{77} Although Plotinus did not refuse writing,
Porphyry tells us that his books were entrusted only to his inner circle, and that Porphyry himself only gained access to Plotinus’s texts once having engaged in a lengthy written exchange with another of Plotinus’s disciples in which Porphyry finally concedes that the master is right. The reasons for this, as Hadot reminds us, are not difficult to discern—manuscripts could be reproduced and copied at will, such that Plotinus, echoing Plato’s concerns, was careful to ensure that his writings were not made available to just anyone. Hadot claims that, in acting thus, Plotinus was merely “conforming to a widespread practice,” one that included Augustine, for example, who similarly provided a list of the friends to whom one of his writings could be distributed.

Focusing his attack on Derrida by turning specifically to the *Phaedrus* (the logo-centrism of which Derrida had invoked in *Of Grammatology*), Foucault argues that what we “should note straightaway” is that “Plato does not at all put oral discourse (*logos*) on one side and written discourse on another.” Throughout the text, indeed, the term *logos* denotes both written and oral discourse. Indeed, Foucault points out that there is even a point in the dialogue where Plato makes explicit the absence of any such division, which is the point where Phaedrus says that Lysias’ speech is not worth much because Lysias is only a logographer, namely someone who writes his speeches, and whose discourse therefore does not arise from his own *logos*. Lysias, in Phaedrus’ dismissive view is merely a hired speechwriter. But Socrates replies sharply to Phaedrus that he should not despise the logographers, for there is nothing intrinsically shameful in writing speeches—what matters is rather, whether in writing or in speech, one speaks well or badly.

Rejecting the classical distinction between the logographers’ written discourse and the living *logos*, the real question for Foucault’s Socrates/Plato, is how to distinguish between the good speech and the bad speech, whether it has been written down or not.

For Foucault, the purpose of the *Phaedrus* is to dismiss the idea that the true discourse could know the truth in advance, since then discourse would be nothing other than the dissimulation of what is already known (*doxa*), which would reduce philosophy to rhetoric. Given that it can speak for or against the same thing, rhetoric is indifferent to truth. Lysias’s speech in the *Phaedrus* epitomises this, since it seeks to prove that a boy should bestow his favours on the man who does not love him rather than the one who does. Indeed, for the true discourse to be other than rhetoric it is not enough even to posit that the true discourse *seeks*
the truth. Philosophical discourse rather stands in a constant relation to truth—it is truth-telling as ontology, as a way of being, beyond any epistemology. In seeking the truth as something external to the soul, we would be reproducing the claim of sophistry that the truth can be had, merely displacing this having of the truth from the beginning to the end of our discourse. True discourse is marked not by any knowing at all but by its capacity to modify the soul. Only the soul can accede to truth; is this capacity for truth. Truth can only recognise itself in the soul which it modifies.

Yes, the exclusion of writing in the Phaedrus is part of a wider attempt to differentiate philosophy from rhetoric or, to say the same thing, truth from opinion. But this differentiation does not place a logocentric, self-same soul alongside the sophistical soul of a dissembler. Rather, the distinction that matters is that the logos of the philosopher, transformed by the dialectic, changes while the sophist must remain stuck with the doxa (opinion) of his day. The philosopher's soul is thus in motion while the soul of the sophist is what remains self-identical—unchanging regardless of what side of the argument it adopts, as rhetoric demands. The sophist, hence his name, has the measure of truth, which is why he can sell his techne. The philosopher, meanwhile, must submit to the demands of the dialectic—to the parrhesia (which Foucault came to translate as “the courage of truth”) which is a pact of mutual submission to the truth. This pact means that I only get to test the soul inasmuch as he tests mine in return. In the dialectic, truth is a process rather than a possession.

This also implies that while the sophist, by definition, is a bad sophist if his rhetoric does not prevail, the philosopher does not need to win the argument. The end of the Protagoras is exemplary here—are we not supposed to hear in Socrates’ admission that he and his sophist protagonist have switched places (such that each ends up where the other started out) the essential difference between philosophy and sophistry? Philosophy, Plato seems to be telling us, is an idea of the movement of truth in place of the stasis of sophistry. The sophist’s discourse must remain where it started where the philosopher’s must be transformed.

Foucault’s understanding of Plato’s exclusion of sophistry is therefore very different to that of deconstruction. In Derrida’s account in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’, Plato’s refusal of sophistry maps onto his exclusion of writing, since both writing and rhetoric are seen as dissembling an original presence, whether that of Speech or of Truth. Taking the example of the speech-writer that appears in the Phaedrus,
Derrida notes that, in writing “what he does not speak, what he would never say,” the speech-writer is already stuck in the “posture of the sophist: the man of non-presence and of non-truth.”84 Thereby, “the incompatibility between the written and the true is clearly announced”:

For writing has no essence or value of its own, whether positive or negative. It plays within the simulacrum. It is in its type the mime of memory, of knowledge, of truth, etc. That is why men of writing appear before the eye of God not as wise men (sophoi) but in truth as fake or self-proclaimed wise men (doxosophoi). This is Plato’s definition of the sophist. For it is above all against sophistics that this diatribe against writing is directed: it can be inscribed within the interminable trial instituted by Plato, under the name of philosophy, against the sophists. The man who relies on writing, who brags about the knowledge and powers it assures him, this simulator unmasked by Thamus has all the features of a sophist: “the imitator of him who knows,” as the Sophist puts it (268 c).85

Derrida, then, although in no way championing sophistry as such, sides with the sophists against the pretensions of philosophy to overcome representation with presence. For Foucault, by contrast, there is something much more historically situated going on.86 First, the rise of rhetoric, along with the sophists who taught it, was concretely the outcome of the way in which democracy introduced rules of political equality that well-born Athenians now needed to overcome if ever they were to recover their station as the best. Sophistry sold the rhetorical tools necessary in order for these young men to prevail once again over the hoi polloi. Philosophy, by contrast, took up the problem of democratic equality not at all at the level of the political game, but rather out of concern for the future of parrhesia (here translated as plain-spokenness):

the expulsion and exclusion of rhetoric was not at all the eulogy of a logo-centrism that would make speech the form peculiar to philosophy, but the affirmation of the constant connection of philosophical discourse—no matter whether in written or oral form—to the truth….87

Second, Foucault’s Plato insists on differentiating philosophy from sophistry because the former renounces the agonistic relationship between souls characteristic of rhetoric (in which each seeks to prevail over the other) in favour of a relationship in which one soul tests another and itself at the same time. This “test
relationship” established by *parrhesia*, by plain and courageous speech, replaces aristocratic competition (a competition that had to lead, by contrast, to rhetoric) with the natural affinity of friendship. The aim of the true discourse is no longer to win but, through love, to establish a homology between two souls such that both can accede to the same truth 88: “to agree, to say the same as the other, to mean the same as the other.” The identity of the logos between friends’ souls is here the measure of truth, not the identity of a divine or natural logos.

In establishing friendship as the ground of truth and truth as constitutive of friendship, Foucault introduces a division between the will to truth and the will to power that goes much further than his earlier work, where truth-power had seemed inseparable, if not indistinguishable for all that. In philosophical friendship the parrhesiast relates to the other not in the political sense of seeking supremacy, but in the ethical sense of the test. By way of the test, namely telling the truth to the other, but also accepting the challenge of truth for oneself, the parrhesiastical pact establishes a measure of equality between the parties in which the will to truth remains irreducible to the will to power. Though there is still struggle, it is struggle for the truth, not by the truth, and it is a struggle that unites, rather than dividing. The parrhesiastic relationship is one in which the truth is put to work not over against the other but for him, and for oneself too. This is the dual structure of care for self, which is also care for others. The test of truth with the other is a collaborative rather than a competitive endeavour because establishing a relationship to the truth is not something that one can do alone. Just as the other requires my challenge, so also I need his. While in rhetoric I seek only to modify the soul of the other (through flattery), philosophical discourse modifies my soul too.

In this sense, notes Foucault, the “logographic mode” of discourse (whether written or spoken) found in rhetoric lacks the problem of Being that the auto-asceticism of philosophical discourse maintains. If Being is always a question, then the movement of the soul enabled by the dialectic establishes the real difference of philosophy from sophistry beyond any logocentrism.

**CONCLUSION**

In Foucault’s last lectures on ‘The Government of Self and Others’ at the Collège de France, Plato’s exclusion of writing relates not to the timelessness of the logos—this is not an ontotheology—but to its need to be timely, to be actually
lived rather than identified with a set of fixed doctrines. It is not, then, a matter,
as Derrida held, of opposing the logos of a “divine or natural writing” to a “fallen,”
“finite” writing, but rather of opposing a writing that can never be finite enough
viz philosophy as a mode of life in which life precisely changes.

Foucault in this way returns to and renews his earlier attack on Derrida’s thought
as ahistorical—unable to see anything outside of the text. Derrida’s construction
of the philosophical tradition as logocentric ironically reproduces the very philos-
ophy of presence it is supposed to refute. For it gives us a philosophy that, despite
its apparent differences, is at bottom selfsame—identical with the exclusion of
writing. It is enough for Foucault to show that, from the moment of its Socratic
event, philosophy was never identical with itself in this way. First, the exclusion of
writing in Plato is a straw person; it is more accurately described as the exclusion
of a certain logos (both written and spoken) that Plato sees as insufﬁciently mo-
bile and collective for philosophy. If philosophy is to manifest a living logos rather
than lifeless doctrines, then it requires that the logos take the form of the dialec-
tic. Second, while Plato’s dialogues do exhibit a philosophy of presence, there is as
much that is concerned with practices—with the ethics of care of self rather than
with metaphysical essences.

Finally, even if Plato is indeed guilty of logocentrism, this does not mean that
ancient philosophy stands similarly charged. Ancient philosophy was not just Pla-
tonism. The implicit exclusion of writing in Cynicism in particular stemmed from
the refusal of any formal teachings—Cynicism did not want to be another philos-
ophical school—in order that philosophy be characterised by the ongoing test of
the courage of truth (parrhesia), a test that must continually be taken up again
throughout life. The parrhesia that, as Foucault shows, the Cynics made central
to the philosophical life would be badly characterised as logocentric. For parrhe-
sia, where the logos is characterised by the test of truth and not by its content, is
never identical with itself, never the full presence of a divine or natural word. As
merely the courage to bind oneself to the truth through a risky confrontation with
normalising power (the nomoi, the laws or customs that the Cynics rejected), the
life of the Cynic was rather characterised by a crude and confrontational logos
defined only by its opposition to citizenship. What is present in the logos of the
Cynic is really only the absence of any given identity. The being of the Cynic is
merely his nonbeing, his being a-polis, without a state.
Foucault’s account of ancient Cynicism intends, among other things, to show that there is much in the philosophical tradition that is not logocentrism. Is Foucault’s relationship to this tradition finally more affirmative than that of deconstruction inasmuch as he is alive to its difference from itself? Where deconstruction grudgingly acknowledges its dependence on that which it deconstructs, almost as if caught in the net of its own logic, Foucault finishes with a much more assenting statement of his dependency. For Foucault finds an alternative to the metaphysics of presence not in the absences and elisions of metaphysical texts but rather in the diversity of lived practices of philosophy.

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NOTES


8. Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 38. There is no space to expand my account of the difference between Foucault’s archaeological approach to history and Derrida’s insistence on a more ‘transcendental’ approach here. Interested readers should consult Khurana (“The Common Root of Meaning and Nonmeaning: Derrida, Foucault and the Transformation of the Transcendental Question,” in O. Custer et al. (eds), *Foucault/Derrida: Fifty Years Later* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), who argues that despite Foucault’s accusation that Derrida’s critique of him is ahistorical and built on an entirely canonical post-Kantian concern with transcendental conditions, in fact Derrida’s transcendental questions are far from the conventional kind.


12. Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, 7


15. Foucault, *History of Madness*, 46


20. Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 54
22. Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 55
23. Derrida, “Cogito and the History of Madness,” 56
25. Foucault, *History of Madness*, 47
27. Foucault, *History of Madness*, xxviii
34. In the same year there was also a shorter ‘Reply to Derrida’, which was initially published in the journal *Paideia* and which Foucault also included as an appendix to the second edition of *History of Madness.*
35. Foucault, *History of Madness*, 553-4
36. Foucault, *History of Madness*, 561
37. Foucault, *History of Madness*, 568
38. Foucault, *History of Madness*, 569
41. Foucault (History of Madness, 569) had already argued in ‘My Body’ that Derrida had missed this ‘essential discursive determination’ in Descartes’ exclusion of madness: namely ‘the double weave of the exercise and the demonstration’. Foucault now conducts a full genealogy of this philosophical ‘double-weave’.
44. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 15
45. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 7
46. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 18
47. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 11 & 30
48. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 71
51. Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 77-8
52. Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 79
53. See, for example: Jacques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena: and other essays on Husserl’s theory of
55. Foucault, The Courage of Truth: the government of self and others II, 163
57. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 242; see also, 255
58. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 253-4
60. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 247
61. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 247
63. Plato, “II and VII Letters,” 344a
64. Plato, “II and VII Letters,” 344b
66. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 247
68. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 248-9
69. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 249
70. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 254
71. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others 255
72. As the first Cynic, Antisthenes, told a friend who had lost his notes: ‘you should have inscribed them on your mind instead of on paper’. Antisthenes also ‘maintained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of words or learning’ (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Vol. II, trans. R.D. Hicks (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1991), 7 & 13).
73. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 51
74. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 254
75. Martin Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 237-8
76. Heidegger, Plato’s Sophist, 239
78. Hadot, Plotinus: or the simplicity of vision, 88
79. Hadot, Plotinus: or the simplicity of vision, 89
80. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 329-30
81. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 330-1; 335; 352
82. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 335
83. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 370
84. Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 68
85. Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 105-6
86. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 369
87. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 352
88. Foucault, The Government of Self and Others, 335; 371; 374
90. In the *Will to Know*, the Collège de France lectures from 1971, Foucault is by contrast entirely true to the Nietzschean schema, as can be seen from his lecture summary, in particular, where he sees truth as only a fictitious outcome of the will to power. See: Michel Foucault, *Lectures on the Will to Know*, trans. G. Burchell (Houndmills: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013), 197-8.