Deleuze’s philosophy of the event seeks to provide understanding for how pathways towards thinking about the world and acting in it differently can be produced. Deleuze’s event, as Daniel W. Smith puts it, is the cardinal point of a “Copernican revolution of its own in philosophy” which renders rupture, change and “the problem of the new (difference) not simply a question to be addressed in a remote region of metaphysics, but rather the primary determination of Being itself.” The event forms the hinge of Deleuze’s politically activist, postfoundational
philosophy that seeks to offer conceptual tools for the actualisation of manifest change. But what exactly is an event for Deleuze?

The concept of the event is subject to a process of becoming which takes place over the entirety of Deleuze’s work. It begins with *Nietzsche & Philosophy*, where Deleuze terms the death of God that allows humanity to actively participate in the creation of its own future “a joyful event” of “becoming-active” and ends with the proclamation that philosophy must create *conceptual personae* that bring forth events whose creative potentiality exceeds the conditions of their emergence in *What is Philosophy?*. Deleuze’s event does not directly or necessarily produce change—but its creative potentiality always at least opens epistemic and social relations to the possibility of such change. In *The Logic Of Sense*, Deleuze identifies the creative sense-event as “something unconditioned” that is capable of “determining both the condition and the conditioned.” The creativity of Deleuze’s event is immediately puzzling. The event produces novelty, but what exactly renders it creative remains unclear because the event at the same time escapes any established notion of causality and conditioning. The event is both the creative force that charges the genesis of novelty and the rupturing operator of this creative production. In “May ’68 did not take place,” Deleuze suggests that the particular creativity of the event is at work in all political revolutions.

In historical phenomena such as the revolution of 1789, the Commune, the revolution of 1917, there is always one part of the event that is irreducible to any social determinism, or to causal chains. The event is itself a splitting off from, or a breaking with causality; it is a bifurcation, a deviation with respect to laws, an unstable condition which opens up a new field of the possible.

The theoretical riddle of Deleuze’s event is thus given additional political urgency by how closely it is linked to the possibility of actual change. If the event opens up pathways for being in the world—and for the world to be—different, then it is of
vital importance for critical philosophy to understand how creative potentiality works here. The theoretical and political challenge of Deleuze’s event has generated a vast amount of secondary literature offering diverse readings of the source and precise operativity of evental creativity in Deleuze. This paper adds to the existing scholarship on Deleuze’s event, and to a continental philosophy that aims to understand how the event can bring forth manifest change, in two ways. First, the paper draws out how Deleuzian scholarship is dominated by theories which, in one way or another, solve the riddle of evental creativity by retracing the former to a particular original source. Here, I distinguish an ontological perspective, where creative events are charged by a force of differential multiplicity, from genealogical-discursive interpretations of Deleuze’s event, which identify the former as an opportunity for understanding social happenings beyond established structures of meaning. Finally, new materialist-affective readings of the event links its creativity to an affective encounter that allows for conditioned epistemic and social relations to be re-directed towards a different future.

Despite their different theoretical situatedness and set-ups, I argue that all three readings of Deleuze’s event have in common that they displace the moment of evental creativity. The event can here only function productively in so far as it is charged or driven by a virtual difference, critical subjectivity or bodily-material force, which hereby becomes the external source of evental creativity. It is argued that understanding the creativity of Deleuze’s event by externalising it is problematic for two reasons. It ambiguates not only what exactly the event’s contribution to the creation of novelty is, but also, I suggest, re-introduces a primary cause to Deleuze’s theory of sui generis creativity, thus leaving the radical potential of a Deleuzian event that is “irreducible [...] to causal chains” in part unexplored.6

To retain evental creativity as fully immanent to the moment of the event, this paper suggests an alternative reading of Deleuze’s event via the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. It is argued that with Whitehead, the event can be thought as a moment of emergent creativity irretraceable to a particular source
but defined instead by the creative effects it unfolds. In Whitehead’s *Process and Reality*, the actual occasion of creative production emerges in an external materiality but only becomes “event” when the former is enfolded by the sense relations of the nexus of perceptions and abstractions. In this sense, the emergence of evental creativity, as well as its scope and direction, are dependent on the state of the nexus relations the event is immanent to. Understanding Deleuze's event as a moment of emergence in this sense shifts the philosophical focus away from the necessity to isolate the source of evental creativity and towards its relational context and effects. This shift in focus, I suggest in the conclusion, does however not place critical philosophy and resistant action in a place of passivity—material ruptures, affective experience and genealogical critique are still vital conditions of the emergent evental effect, even if neither can, on its own, bring forth something new.

In the first part of the paper, I provide an overview of different ways in which the event is read in Deleuzian scholarship. The second part of the paper introduces Whitehead’s theory of a both genuinely creative and relationally emergent event as set up through the concepts of evental occasion, eternal object and evental nexus. The third part of the paper then retraces Whitehead’s event in Deleuze’s evental philosophy to argue that, in Deleuze and Whitehead, the *sui generis* creativity of the event cannot be linked back to a deeper, external ground or driving force but follows from its relational complexity.

**RETRACING THE CREATIVE POTENTIAL OF DELEUZE’S EVENT: ONTOLOGY, GENEALOGY, EMBODIED AFFECT**

The following section will provide a structured overview of the central interpretational strands that dominate the secondary literature on Deleuze’s evental philosophy. The multiple readings of Deleuze’s event can certainly be mapped in different ways, for example with regard to the central source of philosophical inspiration they attribute Deleuze’s event to—Leibniz, Heidegger, Nietzsche or, indeed, Whitehead. The ordering scheme which I apply and flesh
out in the following groups and divides the Deleuzian scholarship with regard to how it makes sense of the event’s unconditioned creativity. Two caveats regarding this approach are made explicit here. Firstly, this focus on the breadth of the field automatically comes at the cost of depth and specificity. As a consequence, the three readings of Deleuze’s event I distinguish below should not be understood as a complete or exhaustive summary of the rich scholarship the former has generated, but are rather ideal-typical representations of the perspectives which dominate the scholarly reception of Deleuze’s event, painted in the broad brushstrokes of prominent Deleuzian thinkers.

Secondly, different theories are grouped together with a focus only on the particular way in which the event’s unconditioned creativity is deciphered. While I many of the theories assembled in one interpretational strand do have affinities that additionally support the ordering scheme developed, these affinities do not take away from their multiple differences and even tensions, which are however bracketed here in favour of drawing out their alignment on the “non-causal cause” behind Deleuze’s event. For the ontological perspective on Deleuze’s event, Smith views the event as the expression of a being which is multiple, problematic and always in excess of any specific form given to it, while James Williams’ event is the product of a creative processual reality and Sean Bowden deciphers the event from the position that singularities occupy in Deleuze’s ontology. However, their theoretical projects not only share the desire to unpack the precise workings of the machinery of Deleuze’s thought, but also the particular source of evental creativity they identify: the multiplicity of being that is made available in the event.

For the genealogical-discursive perspective, François Zourabichvili is interested in reading Deleuze’s work as an activist philosophy that aims to open up an alternative to both analytical philosophy and liberal politics. Paul Patton, on the other hand, instead draws out what Deleuze’s work, read as a political theory, can offer democratic communities. However, they share a reading of Deleuze that, contrary to the thinkers in the first group, avoids any reference to the ontological
level and instead emphasises the political nature of Deleuze’s thought. Against this background, both Zourabichvili and Patton link evental creativity to the epistemic intervention of the political subject.

Finally, while the new materialisms of Claire Colebrook and Brian Massumi lean towards a cybernetic, relational conceptualisation of onto-genesis, Rosi Braidotti embraces a more vitalist ontology in her evental ethics. However, the philosophical projects of all three seek to recover the transformative potential of bodies and matter and, against this background, unpack evental creativity as the consequence of material affect. For all three, it is a materially entangled, posthuman subject that receives and acts on the event. In the following section, I will draw out all three theoretical perspectives on Deleuze’s event. Regardless of their theoretical diversity, it will be argued that they have something in common: all three perspectives conceptualise Deleuze’s event as functioning creatively through a constitutive externality that operates through, but is located on the outside of, the event.

A first theoretical perspective which can be found in Deleuze scholarship identifies the event as an ontological force of creative becoming. Here, the creative event defies causality because the source of its productive potentiality is nothing other than the virtual multiplicity of being itself. For Smith, one of the central achievements of Deleuze’s philosophy is that it replaces the ontology of foundations and essences that has so far dominated Western philosophy with an ontology of events and differential multiplicity. Following Smith, Deleuze’s events “have full ontological status” but in a manner that is “ungrounded and problematic.” Conceptualised by Deleuze with different theoretical means, including Stoic philosophy in The Logic of Sense and the differential calculus in Difference and Repetition, evental being is situated between expression and expressed, conditions and conditioned. It undoes the analytical logic of cause and effect insofar as it is this creative middle ground that charges the production of both. However, at the same time, this renders evental being the ontological source of creative production.
Smith makes it clear that for him, Deleuze’s evental production of the new should not be understood as a case of ungrounded emergence: whereas the former implies the spontaneous production of a new quality from composite parts, Deleuze’s concept of the new “implies conditions in which novelty or creativity (difference) becomes a fundamental concept at the most basic ontological level.” While not subject to the logic of Platonic foundationalism or Kantian causality, the new here still has a cause insofar as it actualised from an evental being that always pre-exists the former, even though its specific form changes in every process of actualisation. Distinguishing Deleuze’s event from Alain Badiou’s, which reveals the latter’s “taste for the transcendent” insofar as it operates on being from a revelatory outside, Smith suggests that Deleuze avoids such a turn to the transcendent by inscribing evental productivity on the level of ontology. Events are “always are ontological, not subjective”; they exceed the problems they give rise to not in the form of “a mere ‘tear’ or ‘rupture’ in the axiomatic” but through their “objective and determinable ontological positivity.” Deleuze’s event is not derived from an absolute externality, but instead from the immanent “outside” of an ontological potentiality both withdrawn from and in excess of any epistemological or social mechanism of capture.

In The Priority of Events: Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, Sean Bowden produces a close reading of Deleuze’s The Logic of Sense which, I suggest, similarly identifies the event as the ontologically charged, self-iterative motor of creative genesis. Here, the event is the “objective ontological ideality” that sets in motion a process of reciprocal determination that draws sense from the chaotic depth of bodies and materiality and the static series of linguistic signs. Here, events are relational because their specific form depends on their particular expression, and immanent in so far as they have no clearly defined cause external to the surface of sense. However, for Bowden, this does not take away from “Deleuze’s affirmation of the ontological priority of events” over individual substances in the creative process of onto-genesis. Following the course of The Logic of Sense, Bowden retraces evental creativity from the bodily quasi-causes of Stoic philosophy to the iterative
excess of linguistic expression and finally the phantasm expressed on psychic surface zones in Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Here, the phantasm-event is charged by a pre-conscious, pre-linguistic multiplicity which generates the creative event of linguistic expression as the constitutive underside of sense.\textsuperscript{16} Bowden concludes that the process of evental emergence thus unidirectionally moves “from noise to the Voice, from the Voice to speech, and from speech to language or the verb.”\textsuperscript{17} While every particular expression of the event is dependent on pathways of actualisation that involve subjects, their bodies and the series of linguistic signifiers in sense, these do not condition the possibility of creative emergence as such, which is located in a chaotic, pre-conscious sub-sense. In Bowden’s reading, as in Smith’s, the creative event escapes the logic of causality that drives creative production in modern-Western thought, but its creative potentiality nevertheless has a defined ontological cause. Sub-sense can give rise to creative events because it precedes, and remains withdrawn from, the socio-epistemic dynamics of sense-making.

For Williams, every particular event that marks a significant change of direction within the order of actualities is the product of a reality which is in itself fundamentally processual and evental. Like Smith, Williams views evental creativity as the consequence of an ontological multiplicity—but here, it is not a virtual difference in which every event participates but rather a differential multiplicity internal to the event. The event always has “physical and ideal or virtual sides,” rendering it “resistant to causal determinism and to a systematic restriction of possible significations.”\textsuperscript{18} The factual or physical side of the event, for example of a protest during the 2010 Arab Spring, is determined by place, time, participants and social context. But its virtual side, following Williams, is “prior to location in space-time” and thus opens up new cause-effect relations in any given state of affairs.\textsuperscript{19} Williams importantly shows that events, for Deleuze, are not originally meaningful but are rather given meaning in a social context, for example “a rise in outrage.”\textsuperscript{20} He thus allows us to catch a glimpse of a Deleuzian event whose quality as such depends on the relations it is enfolded in, which I will
develop further through Whitehead in the following.

However, context relations merely condition the actualisation of evental force but do not bring it into existence in Williams; the reciprocal shaping between evental creativity and context of actualisation remains limited. This is the case because Williams attributes an ontologically primary, originary status to the processual multiplicity of the event vis-à-vis the “settled objective state” of its representations, structures and agents, which are “always an illusory cover over” the former.\textsuperscript{21} When “a state is undergoing events,” the event is “an intensive transformer running through lives,” which are the active actualisers of evental force, but nevertheless always its secondary recipients.\textsuperscript{22} While Williams relates the evental production of novelty closely to the relational quality of the event, ultimately it is the ontological configuration of the event itself, more specifically its virtual side, that renders the event creative. Again, evental creativity is displaced away from the event itself to an ontological multiplicity which operates in and through the event, but remains withdrawn from any further investigation or action.

In direct opposition to anchoring Deleuze’s philosophy of the event in the depth of ontology, Zourabichvili and Patton develop a second, \textit{genealogical-discursive} reading of the event, which operates in and on structures of expression. Here, the event is identified as a theoretical tool which can recover the underlying differential multiplicity from structurally fixed representations to open up discursive space for the counter-actualisation of different expressions. In the introduction to his \textit{Deleuze: Philosophy of the Event}, Zourabichvili rejects an ontological interpretation of Deleuze’s philosophy and instead argues that Deleuze’s approach is genealogical: “there is no ontology of Deleuze. [...] It is not the univocity of being in itself that interests Deleuze, ... it is the moment of history where the thesis of univocity arises.”\textsuperscript{23} For Zourabichvili, Deleuze’s event is the hinge of a philosophy where creativity lies at the intersection of the multiple interpretations which link a linguistic system to the becoming of the world. Here, the event “is that of the world which allows itself to be enveloped in language.”\textsuperscript{24} It holds in motion a
particular epistemic system but is never bound to and exhausted by it, and can thus also function as the operator of change. Zourabichvili uses the event as a hook to develop Deleuzian philosophy as a methodology to recover conceptual creativity from the notions of causality, teleology and the dogmatic dualism of true/false.

As “the complex theme of the proposition,” the event reveals the problematic difference underlying every propositional expression. Evental singularities burst forth from every instance of sense-expression, which the method of dramatization can utilise to reveal an otherwise to the way in which evental series are actualised as socio-political forms. What is ultimately at stake in evental becoming is a becoming-different that philosophy must counter-effectuated once the iterative potentiality of the event has dissolved structures of representation.

While evental creativity emerges at the intersection between language and the becoming of the world, Zourabichvili displaces this evental creativity to the realm of subjective thought, where the event’s epistemic potentiality becomes actual and actionable. Here, the essential creativity of thought is the “internal outside” which momentarily escapes socio-epistemic conditioning and thus can set change in motion. In Zourabichvili, the evental encounter that forces us to think is “the encounter with a sign.”

Forces are not exterior to thought; they are its outside. Thinking consists in the emergence of sense as force: classical thought is affected by the infinite [...] Infinity ceases to be a simple signification in order to become the very event of thought, that which haunts it and inspires it, that which it encounters and with which it continually clashes. The field of forces is nothing other than the field in which sense is produced - a transcendental field.

The task of the thinking philosopher subject is to identify and act on “the authentic event [...] The philosopher must become a clinician.” In Zourabichvili,
there is at the end nothing puzzling about Deleuze’s event—it presents itself as an opportunity in thought and must be seized by the subject, rendering Deleuze’s evental philosophy ultimately an iteration of the modern project of emancipation grounded in individual reason.

Patton conceptualises Deleuzian events in close theoretical proximity to Zourabichvili as operating through a purely epistemic creativity. For Patton, Deleuze’s events are “ideal forms abstracted from the specific features of any one occasion, or even as open-ended and indeterminate idealities characterized by their ‘iterability’ in Derrida’s sense of the term.” The event is here a moment of excess which deterritorialises socio-epistemic apparatuses. For Patton, the idea of the philosophical concept developed by Deleuze and Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* illustrates this functioning of the event most clearly. Concepts are “pure events of deterritorialisation, becoming, incorporeal transformation, capture, metamorphosis.” Like Zourabichvili’s, Patton’s retracing of evental creativity to a potentiality which operates in epistemic relations also attributes a decisive role to the subject—and especially to the philosopher. Philosophy is a practice of creating “untimely concepts” which extracts not “just any event from things but ‘new’ events, meaning events which are forever new, like justice, unconditional forgiveness, absolute hospitality or democracy to come.” Patton places evental novelty in quotation marks here because, different from the ontological reading, he sees nothing genuinely new in the event that happens, which is always-already caught up in language systems and the power relations they are productively intertwined with. Drawing something new from the socio-epistemically conditioned event is here the task of the philosopher as the external force that renders the event creative by resisting its common sense interpretations and counter-effectuating the event. This subjective counter-actualisation is the source of actually creative events.

The third, *new materialist-affective* perspective on Deleuze’s event accepts and begins with its relational situatedness. Massumi employs Gilbert Simondon’s relational understanding of onto-genesis to show how Deleuze’s event forms
against the background of a contrasting field of emergence spanned between specific socio-political conditions and an individuated actuality. Every individual is here produced through a trajectory of difference/citation that is conditioned by the former field of individuation. Massumi’s aesthetic event, which can be a particular sequence of images on a television screen or an artwork, emerges under the same determined conditions of individuation. However, Massumi employs Deleuze’s materialist reading of bodily potentiality in Spinoza to argue that the relationally emergent event can generate a spontaneous response within the neuronal relations of the affected subject’s body. The affective event can rupture and change relations of thought, economic production or political power because it is autonomous from the relations of capture that make up its social context. As Massumi puts it, the “autonomy of affect is its participation in the virtual. Its autonomy is its openness. Affect is autonomous to the degree to which it escapes confinement in the particular body whose vitality, or potential for interaction, it is.” In Massumi, evental creativity is secondary to a pre-conscious, extra-rational bodily force that the affective encounter opens up.

Like Massumi, Colebrook understands Deleuze’s event as an affective break with social relations. Following an immediate encounter with the material world that forces us to think, the affective event unfolds from the relational interaction of singularities as a force that transcends its relational terms of origin and can thus escape state overcoding or the flows of capitalist axiomatisation. Colebrook uses the example of a group of churchgoers to show how the event arises from material entanglements between humans and nonhumans—spaces, sounds, smells—that produce an intense affective experience.

Imagine a group of Catholic churchgoers on Good Friday gathered around a procession of the crucifix. The crown of thorns, the wood of the cross, the suffering body, the subdued lighting and the recording of Bach’s cantata in the background unite the group through direct affect. We feel the pain, the suffering, the mourning, the melancholy and the elevation.
This is a political event [...] The politics lie in the relation between image and perceivers, the desiring investment in affect. The event produces a group through an organisation and coding of intensities. As Colebrook’s example shows, the socio-political effect of the affective encounter is not necessarily revolutionary, but the affective intensity experienced collectively in the event underlies every political revolution. Affective are actualised through the bodies of subjects, but these subjects are produced through rather than pre-existing the becoming of the event. The subject is “the self-occurring form of the event.” While subjective action is necessary to make use of evental creativity and produce change, this action is only secondary to the pre-conscious event of bodily-emotive affect in which creative force resides. For Colebrook, the feminist potential of Deleuze’s evental philosophy lies precisely in the fact that evental creativity via the affective encounter decomposes the subject of judgement and removes political agency from the (male) acting individual. However, this undoing of subjective agency here comes at the cost of displacing evental creativity to an ontologically primary, essentially creative force of matter and its interrelations, which the acting subject can merely channel.

Colebrook uses the example of light producing a spectrum of colours to illustrate the intense “power to differ,” which she attributes to matter, and which might then enter “into relation with the eye, thereby producing a visibility that can create new terms and new relations. Any space or plane, then, is the unfolding of matter, with relations being effected by specific expressions, which are events of specific powers to relate.” Colebrook is explicit that, in her reading, Deleuze’s evental creativity amounts to “an affirmation of the affective or material over the formal.” Braidotti, on the contrary, attempts a tentative reconciliation of Deleuze’s evental theory with the idea of the subject as the actor of a rupturing (counter-)actualisation. “The free subject, the ethical subject” is here “the one with the ability to grasp the freedom to depersonalise the event and transform its negative charge.” Emergent as conditioned by given socio-political relations, the
event must be seized and counter-effectuated by the subject who thereby proves herself worthy of the event.43 For Braidotti, an evental politics must extract positive productivity from the happenings historically embedded in networks of ressentiment, modulating local, affective becoming into a collective flow which can bring about a different state of socio-political relations. At the same time, Braidotti also dethrones the human subject as the sole or even primary agent of evental change. In The Posthuman, Braidotti makes it clear that her acting subject is a cyborg.44 They are only capable of acting differently because they can access and channel a force located in the assemblage of composed of multiple humans, animals and objects in which “the vital energy that is bios/zoe gets expressed in all its ruthless splendour.”45 Braidotti’s creative event is not produced by the reason or will of a human subject but rather originates in the affective creativity of post-human relations. “At the beginning, there is always already a relation to an affective, interactive entity endowed with intelligent flesh and an embodied mind: ontological relationality.”46

EVENTAL CREATIVITY: FROM EXTERNAL SOURCE TO IMMANENT EMERGENCE

The three interpretive strands that dominate the secondary literature on Deleuze’s event resolve the puzzle of its non-causal creativity in three distinct ways. However, they also have something in common. All three readings make sense of the sui generis creativity of Deleuze’s event by retracing it to a source opened up in, but external to, the event itself. Attempting to understand evental creativity via its source, all three approaches, I argue, ultimately displace it to an externality which is thereby reified as the event’s essentially creative cause. Beginning with what I have identified as the ontological perspective, virtual difference is here what renders the event creative. The evental driving force of virtual difference is framed and located in different ways within individual theories. Smith’s event participates in the virtual multiplicity of being, while Bowden’s event is brought forth by a pre-subjective plane of differential multiplicity and William’s event...
is internally multiple, with one side always remaining virtual and inexhaustible in any creative actualisation. However, in all three, it is not the event itself that functions creative. Rather, the event is only creative because it is derived from or accesses an ontologically situated creative difference which is primary to any particular moment of evental constitution and exceeds the former insofar as it also charges other creative processes, for example the differentiation of ideas or the individuation of subjects.\textsuperscript{47}

At a first glance, the genealogical-discursive reading of Deleuze’s event seems to escape the above formulated charge of displacing evental creativity to a primary source. Here, evental creativity is explicitly not ontologically situated but emerges from the excessive quality of expression, which always transcends states of affairs, specific representations and historical series. However, as the event is here always-already caught up in apparatuses of knowledge and social production, it also has no guaranteed, ontologically grounded creative force. For the event to even have the potential to produce something new, its creativity must be activated—by the resistant subject on the receiving end of the multiple, socio-epistemically enfolded events. In order to access the problematic multiplicity behind an actualised evental ‘problem’, a critical subject, who “does not simply take the actualized event at face value,” must utilise their rational faculties to refuse “the common sense view of events as standing outside and apart from the means of representation.”\textsuperscript{48} This critical subject here becomes the agent of a counter-actualisation which brings forth a novel expression that exceeds existing structures of representation. Once we zoom in on the unfolding of political creativity which is here always coupled to genealogical analysis, it becomes evident that the resistant-creative force of the event ultimately resides in a subject who is able to free herself from the confines of historical and discursive path-dependencies to counter-effectuate the new. Again, it is not the event itself that functions as creative—rather, the event is creative because, and only insofar as, the creative potentiality of thought operates in and through it.\textsuperscript{49}

Overcoming such a subjective-humanist understanding of agency in favour of a
Relational conception of creative genesis is one of the foundational aims of those Deleuzian thinkers who approach the event from a new materialist-affective perspective. On the one hand, evental creativity is here importantly located within the relations spanned between human and non-human actors and social structures and thus understood as immanent to the social context it can rupture. More than in ontological and genealogical-discursive readings, in the new materialist-affective perspective, the event itself—the relations which constitute and situate it and the human and non-human singularities these relations bring to it—carries the explanatory weight of unpacking the conditions for the creative emergence of an epistemic or political otherwise. However, on the other hand, I argue that evental creativity is here still theorised with a focus on its source, which is then retraced to the outside of the event itself. The rupturing quality of affect is derived from the original creativity of matter and its interrelations. The affective encounter channels this creativity, and brings it into contact with, allows for it to be experienced by, the human subject. But the affective encounter is always the secondary product of an originally creative materiality located on the outside of the socio-politically axiomatised epistemological realm, which allows the event to rupture and redirect the relations of the former. Again, evental creativity is not unpacked as *sui generis*, but rather retraced and thereby deflected to an external source which renders the event creative.

All three interpretational strands of Deleuze’s creative event unravel its puzzling creativity by locating it in a source on the outside of the event, which thereby becomes the primary cause of evental creativity. But why should this be considered as problematic? At this point, one might interject that the relationship between event and a creative external source might simply be one example for how Deleuze’s thought utilises the theoretical figure of the outside. In both *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, creative intensity, regardless of whether it takes the form of pure difference or nonsensical chaos, is always linked to the notion of excess, to a beyond which escapes capture in established representational systems and therefore can be made use of to rethink and restructure them. The notion
of the outside is most clearly present in Deleuze's book on Foucault, to whom the outside is a vital constituent of change in thought and action because such change necessitates an epistemologically unconfined, smooth space, an outside of thought without image. As Deleuze argues here, “transformation occurs not to the historical, stratified and archaeological composition but to the composing forces, when the latter enter into a relation with other forces which have come from outside.”

Productive relations always retain the potentiality to produce something genuinely new because they remain external to their socio-politically coded terms, because they continuously open up a diagrammatic outside which exceeds all relational confinement. In this sense, Keith Robinson describes Deleuze’s “metaphysics of creativity” as “an experiment with the ‘outside’.” The issue I diagnose here thus does not lie in thinking the evental creation of something new in conjunction with the theoretical figure of the outside. It rather arises from theorising evental creativity in a way that implies a definitive original source from which the former is derived. Deleuze’s event, which aims to subvert any notion of causality and foundation, resists such a pinning down of evental creativity. Any attempt at the former can only displace evental creativity to a source external to the event itself, which however then renders this source the primary cause of evental creativity. Conceptualising the event as charged by a creative externality in this manner is, I suggest, unsatisfactory for Deleuzian philosophy for two reasons.

Firstly, it ambiguates the analytical purchase of the event. All three readings of Deleuze’s creative event aim to resolve the puzzle of its uncaused creativity—but they go too far, and end up dissolving the contribution of the evental moment. For Deleuze, events cannot be deliberately brought forth or encountered; their potential to create something new is closely linked to the spontaneity with which they operate on knowledge- and social relations, breaking with history, truth or experience. But if we add to this that the event further does not produce but only channels a creative force, it is not at all clear what, if anything, the concept of the event actually adds to our understanding of the production of novelty. Displaced
to an external source, the evental creativity that the various Deleuzian theories unpack so richly and productively can in fact be theorised without reference to the event, as the creation of the new ultimately operates via virtual difference, discursive genealogy or material affect. Similarly to what Robinson observes for the notion of process in Deleuze and Guattari, a lack of engagement with how creative force emerges and operates within the event itself risks reducing the event “to a dependent state or condition of something else [... ] in danger of functioning as an abstract (and transcendent) substratum that differences or becomings move along or undergo, identical with its manifestation as difference, becoming and so on.”

Secondly, and certainly unintended by the thinkers discussed above, I suggest that pinning down evental creativity to a definitive source reintroduces a notion of linear causality to Deleuze’s theory of the event. As Deleuze makes clear in *The Logic of Sense*, the event does not have a clearly defined, primary cause. Events have material causes and ideational and relational quasi-causes that always interact to produce an event. That the “cause” of evental creativity is thus nothing but the relational multiplicity unfolded by different causes in the moment of the event.

The above discussed readings of evental creativity in Deleuze however bind the event to a definitive cause, bracketing rather than engaging the radical potential of an evental creativity that is genuinely without clearly delineated source. The ontological becoming of difference, resistant subjectivity or bodily affectivity here function as the event’s primary causes, endowed with a creative essence that is theoretically black-boxed because it is presumed rather than unpacked and qualified within the respective theories of evental creativity. François Laruelle, in his aligned observations on continental philosophies of the event, terms this external cause the “Other-as-One” of evental philosophy that “indexes an ontological ground with which [the event] remains complicit even as it detaches itself from it.”

In either reading, the primary source of evental creativity is precisely not a Deleuzian (or Foucauldian) outside because it retains a particular, philosophically
representable—even if not accessible—form. It is for exactly this reason that Deleuze emphasises the necessity to “distinguish between exteriority and the outside.” The externality of evental creativity, which operates on socio-epistemic relations from an ontological or rational-subjective outside, rather pushes Deleuze closer to the revelatory-messianic undertone of Badiou's event, which, I suggest, is ultimately foreign to Deleuze's philosophy. I suggest that the unintended consequence of ambiguating the creativity immanent to the evental moment can be mitigated if Deleuze's creative event is not unpacked with a view to the source of evental creativity, but instead as an instance of creative emergence. The event’s creativity, in this reading, is not determined by an originary impulse, but instead by the relational effects this impulse establishes. The event can here always bring forth an otherwise, albeit that the outcome of the creative process is uncertain and depends on the specific relational situatedness of the event. In the following, I will develop such an understanding of evental creativity as immanent emergence by, borrowing from Isabelle Stengers, thinking Deleuze’s evental creativity with Whitehead.

RELATIONAL IMMANENCE AND EMERGENT CREATIVITY IN WHITEHEAD AND DELEUZE

Recalling the starting point of this investigation into Deleuze’s evental creativity, Deleuze, in The Logic of Sense, defines the creative event as that which generates both the condition and the conditioned, disrupting any conventional understanding of causality. At the same time, this should not be taken to mean that the event, as in Badiou, appears ex nihilo. Deleuze’s evental creativity disrupts causality not because it has none, but because it has too many causes: Evental creativity “is subject to a double causality, referring on one hand to mixtures of bodies which are its cause and, on the other, to other events which are its quasi-cause.” Events are, in part, caused by the multiplicity of other events. This assertion can certainly be read in support of the idea that a creative externality is at work in Deleuze’s theory of the event—especially in line with the ontological and material-affective reading where the former is an ontological force primary to actual social relations.
and their “mixtures of bodies.” In the following, I will develop a different reading of the “non-causal causation” of evental creativity in Deleuze—one that is opened up by the philosophy of Whitehead. The following discussion, rather than unpacking Whitehead’s conceptualisation of the event in its nuances and shifts in full, engages with Whitehead where and because his philosophy resonates with Deleuze’s thought on the event.

In *The Fold*, his book on Leibniz, Deleuze paraphrases Whitehead to offer yet another puzzling conceptualisation of the event; at first glance, it has little to do with the moment of creative rupture that Deleuze’s event is usually associated with. As Deleuze writes here, the “Great Pyramid is an event, and its duration for the period of one hour, thirty minutes, five minutes.” I suggest that Deleuze’s reference to the eventalness of perceived and experienced duration offers a different perspective on the creative event: the event is here an emergent moment of relational ordering that can produce anything between the experience of radical rupture and the complete continuity of the world that we perceive. The event is here determined by its creative effect; emergent from the relational complexity at the intersection of matter, sensations and ideas, the event’s creativity is without a clearly identifiable source.

Whitehead’s philosophy has recently received much interest from theorists who draw a non-essentialist vitalism focused on the relational becoming rather than an essential force of life from his thought. Yet, Whitehead himself insists that his philosophy is concerned with and seeks to explain a reality consistent of the “abstractions” of forms and concepts. He situates his thought in opposition to “[t]he evil produced by the Aristotelian ‘primary substance’,” the philosophical belief that ideas can be unambiguously deduced from a material actuality which therefore must be the focal point of philosophical investigation. This apparent discrepancy can be resolved if we look closer at how Whitehead actually conceptualises both materiality and the realm of abstractions that give form to the latter. Whitehead’s speculative empiricism avoids attributing constitutive primacy to either realm and instead locates creativity in the relations between both. In *The Concept of
Nature, Whitehead describes materiality in explicit reference to Henri Bergson’s élan vital as a fundamentally processual passage of nature. The passage of nature is a constantly flowing, creative potentiality that emits the evental singularities that the material world is composed of.\textsuperscript{64}

Whitehead’s passage of nature is not an original force of matter or substance of nature. On the contrary, it is located in an intermediary realm between an ontic materiality and the epistemic abstractions which allow us to perceive, understand and conceptualise the singularities it emits. The passage of nature is “[o]ur knowledge of nature [which] is an experience of activity (or passage),”\textsuperscript{65} not independent from but always interrelated with the subject perceiving it. Since we have no means to perceive nature as it is, we are only aware of it in so far as it is moving, productive, expressive. It is our perception of nature which takes the form of a passage or force of becoming because it can only be experienced in the events it creates. In The Concept of Nature, Whitehead terms these creative effects, which constitute “the ultimate substance of nature,”\textsuperscript{66} actual occasions. The experience of passage, where actual occasions come into existence, is “a concrete slab of nature limited by simultaneity which is an essential factor disclosed in sense-awareness.”\textsuperscript{67} Nature, as we perceive it, emerges from a multiplicity of particular experience-events that, taken together, produce a sense of spatio-temporal passage.

While The Concept of Nature focuses on the evental occasion that produces our experience of nature as its creative effect, it is the event of Process and Reality that, I suggest, resonates with Deleuze’s evental creativity. Here, the creativity of the relationship between perception, thought and the singularities emitted by matter enveloped by the former, which The Concept of Nature has already highlighted, is placed centre stage. The creative event is not an individual occasion, but the nexus of actual occasions from which any new occasion experienced emerges. Whitehead’s evental nexus is composed of previously produced and experienced occasions, and thus spans and interrelates both physical sensations and conceptual abstractions. While the materiality we perceive as passage, and the singularities
it emits, constitute one end of the nexus relations, their other end is formed by conceptual abstractions. As Whitehead’s version of Platonic forms, abstractions have an immobile, unchanging core—they give conceptual form to eternal objects. Like their material counterpart, the passage of nature, eternal objects are potentialities for the process of creative becoming. However, their character is radically different from Plato’s forms in the context of Whitehead’s theory; eternal objects are not unchangeable and independent from the materiality they represent but rather always enfolded with it. The eternal object expressed in abstractions is not primary but radically relative to its relational connectivity to the realm of matter. It is located in the evental nexus where it “provides definiteness to the experience of becoming.”

Eternal objects “work regulatively, or problematically” insofar as their excessive potentiality always outlives any specific actualisation or “solution” drawn from them. In this sense, the eternal object binds materiality to a certain idea, but at the same time functions as a reminder that the link between matter and ideational abstraction could be established differently to produce a different actuality. In the words of Whitehead, eternal objects “involve their own nature’s indecision.” They contain a creative potential but never “in themselves disclose in what actual entities this potentiality of ingressation is realized.” Only if an eternal object exists in the nexus of actual occasions, has become entangled with sensation and experience to give form to something perceived, does it produce a creative effect. But on the other hand, the genesis of the world as we can know it in actual occasions also requires employing the epistemic resources of eternal objects in order to give meaning to perceptions—“objectification is abstraction.”

Whitehead’s nexus is populated by a multiplicity of previously produced actual occasions, each interlinking perceived matter, and the eternal object’s ideational potentiality, in a particular way. It is evental insofar as every actual occasion is created from its relations. But this evental creation must be understood as emergence from relational complexity because it cannot be retraced to a particular source or driving force. Neither matter, its experience or abstract ideas
have a privileged role in creating the world from the nexus of actual occasions. While material singularities, and their perception by the subject, are necessary in order to create something new, the eternal object’s ideational abstractions are equally necessary for material experience to become conceivable, and thus to attain actuality. The evental nexus does not pre-exist either the passage of nature or the abstractions which form eternal objects in any absolute sense, but only temporally—it is composed of nothing but already actualised occasions. It can function creatively only insofar as it is conditioned by previous processes of abstracting creation which always already involve intertwined matter and thought.

The understanding of evental creativity that can be drawn from Whitehead’s *Process and Reality* has no stable foundation. The event emerges in the moment when a new singularity is connected to the nexus of past occasions, and from the relational complexity of connective possibilities opened up here. Whitehead’s nexus offers a way to make sense of the fact that Deleuze, on the one hand, asserts the non-causal nature of the event and, on the other hand, refers to its multiple causes. In Whitehead, the event has no primary cause, but at the same time multiple causes—the multiplicity of relations between matter, experiences and ideas that make up the world as previously made sense of. The idea of creativity as emergent effect that comes to the fore in Whitehead’s evental nexus, I suggest, mirrors Whitehead’s understanding of divine creativity. While there are different interpretations of the way Whitehead conceptualises the primordial nature of God, this paper aligns itself with a reading that views Whitehead’s divine creativity not as a primary creative impulse to which all existence can be traced back, but rather as surfacing in the effects of creation. In *Process and Reality*, Whitehead develops a “conception of God, according to which he is considered as the outcome of creativity ... and as the goad toward novelty.” Creativity does not lie in the source, but rather in the effect of evental genesis.

Every particular actuality is the product of how a new experience is linked to already existent actual occasions in the nexus. Here, a material singularity becomes “a throb of experience including the actual world in its scope.” When we perceive
the colour red, it is not because we directly receive the evental expression emitted from matter. We can only receive it as it comes into being—becomes a particular actual occasion with a particular ordering position in the nexus. For Whitehead, being “is located neither in the object itself nor in the subject that perceives it [...] The key to Whitehead’s concept of becoming is that each becoming occurs in a specific environment and in a specific fashion. That which both enables becoming and differentiates this becoming from any other is the way in which the becoming unfolds.”

In Whitehead, there is no conflict between conditionedness by the abstracting relations of sense and the creation of novelty. Rather, conditionedness by relationally immanent forms of sense, formed with the help of abstractions that reflect a particular image of thought, and a particular socio-political context, is the background against which a creativity, which always happens as a synthetic interaction between perceptive affect and epistemological structures, becomes possible in the first place. While a material singularity is necessary to constitute something it only becomes perceivable, expressive and therefore productive when it is enfolded by the relations of the nexus in a particular way. The duration of the nexus of actual occasions is the evental background from which both continuity and change are produced as particular ways in which a new experience is relationally ordered in the nexus. The event of the Great Pyramid can be one of unchanged continuity if we view it as a historical monument vis-a-vis the multiplicity of changes Egyptian societies have undergone since its erection—but it can also be one of change if, visiting the Pyramid for the second time, we notice that a few of its stones have disappeared.

I argue that Deleuze’s event can, with Whitehead, be understood as emergent from a relational multiplicity which does not pre-exist that what it creates in any absolute sense. The concept of sense here plays the equivalent role to Whitehead’s evental nexus of actual occasions. As Deleuze stresses in different parts of The Logic of Sense, the event is always a “sense-event.” While Bowden, who also unpacks evental creativity in Deleuze through the concept of sense,
views the sense-event as charged by a pre-representational subsense.\textsuperscript{83} I suggest that the former functions analogously to the relationally immanent, emergent creativity of Whitehead’s nexus. Deleuze’s sense-event is without primary cause. As “the fourth dimension of the proposition [...] an incorporeal, complex, and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition,”\textsuperscript{84} the creativity of the sense-event is neither derived from the materiality of the object it makes sense of, from the ideas of the sense-making subject nor from a fixed, logical relation between signifier and signified. As in Whitehead, something on the level of materiality has to happen in order for something new to be created—but this material singularity is not the driving force, or on its own sufficient cause of, evental creativity.

Something new is created only when this singularity is brought into contact with a series of already-produced sense-events where multiple “singularities [...] communicate in one and the same Event.”\textsuperscript{85} As in Whitehead, the actually creative moment from which something new emerges is when a singularity connects to the order of already produced sense. This “Event,” “pure event” or “Eventum tantum”\textsuperscript{86} causes something new to emerge, but only as “quasi-cause” because what functions creative here is not a particular ontological or subjective force, but rather the relational complexity spanned between subjective rationality, expressive proposition and expressed object. Because sense is always-already present as the condition for the emergence of creative events and always expressed in every new instance of evental creation, it is without outside. As Deleuze puts it, bodies and their mixtures produce sense “not by virtue of an individuation which would presuppose it. Individuation in bodies, the measure in their mixtures, the play of persons and concepts in their variations—this entire order presupposes sense and the pre-individual and impersonal neutral field within which it unfolds.”\textsuperscript{87}

CONCLUSION

This paper has drawn on Whitehead’s philosophy to think Deleuze’s event as a moment of relationally immanent, creative emergence. Whitehead’s nexus of
actual occasions opens up a theory of evental creativity that is located in the
creative middle ground spanning between the perceivable materiality of the
passage of nature and the abstractions which express eternal objects in thought
and language. A material singularity can only unfold creative force if and when it
is enfolded in the nexus relations of previously produced occasions which thus
condition all evental emergence. It was argued that the same, immanently creative
event which consists of a material-bodily singularity and an always-already
synthesised set of sense-relations enfolding the former can be found in Deleuze.
Deleuze’s event is a sense-event that escapes the need for constitutive grounding
in an external source that drives evental genesis, and is thereby reified as the
origin of all ideational and social change. Emergent from a relational complexity
which contains matter, language and their interrelations, the sense-event has a
multiplicity of causes, but does not directly follow from an identifiable external
impulse. Its creative effects are determined by the state of the nexus relations
through which it comes into being.

Conceptualising Deleuze’s event via Whitehead as emergent creativity does not,
I suggest, remove any link and relevance to resistant action aimed at manifest
change, even if such political change does not (at least explicitly not) feature in
Whitehead’s philosophy. The decisive moment for change is the point at which
a new evental singularity is enfolded by the nexus relations and linked to the
abstractions it contains and conditions—to lines of meaning, orders of knowledge
and structures of power. This is the moment of the “decision” over which particular
actuality is produced through the connection between singularity and nexus. In
the opening pages of Process and Reality,88 which outline the book’s philosophical
project, Whitehead repeatedly speaks of the need for an “imaginative leap”
or “leap of the imagination”89 which would allow philosophy to understand
phenomena beyond the limits of existing trajectories of meaning. It seems that
Whitehead shares with Deleuze a distinct dislike, and mistrust, of common sense.
Whitehead uses a negative turn of phrase to describe this imaginative leap in the
event as negation. A leap of imagination requires the thinker to negate rather than
accept the connective opportunities most obvious, most readily available in the sphere of abstractions. It is not the simple actualisation of a pre-given evental potentiality that is just waiting to unfold its rupturing force but rather implies an imaginative-conceptual move against the grain to draw something genuinely different from the event.

Deleuze actually develops a very similar account of the revolutionary event in *The Logic of Sense*. Here, too, we encounter a creative event whose potentiality, which is the creative potentiality of sense, is in theory open-ended. In practice, however, upon entering the conditioned nexus of the sense-event, with its links to existing structures of meaning, production and power, any singularity is always “in danger of being snapped up by its cause”—in danger of simply renewing existing lines of sense rather than making use of the creative potentiality it offers. In order to actually instigate a change of tracks in the way world and self are produced in sense and actualise something new, the event must be counter-effectuated. Reading Deleuze’s event with Whitehead thus leaves room for resistant agency in the form of negation or counter-effectuation. Different from the genealogical-discursive perspective on the event, resistant agency is not what brings forth the creative event here, rendering its conditions and effects radically insecure. Whether an evental moment offers opportunities for resistant thought or action to actually produce change is determined by the event’s relational position, and can only be judged after the fact, by its creative effects. In Whitehead’s words, the production of novelty has no conscious elements, but is always “free, complete, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious.” However, under the right conditions of relational emergence, and with the right action to seize it, Whitehead’s event, as Isabelle Stengers puts it, provides a “resource for telling our stories in another way” and places us in a position “in a way that situates us otherwise—not [...] defined by the past, but [...] able, perhaps, to inherit from it in another way.”
HANNAH RICHTER is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Hertfordshire, England. Her work seeks to develop Continental philosophy at innovative intersections, including those with Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, political ecology and Non-Western critique and resistance. She has published in *International Political Sociology*, the *European Journal of Political Theory*, the *European Journal of Social Theory* and *Distinktion*. Her *The Politics of Orientation: Deleuze meets Luhmann* is forthcoming with SUNY Press.
Notes
6. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 437.
12. Ibid., 436.
15. Ibid., 275; see also: Sean Bowden, “Deleuze’s Neo-Leibnizianism, Events and The Logic of Sense’s ‘Static Ontological Genesis’.” *Deleuze Studies* 4:3 (2010, 301–328).
17. Ibid., 243.
19. Ibid., 88.
20. Ibid., 84.
22. Ibid., 113-114.
27 Zourabichvili, *Deleuze: Philosophy of the Event*, 73; see also: ibid., 87.
28. Ibid., 90.
29. Ibid.


38. Elizabeth Grosz’ reading of Deleuze’s event in *The Incorporeal. Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism* is, I suggest, aligned with the new materialist-affective reading I draw out here, but requires special consideration because the external-material source of the creative event is developed more cautiously and implicitly. Grosz identifies the event as incorporeal. Spanning between material and ideational constituents, it emerges from the subsistence of the material in the ideational and vice versa, “a change of state, a modification, something that adheres to or floats on the surface without penetrating the identity and continuity of the body” (Elizabeth Grosz, *The Incorporeal*. New York/Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2017, 39) to affect the subject once it rises to the level of consciousness. Grosz conceptualises her incorporeal against reductive accounts of materialism which exclude or devaluate the productive capacity of epistemic relations. However, I suggest that she ultimately retraces evental creativity solely to the affective surface of the body which is charged by nothing else than the biological-physical becoming of life itself (Grosz, *The Incorporeal*, 7; 66-67; 206-208).


41. Ibid., 18.


49. Smith, not only but also against the background of Patton’s concept-focused reading of evental creativity and the production of novelty, points to the affinities between his reading of Deleuze and the liberal theoretical tradition (*Essays on Deleuze*, 344-348).


55. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 7-8; 86-95.
57. Deleuze, Foucault, 86.
59. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 94.
64. Robinson, “Back to life.”
67. Whitehead, ibid., 53.
70. Shaviro, “Transcendental Empiricism” 87.
72. Ibid.
73. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 110.
77. Whitehead, Process and Reality, 5.
78. In this sense, I agree with Tim Clark’s observation that “a [Whiteheadian] process metaphysics could indeed dispense with Whitehead’s God” even if Whitehead himself does not do so (“A Whiteheadian Chaosmos: Process Philosophy from a Deleuzean Perspective”, Process Studies 28:3-4 (1999, 192)). However, different from Clark, this paper suggests that that Deleuze’s philosophy also does not operate through a primordial creative potentiality but instead in the same logic of creative emergence.
80. Ibid., 190.
82. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 22; 31; 167.
84. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, 19.
85. Ibid., 50; 207.
86. Ibid., 19; 63.
89. Ibid., 4; 13.
90. Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, 95.