In the context of a dialogue with Carole Pateman and intersectionality frameworks, Charles Mills has grouped himself with those who would render more complex the account of women as historically subordinated by virtue of European legal traditions such as the *feme covert* status denying them an independent legal identity. To factor the histories of colonialism, slavery, and race hierarchies, is to reconsider the analysis of women’s subordination and exclusion from the public and political sphere by virtue of sex. It is also to reconsider some of the conventions of white feminism’s historical rights claims, among them, the depiction of the family and home as spaces in which women have primarily been confined to a subordinated and limiting domestic role. This depiction, as has been emphasized by a number of intersectionality theorists, occludes the different status and meaning of home and family under the conditions of colonization and slavery. For example, bell hooks opens *Ain’t I a woman* by distinguishing the specific forms of violence to which female slaves were exposed in the United States, and also by emphasizing slaves’ lack of legal freedom to marry, lack of parental rights, lack of secure private domestic spaces in which to enjoy intimacy and family bonds, exposure to sexual violence, dispossession of children, and the regulation of de facto unions. While this isn’t to forget, as hooks emphasizes, that in their domestic unions, enslaved women were also subject to gender subordination, patriarchal domination might not be the only or best means of understanding the forms of both power and resistance most salient to the home. In the context of
slavery and its aftermath, the home, it has been argued, might more importantly be understood as offering a precious and precarious space of refuge. Thus Mills mentions Hazel Carby’s preferred emphasis that in this sense, domestic spaces, home, and family, could also be spaces of “political and cultural resistance to racism.” It has been argued that such multiple meanings are obfuscated if the family is understood only in terms of the “sexual contract” elaborated by Carole Pateman in her eponymous book.5

Since the publication of The Sexual Contract, gender inequality has come to be widely reconceived in feminist theory as inseparable from the concurrent axes of subordination with which it intersects, most obviously those relating to race, class, and sexuality. According to an intersectional framework, race and gender cannot be seen as constituting either discrete or analogous systems: whether of power, subordination, discrimination, or standpoint.6 The rejection of both analogical and additive understandings of subordination has stimulated a range of alternative metaphors for understanding intersection differently (among them, intersecting “axes” of identity or experience,7 Crenshaw’s traffic intersections, Ann Garry’s roundabouts and multi-altitudinal flows, Spelman’s repudiation of the “tootsie roll” approach, Lugones’ fusion, curdle-separation emulsions, Mills’ sub-contractors8). Pateman and Mills have modified their approaches accordingly. According to this revision, “one cannot speak of the [sexual and racial] ‘contracts’ in isolation, since they rewrite each other.”9

As emphasized in the work of Kimberlé Crenshaw, intersectional frameworks have most importantly aimed to counteract the systematic marginalization of women of color within accounts of subordination and discrimination. They have also become the context for a widespread interest in the way that multiple forms of subordination may serve concurrently, in the words of Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble, “as background for one another, and . . . often find their most powerful articulation through one another.”10 For example, to demonstrate the limitations of an “additive” understanding of subordination Charles Mills turns to a discussion of intersections of gender, power and domination in colonial India by Mary Procida, who points out that a British woman’s legal and social subordination to her husband did not only serve to deprive her of power and authority. To the extent that the marriage eroded her independent legal and social identity, it attached her to that of her spouse, and so delivered a subordinating relation over others by virtue of colonial privilege:
Husband and wife, together, embodied status and authority... Their family business ... was literally the business of empire... Anglo-Indian women’s political power stemmed ... from their ... personal, social, and marital connections with imperial officials ... in the greater imperial family of British India.\textsuperscript{11}

An analysis that saw the relevant forms of subordination as separable would be inadequate to understand the British woman as a combination of subordination to others by virtue of sex, \textit{and} subordination over others by virtue of colonialism, for that additive understanding would fail to demonstrate how (according to a formulation used by Jasbir Puar in another context): “one form of oppression might sustain or even create the conditions of possibility for the other.”\textsuperscript{12} In the example from Procida, legal subordination to their husbands’ affiliated colonial British women with their husbands’ colonial authority.\textsuperscript{13}

Such analyses have given rise to a theoretical climate in which the need to analyze multiple forms of subordination concurrently, and in terms of their inter-, or intra-action, is not contentious. The following paper concerns a point on which there is less agreement: just how multiplying should such an analysis aim to be?

\textbf{I. AVERTING EXCESS}

A wariness of theorizing in terms of too many axes of subordination or difference has emerged with the viewpoint that such excess could jeopardize the aim of representing inequality and subordination.\textsuperscript{14} In \textit{Contract and Domination} Charles Mills agrees with Mary Maynard’s caution about too many forms of difference: “it becomes impossible to analyze them in terms of inequality or power.”\textsuperscript{15} Whereas Mills gives reasons to avoid excessively abundant or extreme theorizing of intersectionality,\textsuperscript{16} Jasbir Puar could be situated at the opposite pole to such cautions. In a sense, she describes the risks of theorizing with too few forms of difference. She adopts a theoretical attention to Deleuzian assemblages and affective flows, precisely to understand the forms of identity and power relating to gender, sex, and race in more fragmentary ways. Puar makes clear her long-standing commitment to intersectional analysis.\textsuperscript{17} But despite its proliferation of figures such as axes, roundabouts, fluids, and multi-velocities, she sees intersectional analysis as having tended, nonetheless, to bind itself to representational, and identity-based forms of analysis.\textsuperscript{18} It has been capable, she argues, of reinstating the “additive” approach to sex and race it works to avoid. (This might most obviously

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be seen if sex and race subordination are separated by the theorist so as to show how these subordinations intersect.9) Those who take a more intensely multiplying approach need not, as she underlines,20 be understood as moving away from intersectionality theory. Indeed the intersectional proliferation about which Mills is concerned is already lurking in the fact that intersectional frameworks are variously concerned with subordination, power, identity, experience, standpoint, context, heritage, solidarity, discrimination, and its litigation. An interrogation of how these dimensions intersect could be added to analyses of the intersections of sex, gender, race, disability, class, sexuality, generational privilege, culture, education, and wealth.

But as we next consider some of the further ways of understanding intersection indicated by Puar and others, it is helpful to recall that the debate also turns on what the criterion for a more or less satisfactory intersectionality framework should be. For Crenshaw, most obviously, that criterion has always been clear: intersectional frameworks should aim to counteract the erasure of Black women she has shown is produced by the analytic separation of gender and race.21

II. ABUNDANCE IN CRITIQUE

I aim next to bring into the conversation a point made, but then taken in a new direction, by Puar: that a consideration of Foucault from an intersectional perspective could redirect analysis to a different problem of intersection. In observing of Foucault’s analyses that “unlike intersectional theorizing . . . the entities that intersect are the body (not the subject, let us remember) and population,”22 Puar has, among her interventions, not just multiplied the fields of intersection, but has also reconsidered what, exactly, can be understood to intersect.

Her intervention could also allow further reflection on whether intersectionality supposes likeness of forms of power. Consider Mills’ “Intersecting Contracts” essay, in which he establishes the view that race subordination will tend to “trump” gender subordination. To be clear, Mills does not take race subordination to be like gender subordination:23 on his view the former is more recent, datable, associated with historical facts and material events such as invasion, colonization, subjugation, the appropriation of lands and peoples. Still, it could be said that this comparison of race and gender nonetheless supposes them to be similar types of power (the form of power characterized as subordination). By contrast, I want to tarry a while longer at the door opened by Puar for a re-
thinking of Foucault amidst her discussion. It seems to me that this door (opened through a brief moment of proximity between Foucault and intersectionality frameworks) might allow a further reflection on an additional intersectionality: that of forms of power. (Such reflection is only enhanced by the recollection that intersectional frameworks have long considered a range of overlapping phenomena: among them subordination, discrimination, exploitation, experience, location, subjectivity, identity, standpoint, proximity. As such, is not clear that the same understandings of power are always being supposed.)

III. THE IDENTITARIAN FOUCAULT

This would also be to add to a direction in Foucault scholarship emphasizing the more fragmentary dimensions of his understanding of power, as in contributions to South Atlantic Quarterly’s special issue Future Foucault. By contrast, in fact, despite briefly opening up this type of analysis by directing reflection towards the alternative kind of intersectionality suggested by Foucault’s account of the intersection of bodies and population, Puar considers Foucault’s potential too limited. She affiliates herself with the Deleuzian terminology of the assemblage which she takes to be better adapted to analyzing abundance in lateral affective relations. And because she will finally prefer other models over what she takes to be the historically, genealogically, and subject-bound analyses of disciplinary identities, the possibility (also broached in her own work) that Foucault’s texts could be mined for further and different potential is short-circuited by what Puar considers to be the identitarian impulse in his work also: the “predominance of subjecthood,” “identitarian interpellation”, and in particular, the analytic focus on the “primacy and singularity of the disciplinary subject.”

In consequence, the characterizations of both Foucault and intersectionality are rendered by depicting their limits “in the final count,” one might say. Puar certainly acknowledges intentions and projects at odds with that final account: for example, the unanimity with which intersectionality frameworks aim to avoid “tootsie-roll” modeling. But she argues these frameworks nonetheless separate these precisely to show their interaction or intra-action. Similarly, Puar hardly fails to perceive Foucault’s repudiation of a “prior” subject or identity in his multiple accounts of subjectivation. But she still finds in Foucault’s analyses an excessive dominance by the emergence of the disciplinary subject. If both forms of analysis can finally be assigned the label of “identitarian,” her assessments are fully cognizant of, and (moreover) sympathetic to, the alternative aims and in-

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novations of both. Of course, Foucault and intersectionality would finally count as identitarian, because Puar is, finally, preferring theoretical models offering a greater complexity in intersections. As I will go on to explore, Puar may have been too quick to dismiss the potential available from the encounter between Foucault and intersectional frameworks she briefly invites.

IV. ABUNDANCE OF CRITIQUE, ABUNDANCE IN CRITIQUE

My point here is not to compare the accounts of power as subordination mentioned by Mills, for example, with the well-known contribution by Foucauldian works such as *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality*: alternative models of power as productive rather than primarily repressive. For Foucault’s work also explored a different kind of multiplicity, emerging particularly in his College de France lectures. Foucault commented a number of times that the models of power under his consideration were not best understood as replacing each other in a linear or chronological development. As he argues in *Security, Territory, Population*:

There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age, and then the age of security. Mechanisms of security do not replace disciplinary mechanisms, which would have replaced jurido-legal mechanisms. In reality you have a series of complex edifices in which, of course, the techniques themselves change and are perfected, or anyway become more complicated, but in which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and mechanisms of security.27

Under these conditions, what happens to abundance of critique? Despite also making more positive mention of Foucauldian resources, in the course of associating analysis of the assemblage with an abundance of affect, Puar doesn’t take Foucault’s work to offer the most promising resources for abundance in critique.

Instead, Foucault is more prone to being reduced to a stylized and limited position such as the theorist of disciplinary power. To the ends of that account, we are that much less likely to be offered the more variable and capacious Foucault, whose concepts of power are multiple, intersecting, sometimes complementary, sometimes auto-resistant, concurrently coalescing and decoalescing. One way of putting this is that Puar, while not an identitarian when it comes to the theorization of subjects, is, to the interests of favoring better theories of the assemblage,
somewhat more identitarian when it comes to characterizing the capacities of philosophers such as Foucault. The contours and confines of Foucault’s work are crystallized to the ends of designating the limits of their theses and commitments.28

In fact, Puar’s brilliant readings could allow us to query the demarcation of Foucault primarily as the identitarian theorist of disciplines, for the move beyond Foucault need not take place at the expense of minimizing our archive of his resources. I turn now to the suggestion that amidst a multiplicity of critique far exceeding his accounts of the disciplinary, Foucault offered a range of explanatory terms and principles better characterized as an abundance of critique. We will also encounter here the Foucault favored by recent theorists of a “future” Foucault.29

Since I opened both with comments about intersectionality and about a more intersectional understanding of family spaces, I turn to one of the less fully explored dimensions of Foucault’s work: his own consideration of families. I take these to offer one of the more promising dimensions within his own work for the consideration of the analytics of “abundance of critique.”

V. FAMILY AS THE INTERSECTIONALITY OF TECHNIQUES AND POWERS

Foucault published no projects directly on the family nor supposed its status as an institution. He anticipated a possible project on the children’s crusade but not a genealogy of families. But he revisited family spaces through multiple modes of analysis. We find in his work a great number of families, although, as has been widely observed, his optic is limited to the classical, the Christian, and the European. Within those parameters, Foucault will identify women in the family as traditionally subordinate to the patriarchal forms of power he deems sovereign.30 Women could also be described as subordinate within the family according to the vector of its emergence as a problem of management and governmentality. Thus wives, servants, and children belong to the households whose good management are associated with such forms as the care of the self, the arts of existence, and could give rise to parallels between good management of the household and of the state.

But in a discussion of the relation of wife to husband as one of the traditional (and lingering) forms of sovereign power, Foucault also describes the emergence of the family as the locus of complex intersections of the disciplines. While, as he argued
in *Discipline and Punish, Psychiatric Power, Abnormal*, and elsewhere, disciplinary institutions were not *based* on family structures (nor on their forms of discipline in the conventional sense), more archaic forms of sovereign power and their associated techniques of punishment and obedience might nonetheless reinforce the more productive disciplinary mechanisms that can be distinguished from sovereign forms of power. For example, techniques of familial obedience might be important to aspects of a subject’s integration in the disciplinary networks associating school-factory-army, etc. The individual who cannot be disciplined might be returned to the family, making it also a space of excess for disciplinary networks. Moreover, while disciplinary structures were not modeled on families, Foucault sees the family space as emerging as a vector for the disciplines in a number of ways, in interconnection with their capillary form. It is a domain of intense scrutiny and stimulation—of stimulation of oedipal interest, as Foucault argues, and of parental and expert hermeneutic scrutiny for signs of abnormality. Moreover it is also a securitizing domain—as with projects to defend the “traditional” family, or to defend children from destructive external influences, or connections between the normative conduct of families and the defense of populations, or nation, or futures. And it takes on neoliberal dimensions, belonging to understandings of human capital or to projects of “investment” in the family.

Another reason the multiple forms of power depicted by Foucault are not just linear developments replacing each other is that they embody techniques differently taking shape in different contexts (including those of observation, classification, the interest in the psychological “case,” pastoral care, police interest) and differently consequential as such. The fact that forms of power intersect may mean that some related phenomena coincide in strange ways or might even challenge each other’s interests: the biopolitical interest in taking care of life can, for example, intersect with regimes for taking that same life. Foucault is also interested in the ebbs and flows of conditions and techniques that allow forms of power to mutate into each other as indicated by the rich and varied metaphors to be found in *History of Sexuality* and *Society Must Be Defended* for the relationship between sovereign power and biopower, (such as the “penetration” and “imprinting” of the one by the other).

In short, the resources of Foucault allow more diverse ways of thinking the intersectionality of modalities of power. It is not that Foucault’s resources are indispensable. But there is more interest in interpreting Foucault in terms that correspond most, rather than least, to the theoretical resources for which Puar’s work

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What might this intersection of multiple forms of power mean for an understanding of the techniques of parental and maternal care associated with family spaces? Families that became vectors of disciplinary environments might also come to be mediated by expert opinion about child raising, and the need for care in parental surveillance for abnormality, identity, concealment, deviation, harm, etc.

Thus, in participating in conducts of maternal care, women themselves can act as the hinges of sovereign power (their caring role also participating in the traditions of gendered subordination Foucault associates with sovereign power) with discipline and biopolitics in many senses. They might be vectors in the scrutiny of children in the home and the defense against masturbation, and they might be lynchpins in the surveillance and stimulation of interest in the micropractices of children's bodies. In the home, they might act as the more specific auxiliaries of the expert’s authority in childrearing, which might both reinforce but also replace some of the traditional domains of sovereign power also at work in families. And, as Foucault briefly argues in the first volume of *History of Sexuality*, maternal care could also, within disciplinary contexts, be individuated as with the problematization, medicalization, categorization or sheer alertness to the spectre of the harmful or “hysterical” mother. The conduct of maternal care is also assimilated to and plays a role in the abstractions of population management (thus the interest in “birthrate,” or the overall quality of health, childrearing practice, prevalence of wetnursing, etc in a population or nation). Women might belong to the governmentality of abstract trends, and yet at the same time be individualized, moralized, subjectivized, “responsibilized” in these terms also—according to the corresponding understandings of maternal duty towards state, future, population, nation. They might play a role in mechanisms of security, in ideas about the need to defend against risk to the health of population (for example, there might be indifference about problematized maternal practice, such as entrusting children to wetnurses below a certain threshold, but concern above that threshold).

The mother might be also be individualized in disciplinary terms. She might be associated with hermeneutically conducted identity formations, confessional practice, the production of forms of knowledge and self-understanding in corresponding categories and norms for the caring mother. Meanwhile, biopoliticized mothers (and women understood as potential mothers) might be caught up in
overall administrations of “birthrate” or “healthy upbringing.” Women might be individualized as abnormal (for example becoming psychological or sociological “cases” of aberrant maternity such as putatively negligent pregnancy or childraising). But such phenomena emerge also in accounts of trends, statistics, “prevailence” within groups, types, or populations. As such they can also be the pretext for differential distribution of concern, welfare, intervention, or resources. Similarly, biopolitical interest in “birthrate” tends to manifest as interest in the birthrate of certain groups within a population, tacitly or overtly in opposition to others. The result of interest in collective reproductive life and health has often been that some lives are implicitly or explicitly assumed to matter more. The reproductive conduct of some can be deemed to encroach on overall common interest. In short, the multiple ways in which maternal conduct can integrate into biopolitical and thanatopolitical, sovereign, disciplinary and securitizing registers can mean that the corresponding modes of power and strategies may simultaneously overlap, complement, and be at odds with each other in various respects.

Since a technique of maternal care could be at once multiple techniques—or be integrated into multiple apparatuses—and not always consistently, it does not have a definitive status (given the diverse, coalescing and decoalescing strategies, modes of power, and governmentalities in which it is imbricated). Given the range of overlapping modes and registers in which it might be participating: observation, concern, stimulation, interest, disinterest, correction, optimization, hermeneutics, classification, aggregation, demographization, individuation, explanation, subordination, identification, investment, it might be said never to completely or definitively take place.

So, to think of Foucault’s comment in “What is Critique,” that “no one should ever think that there exists one knowledge or one power,” the alternative might be to give greater attention to how the various modes and techniques he describes may coalesce and decoalesce without exactly coinciding. Analysis could reorient to how techniques, and segments of techniques, can belong simultaneously to different modes, and in specific cases, with what effects. And while they can be complementary, we can also give attention to conflicts between these techniques and the different apparatuses, assemblages, strategies, and temporalities to which they belong.

Such scrutiny offers a route back to the opening consideration of the scrutiny an intersectional framework is able to give the forms of mutually reinforcing and
mutually deconstituting subordination and authority embedded in colonial families. It could also lead to further dialogue with Achille Mbembe’s introduction of necropolitics to biopolitical theory. Mbembe has made intermittent reference to sex, gender, and sexual difference (terms most strongly in question in *On the Postcolony*) without extensively foregrounding their intersections. Insofar as his discussions of the necropolitical have briefly touched on sexual difference, there is a degree of affinity with an argument to which Charles Mills has also referred: the dissolution of the rule of law, national instability and the impact of colonialism on paternal authority can all manifest in forms of violence against women. Mills has cited Gloria Anzaldúa on a related point (the context is different, but there are similarities in the modeling of power relevant to gender):

‘machismo’ is an adaptation to oppression and poverty and low self-esteem. It is the result of hierarchical male dominance ... The loss of a sense of dignity and respect ... leads him to put down women and even to brutalize them.36

In “Politics as a Form of Expenditure”, Mbembe writes of decolonizing contexts and the perception that a threatened patriarchal power can manifest in a “hardening of the dichotomy of the sexes” and an intensification of sexual violence. This intensification is described as “another modality of domination,” reacting to a crisis of power and masculinization. It is identified by Mbembe in phenomena ranging from the exacerbation of rape to the manhood rites of child soldiers.37

For all that Mills and Mbembe offer very different arguments, they both refer to the view that one form of power can be understood as compensating for another. But Mbembe’s work has engaged a broader spectrum of concepts of power (not reducible to, but including, Foucault, Deleuze, and a number of post-Foucauldian Italian philosophers). One question that arises, then, is how his occasional reference to gender relations (particularly their necropolitical variants) could be engaged by the complex and multiple understandings of power available in other dimensions of Mbembe’s work on colonization, plantation, apartheid, and slavery, particularly in *Critique of Black Reason*. Hortense Spillers, Sharon Holland, and Saidiya Hartman are among those who have attributed a stronger and more complex role to the multiple temporalities of the sexual, gender inflected, and reproductive violence of slavery and its afterlife. Their work foregrounds the continuing impact on the meaning and embodiment of eros, family, sex, and care,38 and the dissociability of these dimensions from the multiple forms of power (sov-
ereign, disciplinary, biopolitical, securitizing, states of exception, states of illegibility) discussed in Critique of Black Reason.\textsuperscript{39}

VI. The multiple temporalities of necropolitics and \textit{White Material}

With the opening remarks on intersectionality and the family having lead, not only to Foucault on families and the multivalence of their technologies of care, but also to the postcolonial states of disorder in which “anybody can kill (or be killed by) anybody else,”\textsuperscript{40} I conclude with paradoxes of care in postcolonial and decolonizing contexts missing from Foucault’s work. Drawing on all the resources outlined in this paper, one could give attention to the plural contexts of bodily conducts such as gestures of care. With Mbembe, we can ask: how do they correspond at once to different modes of power, to multiple temporalities, and belong only unstably to their present? At a provisional juncture of Foucauldian and intersectional frameworks one could add attention to the mutual conditioning of gender and colonial subordination, the intersections of their forms and techniques of power, and their constitutions and deconstructions.

To this end, my conclusion turns to the concurrent forms of temporality and the deconstructions and reconstitutions of forms of care (parental, maternal, colonizing and decolonizing) explored in Claire Denis’ \textit{White Material} (2009). This film depicts the multiple formations of power and time of a decolonizing (unnamed) French-African country in which civil war is erupting. It is concerned, in this context, with the intersections of care and survival with gendered, colonial, post- and de-colonial authority, variants that both overlap and conflict.

Maria, a white French woman running a coffee plantation is among those for whom, in this context, time—which has never been one’s own “proper” time—has run out. Withdrawing, the French army takes Maria’s life to be their concern, making one more attempt to incorporate her into their securitizing logic. In the stupidity she attributes to this aim, Maria’s own suppositions enact their own stupidity. Her bodily habits participate in future oriented temporalities and forms of sovereign power “over” the land she takes to be hers and in which she still sees potential profit for her family. Her habits and suppositions belong just as much to the vectors and competing temporalities of disorder and retributive violence, and the dissemination of new forms of death described by Mbembe. That’s to say, the segments of coinciding techniques of power, apparatuses, and their complex temporalities may give meaning to each other and coexist while also calling each
other into question, contesting each other _because_ they participate in each other.

Through much of the unfolding of _White Material_, Maria fights first to ensure that the beans are harvested despite the chaos, and subsequently, to get back to her plantation. But for reasons both patriarchal (the sale without her knowledge of the plantation by her husband and father in law to Cherif, the local mayor) and decolonial (she then struggles to get back to a plantation it turns out the militia have burned down), her efforts belongs to one form of time, and the land to another. So it is with Maria’s efforts to get home to her son, asserting his need of her. In fact he has been burned alive, along with the farm, by the local militia. This unfolding chaos with its disordered formations of power, fragmentary alliance, and death penalty belong no less to Maria’s futures than the family cares she is implausibly still projecting—all the while that the desperate force of her efforts implicitly recognizes the countering times.

But we have also seen how Maria’s concern for her son, Manuel, overlaps with an indifferent colonial privilege, when she dismisses the report of his recent attack on Lucie with whom her husband has had another son. Maria’s multiple efforts of care—for the land, the crop, the profit, son, futures, are playing out in a time both shortened and accelerated by their intersection with the decolonizing chaos. Chaos and care, the colonial and the decolonial are remaking each other's modes and meanings. The bodily gestures and techniques of care, are corporeal engagements with the multiplicity of concurrently unfolding, disynchronous futures with which they simultaneously interconnect.

Consider Maria’s spontaneous and expectant turn for help and solace to an unknown African woman who does briefly place her arms around her in the gesture of comfort. As Cherif, also Maria’s friend or lover, drives her back to the plantation, he consoles her with his hand raised in the gesture of care. Meanwhile she is explaining, peremptorily, that he will have to help her locate her missing son, Manuel, as he is not able to take care of himself. Her various manners of entitlement seem consistent with the colonial demeanor which is depicted in the film as Maria’s unthinking habit. But Cherif’s raising of his arm in the gesture of consolation seems also to be raised in a different kind of authority over her as well, as he interprets the state of things in which she is now embroiled. In this present, he explains to Maria, _blondeur_, blondness, whiteness, and blue eyes represent _malheur_ (the impending bad outcome) and provocation to be pillaged. How best to understand the spontaneous bodily gestures of care, as occupying
concurrently different modes of power and as such, “thinking against eachother,” disrupting each other? Because different forms of power are concurrently in play, the “same” gesture—the technique of a caring hand, or arm around the shoulders, the bodily gestures and emotional techniques of caring, like the projects of taking care of land as well as human bodies, are at once participating in different registers, deformations and reformations, constituting vectors in a number of apparatuses.

To return to the point from Mills with which this essay began, such techniques can be informed by the colonial appropriation of land and assertion of privilege, their legal and proprietal regimes, and their bodily assumptions of “rights over”. Yet their expressions of care might also be playing out as other forms of subordination (among them the patriarchal). The bodily techniques of care for the future of the plantation are intersecting with the traditions of feminine domestic management conventional to the narratives of white feminism. They are intersecting also with waning of the colonial privilege with which they are inflected. The very “same” bodily gesture might be at once all of these things, interconnecting with all these modes, in this sense multivalent. Meanwhile some of the items that have been integrated into the transactions of day-to-day caring take on a new significance as persisting. Not human bodies nor their gestures, but things: items of clothing, a necklace, small electronic devices, seem more likely to persist in a time of stimulated violence and spontaneous killing. An abandoned radio, a beret, a necklace, a priest’s cape, red shorts, will outlive these people who have used and worn them, acquiring new circulations, agencies, and new roles, longer time sequences, and unknown futures, in contrast to the terminal living bodies.

If we choose to see Foucault’s account of genealogy’s complexity as indicating a multiplicity of forms of power and their multivalent techniques, we can expand on a different sense of how the present is already disrupted. It is disrupted not just by the phenomenon Foucault thought of as resistance or polyvalent tactics of power, and not just by the possibility of imagining “a future or a truth that [it] will not know nor happen to be.” Auto-contestation, potential for transformation, the resources for an ongoing “imagining” otherwise, and a potential becoming-otherwise are already delivered in the unpredictable relations between the multiple roles and temporalities of the techniques, modes of power, and governmentalities described by Foucault—none fully accomplishing themselves and none fully belonging to their own present. 

White Material prompts reflection on the complexity of the multiple and inter-
secting times it depicts. It depicts elements (a gesture, a technique, an object) that are in Foucault’s sense, “thinking.” Participating in a number of modes of power and temporality, they also manifest their concurrent mutual contestation. I similarly see this as the significance of the multiplicity of modes of power and techniques considered by Foucault’s projects. In ways both articulated, but also available for further development, in Foucault’s own work, they can be reconsidered in terms of their cumulative effect, and as interrupting and contesting, the presents to which they belong.

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NOTES

2. bell hooks, Ain’t I A Woman: Black Women and Feminism (Boston MA, South End Press, 1981),


7. See, for example, the prominence of this term in the definitions offered by Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge in *Intersectionality (Key Concepts)* (London: Polity, 2016), 2.


9. Mills, in Mills and Pateman, *Contract and Domination*, 172. Intersectionality analysis has also been characterized by Jasbir Puar as feminist theory’s dominant paradigm for the analysis of difference,” and as the “prevailing approach in queer theory,” if not (as suggested by Leslie McCall) women’s studies “most important theoretical contribution”), Jasbir K. Puar, “‘I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess’: Becoming-Intersectional in Assemblage Theory,” *PhilosOPHIA* 2.1 (2012): 49-66, 49.


13. The complexity of such intra-action would also be occluded by a long-standing habit within the tradition of white women’s rights claims of likening women’s status to enslavement or colonization.

14. In one interview with Pateman, Mills speaks to the need to factor class subordination in addition to the sexual and racial contracts, and acknowledges that there is also a heterosexual contract. But he also speaks to the analytic unworkability of too much multiplicity: “In my chapter on intersectionality ... I suggested that four subject positions needed to be taken into account: white men, white women, non white men, non white women. If you try to add class or sexuality, that number would go up to eight, or sixteen if you tried to add both. (The number of subject positions is 2^n, where n = the number of ‘contracts.’) So obviously that would be unworkable. Maybe the thing to do is select out two variables at a time, and focus just on those, and then repeat the process with two other variables,” Carole Pateman and Charles Mills, “Contract Theory and Global Change: The Intersections of Gender, Race, and Class.” In *Sexuality, Gender, and Power: Intersectional and Transnational Perspectives*, ed. A. G. Jónasdóttir, V. Bryson and K. B. Jones (New York and London: Routledge, 2011): 113-126, 123. Naomi Zack expresses the concern that women and their political solidarity could be overly fragmented by an excessively intersectional understand-
ing, see *Inclusive Feminism: A Third Wave Theory of Women's Commonality* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005).


17. Puar, “I would rather be a Cyborg,” 49.


23. Among his specific comments in this regard, see “Intersecting Contracts,” 175.

24. *South Atlantic Quarterly* 111:3 Summer (2012). See for example guest editor Jacques Khalip’s emphasis in his introductory essay of a reading of Foucault with Derrida “tend[ing] toward[s] the creation of multiple critical positions through which to ponder the forms of constraint and potentialities that underwrite the blindness or illegibility of their own insights” (426), Dean’s emphasis on the disunification and multiple topologies of Foucauldian bodies, and Hansen’s reading of Foucault in terms of molecular reconfigurations (434).


28. In this, the characterization also does not coincide with Deleuze’s own reading of Foucault.

29. See note 24.


32. A point particularly developed in Donzelot’s *The Policing of Families* (New York: Pantheon, 1979).


Porter, (Los Angeles: Semiotexte, 2007), 60.


41. “Extreme blondeur attire une espèce de malheur. C’est quelque chose qu’on désire saccager. Les yeux bleus sont génants. C’est pourtant son pays, il est né ici, mais le pays ne l’aime pas.”

42. Foucault, *History of Sexuality,* 93-5, 98.