legacies of german idealism: from the great war to the analytic/continental divide
andreas vrahimis

Many years hence, when the reaction of the past shall have left only the grand outline in view, this perhaps is how a philosopher will speak of it. He will say that the idea, peculiar to the nineteenth century, of employing science in the satisfaction of our material wants had given a wholly unforeseen extension to the mechanical arts and had equipped man in less than fifty years with more tools than he had made during the thousands of years he had lived on the earth. Each new machine being for man a new organ—an artificial organ which merely prolongs the natural organs—his body became suddenly and prodigiously increased in size, without his soul being able at the same time to dilate to the dimensions of his new body.

—Henri Bergson, The Meaning of the War
On August 25, 1914, almost two months from the outset of the First World War, the German army occupied the Belgian university city of Leuven, intentionally burning its University’s great library with its hundreds of thousands of manuscripts and books. It may be argued that the violation of this sanctuary of learning was the event that triggered a different aspect of the war, one fought between intellectuals, by the pen rather than by the sword. This is what we will refer to from now on, in the words of the Neo-Kantian philosopher Alois Riehl, as “the Cultural War [Kulturkrieg].”

Having said for a long time that he was used up, finished, more old-fashioned in his pretended audacities than the most pompous nonentities, she now comprised that condemnation in a general indictment by saying that he was “pre-war.” According to the little clan, the war had placed between him and the present, a gulf which relegated him to a past that was completely dead. Moreover—and that concerned rather the political world which was less well-informed—Mme. Verdurin represented him as done for, as complete a social as an intellectual outsider.

—Marcel Proust, Time Regained

Ah, demons of the whirlwind, have a care, What, trumpeting your triumphs, ye undo!

The destruction of the library immediately made world news headlines. A number of French and Belgian intellectuals wrote in protest against Germany’s brutality towards learning and culture. British writers and intellectuals gathered around Wellington House, also known as the War Propaganda Bureau, commissioning an onslaught of propaganda, some of which was pure fiction, against Germany’s barbarism in the so called “Rape of Belgium.” Under the August 1914 Defence of the Realm Act, Britain not only prohibited the teaching of German at schools, but also banned all books written in the German language. The German response came in the form of the notorious Manifesto of the Ninety-Three professors defending “Germany’s honour” against accusations of barbarism, proclaiming that Germany’s acts in Belgium were part of a war that was not caused by Germany, which was now obliged to fight in order to protect “the legacy of a Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant.” Numerous speeches and publications by German intellectuals, including almost all of the most prominent academic philosophers at the time, followed the line of the manifesto. The response by intellectuals around the world included those of prominent philosophers such as Bergson in France, and Dewey in the United States. This international turn against the German professors’ philosophical heroes seems to have, obviously very problematically, taken it for a fact that the legacy of 19th century figures such as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, or even Nietzsche, were in some sense rightly invoked by their self-proclaimed inheritors as justifiers of German militarism.

This paper will begin by exploring that part of what I referred to as the “cultural war” that has to do with philosophy. More specifically, as we shall see, the way philosophers in Britain and Germany dealt with the war is intimately related to this idea of the legacy of Kant and post-Kantian philosophy. More ambitiously, I will try to trace connections between the First World War and subsequent developments of factors that would gradually lead to the formation of the idea of a divide between analytic and continental philosophy. The study focuses on the rhetorical and outright propagandistic uses in which philosophy, or rather appeals to philosophy, were employed during the war (to the detriment of careful study of the arguments, which would require much longer study). The reason why focus on such surface impressions is useful here is because, as I shall show, it was such proclamations, rather than detailed philosophical argument, which shaped the subsequent history of philosophy, by giving philosophers excuses not to read some of their peers’ work.
1. IT WAS ALL NIETZSCHE’S FAULT

The philosophy of F. W. Nietzsche was, perhaps above that of any other Germanophone thinker, the subject of most abuse during the war. As Nicholas Martin has shown, most of the wartime commentary on Nietzsche was based on gross exaggerations of doctrines that are either based on very selective readings of his work, or simply on ignorance of that work. The breakout of war, it seems, could be blamed on Nietzsche, due to the fact that Gavrilo Princip, who had assassinated Archduke Ferdinand, had been a follower of Nietzsche. And though the “Black Hands,” the Nietzsche-inspired secret society of which Princip was a member, had been militant against Austria’s annexation of Bosnia, this did not prevent British propagandists in the autumn of 1914 from identifying Nietzsche with the policies of the Kaiser. Nietzsche’s aphoristic texts, though explicitly anti-nationalistic and even anti-German, often develop romanticised images of war. This allowed for the projection of all sorts of meanings onto selected fragments. Nietzsche’s German publishers might have seen an opportunity for sales here. The war anthologies of Nietzsche’s work were best sellers among the German soldiers. According to the Nietzsche scholar Karl Jöel, this was evidence that “this people went to war with their souls.” This was the basis of the British propagandists’ myth that Thus Spake Zarathustra was somehow formally included in the Prussian infantry’s field packs, in place of the bible. The idea of Nietzsche as an obverse alternative to the bible disturbed Nietzsche’s British critics, as is reflected in the following lines of a poem by Edmond Holmes:

Christ or Nietzsche? Right or might?
Truth of Heaven or lies from Hell?
Healing balm or bursting shell?
Freedom’s day or serfdom’s night?17

Yet despite the potential ease with which Nietzsche could be abused by the popular press for the purposes of propaganda, once the professional philosophers stepped in the arena the project was abandoned. Nietzsche was neither on the minds nor on the reading lists of many academic philosophers at the time. In fact, Nietzsche’s depiction as the mastermind behind the Kaiser’s policies was the first acquaintance with his thought for many in the Anglophone world. Furthermore, in Germany the mainstream of academic philosophy was dominated by Neo-Kantianism, whose mainly epistemological conception of philosophy had little to do with Nietzsche. Some German academics, for example Wilhelm Dilthey
and Rudolf Eucken, did already draw inspiration from Nietzsche’s work prior to the war. Another exceptional case was Bergson, who was himself not in the mainstream of French academic philosophy but rather, like Nietzsche, had at the time a more broad impact on an intellectual elite beyond the circles of academia. These would be the sources from which, at the end of the war, the predominantly Germanophone tradition of Lebensphilosophie would be put together to challenge the Neo-Kantian establishment.

What was on the minds of mainstream academics, nonetheless, was a Germanophone tradition of philosophy that had begun with Kant. As a reviewer of Dewey’s wartime polemic for the New York Times put it,

Not Nietzsche, but Immanuel Kant is responsible for the spirit of twentieth century Germany. Not belief in the superman but belief in the categorical imperative and the thing-in-itself has sent Germany to war with the world. Not Thus Spake Zarathustra but the Critique of Pure Reason explains the amazing utterances of Bernhardi, of Treitschke, of Wilhelm himself.

The claim that Kant, a staunch defender of cosmopolitanism and “perpetual peace,” was in any way responsible for the war appears even more controversial than the idea that the anti-Prussian Nietzsche was posthumously guiding the Kaiser’s hand. Had we not already come across the Manifesto of the 93, we might have been severely puzzled as to where someone like Dewey could have gotten the impression that Kant was somehow responsible for the war. It is, therefore, to the Germanophone claims to the legacy of Kant that we must now turn.

2. WAR AND THE GERMAN LEGACY OF KANT

As Beiser has maintained, the period from the middle of the 19th century up to the outbreak of the First World War can, without exaggeration, be described as “one of the most creative and revolutionary periods of modern philosophy,” even if it has been “little studied in German [and] even less in English.” The metaphilosophical debates taking place during this period, revolving around a certain crisis regarding philosophy’s self-conception, were crucial in shaping philosophy’s reaction to the successes of the positive sciences in the 19th century. From the 1890s to 1914, Germanophone academic philosophy was mainly concerned with the methodological issue of criticising “psychologism,” in parallel to related methodological projects of critique directed against various
other vague “isms” such as positivism, historicism, materialism, and relativism. The emergence of experimental psychology laboratories raised the question of whether psychologists should hold positions in philosophy departments, an issue that is inseparable from philosophical critiques of psychologism.

One of the first overt attacks against psychologism is to be found in the work of Frege, whose hostile review of Husserl’s brand of psychologism seems to have disrupted the correspondence between these two “grandfathers” (as Michael Dummett calls them) of, respectively, analytic philosophy and continental phenomenology. Whatever one thinks of the heated debate during the past few decades over the relationship between Frege’s and Husserl’s anti-psychologism, Husserl’s claim to refute psychologism in the first volume of his *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900) is clearly the origin of the controversy known as the Psychologismusstreit that remained at the forefront of Germanophone philosophy for the next fourteen years, and which (alongside almost all other philosophical activity in the Germanophone world), came to a halt with the start of the war. Philosophy’s identity crisis, of which the turn-of-the-century anti-psychologism had been a result, seemed to have found a temporary solution in philosophers’ assuming the role of defenders of Germany’s cause.

It is perhaps telling that, one hundred years later, German philosophers’ wartime writings mostly remain untranslated in English. By contrast to the unrefined accusations against Nietzsche, these were attempts to justify the war by men who had devoted their lives to rational thought. It is thus even more troubling that such men could allow themselves to join the supposed general enthusiasm for the war. Neo-Kantian philosophers, who had seen themselves as inheritors of the legacy of Enlightenment humanism, would come to write tracts celebrating Germany’s cause. Perhaps the most unexpected aspect of Neo-Kantian support for German militarism was that offered by Herman Cohen, the head of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, who also happened to be Jewish. In a 1914 address to the Kant Society of Berlin, Cohen repeats a refrain that would be found in the “Manifesto of the 93” when he attacks the distinction between culture and its defence through war, conjoining Germany as a nation of poets with Germany as a nation of soldiers. According to Cohen,

> Germany is and remains in continuity with the eighteenth century and its cosmopolitan humanity ... [In] us there struggles the originality of a nation with which no other can compare.
For Cohen, there appears to be no clash between the cosmopolitan Enlightenment values to which he aspired and Germany’s participation in the war. Or, as the “Manifesto of the 93” puts it:

> Without German militarism, German civilization would have vanished long ago from the face of the earth ... [The] German army and German people are one.

This idea of the oneness of the German people and the army seems to go some way to explaining why at the start of the war philosophers ceased their disputes over psychologism and adjusted to their new role as the army’s propagandists.

One of the most prolific of the philosopher-propagandists during the war was another Neo-Kantian, Paul Natorp. Our puzzlement regarding the possible alignment of Kantian Enlightenment values, socialist politics, and Prussian militarism was not shared by Natorp, who based one of his arguments in favour of the war on this seemingly incoherent alignment. In his 1915 book *Der Tag des Deutschen*, Natorp claims that, by contrast to the Western countries that had dedicated their efforts to imperial conquests, Germany had developed its philosophy. Somehow, the superiority of German academic-philosophical learning made it a good candidate for winning the war. Furthermore, Germany had applied its philosophical advances to the idea of a society based on reason. Socialism and militarism could come together in a society where “the autonomy of rational will” would be the basic organising principle. This Kantian form of socialism, according to Natorp, justified Germany’s war.

Neo-Kantian philosophical defences of the Kaiser’s position in the war such as Natorp’s, were typical of the German professoriate’s defence of German militarism. We can view Natorp’s defence as a development of the quasi-Kantian ideal of a non-individualistic, non-egalitarian socialism that went hand-in-hand with a critique of Western European capitalistic societies, especially Britain. One aspect of this criticism was developed by the economist and sociologist Werner Sombart, who in a 1915 pamphlet famously interpreted the war in the Western front as one between “traders” [Händler] and “heroes” [Helden]. Obviously Sombart’s heroes were German, while the traders were English. According to Sombart, the English capitalists are traders in that they view the world in terms of transactions, positioning themselves as the ones who receive. By contrast, the German hero “approaches life with the question: what can I give you?.” The former is not...
only characteristic of English society, but also of the philosophy developed by that society. Sombart traces a trajectory of the “trader’s spirit,” starting from Bacon and leading up to utilitarian ethics, which he sees as characterised by individualism. The ideal life lived according to the Benthamite principle of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” is interpreted by Sombart as resulting in “comfort with respectability: apple pie and Sunday service, peaceableness and football, money-making and leisure for some hobby.” When applied to political theory, the “trader’s spirit” leads to a kind of fear of the state, advocating non-interventionist policies which would allow traders to comfortably go on with their transactions.

Sombart’s division between traders and heroes can be seen as relying on an older distinction developed in Germanophone academia prior to the war, between culture and civilisation. The German “mandarin” academics, as Fritz Ringer calls them, had sought to justify their existence by appeal to the notion that the civilisations which developed through technological progress in the Western world were lacking the inner cultivation that constitutes a culture. Therefore the German state required a learned intellectual elite which would uphold its traditions, keeping the flame of this culture alive in German Universities. It is notable that, like Natorp’s idea of a community of “autonomous rational wills,” the division between civilisation and culture can be traced to Kant, who discusses it as follows:

We are cultivated to a great extent by the arts and the sciences. And we are civilized to a troublesome degree in all forms of social courteousness and decency. But to consider ourselves to be already fully moralized is quite premature. For the idea of morality is part of culture. But the use of this idea, which leads only to that which resembles morality in the love of honor and outward decency, comprises only mere civilization.

While clearly a distortion of Kant’s views, the Neo-Kantian philosopher Alois Riehl would come to see the division between civilisation and culture as that over which the war was fought. According to Riehl, Germany’s enemies had been characterised by civilisations directly determined by the advances of technology and capitalism. Riehl seems to be in line with Sombart’s critique of utilitarianism when he claims that calculative, instrumental uses of reason belong still to the realm of technological civilisation. According to Riehl, in a line that anticipates subsequent continental critiques of the relation between rationality and techno-
capitalism, “Even intellectualism, i.e. the training of our understanding, is no more than civilisation, it is merely something external.”

It is against this mere civilisation, and in defence of culture, that Germany must go to a war. Echoing Cohen’s idea of cosmopolitanism, Riehl claims that “[w]e fight this war in order to preserve and improve our culture, and we know that thereby we fight for the future of mankind.”

3. NEGOTIATING THE LEGACY OF GERMAN IDEALISM

It is not surprising, given the claims about Kant involved in German philosophical propaganda, that Anglophone philosophers would raise issues regarding the association of the German Idealist tradition with German militarism. As already mentioned, the debate begins with Dewey’s indictment of the idealists in his 1915 German Philosophy and Politics, which of course is more scholarly than its New York Times review cited above. Dewey’s book issues a serious challenge to the idealistic establishment in the Anglophone philosophical world, from which his own thought had emerged prior to the war. The controversy that ensues dominates British philosophical debate during the war, and revolves around issues to do with political philosophy and international relations. One of the most well known takes on this debate comes from the dedication of Hobhouse’s 1918 The Metaphysical Theory of the State, a letter to his son who is fighting in the trenches. It begins by juxtaposing the image of their reading Kant together in their home garden before the war began, to that of his reading Hegel while Hobhouse hears German planes over London:

Was this a time for theorizing or destroying theories, when the world was tumbling about our ears? My second thoughts ran otherwise. To each man the tools and weapons that he can best use. In the bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine, the foundations of which lay, as I believe, in the book before me. To combat this doctrine effectively is to take such part in the fight as the physical disabilities of middle age allow. Hegel himself carried the proof-sheets of his first work to the printer through streets crowded with fugitives from the field of Jena. With that work began the most penetrating and subtle of all the intellectual influences which have sapped the rational humanitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in the Hegelian theory of the god-state all that I had witnessed lay implicit. You may meet his Gothis in mid air, and may the full power of a just cause be
with you. I must be content with more pedestrian methods. But “to make
the world a safe place for democracy,” the weapons of the spirit are as
necessary as those of the flesh.\footnote{42}

Though for Hobhouse the attack on Hegelian political philosophy had seemed
an obvious contribution to the war effort, it was not at all clear that this was
a conception of patriotic duty shared by all British philosophers. The influence
of German high culture, including German Idealism, had been a force that had
shaped British philosophy prior to the war.\footnote{43} This is why most British attacks
against Kant and Hegel were directed against their British advocates, not the
German professors.

In response to allegations of responsibility for the war made against German
philosophical theories of the state, the German-British pragmatist philosopher
at Oxford, F. C. S. Scott Schiller, would argue in his review of Dewey’s German
Philosophy and Politics

The large and influential section of our rulers which was educated at
Balliol by T. H. Green and his followers has been for years indoctrinating
us with this same theory [that of German philosophy] without any terrible
effects. So may not the verdict of history be that philosophic ideas had as
little to do with it as with other wars?\footnote{44}

Schiller’s approach characterises the British Idealists’ response to their opponents,
whose attacks were epitomised in the charge directed against Bosanquet of being
a “Prusso-phil [sic] philosopher.”\footnote{45} To such charges, the general response seems
to have been an acceptance of a certain degree of philosophical Prussophilia, to
be distinguished from other forms of Prussophilia. In other words, Anglophone
philosophers influenced by Germanophone thought would insist, as Schiller does,
that Germanophone philosophy has little to do with German militarism. For this
they would need to uphold the distinction between German culture and Prussian
militarism which the German professors had vehemently attacked.

One may object to the idea of the pervasiveness of Germanophone influence on
British academic philosophy by claiming that British Idealism had, by the time of
the war, been overthrown by an even more purely British philosophical movement,
analytic philosophy. This is a distorted picture on two levels. On the one hand, it
would be wrong to imagine British Idealism to have simply vanished due to Russell
and Moore’s criticisms, which did not result in the immediate resignation of all British Idealists from their academic positions. British philosophy departments would include members working in the British Idealist tradition until long after the First World War. In fact, it had been Russell, and not the British Idealists whom he criticised, who would lose his academic position during the war, due to his pacifist stance. On the other hand, it would be wrong to believe the subsequent depiction of the birth of analytic philosophy as a somehow particularly British philosophical revolution. As David Bell has argued, rather than seeing the analytic “coup” as a revolutionary act of creation ex nihilo, as it was commonly portrayed after the war, it would be more correct to view it as based on Russell and Moore’s acquaintance with developments which had taken place in Germanophone philosophical debates of the latter half of the 19th century. One can trace a line of influence on pre-war British philosophy by a series of Germanophone thinkers opposed to German Idealism, including Herbart, Bolzano, and Brentano.

Because Hegel and Kant, not the lesser known Bolzano or Brentano, were at the epicentre of the cultural wars, the British Idealists could be seen Prussophile, while Russell and Moore could add the epiphenomenal label of ‘Britishness’ to what would later be called “analytic philosophy.” Though this label made little difference to the way in which the content of analytic philosophy developed, we can see it as a precursor for subsequent troubled relations with non-analytic philosophical trends. We could say that it is the condition of possibility for carelessly bundling all non-analytic approaches to Western philosophy as “continental.”

4. AFTER THE WAR

Let us now move on to how things turned out after the war. The international academic scene immediately after the war was shaped by the boycotting of German and Austrian academics from international scholarly associations, conferences, or other events. By contrast to the prominence that German Universities enjoyed in international academic networks prior to the war, they now found themselves isolated. Furthermore, due to the post-war economy, a large number of Germanophone University graduates would find themselves unable to secure academic positions.

It is possible here to generalise regarding the divergent ways in which the legacy of the cultural wars was worked through during the decade following the end of hostilities. For Germanophone philosophy, this would be played out in the
gradual dissociation of a younger generation of philosophers from the Neo-Kantian establishment that had participated in the cultural wars. By contrast, one might argue that British philosophy simply incorporated the polemic against Anglo-German Idealism developed during the war into its self-image. The British Idealist tradition was portrayed as having died out after the war, while the analytic tradition which would come to replace British Idealism as the mainstream in academic philosophy, despite having avoided participation in the cultural wars, would eventually grow willing to adopt its designation as somehow more British than its idealist predecessor.

In what follows I will illustrate these developments by focusing on two events that shaped interwar philosophy. The first is Husserl's 1922 lecture series at UCL, while the second is the 1929 Davos Hochschule. Both events were conceived as efforts towards overcoming the war’s effects. As I will show, both are also crucial in understanding the development of the idea of the analytic/continental divide.

4a. Husserl’s UCL lectures

When Russell was imprisoned for his activities in favour of pacifism in 1918, he took with him a copy of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen. Despite the ban on German books during the war, Russell had planned on reviewing the book for Mind. His philosophical views had already been seen, prior to the war, by the modernist poet and self-professed dilettante philosopher T. E. Hulme as somehow close to those proposed by Husserl. Unfortunately Hulme would go on to die in the same war which he had bitterly defended against Russell’s pacifism, and so his idea of the proximity of Russell and Husserl’s philosophy was never seriously fleshed out. Russell never finished his projected review of Husserl, though he did write a letter to Husserl about it. He seems to have thought highly of the book, which he would later praise as being “a monumental work” which he sees as part of “a revolt against German idealism ... from a severely technical standpoint” and which he places alongside the work of Frege, Moore, and himself.

It might seem puzzling, then, that analytic philosophers seemingly did not pay much attention to one of their founding fathers’ praise of phenomenology. It should be noted however that, whether or not due to Russell’s sympathy, a number of analytic philosophers had indeed been interested in phenomenology at around this time, among whom we might mention Carnap who studied under Husserl, Wittgenstein who at some point during the twenties would see his own work as
phenomenology, and Ryle who mentions in his autobiography that he taught a course titled “Logical Objectivism: Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl and Meinong” at Oxford in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{55}

Ryle nonetheless mentions that the course was unwanted. This may have to do with the fact that Husserl had been the first Germanophone philosopher to lecture in Britain after the war. Husserl’s lecture series at UCL has been seen as a fiasco that failed to win over any converts to phenomenology (with the possible exception of Ryle), or to have convinced any British philosophers that willingness to read Germanophone philosophers might be rewarding.\textsuperscript{56} This has less to do with the ideas that Husserl presented to his British audience than the way in which he presented them. Husserl’s lectures, presented in German, seem to have presumed some familiarity with Husserl’s earlier work and jargon. It did not help that Husserl had decided that it would be appropriate to name his philosophy “transcendental idealism,” which would not win him any friends in 1922. Russell’s clarification that Husserl’s work was in fact part of a revolution against German Idealism came too late, and was not substantial enough to reverse the bad impression Husserl had left. And whereas he would tell his French audience, in much better French, that he was an unorthodox Cartesian – thereby paving the way for his canonization in France (a point further reinforced by the Franco-German philosophical rapprochement that would take place at Davos, to which we now turn) – Husserl’s English translation had implied to his British audience that he was in the line of influence of Kant and Hegel.

4b. Davos: The demise of Neo-Kantianism

German interwar philosophy was marked by the demise of the old Neo-Kantian philosophical schools, and this decline is arguably crucial to the development of the idea of an analytic/continental divide. As Michael Friedman has shown,\textsuperscript{57} understanding one of the crucial moments in the history of the divide, namely Carnap’s polemic against Heidegger, requires a background understanding of the decline of Neo-Kantianism. In fact, as I have argued elsewhere, the Carnap-Heidegger affair is best understood in the context of a certain polarisation within Germanophone philosophy, a consequence of the decline of the old establishment, rather than as part of an analytic/continental divide characterised by a lack of engagement between camps.\textsuperscript{58} There were, of course, more than two candidates for the philosophical throne of the Neo-Kantians, and one could see the end of the war as being cause for a general reassessment of Kant’s legacy by various
philosophical schools including *Lebensphilosophie*, Marxism, Phenomenology, Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Heideggerian Existentialism, and Logical Positivism. Nevertheless, explaining the decline of Neo-Kantianism is crucial for understanding the move from interwar philosophy to the development of the analytic/continental divide. One could attempt to explain it by the mere fact that almost all the Neo-Kantians, with the exception of Ernst Cassirer, had either died or retired soon after the war. Yet, as Beiser puts it, this supposed explanation “begs the question why no one came to replace them.”

There seem to remain two main options for explaining Neo-Kantianism’s interwar decline. The standard account portrays the rationalistic Neo-Kantians in struggle with the irrationalism of *Lebensphilosophie* and Heideggerianism. The tale to be told in favour of this view is tightly interwoven with the legacy of the First World War, as well as the development of the idea of the opposition of a continental (primarily Franco-German) philosophy to Anglophone analytic philosophy. The symbolic death of Neo-Kantian philosophy has commonly been seen as taking place in the 1929 Davos Hochschule. This had been part of a series of annual meetings at Davos conceived of as a “Locarno for intellectuals,” a post-war rapprochement between French and German academics. The high point of the proceedings was a formal dispute between Cassirer and Heidegger over the legacy of Kant. This would be attended by numerous French and German philosophers, including Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice de Gandillac, Jean Cavaillès, Léon Brunschvicg, Eugen Fink, Joachim Ritter, Otto Friedrich Bollnow, and Rudolf Carnap. For various reasons, which I have discussed elsewhere, the meeting was popularly depicted in terms of a victory on Heidegger’s behalf. Thus the effort at Franco-German re-acquaintance would result in a generation of young French philosophers taking the news of Heidegger’s victory back to France, leading to the eventual popular triumph of existentialism after the Second World War. On the Austro-German side, however, this would result in an analytic critique of Heidegger, as well as a subsequent critique of both Heidegger and his analytic critics by the Frankfurt School. Carnap’s polemical challenge was issued at first in the context of a lecture to the students of the Dessau Bauhaus in September 1929, where Carnap would encourage artists and designers to fill in the gap which is left once metaphysical nonsense (exemplified by Heidegger’s pronouncement that “Das Nichts selbst nichtet”) is overcome. Carnap’s attack was, however, accompanied in that same year by sympathetic remarks on Heidegger by both Wittgenstein (who claimed that he “can readily think what Heidegger means by Being and Dread”) and Ryle. Ryle’s self-proclaimed sympathy towards Heidegger
does not seem to preclude him from prophesying that phenomenology is “at present heading for bankruptcy and disaster and will end either in self-ruinous Subjectivism or in a windy mysticism.”

To go back, however, to our question regarding Neo-Kantianism’s decline, we may here turn to one of the most common depictions of Cassirer and Heidegger at Davos, as offered by Hendrik Pos. Pos contrasts the “Apollonian” figure of Ernst Cassirer, “the heir of Kant ... tall, powerful, serene,” with Heidegger, who he sees as harbouring “feelings of loneliness, of oppression, and of frustration, such as one has in anxious dreams.” Such feelings, Pos goes on to argue, were shared by the academic youth of Germany, which turned to Heidegger due to sharing such feelings with him rather than due to the philosophical content of his work. Notice that Cassirer could be portrayed, 15 years after the war, as a rationalistic proponent of the Weimar Republic continuing the Neo-Kantians’ legacy. After the war, the remaining Neo-Kantians had followed a portion of German academia in defending the Weimar Republic against its numerous critics, epitomised by Cassirer’s lecture on the occasion of its tenth anniversary in 1928. Thus, to summarise this way of explaining the decline of Neo-Kantianism, we could say that it fell, together with the Republic, by the hand of its irrationalist enemies.

There is, however, another possible explanation, which would at least partly locate Neo-Kantianism’s decline in the stance it defended during the First World War. Though one may argue that beyond the surface appearance of jingoism there had been a rational force at work in Neo-Kantianism’s war-time arguments, they had been rendered irrelevant by the Central Powers’ defeat. Furthermore, one might argue that the war had arbitrarily put the significant philosophical debates in which the Neo-Kantians had been engaged before 1914 to an end. Not only had these establishment figures arguably given up serious philosophy in order to become propagandists, but furthermore their pre-war philosophical views seemed to have little relevance to what was interesting and new in the post-war philosophical scene. The fundamental distrust towards modernity characteristic of the academic establishment prior to the war was sidelined by the new varieties of modernism in philosophy as much as in other aspects of culture, including a kind of “reactionary modernism.”
CONCLUSION: THE RELATION BETWEEN THE WAR AND THE DIVIDE

Having presented this overview of the situation that developed between 1914 and 1929, we can go on to ask how it was that the war and its legacy contributed to the subsequent emergence of the idea that philosophy is divided into two camps, analytic and continental. To clarify, I talk about its subsequent emergence since, prior to the Second World War, no philosopher had thought in such terms, and thus to imagine that the idea of the divide existed in the interwar period would be anachronistic. [Indeed the first explicit mention of a divide between English and Franco-German philosophy that I have been able to trace was uttered by Georges Bataille in 1951, after a night of drinking with A. J. Ayer and Merleau-Ponty. Furthermore, though the term “analytic philosophy” had been used by Collingwood in the 1930s to describe a certain tendency of thought to which he was opposed. The term would only play a significant role in the self-perception of analytic philosophers with the end of the Second World War.]

Scholars have connected the war to the divide in different ways. Peter Simons, for example, notes that the death of Adolf Reinach (Husserl’s former star-student) in the trenches, would allow phenomenology to take the Heideggerian path that it did. Had Reinach lived, it might have been possible to see Carnap’s polemic against Heidegger as siding with a phenomenological opposition to Heidegger rather than an opposition to phenomenology tout court. However, while Simons correctly notes that the effects of the war on the divide are uncertain, and so goes on to discuss the crucial issue of the demise of Neo-Kantianism and the rise of Heideggerianism without any other reference to the war, as I have shown above, the war is clearly of central importance to it.

A way of linking the war to the divide through the sociology of knowledge has recently been offered by Steve Fuller. Fuller seeks to explain the German academics’ pronouncements in favour of militarism by appeal to the idea that the perceived superiority of Germany over the Western powers was due to the superiority of its academic learning. Fuller then sees the subsequent developments in philosophy which lead to the analytic/continental divide as responses to the perceived failure of the German University system, associated with losing the war. Though this perception of failure may be partly correct in connection to our question regarding the demise of Neo-Kantianism, Fuller’s account unfortunately contains a problematic degree of over-generalisation. For example, he associates German learning with “German Idealism,” paying little attention to the important
developments in Germanophone philosophy after Hegel and up to the war (which one might want to refrain from placing under the banner of German Idealism). It might, however, be significant to look at Fuller’s proposal as one of the multiple aspects of the phenomenon of the demise of Neo-Kantianism and its effects on interwar Germanophone academic philosophy.

A more precise take on the relationship between the war and the divide was recently presented by Jack Reynolds, who has argued that the war led to a split over the relation between philosophy and politics or history. Analytic philosophy becomes, according to Reynolds, a kind of philosophy that dissociates itself from politics, while the various strands of continental philosophy are characterised by an embeddedness of political thinking in their theorising. Even if analytic philosophy is to be thought of as associated with this meta-philosophical demarcation from politics (conceived in non-essentialist terms as a family resemblance), there is nonetheless a particular element in post-war analytic philosophy that Reynolds’ view does not seem able to account for. The extrusion of politics from interwar philosophy (and vice versa, i.e. the prohibition against the uses, which are necessarily abuses, of philosophy in political life), is not only to be found in philosophers’ silence about politics. It is also exemplified not only by Russell’s revival of the critique against German Idealism, with its references to “the German treatment of Belgium,” but also by Neurath’s Anti-Spengler, in many ways a prequel to Carnap’s criticisms of Heidegger. In the case of Neurath, who was writing while imprisoned for his participation in the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919, the banishment of philosophy (or, as Neurath puts it, “pseudo-rationalism”) from the sphere of political action is clearly a political project: “Anti-metaphysicians strengthen the force of the proletariat.” Neurath was perhaps exceptional in explicitly linking the anti-metaphysical work of logical positivism to Marxist political action. There was, however, an implicit remnant of Neurath’s spirit in the overall project of segregating analytic philosophy and politics. Though most early analytic philosophers did conceive of philosophy as politically neutral, this was, in many cases, itself a political position. It might further be noted that analytic philosophy’s political neutrality was formed in opposition to views of the embeddedness of political thinking in philosophy that were perceived as connected with the war (e.g. contra Hegel, Spengler, or Heidegger).

As already mentioned, some of the developments surrounding the Great War and its aftermath can be seen as constituting conditions of possibility for the emergence of the idea of the divide. It would be mistaken to think of philosophy
during the interwar period as divided into two and only two warring camps, since it involves a plurality of factions. That is not to say that there are no interesting philosophical disagreements, or clashing metaphilosophical conceptions, during the period we are discussing. It is rather to say that a schema based on bilateral opposition is inadequate for capturing interwar philosophical debates. One could suggest an alternative schema: that of a branching out from an older order centred around types of Kantian or post-Kantian idealist philosophy, towards various “revolts” against the old establishment. The old establishment was one in which idealist philosophers could meaningfully debate amongst themselves and with rival non-idealist philosophers. The various “revolts” against idealism take place in such a way as to allow a limited degree of dialogue with rival idealists, but somehow muddle dialogue with rival “revolutionaries.”

Of course there are various limitations to this schema. First of all, in being schematic, it might fail to account for all significant details. This is, nonetheless, the kind of trouble that is faced by such attempts at generalisation, and is perhaps tolerable only by contrast to the kind of over-generalisation included in the idea of an analytic/continental divide. A particular problem, however, which arises from the general schema is its portrayal of a quasi-unity of pre-war idealist philosophy, which is presupposed in the notion that pre-war philosophers were somehow more able to engage in a supra-national exchange of views. Again, though this is limiting with regard to the schema at hand, if one contrasts it with the schema of an analytic/continental divide it becomes clear that it is a more likely candidate for a verifiable claim: the numbers of philosophers involved in idealistic schools between the 19th century and the Great War are far fewer than those involved in the analytic/continental divide.

Prior to the war, Anglophone, Francophone, and Germanophone philosophers may be seen as having, to a large extent, been able to converse about their shared concerns over the legacy of thinkers such as Kant or Hegel. Germanophone academia had established international prestige through scholarly networks which ensured that being versed in some form of Germanophone learning was an integral part of academic training throughout the world. The war caused the collapse of these networks, and the effects of this collapse included a cultural war between philosophers in Germany, Britain, France, and the United States. In the aftermath of the war, German scholars were excluded from international academic activity. And whereas Franco-German philosophical relations would be rekindled after the war at affairs like Davos, British hostilities toward German philosophy would not
come to be revised after the war. This, I claim, is the cultural-political framework in which the development of the idea of the analytic/continental divide became possible.84

—University of Cyprus
NOTES

4. The library, built in 1345, was arguably a masterpiece of high medieval architecture. Its collections of around 230,000 volumes included over a thousand 12th century manuscripts, nearly a thousand 15th and 16th century incunabula and postincunabula, portraits of scholars and philosophers such as Erasmus and Justus Lipsius, all of which were deliberately destroyed along with the building. See Jeff Lipkes, *Rehearsals: The German Army in Belgium, August 1914* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2007).
10. Such an extensive scholarly study, with regard to Anglo-German philosophical exchange during the war is found in Peter Hoeres, *Der Krieg der Philosophen: Die Deutsche und Britische Philosophie im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004).
13. As Martin, “Nietzsche as Hate-Figure in Britain’s Great War” (esp. 148-150) shows, British commentators had portrayed the triumvirate of Nietzsche - Treitsch - Bernhardi as responsible for the “ideas of 1914,” though the connection between the thought of these three was quite arbitrary.
14. A similar phenomenon is discussed by Boutroux, who mentions German tear-off calendars with “quotations from German thinkers, intended to explain and justify the conduct of their country in this war” [Émile Boutroux, *Philosophy and War*. Trans. Fred Rothwell. (London: Constable, 1916), vi].
15. Martin, “Nietzsche as Hate-Figure in Britain’s Great War,” 155.
17. Cited in Martin “Nietzsche as Hate-Figure in Britain’s Great War,” 154.
21. Here Bergson’s account can be contrasted to Dewey’s. Bergson’s overall view of the war was as
a clash between spirit and machine, in which philosophy had little part to play, being “doomed to translate into ideas what was, in its essence, insatiable ambition and will perverted by pride” (The Meaning of the War, 29). As Bergson puts it, “Germany, having finally become a predatory nation, invokes Hegel as witness; just as a Germany enamoured of moral beauty would have declared herself faithful to Kant” (The Meaning of the War, 30). Furthermore Bergson sees Germany’s war as an abandonment of the Kantian principles of “the inviolability of right, the eminent dignity of the person, the duty of mutual respect among nations” (The Meaning of the War, 45), which German philosophers had “received for the most part from the France of the eighteenth century and of the Revolution” (The Meaning of the War, 45). In France, it was Boutroux who defended the Deweyan identification of Kant with German militarism, going as far as to claim that “their generals state that the German officer is nothing else than the visible representative, the incarnation, of the categorical imperative” (Boutroux, Philosophy and War, v).

22. Anonymous, “German spirit due to Kant, not Nietzsche: Professor Dewey traces German Militarism back to the famous Philosopher of the Eighteenth Century and his Categorical Imperative.” The New York Times, July 18 1915.
24. See Kusch, Psychologism.
25. See Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, 295-299, where he refers to the emergence of a critique of these vague positions as a response to a “crisis of learning,” Kusch’s Psychologism, 95-122, also connects all these other -isms to psychologism (see esp. 118-120). By contrast with Ring-er’s claim that “roughly from 1850 to 1880, German scholars were comparatively unconcerned with philosophical or methodological questions” (The Decline of the German Mandarins, 298), paying more attention to “empirical work in various disiplines” (ibid), Beiser’s After Hegel might allow us to see that controversies over materialism (53-96) and historicism (133-157) during this time might have paved the path for subsequent rejection of such “isms” during the “crisis of learning.”
27. See Beiser, After Hegel, 15-19.
28. In this, philosophers would join a multitude of German academics, though as Kusch’s Psychologism, 219-224, points out, not most psychologists, who had found more practical ways of getting involved in the war effort.
30. Quoted in Habermas, “The German Idealism of the Jewish Philosophers,” 41. Habermas goes on to comment that “This kind of loyalty to the state later delivered over those who in deluded pride called themselves National German Jews to the tragic irony of an identification with their attackers” (41).
31. Quoted in Kusch, Psychologism, 213.
32. See Kusch, Psychologism, 213-219.
34. Quoted in Kusch, Psychologism, 214.
35. Of course, this “true” socialism which Natorp envisaged was one “in which neither egalitarianism nor the race for unearned income would play a role” (Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins, 189).


43. If we take J.S. Mill at his word when he writes in 1840 that philosophy in Britain is divided between the scientific empiricist brand of philosophy advocated by Bentham, and the “continental” Kantianism of Coleridge [John Stuart Mill, “Coleridge.” *The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill: Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society* (Vol. 10). Ed. J. M. Robson. (London: Routledge, 1985), 117-164], it would seem that it is a development of the latter which wins out, dominating academic philosophy until the turn of the century.


46. As Akehurst, for example, points out, the Cambridge philosophy department, where analytic philosophy “made quiet progress” [Thomas L. Akehurst, *The Cultural Politics of Analytic Philosophy: Britishness and the Spectre of Europe* (London: Continuum, 2010), 22] was quite small, while “in the much larger philosophy department at Oxford, the ideas of the Cambridge (analytic) school of philosophy were barely discussed” (22) up to the 1930s.


48. See O. W. Nasim, *Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). As Nasim points out, the British New Realists’ debates were shaped by concepts developed by the Austrian Realists, especially through G. F. Stout’s British version of Brentanianism.


50. See Akehurst, *The Cultural Politics of Analytic Philosophy*, 28-29. Though Akehurst may be right in claiming that Russell did not “indulge in bloodthirsty militarism, or German-bashing, in 1914-1918” (29), it should be noted that Russell did participate in a symposium held by the Aristotelian Society in 1915 which was at least partly directed against (British) Hegelian views of the state (and where, for example, on page 313, we find the accusation of Prussophilia directed against Bosanquet); see Burns, Russell, & Cole, “Symposium: The Nature of the State in view of its External Relations.” (As Akehurst clarifies, this is a critique of “the Hegelian view of the state, albeit without mentioning the names of any philosophers alive or dead” (29).)

51. See e.g. Ryle’s (misleading) claims to the Britishness of “the massive developments of our logical theory ... partly responsible for the wide gulf that has existed for three-quarters of a century be-
between Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy. For, on the Continent during this century, logical studies have, unfortunately, been left unfathered by most philosophy departments and cared for, if at all, only in a few departments of mathematics.” Gilbert Ryle, “Phenomenology vs. The Concept of Mind.” Collected Papers: Critical Essays Vol. 1 (London: Hutchinson, 1971), 182.


57. Michael Friedman, A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger (Chigago: Open Court, 2000).


60. See Kusch, Psychologism, 243.


63. See Vrahimis, Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy, pp. 31-46.


68. Pos, “Recollections of Ernst Cassirer,” 68.

69. According to Ringer (The Decline of the German Mandarins, 202-213), for that minority of German academics that supported Republicanism, this tended to be seen as a case of acceptance of the inevitable; the supporters of the Weimar Republic faced fierce opposition from their conservative peers who stood for an anti-Republican “orthodoxy” (pp. 213-227).

70. See Ernst Cassirer, Die Idee der republikanischen Verfassung (Hamburg: Friedrichsen, 1929).

71. In considering this, Beiser’s “Weimar Philosophy and the Fate of Neo-Kantianism” claims to play “advocatus dii voli” (p. 116). Though Beiser mentions this option (“Although the neo-Kantians were, to be sure, not the only advocates of the war, some of their most prominent spokesmen—Windelband, Cohen and Natorp—had been especially vocal, indeed fanatical, on its behalf.” (p. 116)), he fails to explain exactly how Neo-Kantianism’s defense of German militarism led to its
decline. Beiser instead locates Neo-Kantianism’s decline in its failure to offer an adequate philosophical response to historicism, nihilism, and pessimism. Though these can be portrayed as irrationalistic by contrast to Neo-Kantian rationalism, the “devil’s advocate” can claim that they may have been the rational stance to take after the war, especially given the absence of philosophical refutation.

72. See e.g. Hoeres, Der Krieg der Philosophen.
75. Peter Simons, “Whose Fault?”.
77. But see e.g. Beiser, After Hegel.
84. I am grateful to the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy, and particularly to Dr Richard Colledge, for the invitation to present at the Society’s 2015 conference, and for providing me with the opportunity to talk about this topic on the 100th anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War.