INTRODUCTION

This paper maps an adaptation of terms between two planes of conceptual development, as provided by works in the œuvres of David Hume (1711-1776) and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995). The terms introduced by Hume are ‘the subject,’ ‘the principles of association of ideas,’ and ‘the imagination,’ as these appear especially in *A Treatise of Human Nature, being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects* (1739). The first part of the paper will consider these. Attention will then turn to their treatment by Deleuze, mainly in the first book published under his own name, *Empirisme et subjectivité, Essai sur la nature humaine selon Hume* (1953), but with reference also to three collaborative ventures that preceded and followed. These are: *David Hume, Sa vie, son œuvre, sa*
The pattern of adaptation across these works is after this carried over to a question. How might the concept of ‘quasi-cause,’ developed by Deleuze in Logique du sens (1969) along with a different vocabulary of ‘the subject,’ relate back to what Deleuze makes of Hume’s three ‘principles of association of ideas’—“RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place, and CAUSE and EFFECT”—in his earlier work on Hume? The case to be ventured is that Deleuze’s reading of Hume, beginning in 1952, and his development of concepts of quasi-cause and quasi-causal system in Logique du sens seventeen years later, reflect reciprocally on one another, even though Hume rates but a single mention by name in the later book, and in relation to only just one of the ‘principles of association of ideas,’ cause and effect. But it is instead the other two ’principles,’ resemblance and contiguity, whose lingering pertinence we seek to explore in and through the original vocabulary of Logique du sens.

This approach to Deleuze on Hume develops a conceptual genealogy and is, as will be seen, fundamentally different from how the Deleuze-Hume relation is considered in available books in English: Jeffrey Bell’s Deleuze’s Hume (2009) and Jon Roffe’s Gilles Deleuze’s Empiricism and Subjectivity: A Critical Introduction (2017). Both of these focus on Deleuze’s structure of argumentation in the 1953 book, and introduce it as “his first published book” (Bell) and “his first book” (Roffe). Neither so much as mentions the 1952 work credited to joint authorship of Deleuze and André Cresson. A Leitmotif throughout what follows will be a case that to consider this earlier—and still untranslated—work will make for a yield of unexpected benefits regarding Deleuze not only on Hume, but on philosophy.

In January 1739, four months before he turned twenty eight, the Scottish philosopher David Hume published ‘the first Edition of a Book in two Volumes’ called A Treatise of Human Nature, subtitled: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. With a simplicity and clarity that Gilles Deleuze, toward the end of his life, would associate with “genius,” its program of audacious empiricism is established from the opening paragraph, under the heading ‘Of the Origin of our Ideas’:

“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 21
All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with the most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning ...

With this first paragraph, Hume in his very arrangement of words credits perceptions with a kind of activity that comes close to sounding like agency: ‘All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds.’ This ascription of prepersonal activity has its correlate in Hume’s repudiation, later in the Treatise—and notwithstanding his casual mention of ‘the soul’ in the passage above—of “any idea of self” as an in some way unified and continuous entity linked to “personal identity.” We shall consider subsequently how this phrase ‘resolve themselves’ bears relation to Deleuze’s own philosophical style: in particular his manner of deploying the French reflexive verb, whose ambiguity tends to be lost in translation. It is also with similar device of language that Hume ascribes activity suggestive of agency to what he calls the ‘principles’ of ‘connexion or association of ideas.’ These are introduced thus (with capitalizations in the text):

The qualities, from which this association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey’d from one idea to another, are three, viz. RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place, and CAUSE and EFFECT. The element of activity in these ‘principles’ is emphasized especially when Hume, later in the book, considers them in detail:

I have often observ’d, that, beside cause and effect, the two relations of resemblance and contiguity, are to be consider’d as associating principles of thought, and as capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to another.

This term ‘the imagination,’ Hume has also already distinguished from ‘memory,’ asserting that:

When we remember any past event, the idea of it flows in upon the mind.
in a forcible manner; whereas in the imagination, the perception is faint
and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv'd by the mind steddy
and uniform for any considerable time.\textsuperscript{10}

But this difference also implies that “the imagination is not restrain'd in the same
order and form with the original impressions, while the memory is in a manner
ty'd down in that respect, without any power of variation.”\textsuperscript{11} So while “the chief
exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and
position,” Hume also emphasizes “the liberty of the imagination to transpose and
change its ideas”.\textsuperscript{12}

The fables we meet with in poems and romances put this entirely out of
question. Nature there is totally confounded, and nothing mentioned but
winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants.\textsuperscript{13}

This is Hume’s first mention in the book of the term ‘nature’ as a substantive,
independently of the proposed phrase ‘human nature,’ and with a sense of
normativity. Both the context and the extremity of phrasing—“Nature there is
totally confounded, and nothing mentioned but...”—indicate the direction the
book will take. The role of the principles is to ‘guide’ the imagination, for:

Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone wou’d join them;
and ‘tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex
ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them,
some associating quality by which one idea naturally introduces another.\textsuperscript{14}

But of the three principles—‘RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place,
and CAUSE and EFFECT’—it is emphatically the last of these that Hume
emphasizes, and on which he dwells: “there is no relation, which produces a
stronger connection in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another,
than the relation of cause and effect between their objects.”\textsuperscript{15}

Having isolated out these ‘principles’ and affirmed their activity, Hume was
also committed, in his investigation, not only to ‘the experimental Method of
Reasoning,’ but to its role in cultivating “demonstrative sciences [whose] rules
are certain and infallible.”\textsuperscript{16} Regarding these, the Treatise states that “our reason
must be consider’d as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect.”\textsuperscript{17} As
might be expected from this comparison of the relation cause-effect to the relation
reason-truth, Hume privileges the associative principle of ‘cause and effect’ over
the principles of ‘resemblance’ and ‘contiguity.’ “We find from experience,” he writes, “that belief arises only from causation, and that we can draw no inference from one object to another, except they be connected by this relation.”8 Hume emphasizes the impenetrability of the terms of causal relation: “we are never sensible on any connexion between causes and effects, and ... 'tis only by our experience of their constant conjunction, we can arrive at any knowledge of this relation.”9 But if this is itself an affirmation of the importance of ‘habit’ in ‘belief,’ he is of no doubt regarding the relevance and applicability of this relation to experimental method in European science, such as was ascendant during the period when he was writing:

'Tis certain, that not only in philosophy, but even in common life, we may attain the knowledge of a particular cause merely by one experiment, provided it be made with judgment, and after a careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances.20

It is precisely via ‘careful removal of all foreign and superfluous circumstances’ that experiments are rendered repeatable and verifiable, toward establishment of cause-effect relations—or in Hume’s terms ‘constant conjunction’—among phenomena, that can then be predictably ordered. By contrast, Hume after introducing the ‘principles’ of ‘resemblance’ and ‘contiguity’ in the association of ideas, disparages their significance, declaring their “effect much inferior to causation.”21 He acknowledges that they “still have some effect, and augment the conviction of any opinion, and the vivacity of any conception”: thus they are “relations not to be neglected,” including in how they can involve the passions.22 But of ‘contiguity’ he writes:

it has been remark’d among the Mahometans as well as Christians, that those pilgrims, who have seen Mecca or the Holy Land are ever after more faithful and zealous believers, than those who have not had that advantage. A man, whose memory presents him with a lively image of the Red-Sea, and the Desert, and Jerusalem, and Galilee, can never doubt of any miraculous events, which are related either by Moses or the Evangelists. The lively idea of the places passes by an easy transition to the facts, which are suppos’d to have been related to them by contiguity, and encreases the belief by encreasing the vivacity of the conception. The remembrance of these fields and rivers has the same influence on the vulgar as a new argument; and from the same causes.23
Given Hume’s extreme skepticism regarding religion, this assessment cannot be taken as his recommendation for the associative ‘principle of contiguity,’ resort to which he links with ‘the vulgar.’ Likewise, he allows that poets may find benefit in what he calls ‘feign’d contiguity’:

A poet, no doubt, will be the better able to form a strong description of the Elysian fields, that he prompts his imagination by the view of a beautiful meadow or garden; as at another time he may by his fancy place himself in the midst of these fabulous regions, that by the feign’d contiguity he may enliven his imagination.24

But while acknowledging that “even where the related object is but feign’d, the relation will serve to enliven the idea, and encrease its influence,” Hume affirms “a general rule against the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feign’d resemblance and contiguity.”25 For “as the relation of cause and effect is requisite to persuade us of any real existence, so is this persuasion requisite to give force to these other relations.”26

Hume even links the tendency to invest in ‘resemblance’ and/or ‘contiguity,’ as principles of association of ideas, with ‘weakness’:

There is a very remarkable inclination in human nature, to bestow on external objects the same emotions, which it observes in itself [resemblance]; and to find every where those ideas, which are most present to it [contiguity]. This inclination, it is true, is suppressed by a little reflection, and only takes place in children, poets, and the antient philosophers. ... We must pardon children, because of their age; poets, because they profess to follow implicitly the suggestions of their fancy: But what excuse shall we find to justify our philosophers in so signal a weakness?27

II

More than two centuries after David Hume published the first two volumes of A Treatise of Human Nature as his first book, just before his twenty-eighth birthday, Gilles Deleuze published his first two books, both to do with Hume, and one shortly before, one shortly after, his own twenty-eighth birthday.28 The first of these, issued in 1952, does not appear on the lists of works that introduce Deleuze’s later books in both French and English, and that include those written

“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 25
collaboratively with Félix Guattari and Claire Parnet. Yet as another work of joint credited authorship, it not only bears mention here, but also provides, arguably, Deleuze’s first public paragraph in book form, which is to do with Hume. Called *David Hume, Sa vie Son œuvre Sa philosophie*, this short book was part of a previously formulaic introductory “Philosophes” series produced by Presses Universitaires de France for senior high school students. The series author, over twenty six previous volumes, was André Cresson, who maintained across these a didactic and informative style such as could begin with Marcus Aurelius, Pascal, and Plato in 1939, and continue, apart from the last two years of World War II, throughout the next decade, on thinkers as diverse as Spinoza, Aristotle, Leibniz, Bacon... the list goes on.

Cresson, however, died in March, 1950 at age eighty-one, two years before the series book on Hume was published. The extent of his contribution could not be known without, perhaps, an initial manuscript. But Deleuze, who was then completing a thesis on Hume for his Diplôme d’études supérieures, appears to have been recruited by the series editor Émile Bréhier, by then himself elderly, whom Deleuze would later credit, in *Logique du sens* of 1969, with having conceptualized, in his own 1905 dissertation, a “Stoic” distinction between “corporeal bodies / incorporeal events.” The fact that two years passed between Cresson’s death in March 1950 and the book’s publication in 1952 hints in itself that Deleuze had a more than apprenticeship role in the book’s final form; so too does the fact that Bréhier himself, as the series long-time editor, would die, age seventy-five, in February 1952, before the book appeared. There is clearly some mystery as to the process. But it does seem apt to recognize in *David Hume* Deleuze’s first book-length venture, evidently licensed by Bréhier, into a form: what he would himself four decades later, nominally in authorship with Félix Guattari, call “l’art du portrait”: the art of the portrait. But this is a kind of ‘portrait’ whose style is both illuminated by, and helps illuminate, Deleuze’s sustained interest, nearly three decades later, in the œuvre of Francis Bacon, that includes portraiture radically skewed from any presumption of verisimilitude. *David Hume* became Deleuze’s first book-length field of experiment in skewed philosophical portraiture: in this case also within a formula, yet introduced as distinctive in voice from the previous twenty-six books in the series on its first page.

Then shortly after his twenty-eighth birthday on 18 January, 1953, Deleuze published a version of his thesis on Hume, also with Presses Universitaires de France, under the title *Empirisme et subjectivité, Essai sur la nature humaine selon Hume*. The very difference in full title from that of the 1952 book—*David
Hume, Sa vie, Son œuvre, Sa philosophie—gives a hint of the scale of transition, with the second showing more than a hint of throwing off shackles, including of biographical personalization. Jon Roffe, in focusing exclusively on Empirisme et subjectivité for Deleuze’s treatment of Hume in his 2017 Gilles Deleuze’s Empiricism and Subjectivity: A Critical Introduction, has pointed out that there is “a pleasing symmetry” to the fact that “David Hume was the same age when the first two books of his precocious masterpiece A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) initially appeared.” But more than just a ‘pleasing symmetry,’ there are the beginnings of an interweaving: whether coincidental or otherwise is unclear. For, if Hume published the Treatise as two books in January 1739, shortly before turning twenty-eight (on 7 May), Deleuze would publish two books largely to do with Hume’s Treatise shortly before and shortly after he himself turned twenty-eight on 18 January 1953. The ‘symmetry’ becomes more complex, and even becomes a little dizzying with the tidbit that 18 January in 1739 began the very week at whose end Hume’s Treatise was first advertised as follows in the 25 January edition of The London Evening-Post:

This Day is publish’d, Price 10s.
Beautifully printed in two Volumes, Octavo,
Vol. II. Of the Passions.

Was Deleuze himself aware of these retrospective, and somewhat mutated ‘symmetries’? This likely is impossible to say. But the pattern also extends to his choice of full title for the first book published under his own name, which can be juxtaposed generatively also with the full title of the book (or books) that Hume himself published on the earlier side of twenty-eight. The two titles juxtaposed, in Hume’s English (as advertised), and Deleuze’s French, look like this:

Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into moral Subjects

Deleuze: Empirisme et subjectivité, Essai sur la nature humaine selon Hume

To consider this juxtaposition carefully will suggest not only the style of Deleuze’s entry into Hume, but will provide its own entry into a richly pregnant terminological aspect of that adaptation. Standing out especially, in the way...
of repetition with slight difference, is the five-word phrase, in Hume’s title, “A Treatise of Human Nature,” and in Deleuze’s title, the five word phrase “Essai sur la nature humaine” (followed by “selon Hume”).

Unfortunately, the standard translation of Empirisme et subjectivité by Constantin Boundas, for all its usefulness, masks this hinge of near identity between the first part of the earlier title, and the second part of the later, giving to an English-language reader Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume’s Theory of Human Nature. The title page of the 1953 PUF French edition yields no indication whatsoever of the word “Theory” in Deleuze’s title. Rather this title in literal translation would read, with capitalization as per English convention and with the option of an indefinite article, Empiricism and Subjectivity: [An] Essay on Human Nature According to Hume. This more literal translation suggests, in turn, the extent of mutated resemblance, including in the subtitle, with Hume’s title in English of his own first book (which with all due paradox was in two books). Thus the same juxtaposition of titles, with Deleuze’s translated from the French as given, would read:


Deleuze’s full two-part title, then, literally translated, embeds a close variant of Hume’s primary title, at the beginning of its secondary title (both here in bold). This extent of resemblance (and symmetry) between the first part of Hume’s title, and the second of Deleuze’s also prompts the question: is there similar mutated relation between the second part of Hume’s title and the first part of Deleuze’s, given in translation:

Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature, An Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into moral Subjects


Between Hume’s second part, and Deleuze’s first part (both in bold), there is a common root word, “subject-“ as also the only common word between the
two parts. And yet structurally, they are similar, with each displaying two noun phrases (with Hume) or nouns (with Deleuze) of category. For if “An Attempt to Introduce” is bracketed in Hume’s contribution, the noun phrases of category are “the Experimental Method of Reasoning” and “moral Subjects.” In Deleuze’s contribution, the nouns are “Empiricism” and “Subjectivity.” It seems fair to say that “the Experimental Method of Reasoning” can be uncontroversially linked with “Empiricism”: in particular the kind developed by Hume. This leaves the term “moral Subjects” in Hume’s second title, and “Subjectivity (subjectivité)” in Deleuze’s first. What happens across this gap? What is in the latter that is not in the former, and in the former that is not in the latter? How does the former become the latter?

III

An event that happened between the appearance of the term “moral Subjects” in the second title of Hume’s *Treatise* in 1739, and that of “subjectivité” in the first title of Deleuze’s *Empirisme et subjectivité* in 1953 was the writing and publication of *David Hume, Sa vie, Son œuvre, Sa philosophie* in 1952, with—or out of—Cresson, who is jointly credited on the cover. But the very fact that one can write and is obliged to write, ambiguously, ‘with—or out of—Cresson’ about this first Hume book itself provides a hint that across the three Hume projects (for Deleuze was writing his Diplôme d’études supérieures on Hume also) the young Deleuze had occasion, out of his encounter with whatever notes Cresson had provided or left, to begin to develop and practise his own method of in effect seeping into, interpenetrating, and repurposing the work of an earlier thinker: in this case not only on Hume, but on Cresson’s entire series format, along with whatever notes he left on Hume. These circumstances deserve closer focus than they have hitherto received, in that they made for an experimental prototype of the method then furthered and refined by Deleuze not only in *Empirisme et subjectivité* regarding Hume’s own œuvre, but subsequently in works on Nietzsche, Kant, Bergson, Spinoza, and Leibniz.

Consideration here will be of just one paragraph, but an important one: not only for its eloquence, inventiveness, and provision of clues, but because it quite possibly introduced and introduces Deleuze’s voice in book form. For a comparison of *David Hume* with any of André Cresson’s twenty-six prior books in the *Sa vie, Son œuvre, Sa philosophie* series makes for the strong impression that it is not his voice but an entirely new one that appears strikingly as early as the second paragraph. Cresson’s treatments tend to begin, under the heading ‘La Vie,’ with a lengthy

“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 29
paragraph giving detail of the title philosopher’s life. In *David Hume*, by contrast, the opening paragraph is just a single sentence, stating that Hume was born in Edinburgh in 1711 and died in 1776. This is followed by a second paragraph whose categorical confidence and ambition are nowhere in evidence in books credited to Cresson alone. Given its style and reliance on nuance, and given that it is not available in a translation considered standard, this passage is provided first in the original French:

La vie d’un grand philosophe semble toujours être un peu l’idée qu’il s’est faite de la vie. En apparence, au moins, les philosophes sont plus responsables de leur vie que les poètes et les savants, puisqu’ils ne peuvent invoquer ni le destin, ni les droits d’une impersonnalité scientifique. Dans les événements d’un grand philosophe, dans les traits de son caractère, dans ses ambitions, jusque dans ses timidités, on peut lire toute une conception de l’existence, involontaire, immédiate. Celle-ci représente une philosophie implicite, qui entretient avec l’œuvre un rapport complexe, dans lequel le grand philosophe est toujours autre chose aussi qu’un grand philosophe.  

And in as literal a translation as possible, respecting French pronominal conventions:

The life of a great philosopher seems always to be a little the idea that he has made of life. In appearance, at least, philosophers are more responsible for their life than poets or scientists [or ‘scholars’: *savants*], insofar as they can invoke neither destiny nor the rights of a scientific impersonality. In the events of a great philosopher, in the traits of his character, in his ambitions, as in his timidities, one can read an entire conception of existence, involuntary, immediate. This represents an implicit philosophy, that maintains with the œuvre a complex relation, in which the great philosopher is also always something other than a great philosopher.

What is to be made of this passage? Clearly it was not written by Cresson. But just as clearly, it is within a book that, implicitly, was disavowed by Deleuze in that *David Hume* has never been admitted to the list of works that introduce his books in French. Yet it is so striking a compression, and so original an assessment of ‘the great philosopher,’ that it surely deserves to be considered in relation to Deleuze’s more recognized work. On one level, it can be read as Deleuze’s own summary and categorical articulation of the ‘Sa vie, Son œuvre, Sa philosophie’
format, into a multi-faceted concept of ‘a great philosopher’: condensed and original, with the strongly declarative style found in Deleuze’s later works. Deleuze extrapolates from introducing Hume, to introducing this concept, in the process also introducing himself, and his own philosophical voice, but masked, in behind and within Cresson’s, which was then widely present in bringing French lycée students to philosophy. We pause especially over the last two sentences of the four provided by this early—even earliest—Deleuze:

In the events of a great philosopher, in the traits of his character, in his ambitions, as in his timidities, one can read an entire conception of existence, involuntary, immediate. This represents an implicit philosophy, that maintains with the œuvre a complex relation, in which the great philosopher is also always something other than a great philosopher.

Would one usually associate these views, so eloquently put, with Deleuze? Yet the concluding syntax indeed suggests the gnomic celebrant of paradox in *Logique du sens* (1969), even as the very word ‘events’ provides a direct line into this later work, where Deleuze, developing Émile Bréhier’s ‘Stoic’ distinction between corporeal bodies and incorporeal events, inquires into what he calls ‘expressive relations of events among themselves.’ They are not, he writes, “relations of cause to effect, but an ensemble of non-causal correspondences, forming a system of echoes, of reprises, and of resonances, a system of signs, in short an expressive quasi-causality, not at all a necessitating causality.”

These passages are structurally similar, including in sequences of qualifying nouns. The first sentence of the earlier passage gives these with a preposition: ‘In the events of a great philosopher, in the traits of his character, in his ambitions, as in his timidities...’ In these, proto or masked, Deleuze tells us, ‘one can read entirely an involuntary, immediate conception of existence’: ‘an implicit philosophy, that maintains with the œuvre a complex relation, in which the great philosopher is also always something other than a great philosopher.’

Was Deleuze writing not only with reference retrospectively on Hume, as the named subject-matter of the book, but anticipatorily about himself, ‘a great philosopher’ then yet to be? Was he already by this time thinking about being ‘a great philosopher,’ and how to get there?

This is a stunningly crafted paragraph to find at the outset of the first book published with Deleuze’s name on the cover, when he was the age at which Hume published the two volumes of the *Treatise*. The paragraph on ‘quasi-causality,’ sixteen years
later in 1969, is crafted with similar structure and eloquence, and with, again, a sequence of qualifying nouns. These add up to, ‘in short an expressive quasi-causality’: a term conceptualized in this passage in a way structurally analogous to how ‘a great philosopher’ is conceptualized via qualifying nouns in the earlier passage. Roffe writes of “a complex of hidden conceptual tunnels” that run between Deleuze’s less widely read early work—specifically, for him, *Empirisme et subjectivité*—and “thematics ...prominent in his more famous works.” Here the hint of such a ‘tunnel’ is pushed back still further, to Deleuze’s earliest published words in book form, with the components of this particular tunnel to be considered further below in relation also to Hume’s ‘principles of association of ideas.’

But here a distinction as well as a ‘tunnel’ deserves to be noted. In the later passage from *Logique du sens*, Deleuze has created the terms of the concept, by putting together three words—‘expressive quasi-causality’—that had not been previously put together. By contrast, the designation ‘great philosopher’ has been heard many times, and in this case the youthful Deleuze gives it new content, and to this extent a new concept. This difference opens into a difference of kind. In correspondence of 1970 to Michel Cressole, published as “Lettre à un critique sévère,” Deleuze describes himself as of the last generation of students to be ‘bludgeoned’ with the history of philosophy. Here it is possible he even had Cresson in mind, given that between Deleuze’s fourteenth and eighteenth years, Cresson published no fewer than fourteen didactic books in the *La vie, Son œuvre, Sa philosophie* series. Deleuze continues, in a well-known passage:

> But, above all, my manner of launching myself at this epoch, was, I believe, to conceive of the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery, or, it comes to the same, immaculate conception. I imagined myself arriving in the back of an author, and making him a child, that would be his, but that would nevertheless be monstrous. 

Is the concept of ‘a great philosopher’ with which Deleuze introduces himself, somewhat masked, by ‘buggering’ it out of Cresson’s entire series format, ‘monstrous’? Perhaps in relation to earlier parameters of the format, it could be said to be so. Perhaps it could even be said to be so in relation to usual notions of ‘a great philosopher,’ and in relation to much of Deleuze’s later œuvre itself, which would surely play down ‘traits of character,’ ‘timidities,’ ‘ambitions,’ in favour of impersonal and nomadic ‘singularities’ that do not respect ‘the individual.’ But this is surely a paradox within Deleuze’s œuvre: that amid an emphasis on ‘prepersonal singularities’ such as is developed in both his major works *Différence et répétition*
(1968) and *Logique du sens* (1969), he would not only introduce himself in 1952 via an account of ‘the great philosopher,’ but would cling to it, such that it resurfaces in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie* in 1991, nominally written with Félix Guattari: “at the limit, does not each great philosopher trace a new plane of immanence, bring new material of being, and provide a new image of thought.”

But if the concept of ‘a great philosopher’ introduced at the outset of David Hume, *Sa vie, Son œuvre, Sa philosophie* in 1952 can be read as having been ‘buggered’ out of the series format established by Cresson and Bréhier, the same cannot so easily be said of the later concept of ‘expressive quasi-causality’ whose presentation is so similar structurally. Rather it would seem, as concept, to correspond more closely to what Deleuze had to say in a letter of 1984, fifteen years after *Logique du sens*:

> What interests me, are concepts. It seems to me that concepts have their own existence, they are animate, they are invisible creatures. But precisely, they need to be created. Philosophy seems to me to be an art of creation, along with painting and music: it creates concepts.

There is a suggested distinction here between ‘buggered’ and ‘created’ concepts. As an example of the former, we give that of ‘the great philosopher’ presented at the outset of David Hume in 1952. As an example of the latter, we give ‘expressive quasi-causality’ as presented in *Logique du sens* in 1969. With this distinction in mind, we can now return to consideration of what happens between the terms ‘moral Subjects,’ as presented in the title of Hume’s first book (the Treatise) and ‘Subjectivity (subjectivité)’ as presented in the title of Deleuze’s first book under his own name. For ‘subjectivity’ as it appears in Deleuze’s title would seem to be not a created concept, but a buggered one, out of a Humean text in which the term ‘subjectivity’ does not appear at all.

IV

In far and away the most of its appearances in Hume’s *Treatise*, the word ‘subject’ refers, simply and unambiguously, to matter under consideration, as in the phrase ‘our subject.’ This usage of the word is introduced as early as the second and third sentences in the paragraph-long ‘Advertisement’ that begins the book:

> My design in the present work is sufficiently explain’d in the *introduction*. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have there plann’d out to my self, are not treated of in these two volumes. The subjects of
the understanding and passions make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves...*

This usage of the word ‘subject’ or ‘subjects’ continues throughout the Treatise, including multiple times in the Table of Contents. The term ‘moral subjects’ appears in the Introduction, in a way that again suggests this usage of the noun ‘subjects,’ but with an adjective:

And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. It is no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from THALES to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury ... etc.] in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public.*

The impression here is that the word ‘subjects,’ for Hume in this context, takes the adjective ‘moral’ as it would take the adjective ‘natural,’ as subjects to which, Hume asserts, ‘experimental philosophy’ might be applied.

The term ‘moral subjects’ occurs just once again in the entire Treatise, in Book III: Of Morals, and again in conjunction with the adjective ‘natural,’ so as to distinguish between ‘natural or moral subjects’:

An active principle can never be founded on an inactive; and if reason be inactive in itself, it must remain so in all its shapes and appearances, whether it exerts itself in natural or moral subjects, whether it considers the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings.*

In this case, the parallel of disjunction between ‘natural or moral subjects’ and ‘the powers of external bodies, or the actions of rational beings’ suggests there might be a relation between the term ‘moral subjects’ and the term ‘rational beings.’ Yet this is still ambiguous and obscure.

Justice and Injustice,” beginning in Section VII, “Of the origin of government”: “Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects.” This appearance of the word ‘subjects,’ used in this way, provides a reminder, necessarily, of Hume’s embeddedness, in the fourth decade of the eighteenth century, in an imperial and then vigorously expansionist monarchy, where an individual’s status was closely defined as a subject in relation to the monarch, of whom ‘magistrates’ were agents. David Hume himself lived as ‘a subject’ in this sense, and the word had a place in the functioning of a top-down class hierarchy, that, as integral to imperial Britain, was in process of colonial export over much of the globe. Hume’s introduction of the word in this context, preceded by the possessive pronoun ‘their,’ expresses the system in a sentence: ‘Magistrates find an immediate interest in the interest of any considerable part of their subjects.’ And it is out of this relation, Hume notes, that:

bridges are built; harbours opened; ramparts raised; canals formed; fleets equipped; and armies disciplined everywhere, by the care of government, which, though composed of men subject to all human infirmities, becomes, by one of the finest and most subtle inventions imaginable, a composition, which is, in some measure, exempted from all these infirmities.

Here the word “government” is linked with a sequence of actions characteristic of expanding empire. And here, too, the root word ‘subject’ appears as a verb in the passive voice: men are ‘subject’ not only to magistrates, but ‘to all human infirmities’; yet ‘by the care of government’ (so described) become a part of something greater: ‘a composition, which is, in some measure, exempted from all these infirmities.

With this further usage of the word ‘subject’ in the Treatise, not only is the word given a political dimension, within the context of Hume’s remarks on the formation of government, but the word ‘subject’ is at once rendered decisively ambiguous in Hume’s title. Is the term ‘moral subjects’ used in some analogous sense to the term ‘loyal subjects’: that is, a particular kind of human being in a particular kind of political context? Or is it used in some analogous sense to ‘moral matters at hand’? But intensifying this element of paradox, the term is also delineated and given limits in its ambiguity. The word ‘subjects’ in the title could mean in the sense of the matter at hand, and it could also mean in the sense of a political status within the terms of government as Hume described them in the monarchical Britain of the mid-eighteenth century, which he would himself serve loyally, including in diplomatic posting. The ambiguity seems unresolvable in the

“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 35
presence of sustained double usage of the word in the *Treatise*.

Here it is necessary to point out a questionable and even misleading interpolation regarding the word ‘subjectivity’ as it applies to Hume in Roffe’s generally excellent short book Gilles Deleuze’s *Empiricism and Subjectivity: A Critical Introduction*. In considering Hume’s assertions about ‘the self’ early in *The Treatise*, Roffe writes:

> Hume’s discussion here is more nuanced than it is sometimes taken to be, but the upshot is as straightforward as it is famous: subjectivity is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement... ⁴⁵

But Roffe’s own phrasing is not straightforward here, in that Hume does not use the word ‘subjectivity’ to introduce the quoted passage, any more than it appears anywhere else in the *Treatise*. Rather after commenting ironically that “some metaphysicians” may believe in “the self,” Hume continues:

> But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions...

In short, Roffe’s introduction of the term ‘subjectivity’ in this way, as though it could be credited to Hume himself is not only confusing, but also obscures both the extent of Deleuze’s act of ‘buggery’ in regard to Hume’s text, and its mechanics.

For it is likewise into the gap of ambiguity between Hume’s two usages of the word ‘subject,’ that Deleuze, two hundred and fourteen years later, inserts himself and commits his act of buggery and ‘immaculate conception,’ producing the offspring concept—‘subjectivité’—made prominent in his own title, which itself was clearly developed in relation to, and with mutated resemblance to, Hume’s title. In doing so, he also—as we shall see—inserts into his own deployment of the term a direct link with Hume’s ‘principles of association of ideas,’ such as Hume himself does not develop. With this linkage, Deleuze himself radically reconfigures the term ‘subject,’ far beyond its usages in terms both of ‘the matter at hand,’ and of political identity in the top-down contexts of monarchy and empire. Also plausible here is that we have found, in the hinge between these two titles that so resemble one another, with difference, a primordial act of Deleuzian ‘buggery’ and ‘immaculate conception’ in relation to a philosopher, making for a concept of ‘subjectivity’
much removed from the usual Enlightenment trajectory of Descartes-Kant-Hegel. In isolating this hinge we can also examine its mechanics: how the machine works, and works in such a way also as to feed toward Deleuze’s own radically altered concept of ‘Empiricism.’

V

It is Deleuze’s mutation of the word ‘subject,’ and not only between the titles of the two books, that heralds this act. Concerning the word in Deleuze’s reading of Hume, we could perhaps do no better than to offer this passage from the fifth chapter, itself called “Empirisme et subjectivité.” In doing so, however, we must note a further quirk of ambiguity: namely, translation of Hume’s word ‘mind,’ which is introduced at the very outset of the Treatise: ‘All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds...’ The word ‘mind’ was put into French by Deleuze’s choice of translation of Hume’s Treatise, that of 1946 by André Louis Leroy, with the dual-purpose French word ‘esprit,’ which can mean both ‘mind’ and ‘spirit.’ Thus when Deleuze writes, “il faut comparer le sujet avec l’esprit,” Boundas appropriately carries the translation back to Hume’s English term ‘mind,’ with “we must compare the subject with the mind.”

But clearly, when Deleuze asks “quels sont les principes qui constituent le sujet dans l’esprit?” he is folding in not only a radical adaptation and problematisation of Hume’s use of the word ‘subject,’ but also more implicitly—in French—a challenge to traditional religious terminology and range of meaning of the word ‘esprit.’

This passage is too important to let the standard translation pass unexamined, and is given in French toward both appreciation of nuance, and recognition of some questionable choices:

... quels sont les principes qui constituent le sujet dans l’esprit? Sous quel facteur l’esprit va-t-il se transformer ? Nous avons vu que la réponse de Hume est simple : ce qui transforme l’esprit en un sujet, ce qui constitue un sujet dans l’esprit, ce sont les principes de la nature humaine. Ces principes sont de deux sortes : les principes d’association d’une part, d’autre part les principes de la passion, qu’on pourra présenter à certains égards sous la forme générale d’un principe d’utilité. Le sujet est cette instance qui, sous l’effet d’un principe d’utilité poursuit un but, une intention, organise des moyens en vue d’une fin, et, sous l’effet de principes d’association, établit des relations entre les idées. Ainsi la collection devient un système. La collection des perceptions devient un système quand celles-ci sont...
organisées, quand celles-ci sont reliées.\textsuperscript{50}

For all its value, the standard translation invites revisiting at moments in this passage that are key to a close mechanics of how Deleuze ‘buggers’ Hume, to produce a ‘subject’ that differs from usages of the word in Hume, yet still ties this concept back toward dependent constitutive relation to ‘the principles of association,’ plural. Three points bear noting:

1. For “Sous quel facteur l’esprit va-t-il se transformer?” the Boundas translation gives “What factors will transform the mind?” But it is clear that the word ‘facteur’ in French is singular. Moreover, the verb phrase “va-t-il se transformer” is not the predicate of the noun ‘facteur’ but of ‘l’esprit,’ and is given as reflexive. A more suitable translation would be “Under what factor will the mind be transformed (or transform itself)?” This allows for the ambiguity of the French reflexive infinitive ‘se transformer,’ with the active reflexive voice (‘transform itself’) explicitly licensed, in this context, by the opening sentence, in English, of Hume’s \textit{Treatise}: ‘All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds...’ (emphasis added);

2. Boundas gives for the emphasized phrase “d’un principe d’utilité” not “of a principle of utility,” but rather “of the principle of utility,” changing the indefinite article ‘a’ to a definite ‘the,’ and omitting italicization. This gives the impression that ‘the principle of utility’ has already been established as singular, distinctive, and definitive by Hume himself, when this would not be established with clarity until 1789, after Hume’s death in 1776, by Jeremy Bentham. Deleuze’s actual construction is more speculative: “qu’on pourra présenter à certains égards sous la form générale d’un principe d’utilité”: “that one will be able to present in certain respects under the form of \textit{a principle of utility}”; and

3. Perhaps most significantly for our purposes here: the standard translation gives for “Le sujet est cette instance” the English “The subject is the entity.” But ‘instance’ in French is stronger than this, and more active, being generally translated not—as might be expected—directly as ‘instance,’ and definitely not as ‘entity,’ but as ‘authority.’ To quote the first meaning given in the Collins- Robert Dictionary: “instance \textit{nf (a) (autorité)} authority” and gives the example “le conflit devra être tranché par l’- supérieure.”\textsuperscript{51} It would seem silly to imagine that Deleuze was unaware of this range of usage of the word, and of this strong usage in particular, when he deployed it.
Accordingly and crucially, then, Deleuze’s usage of the word ‘instance’ in French, as applied to ‘le sujet’ / ‘the subject,’ carries the latter word over from being, as in Book III of Hume’s *Treatise,* associated with being *subject to* established authority, in the form of ‘magistrates’ who are themselves part of an established hierarchy with the monarch at the summit, as per the British Empire, to being *its own active* authority. This is a radical departure from Hume’s usage of the word ‘subject’ in the *Treatise,* and the entire passage given above in French might more helpfully be translated as:

...what are the principles that constitute the subject in the mind? Under what factor will the mind be transformed / transform itself? We have seen that the response of Hume is simple: that which transforms the mind into a subject, that which constitutes a subject [Boundas gives ‘the subject’] in the mind, are the principles of human nature. These principles are of two sorts: the principles of association on the one hand, and on the other hand the principles of passion [Boundas gives ‘the passions’], that one will be able to present in certain respects under the general form of a principle of utility. The subject is that authority which, under the effect of a principle of utility, pursues a goal, an intention, organizes means in view of an end, and, under the effect of principles of association, establishes relations among ideas. Thus the collection becomes a system. The collection of perceptions becomes a system when these are organized, when these are linked together.52

This paragraph makes for such transformation of the notion of ‘subject’ as it is found in Hume, that Deleuze’s statement “We have seen that the response of Hume is simple...” becomes bizarre. Deleuze asks (in our translation): “... what are the principles that constitute the subject in the mind? Under what factor will the mind be transformed / transform itself?” And he replies: “We have seen that the response of Hume is simple: that which transforms the mind into a subject, that which constitutes a subject in the mind, are the principles of human nature.” Yet Hume does not does not use the term ‘subject’ in this way in the *Treatise* or problematize it as Deleuze does. And it is clear from Deleuze’s footnotes that the *Treatise* was his primary reference, and was especially so for the chapter in which this passage appears. We here put a magnifying glass to an act of Deleuzian buggery, in what he makes of Hume’s ‘subject.’
Deleuze carries over intact from Hume a confidence in the “principles of association of ideas,” given by him as “contiguité, ressemblance, et causalité,” in organizing the mind. He respects Hume also in insisting on priority of “the principle of passion” as “the other kind of affection”:

Association links ideas in the imagination; passion gives a sense to these relations, thus a tendency [penchant] to the imagination ... It is because man [l'homme] has passions that he associates these ideas; there is thus a double implication of the passions and the association of ideas.

But Deleuze applies this ‘double implication’ in regard to ‘the subject’ in a way that Hume—with his own range of usage of the word ‘subject’—does not. “Ce que nous devons mettre d’abord en lumière,” Deleuze writes in Empirisme et subjectivité, “c’est que le sujet, étant l’effet des principes dans l’esprit, n’est rien d’autre que l’esprit comme activé.” / “What we must first bring into light is that the subject, being the effect of the principles in the mind, is nothing other than the mind as activated.” The subject, then, for Deleuze, is identified with—“is nothing other than” / “est rien d’autre que”—“the mind as activated.” But this is not Hume on ‘the subject’; it is Deleuze on ‘the subject’ through Hume, and entails a manoeuvre—a ‘buggery’—surely as audacious as Deleuze’s later claim (in 1981) that “univocity is the keystone of Spinoza’s entire philosophy,” when—as Daniel W. Smith has pointed out—Spinoza himself never used the term.

To reprise the latter part of the above quotation:

The subject is that authority which, under the effect of a principle of utility, pursues a goal, an intention, organizes means in view of an end, and, under the effect of principles of association, establishes relations among ideas. Thus the collection becomes a system. The collection of perceptions becomes a system when these are organized, when these are linked together.

This term ‘system’ will resurface with particular relevance in Logique du sens. But bearing note here is that the principles are, in Deleuze’s reading as for Hume himself, active: “les principes d’association ... choisissent les perceptions qui doivent s’unir dans un complexe” / “The principles of association... choose the perceptions that must be unified / unify themselves [doivent s’unir] into a complex.” Here again is the potential for ambiguity in the French reflexive verb as deployed by Deleuze in a text concerning a philosopher whose opening
line in his first book (the Treatise) reads: ‘All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds...’ (emphasis added). This is as strong a declaration by Hume, at the outset of the Treatise, as Deleuze’s about ‘the great philosopher’ at the outset of David Hume (for surely there can be no doubt, at this point, that these words were penned by Deleuze, and not by André Cresson). Hume himself might as well be describing ‘prepersonal singularities’: such possibly was the potential, for Deleuze, contained in this single sentence. Thus it cannot be emphasized too much that the option of translating such verbs in the active as well as passive voice, when they appear—as they frequently do—in Deleuze’s oeuvre, is given credence by Hume’s own phrasing in English at the outset of the Treatise, as a text with which Deleuze himself engaged both extensively and early: “All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds ...”

We shall also, in considering Logique du sens, see how important is this ambiguity in the reflexive verb to an ontology that invests in “events as jets of singularities [les événements comme jets de singularités].”

But Deleuze also describes action of the principles in this way: “Relations are an effect of the principles of association. These principles themselves give a constancy to the mind, they naturalize it.” And while Deleuze persistently references ‘principles’ (plural), he also—as might be anticipated in his calling “relations ... an effect of the principles of association”—seems to follow Hume in privileging, among the three, that of causality (or as Hume describes it “CAUSE or EFFECT”):

Finally, it is necessary to make a place apart for causality. Hume presents to us belief as dependent on two principles: experience and habit. What are these doing on the list? To understand, it is necessary to remember that the principle of causality has not only for effect a relation, but also an inference according to the relation. Causality is the only relation according to which there is an inference.

With this last statement on causality and inference, there are grounds for pause of a different sort. For what merits noting is that with this correlation established between ‘causality’ and ‘inference,’ the term ‘inference’ as much as vanishes from Deleuze’s working vocabulary thereafter: not simply within this book, but within his œuvre. It appears barely at all in Différence et répétition of 1968, as Deleuze’s Doctorat d’État and first effort at independently “doing philosophy”: its appearance being precisely in the context of an early discussion of “expérimentation scientifique” as involving “des milieux relativement clos.”

Likewise, it is present only with brief reference to the aspect of “manifestation” in
propositions in *Logique du sens* of 1969, as a book whose title would seem to invite it. 63 And it appears just once in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* of 1991, with reference to the eighteenth century “creation of the great empiricist concepts (association, relation, habit, probability, convention)” : which is to say, Hume. 64 Deleuze also makes much the same reference in the short text “Hume,” that appears in the fourth volume of François Châtelet’s *Histoire de la philosophie, Les Lumières*, of 1972. 65

The term ‘inference’ appears, that is, in the context of recapitulation, not active relevance. This in itself distances Deleuze from the approach to Hume characteristically taken in twentieth century Anglo-American thought, with its emphasis on close dialogue between philosophy and science, such that the name ‘Hume’ is tied precisely to what he makes of causality and inference. Instead Deleuze, having studied Hume closely in his own way, and having made clear his familiarity with both the relation causality-inference as developed by Hume, and its ‘special place,’ then himself developed an approach to philosophy largely without building into it resort to the verb ‘infer’ or to the noun ‘inference,’ as mapped by Hume, and referenced by Deleuze himself, in this strict way.

Yet Deleuze does also manage to bugger Hume yet again, regarding the concept of imagination in *Difference and Repetition*, and this bears noting via direct quotation: in this case from the translation by Paul Patton. It is in the contexts of his considering what he calls “Hume’s famous thesis”: that “Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it.” Without giving a source,

Hume explains that the independent identical or similar cases are grounded in the imagination. The imagination is defined here as a contractile power: like a sensitive plate, it retains one case when the other appears. It contracts cases, elements, agitations or homogeneous instants and grounds these in an internal qualitative impression endowed with a certain weight. When A appears, we expect B with a force corresponding to the qualitative impression of all the contracted ABs. This is by no means a memory, nor indeed an operation of the understanding: contraction is not a matter of reflection. Properly speaking, it forms a synthesis of time. ... In any case, this synthesis must be given a name: passive synthesis. Although it is constitutive it is not, for all that, active. It is not carried out by the mind, but occurs in the mind which contemplates, prior to all memory and all reflection. 66
Clearly, when Deleuze writes ‘the imagination is defined here as a contractile power...’ this is his own adaptation—or buggery—of Hume on imagination. The tone of categorical declaration is characteristic, even though none of the assertions is testable. And perhaps this is the point. Deleuze draws less on the Hume responsible for a vocabulary of causality, experiment, and inference, than for a vocabulary of ‘imagination’ and—as will be seen—‘principles of association of ideas’ that include resemblance and contiguity of time and/or space.

Paradoxically, given the intensity of Deleuze’s early focus on Hume, references to him in Deleuze’s subsequent œuvre largely also vanish. The only one of these sustained beyond a few words consists of the chapter-length “Hume,” prepared by Deleuze for the fourth volume of François Châtelet’s Histoire de la philosophie, Les Lumières, published in 1972. But this text contains, given the very title of Deleuze’s 1953 book on Hume, its own anomaly of absence, in that the terms ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivity’ do not appear at all. This was also the period of Deleuze’s intense involvement with Félix Guattari toward Capitalisme et schizophrénie, L’Anti-Œdipe, which appeared in the same year as Châtelet’s Histoire containing “Hume.” In L’Anti-Œdipe, the term ‘subject’ is—with no mention of Hume—folded into the Freudian/Lacanian and machinic vocabulary brought by Guattari to the collaboration. So for how “the subject is produced,” Deleuze and Guattari give, as a “point of departure,” “the opposition between desiring machines” (as a term that owes much to Guattari’s 1969 paper “Machine et structure”), and “the body without organs,” (as a term adapted by Deleuze from Antonin Artaud in Logique du sens, published also in 1969, and read by Guattari in preparing his paper). This reconfiguration was by then informed also by Deleuze’s own published ‘portraits’ of Nietzsche, Kant, Bergson, Proust, and Spinoza as well as by both Différence et répétition (1968) and Logique du sens (1969). In the former, Deleuze provides his most systematic approach to an ontology of ‘univocity,’ in which “Being says itself (l’Être se dite) in a single and same sense, of all its individuating differences and intrinsic modalities.” In the latter, which must qualify as one of the most unusual texts of philosophy ever written, he develops, in elaboration of this ontology, a ‘theory of sense’ that applies, through paradox, to “a world swarming with anonymous and nomadic singularities, impersonal, pre-individual.”

The direction here will be toward Logique du sens, where Deleuze’s readings of Lewis Carroll’s “Alice,” Émile Bréhier’s “Stoics,” and Antonin Artaud, figure prominently toward his development of a model of ‘sense production.’ Conditioning this movement will be, first, consideration of what Deleuze does also with Hume’s term ‘association’ in Empirisme et subjectivité, and secondly an
assessment in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? that reverberates retrospectively in terms of mapping Deleuze’s change of vocabulary in Logique du sens back on his earlier work on Hume.

VII

In considering “the conception that Hume gives of society,” Deleuze asserts in the second chapter of Empirisme et subjectivité that “the principal idea is this: the essence of society is not the law, but the institution.” And in considering “the institution’ in relation to “the laws of association that regulate the game of the imagination,” he offers the following comment citing not Hume but Henri Bergson. It is given first in French on account of a peculiarity in a crucial sentence, that makes for a détournement (or buggery), highly condensed, by Deleuze of Bergson, in service to a wider détournement of Hume:

On a vite fait de critiquer l’associationisme; on oublie trop volontiers que l’ethnographie nous y ramène, et que, comme dit encore Bergson, « on rencontre chez les primitifs beaucoup d’interdictions et de prescriptions qui s’expliquent par de vagues associations d’idées ». Ce n’est pas vrai seulement pour les primitifs. Les associations sont vagues, mais en ce sens qu’elles sont particulière et varient d’après les circonstances. L’imagination se révèle comme une véritable production de modèles extrêmement divers : les institutions sont déterminées par les figures que tracent les tendances, selon les circonstances, quand elles se réfléchissent dans l’imagination, dans une imagination soumise aux principes d’association.

The following is offered as an alternative to the standard translation, noting that Deleuze’s use of the pronoun ‘on’ in this passage would seem to make for a pre-eminent early instance of what he would elevate, in the Preface to Différence et répétition, to “la splendeur du « ON »,” out of a credo that reads: “Nous croyons à un monde où les individuations sont impersonnelles, et les singularités, pré-individuelles” / “We believe in a world where individualizations are impersonal, and singularities, pre-individual.” Translation of “On” in this passage as the impersonal “one” seems appropriate, even as Deleuze gives “nous” in the objective case. Boundas begins the passage with “We were quick to criticize...”

One was quick to criticize associationism; one forgets too easily that ethnography carries us back to it, and that, as Bergson likewise says, “one
encounters among primitives many interdictions and prescriptions that are explained by vague associations of ideas.” This is not true only for the primitives. Associations are vague, but in this sense that they are particular and vary according to the circumstances. The imagination is revealed /reveals itself (se révèle) as a veritable production of extremely diverse models: institutions are determined by the figures that these tendencies trace, in accordance with the circumstances, when they are reflected in the imagination, in an imagination submitted to the principles of association.”75

This passage opens—from Deleuze’s European perspective, conditioned by Bergson—terms of engagement with ‘the primitives,’ that will re-manifest in different ways, as an idea that differentiates, across his later œuvre. Deleuze does not footnote the reference to Bergson, as he footnotes references to Hume throughout the book; nor does Boundas source it in the notes to the translation. But worth noting is that the passage appears in Bergson’s last book Les deux sources de la morale et la religion of 1932, and that Deleuze, in quoting it without reference, also does not quote its entirety as a sentence, and so adapts it, in a focused instance of his adaptations (or ‘portraits’) of earlier philosophers. That is to say, he leaves out the terms of judgment, shown here in bold, with which Bergson’s text concludes the sentence: “On rencontre chez les primitifs beaucoup d’interdictions et de prescriptions qui s’expliquent par de vagues associations d’idées, par la superstition, par l’automatisme” (“by superstition, by automatism”).76 In excluding these last two judgment terms, Deleuze leaves the reference both open and neutral: ‘On rencontre chez les primitifs beaucoup d’interdictions et de prescriptions qui s’expliquent par de vagues associations d’idées.’ He also, rather than providing an ellipsis that would indicate the quoted sentence continues in the original (as it does), closes it with a period, as though to imply that this is where it ends in the original (as it does not).

Bergson wrote and published Les deux sources de la morale et la religion in the waning years of another empire: the French. The year following its publication, Adolf Hitler, sustained by a mania of ‘vague associations of ideas,’ would become chancellor of Germany, and Europe would enter the second phase of a trajectory, begun with the First World War, of imperial contraction and collapse. It is within the frame of this collapse—both temporal and spatial, and ongoing when Deleuze published Empirisme et subjectivité in 1953—that Deleuze opts for this neutrality and openness of possibility, rather than closing the sentence down with terms of confident condescension—‘superstition,’ ‘automatism’—as Bergson’s text of

“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 45
1932 does. Deleuze then effects a characteristic if subtle détournement of just this sentence to include not only ‘les primitifs’: ‘Ce n’est pas vrai seulement pour les primitifs. Les associations sont vagues, mais en ce sens qu’elles sont particulières et varient d’après les circonstances.’ / “This is not true only for the primitives. Associations are vague, but in this sense that they are particular and vary with the circumstances.” Boundas here gives ‘Associations are vague, but only in the sense that they are particular and varying according to the circumstances.’ The exclusionary ‘but only’ does not seem justified by ‘mais en ce sens,’ and introduces—like Bergson’s ‘par la superstition, par l’automatisme’ that Deleuze leaves out—a term of judgment. The Boundas translation thereby closes off a sentence that, with different translation—‘but in this sense’ for ‘mais en ce sens’—displays both tentativeness and a certain curiosity: ‘but in this sense that they are particular and vary with the circumstances.’

That Deleuze retains the term ‘primitives’ beyond the quotation marks that enclose the passage from Bergson, with its provenance of relation to the practices and categories of European imperialism, in whose wake anthropology followed, likewise merits pause. He does so in 1953, six years after Claude Lévi-Strauss’s publication of Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, that ushered ‘the primitive’ into the vocabulary and method of structuralism. Deleuze ventures, also tentatively at this point, something else: a continuity with ‘the primitives’: ‘Ce n’est pas vrai seulement pour les primitifs.’ He also questions Bergson on ‘associationism’: this is implied in “On a vite fait de critiquer l’associationisme ..,” with ‘on’ linked to Bergson via the phrase “comme dit encore Bergson.” Deleuze has gone to Bergson for a concept of ‘associationism’: this is thirteen years before he would publish his monograph Le Bergsonisme in 1966. But what he would have found in the earlier book where Bergson introduces the term ‘associationism’ is its own association, by Bergson, with strict determinism in relation to processes of the mind:

The determinist ... holds that the determination of conscious states by one another is absolute. This is the origin of associationist determinism ... Psychological determinism, in its latest and most precise shape, implies an associationist conception of mind. But this is not the outrightly manipulative direction in which Deleuze, in Empirisme et subjectivité, opts to go with his own reference to ‘associationism.’ As he considers Hume’s principles of association of ideas without full emphasis on causality, so he considers ‘associationism’ without Bergson’s emphasis on
determinism, as well as without Bergson’s anchorage in ‘the self.’ Bergson himself links ‘the primitives’ with ‘interdictions and prescriptions that are explained by vague associations of ideas, by superstition by automatism.’ In doing so, he implies that he is outside all of these. Deleuze hesitates to take this step, and moves away also from the precision cultivated by ‘associationist determinism.’ He instead makes the tentative but important statement: ‘This is not true only for the primitives. Associations are vague, but in this sense that they are particular and vary with the circumstances.’ Deleuze’s introduction of the term ‘associationism’ does not, then, lead toward a program of controlled experiment, where otherwise ‘natural phenomena’ are linked through deliberate contiguity—that is to say, a determinism of association—but rather toward ‘the imagination’: ‘The imagination reveals itself / is revealed [se révèle; English is lacking the generative ambiguity of the French reflexive verb] as a veritable production of extremely diverse models.’

The word ‘production,’ lodged in this way in Deleuze’s œuvre in 1953, will itself be adapted in 1972 by Deleuze and Guattari in *L’Anti-Œdipe*, including in terms of “desiring production” as “pure multiplicity” and “desire as autoproduction of the unconscious.” But a focus for Deleuze in the study of Hume is not ‘the unconscious,’ as a term unknown to Hume. Rather it is ‘the imagination,’ as a term that informs Hume’s own introduction of the principles of association of ideas, that are described as “capable of conveying the imagination from one idea to another.”

‘Institutions are determined,’ Deleuze writes, ‘by the figures that these tendencies trace, in accordance with the circumstances, when they are reflected in the imagination, in an imagination submitted to the principles of association.’ ‘The principles of association’ are, for Deleuze as for Hume, active. They are also three: not only cause and effect, but also resemblance and contiguity. Deleuze also makes a qualification: ‘This does not signify that the imagination in its essence is active, but only that it rings out, that it resonates.’

The term ‘resonates (résonne)’ does not appear in either Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature*, or his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*: it is among Deleuze’s supplements to a reading of Hume. But it is also a term that reappears extensively in *Logique du sens*, and how it does provides a pivot of transition between two vocabularies. Travelling in time within Deleuze’s œuvre in this way will be assisted by a brief passage that appears even farther along within this œuvre in *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?* of 1991. Though credited to Deleuze and Guattari, this passage was almost certainly written by Deleuze, speaking directly as it does to his early work on Hume:

“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 47
We ask only that our ideas link together according to a minimum of constant rules, and the association of ideas has never had any other sense, than to furnish us with these protective rules, resemblance, contiguity, causality, that permit us to put a little order in ideas, to pass from one to another following an order of space and time, preventing our “fantasy” (delirium, madness) from travelling the universe in an instant, producing winged horses and dragons of fire.\textsuperscript{82}

The reference to ‘winged horses and dragons of fire’ recalls Hume on ‘winged horses, fiery dragons, and monstrous giants’ in the \textit{Treatise}.\textsuperscript{83} But close variants on this combination, as informing Deleuze’s comment on Hume, have also appeared already in both \textit{Empirisme et subjectivité}\textsuperscript{84} and even the chapter-length “Hume” of 1972,\textsuperscript{85} as Deleuze’s chosen means of describing the ‘whimsical [fantaisiste] and delirious’ activity of the imagination in the absence of principles of association. But with the version in \textit{Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?}, direct translation from French is important, in that inexplicably, the standard 1994 English version by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell \textit{leaves out} the phrase “to pass from one to another following an order of space and time” / “de passer de l’une à l’autre suivant un ordre de l’espace et du temps.”\textsuperscript{86} Thus an English-language reader of \textit{What is Philosophy?}, as their translation, has simply not had access to this phrase in Deleuze’s 1991 reading backward to his work on Hume. Yet the notion of ‘following an order of space and time’ will prove especially important in considering how Hume’s ‘principles of association of ideas,’ and in particular ‘resemblance’ and ‘contiguity,’ are conceptually redistributed in \textit{Logique du sens}.

\section*{VIII}

David Hume rates barely a mention by name in \textit{Logique du sens}, and just a single citation appears in the index of the 1990 English translation by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, edited by Constantin Boundas.\textsuperscript{87} The referenced passage has, as we shall consider shortly, to do precisely with causation and inference. Yet what we want to suggest here, including via the above passage from \textit{Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?} is that Hume’s ‘principles of association of ideas,’ and in particular resemblance and contiguity, inform and will be of help toward clarifying the concept of ‘quasi-cause’ as developed by Deleuze in \textit{Logique du sens}. Likewise, the concept of quasi-cause may make for somewhat mutated applicability of these principles of association. In \textit{Logique du sens}, as his most stylistically audacious
book, Deleuze invests in a distinctive vocabulary and series structure, announced most prominently by his titling the avant-propos “de Lewis Carroll aux stoïciens” / “from Lewis Carroll to the Stoics,” and concluding it by calling the book that follows “un essai de roman logique et psychanalytique” / “an attempt at a logical and psychoanalytic novel.” Between these antipodes, he provides a succinct statement of method and objective: “We present some series of paradoxes that form the theory of sense.” But this is itself enclosed in paradoxes. Why from Lewis Carroll to ‘the Stoics,’ when Carroll (1832-1898) lived hundreds of years after both Greek and Roman Stoics? What is ‘a logical and psychoanalytic novel’?

We will here necessarily consider just one thread within the lush textscape of *Logique du sens*. The “from-to” aspect becomes less paradoxical with recognition of the extent to which Deleuze in the text that follows relies on Émile Bréhier’s 1905 dissertation *La Théorie des incorporels dans l’ancien stoïcisme* for his account of ‘the Stoics’ and in particular for a distinction between corporeal bodies, that interact causally, and incorporeal events, that, as “surface effects,” do not. Deleuze has here moved far beyond his bending of Hume to describe ‘the subject’ as ‘that authority [instance] which, under the effect of a principle of utility, pursues a goal, an intention, organizes means in view of an end, and, under the effect of principles of association, establishes relations among ideas.’ Instead, he invites his reader to a “new discourse,” of which he states:

...the subject of this new discourse, but there is no longer a subject, is not man or God, and even less man in the place of God. It is [the] free singularity, anonymous and nomadic, that traverses [parcourt] as much men, plants, and animals independently of matters of their individuation and the forms of their personality... A strange discourse that should have renewed philosophy, and at last treat sense [sens] not as a predicate or property, but as event.

It is this marginalization, overthrow, and dissolution of ‘the subject,’ joined with foregrounding of the ‘event’ in relation to ‘sense’ which help make of *Logique du sens* an especially ferocious instrument toward reconfiguration also of experience and perception. Where causal relations apply, for Deleuze of *Logique du sens*, is in regard to bodies, transposed from relations of “objects” as famously illustrated by Hume in both the *Treatise* and the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1748) with the example of billiard balls. And it is the principle of cause and effect, identified as a principle of the association of ideas, that makes for Deleuze’s single explicit acknowledgement of Hume in *Logique du sens*: “Hume saw this
profondely: in the association from cause to effect, it is ‘the inference according to the relation’ that precedes the relation itself.”

But Deleuze gives a twist to this assessment in Logique du sens, bringing to it also a relation between bodies and ‘incorporeals’ as events that he attributes to ‘the Stoics,’ but that owes much to Bréhier’s Théorie des incorporels dans l’ancien stoïcisme. This Deleuze inhabits and digests as he inhabits and digests Hume, equating ‘incorporeals’ as ‘effects’ with both ‘the ideational (l’idéal)’ and ‘surface events (des événements incorporels à la surface).’ He asserts that:

Incorporeal effects are never themselves causes in relation to one another, but only “quasi-causes,” following laws that express perhaps in each case the relative unity or the mixture of bodies on which they depend as their real causes.

Deleuze conjures rather than draws the term ‘quasi-cause’ out of his reading of ‘the Stoics’ and Bréhier, for, as with ‘subjectivity’ and Hume, it is to be found in neither. But in Logique du sens, Deleuze affirms also ‘the Stoics’ cleavage between bodies and ‘incorporeals,’ and an identification of ‘incorporeals’ with ‘surface events,’ that are in ‘quasi-causal’ rather than causal relation with one another. And here is the crucial point. In doing so, he invites a transposition out of both his earlier study of Hume, and his later comprehensive reminder, in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, that ‘the association of ideas has never had any other sense, than to furnish us with these protective rules, resemblance, contiguity, causality.’ For if ‘the association of ideas has never had any other sense, than to furnish us with these protective rules’ (emphases added), and relations of bodies are to do with the principle (or protective rule) of causality, then what follows is that in relations of ‘quasi-causality’ among incorporeals as well as in ‘permit[ting] us to put a little order in ideas, to pass from one to another following an order of space and time’ (emphasis added) are the remaining two: resemblance and contiguity. And as it is possible to cross-reference forward here in Deleuze, from Logique du sens (1969) to Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (1991), it is also possible to cross-reference back, to Empirisme et subjectivité (1953), where Deleuze anticipates the kind of relationality that in Logique du sens he would identify with the term ‘quasi-cause’: “the imagination in its essence ... resonates.”

Deleuze brings this term ‘resonance’ to Logique du sens (1969) and there puts it into relation with ‘the Stoic’/ Bréhier vocabulary of ‘incorporeals’ and his own term ‘quasi-cause,’ with again in the background Hume’s ‘principles of association of ideas.’ He gives a two-fold description of ‘the event’ with—again—an ambiguity
And above all, in one case, we connect the event to its corporeal causes and to their physical unity; in the other case, we connect the event to its incorporeal quasi-cause, causality that it gathers and makes resonate in the production of its own effectuation. The Lester / Stivale / Boundas translation gives, for Deleuze’s blunt apposition, without an article, of the word ‘causality [causalité]’ after the phrase ‘incorporeal quasi-cause [quasi-cause incorporelle],’ a phrase instead of a word: ‘the kind of causality.’ The urge to qualify is understandable: is ‘quasi-cause’ ‘causality’ in Hume’s sense of the term or not? No, Deleuze tells us: “Events are never causes of one another, but enter into relations of quasi-causality, unreal and ghostly causality that does not cease to return in the two senses.” And what are “the two senses?”

Sense is that which is formed and deployed [se forme et se déploie; the reflexive verb again] at the surface. Even the frontier is not a separation, but rather the element of an articulation, such that sense is presented [se présente] both as that which happens to bodies and that which insists in propositions.

Deleuze acknowledges the multiple senses of the word ‘sens,’ which can also draw in both ‘direction’ and ‘meaning’ in English. However: ‘only incorporeal events constitute expressed sense.’ With these terms established, Deleuze distills the following question and answer:

The question becomes: what are these expressive relations of events among themselves? ... They are not relations of cause and effect, but an ensemble of non-causal correspondences, forming a system of echoes, of reprises, and of resonances, a system of signs, in short, an expressive quasi-causality, and not at all a necessitating causality.

‘Non-causal correspondences’ are, again, remindful of Hume’s other two ‘principles of association of ideas’: resemblance and contiguity of time or place, that—though marginalized in experimental science—nevertheless, like ‘causality,’ ‘permit us to put a little order in ideas, to pass from one to another following an order of space and time...’ But here they are invited into application not to ideas, but to ‘expressive relations of events among themselves.’

“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 51
This is a very different notion of ‘associationism’ from that related by Bergson to calculated experiment and ‘determinism,’ in that ‘events’ outside the laboratory are neither predictable nor controllable in such a way. “An order of space and time” is presented by Deleuze as an alternative to ‘fantasy’ (delirium, madness)... “travelling the universe in an instant, producing winged horses and dragons of fire.” This correlation can be carried in multiple directions that can only be suggested here. ‘An order of space and time’ does not imply—indeed it discourages—investment in any particular order of space and time as definitive. ‘An order of space and time’ also correlates, however, with Deleuze’s own association, in the late essay “Ce que les enfants disent,” of ‘the libido’ with the indefinite article:

That which concerns the libido, that which the libido invests, presents itself with (se présente avec) an indefinite article, or rather is presented by (est présenté par) the indefinite article: an animal as qualification of a becoming or specification of a trajectory (a horse, a chicken...); a body or an organ as power (pouvoir) to affect or to be affected (a stomach, some eyes...) ...  

Bearing emphasis here is that ‘the libido’ as presented in this passage has little to do with ‘the unconscious’ as personal. Rather for Deleuze of 1993:

It is the peculiarity of the libido to haunt history and geography, to organize formations of worlds and of constellations of the universe, to derive the continents, to people them with races, tribes, and nations... The libido has not metamorphoses but world-historical trajectories.  

So expansive a notion of ‘the libido’ also carries Deleuze, in this same essay, to revisiting the ‘primitives’ who, in Empirisme et subjectivité of forty years earlier, make for his selective quotation of Bergson to exclude linkage of ‘vague associations of ideas’ with—as given by Bergson—‘superstition’: ‘one encounters among primitives many interdictions and prescriptions that are explained by vague associations of ideas. This is not true only of the primitives...’ In “Ce que les enfants disent,” return to ‘the primitives’ is via Australian aborigines, as considered by Barbara Glowczewski in her then recent Du rêve à la loi chez les Aborigènes. “Thus the aborigines of Australia,” Deleuze tells us, “combine nomadic itineraries and dream voyages which together compose ‘an intermingling of courses,’ ‘in an immense cut of space and time that it necessary to read like a map’.” Such an ‘intermingling of courses [entremaillage de parcours],’ combining ‘nomadic itineraries and dream voyages,’ itself recalls Deleuze’s casting, in Logique du sens,
of ‘expressive relations of events among themselves’ in terms of “an ensemble of non-causal correspondences, forming a system of echoes, of reprises, and of resonances, a system of signs, in short, an expressive quasi-causality, and not at all a necessitating causality.”

And both hearken back still further to his casting, in *Empirisme et subjectivité*, of ‘institutions’ as “determined by the figures traced” by associative “tendencies... in an imagination submitted to the principles of association,” and that ‘resonates’. We may add, retrieving the phrase left out of the standard translation of *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*, “following an order of space and time.”

How such a notion of ‘following’ might bear on ‘expressive relations of events among themselves’ seems itself a question worth considering.

‘Following’ in this way also invites being carried back to the very paragraph, disavowed in most lists of his published works, by which Gilles Deleuze introduced himself in book form in 1952, with an assessment of ‘the great philosopher.’ For if it is ‘in the events of a great philosopher’ that ‘one can read an entire conception of existence, involuntary, immediate,’ and so ‘an implicit philosophy,’ and if events are related not causally but ‘quasi-causally,’ with the concept of quasi-cause circling back to Hume on resemblance and contiguity of time or place, then precisely such odd resemblances and contiguities as those exhibited by what Roffe calls ‘pleasing’ symmetries in Deleuze’s approach to Hume may themselves invite more careful attention. That Deleuze became ‘a great philosopher,’ in the tradition within which he trained and which he so meticulously adapted, there can be no doubt. But with this carefully crafted paragraph, made public at the age Hume was when he published the *Treatise*, Deleuze both offers and implicitly licenses expansive terms of retrospective consideration, including of himself as ‘great philosopher’ (who ‘is also always something other than a great philosopher’). And might such ‘symmetries’ themselves hint at ‘an implicit philosophy,’ and even ‘an entire conception of existence’ not usually linked with the name “Deleuze”?

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NOTES


7. ibid., 306.

8. ibid., 58.

9. ibid., 156; emphasis added.

10. ibid., 56.

11. ibid., 56-57

12. ibid., 56-57; emphasis in the text.

13. ibid., 56-57.

14. ibid., 58.

15. Ibid, 58.

16. ibid., 231.

17. ibid., 231.

18. ibid., 157.

19. ibid., 295.

20. ibid., 154.

21. ibid., 157.

22. ibid., 157, 368.

23. ibid., 160.

24. ibid., 158.

25. ibid., 159; emphasis in the text.

26. Ibid., 159.

27. ibid., 273-74.

28. The symmetry and resonance of the relation Hume / Deleuze includes not only publication of a first independently authored book of philosophy at age twenty eight (with Deleuze’s on
Hume), but publication of a second such after a nine-year hiatus from book-length ventures: in Hume's case *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* in 1748, and in Deleuze's *Nietzsche et la philosophie* in 1962. Moreover Deleuze's 1962 book on Nietzsche was followed three years later by another, much shorter book, called simply *Nietzsche*, as a new work on the philosopher for the Philosophes series, thereby effectively displacing Cresson's *book on Nietzsche*, done for the same series, in 1942. This effected a reversal in the pattern of the two Hume books of 1952 and 1953.

29. See Dosse, 119.
32. Roffe, xi.
36. Roffe xiv.
38. Deleuze and Guattari, 1991 10. Questions of attribution arise in *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* in ways that they do not in earlier works by Deleuze and Guattari. François Dosse asserts in his joint biography that *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* “was manifestly written by Deleuze alone, but he agreed to a coauthor credit with Guattari, as a tribute to their exceptionally intense friendship, suggesting too that the ideas developed in the book and its language were the fruit of their common endeavour since 1969” (Dosse 2010 456). Certainly it does seem fair to attribute to Deleuze sections that hearken directly to his earlier work
41. ibid., 44.
42. ibid., 509.
43. ibid., 590.
44. ibid., 590.
45. Roffe, 8.

“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 55
49. ibid., 109.
50. ibid., 109; emphases in the text.
52. Deleuze, *Empirisme et subjectivité*, 109; emphases in the text.
53. ibid., 112.
54. ibid., 127.
55. ibid., 58. Boundas gives “nothing but the mind as activated,” which is questionable from the French “n’est rien d’autre que l’esprit comme activé.”
64. Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*, 54.
68. Deleuze, *Différence et répétition*, 53.
70. Deleuze, *Empirisme et subjectivité*, 34. Roffe considers Deleuze (on Hume) on “institutions” page 47 and following. Bell provides his own reading of same on pages 17 and 97 of Deleuze's *Hume*.
71. ibid., 38.
72. ibid., 39.
Deleuze, *Empirisme et subjectivité*, 38.


Deleuze and Guattari, *L’Anti-Œdipe*, 50, 34.

Hume, *Treatise*, 156.


Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*, 189.


Deleuze, *Empirisme et subjectivité*, 4; *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, 23.


The original French for this passage reads, on page 189 of the 2005 Éditions de Minuit edition of *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*:

Nous demandons seulement que nos idées s’enchaînent suivant un minimum de règles constantes, et l’association des idées n’a jamais eu d’autre sens, nous fournir ces règles protectrices, ressemblance, contiguité, causalité, qui nous permettent de mettre un peu d’ordre dans les idées, de passer de l’une à l’autre suivant un ordre de l’espace et du temps, empêchant notre « fantaisie » (le délire, la folie) de parcourir l’univers dans l’instant pour y engendrer des chevaux aîlés et des dragons de feu.

The phrase missing from the Tomlinson / Burchell translation (Deleuze and Guattari 1994 201) is underlined.


Deleuze *Logique du sens*, 7. The Lester / Stivale /Boundas translation gives for the phrase “un essai de roman logique et psychanalytique” the English “an attempt to develop a logical and psychological novel” (Deleuze 1991 xiii). As this account provides a hinge of transition between the avant-propos and the opening series of *Logique du sens*, and is Deleuze’s summing up of the former toward the latter, the English “psychological” for the French “psychanalytique” bears pointing out as misleading.

ibid., 7.


“principles of association of ideas” to “quasi-cause” · 57
94. ibid., 15.
97. ibid., 46.
98. ibid., 151; emphasis added.
99. ibid., 170.
100. Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*, 189.
102. ibid., 82-83.
104. ibid., 83.
107. Deleuze and Guattari, *Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?*, 189.