This article revolves around the question of crisis in terms of Jacques Rancière’s idiosyncratic conception of politics, namely the politics of disagreement. Despite Rancière's thoroughly constructed set of concepts for politics, the question of crisis remains almost untouched. There are a few remarks where he critically articulates the political deployment of the term crisis, but those remarks fail to provide a thorough picture of the political problematization of the term. However, my endeavor in this article is not to employ a banal assessment of Rancière’s treatise on politics by indicating how the concept of crisis is overlooked. Nor is it to engage in a precipitant critique to integrate the term crisis into the political
framework of Rancière. Instead, the foremost aim is to demonstrate that a certain theme of crisis is already and latently at work at the heart of Rancière’s peculiar understanding of politics. To put it another way, what is primarily at stake in this article is the revealment of crisis as a core question characterizing Rancière’s politics of disagreement by dint of the fundamental drama between the police and politics. In this vein, by formulating a line of inquiry starting from where Rancière vaguely mentions the concept of crisis and extending to the very dynamics of the politics of disagreement, I firstly propose to construe Rancière’s critique towards the deployment of the term crisis as a standpoint fundamentally rooted in his critique of consensus-driven politics, namely the police. Secondly, I attempt to develop a novel approach of crisis in a manner different from Rancière’s critical articulation yet still conforming with his dissensus-oriented politics. Accordingly, the fundamental strategy I pursue is to treat Rancière’s set of concepts as a toolbox in order to come at the question of crisis in relation to politics from an as yet unscrutinized perspective.

In the interview published in 2009 in the French weekly *Siné Hebdo*, the interviewer asks Rancière his thoughts concerning the crisis in Guadeloupe at that time. However, Rancière provides a response in a way not limited to the crisis in Guadeloupe; his words rather glimpse at a certain political problematization of the term crisis:

> I notice that the very term “crisis” remains a medical metaphor—as if only medicine dispensed by experts has any chance of being effective. Forms of industrial and financial crisis certainly do exist, but crisis as a global political situation does not. Crisis is a vision imposed by governments to maintain the control over the possible.¹¹

In this minor passage, there are two salient points whereby Rancière articulates the concept of crisis in a negative manner. Rancière, on the one hand, problematizes the political use of crisis in the medical sense as it connotes the necessity of expertise for healing or resolution; on the other, he describes crisis as an inflicted
perception by governments to secure the continuous control over the possible field of action. Why does Rancière refer to the medical signification of crisis and articulate it in a tacitly negative way? What kind of connection between the medico-metaphorical use of crisis and politics is then in question?

To provide preliminary insight as to why Rancière negatively takes on the medical use of crisis in politics, it would not be inconvenient to draw attention to a certain drama between the medical practitioner and the patient, namely the expert and the non-expert: a drama that lies in the apparent fact that the patient is utterly impuissant before the medical practitioner in the course of crisis. Obviously, what Rancière problematizes is not the actual drama between these two, but the crude application of which into critical matters concerning a community as though communal decisions cannot be taken, especially in times of crisis, without the expertise of those who are supposedly authority in these matters. In other words, there exists a perception that political crises must or should be intervened by expert practitioners as in medicine. However, such perception for Rancière could only be an ill-advised metaphor that is fundamentally formulated not only to rescue and preserve the exclusive position of political practitioners but also to keep those who must receive dreadful outcomes of crises unable to take effective action.

Indeed, Rancière’s whole project strives for reversing any sort of politico-intellectual orthodoxy which systematically yields an asymmetrical partaking mode in communal matters by the division between those who are entitled to decide and who are not. In contradistinction to such division, Rancière’s endeavor is to reinvigorate the question of equality; he contends for the radical reception of equality between any and every speaking being to be partaking in communal decision-making processes. To that end, Rancière invokes political philosophy not to justify the rationality of political practitioners configuring the possible field of action in communal matters, but, by dint of the radical equality of speaking beings, to disagree with the very foundations of that rationality so that there could be made room for those who are not titled but, in effect, competent to take
part in such decisive processes. I will discuss Rancière’s vehement insistence upon the equality of speaking beings in a more elaborate manner but, prior to that, I intend to delve deeper into Rancière’s critique of political philosophy to be able to present a more reliable discussion on the theme of crisis.

At the level of the medical metaphor, the negativity of crisis rendered by Rancière implicates that the deployment of such metaphor in politics attempts to safeguard the status of those who allegedly possess the authority to intervene in the event of crisis in the name of a whole community; however, it remains limited in explicating a motive that impels him to construe crisis as a “vision imposed by governments to maintain the control over the possible”. What kind of negativity concerning the term crisis is then at stake here? What sort of political vision is implied when it is used medico-metaphorically? What kind of governmental logic is at stake behind such imposition? Ultimately, what is precisely meant by remaining in control over the possible in virtue of the medico-metaphorical infliction of crisis? Accordingly, what I propose is a line of inquiry urged by these questions.

Rancière’s philosophical enterprise comprises a multifaceted treatment of the question of politics whereby he painstakingly backtracks the foundational source of politics by tackling the lexicon of politics in the modality of anew. It is a peculiar mode in which certain concepts we are already conversant with are radically challenged such as dissensus, consensus, police and so on, but also new concepts are invented such as, most notably, the partition of the sensible. The unfolding of the negativity of crisis, for this reason, necessitates a certain engagement with the idiosyncratic manner of Rancière.

For Rancière, the foundational source of politics consists of a set of treatments proposed against a certain problem of beginning, an introduction of a system or organization for human bodies. There is correspondingly a particular concentration on the preliminary stage of politics characterized by these following questions: On what basis can an organization for the common good of human bodies be established? Or, depending on what principle can such order be better off?
What is most particularly demanded in line with these questions is nothing but an originary principle for the well-being of humans within order; yet, what Rancière identifies concerning the inauguration of order is thought-provoking. He points out a striking paradox worded as follows:

The foundation of politics is not in fact more a matter of convention than of nature: it is the lack of foundation, the sheer contingency of any social order. Politics exists simply because no social order is based on nature, no divine law regulates human society.⁴

What Rancière pinpoints here is that the very foundation of politics is actually the non-existence of any foundation to put human bodies in order; it is the absence of any originary principle for such regulation. This paradoxical formulation, however, does not refer to a lack of inspiration; that is, it is not an unsurpassable paradox because politics exists. To be more precise, whereas the lack of any foundation refers to the impossibility of any proper model for the ordering of bodies, the lack of any foundation as the foundation signifies the possibility of any model on the contingency of humans. Politics exists because the very lack of any proper beginning presents itself as the possibility of beginning that never lacks and, by extension, there is infinitely many ways to inaugurate order. The foundation of politics is thus none other than the fact that the possibility of order is contingent upon the impossibility of any proper principle for it.

The problem of beginning intrinsic to politics is then fundamentally and prospectively associated with a speculative activity over a coherent organization of human bodies; further, it is a speculation about the establishment of certain commonality in and through the absence of any regulative principle. Rancière, for this reason, describes politics as “a polemical configuration of the common world”.⁵ Indeed, what emerges from the question of beginning is a stage principally polemical, that is, pregnant with various engagements in controversial beliefs or disputes. What is at stake in the question of beginning is the disclosure of a period wherein important decisions must be made concerning the arrangement
of bodies within the commonality designated by the mutual sharing of space and time, which corresponds to a crisis of a certain kind.

Even though Rancière comes at the dynamics of this period from different angles, he never specifies it as a stage of crisis; however, it is my contention that there is a genuine sense of crisis in the problem arising out of the devoid of any proper foundation. This inevitably requires the rethinking of what crisis means as regards the question determined by the commencement of politics. At this point, it would be apt to resort to the etymology of the word crisis. Notwithstanding the variety of conceptions, I prefer to proceed with two influential ones: the medical and the juridical.

From the vantage point of medicine, also known as the Hippocratic-Galenic perspective, crisis, in its Classical Greek form *krisis*, marks a decisive moment in which actions taken for and on behalf of a patient would lead to a better or worse condition in the course of a disease. Law, on the other hand, is a discipline where the word *krisis* has a relatively more extensive sphere of meaning such as discord, decision, judgement, sentence, court of justice, lawsuit, event and so on. Juristically, the term *krisis*, in parallel to medicine, refers to a moment of cutting or deciding to bring resolution to whatever the issue at stake. In both lexicons, there is a common drama strictly tied to a stage in which making a decision or judgement becomes what is most particularly needed for recovery or resolution. In this respect, the Proto-Indo-European root, namely the verb *krei*, provides a more powerful sense to appreciate these different viewpoints evolving out of the word *krisis*. *Krei* means to sieve and thereby to discriminate, distinguish; later in Classical Greek, it corresponds to the verb *krinein* meaning to separate, decide, and judge.

The manner Rancière interprets the term crisis, especially in relation to its medico-metaphorical deployment in politics, evidently deviates from possible interpretations pertaining to the verb *krinein*; however, this does not necessarily mean that Rancière’s political framework is completely irrelevant to the concept
of crisis when it becomes a matter in the sense of *krinein*. What Rancière discordantly approaches is actually the suffocating use of the term crisis in the field of conventional politics. What is at stake in this special use is the set of arguments and practices which consistently produce people who are bereaved of the capacity to decide and judge for their own sake. Crisis, in this way, is employed as a term which is utterly hostile or foreign to its original meaning, to *krinein*. In one of the interviews he gave, Rancière notes that:

To characterize the phenomena of our times we must, first of all, call into question the concept of crisis. One speaks of a crisis of society, a crisis of democracy, and so on. It is a way of blaming the current situation [the critical situation] on the victims. Now, this situation is not the result of a sickness of civilization but of the violence with which the masters of the world direct their offensive against the peoples. The great fault of the citizens continues to be that of always: that of allowing oneself to be dispossessed of one’s power.⁶

As is evident from the passage, there is a critique of the reduced meaning of crisis, surely the reduction of *krinein*, in the domain of consensus-driven conventional politics. What paves the way for such reduction is the thinking of crisis as a mean not just to keep the people out from decision mechanisms concerning the common but also to hold those responsible if any intense difficulty comes into existence in and about the common. This absurd reformulation of the concept of crisis, in Rancière’s framework, is nothing short of a result immanent to the supposed resolution of the problem of beginning, for which Rancière reinterprets the term the *police*.

Here, rather than immediately diving into the dynamics of Rancière’s re-evaluation of the term police, I would like to urge upon the fact that the paradoxical formulation of politics as the devoid of any divine law to launch a community refers to a scene wherein what is called for is nothing but a certain modality of action so as to set a certain inter-relational commonality of human bodies, hopefully for their own
sake. To put it differently, the question described by the lack of foundation sets a critical stage in which a series of decisions and judgements must be made to put an organization in place. For this reason, the very contingency of any order as the primary question of politics is to affirm the exigency of a series of decisions, judgements and separations over possibilities, or impossibilities, to establish order; that is, the question of beginning sets the prime scene of politics as where the very modality of action is predominantly characterized by the verb \textit{krinein}. Then, at the prime of politics, there lies a specific sense of crisis, for which I propose to reserve the term \textit{the prime crisis of politics}. Therefore, what I mean by the prime crisis of politics is entirely bounded by a scene where possibilities for the establishment of order are sought out or invented to be judged and decided afterwards. The prime of politics is, in effect, a scene wherein two modalities of action are intertwined: invention and decision, fabrication and separation, investigation and judgement, speculation and discrimination, and thus \textit{poiesis} and \textit{krisis}.

As a matter of fact, certain classics of ancient Greek verify this intertwined modality of action in terms of \textit{poiein} and \textit{krinein}, or mythopoeic process of deciding, as a way to deal with the question stemming from the absolute contingency of any order. Perhaps, it would be relevant here to evoke the Greek cosmogonical thought concerning the quasi-dialectical relationship between the notions of \textit{khaos} and the \textit{kosmos}, which fundamentally shapes the perception of life of the ancients and eventually paves the way for the effectuation of the idea of city-state, namely the \textit{polis}, as an organized collectivity of human bodies.  
Accordingly, I would like to draw particular attention to the cosmogonical accounts of Hesiod and Plato for the reason they are both in pursuit of order in terms of labor on the basis of cosmogonical speculations.

According to Hesiod, Chaos is a chasm, a pre-cosmic featureless state by way of which the genealogical evolution of the gods and thereby the evolution of the universe becomes possible. What is signified by the word \textit{khaos} is correspondingly a pure gap, a featureless state. On the other hand, the \textit{kosmos} refers to a progression towards the ultimate and perpetual state in which all the gods, including Chaos,
and the whole universe fall under the authority of Zeus and by that means are put in order. The manner Hesiod conceives of the cosmos, nonetheless, is not that of order pertaining to fulfilment of an individual teleology put forth by an artificer, but of order teleologically alluding to unpredictable productions of oppositional forces, which culminates in the hegemony of Zeus. Simply put, the reign of Zeus means order.

However, Plato’s cosmogonical account in the *Timaeus* is a bit more sophisticated. Contrary to Hesiod, Plato amplifies that, before the ordering of the cosmos, there was chaos which corresponds to a non-progressive state, a deadlock; for this reason, no progress could be achieved without imposition of order on the impasse by an intelligent artificer. This is precisely the point where the Demiurge is invited to the cosmogonical stage as a craftsman god whose duty is to lead the primordial turmoil to the well-ordered *kosmos* by deriving inspiration from the eternal model that is prior to even the Demiurge himself. Therefore, unlike Hesiod, the mode in which the *kosmos* transpires for Plato is that of a progressive order strictly tied as well as oriented to a foreseeable, calculable and invariant teleology, which eliminates the possibility of any erratic and coincidental occurring.

Even if these narratives seemingly tackle the cosmogonical problem chiefly revolving around the variance between the *kosmos* and *khaos*, both narratives mark a transitional process from a state of disorder to a state of order and revere the sacredness of order. Both are designed to serve to the internalization and memorization of the sacred lead of the Gods, respectively Zeus and the Demiurge; what is primarily accentuated in these narratives is correspondingly the sacred order of things. Both narratives are nuancing that the sacred and the order of nature are not mutually exclusive: rather, they are one and the same. For this reason, they must be equally applicable to any order that can be constituted by human aggregates. In a sense, the *polis* is the likelihood of the *kosmos*. This is the argument which presumes that the *polis* would be better off insofar as it is assimilated into the order inherent in the *kosmos*. It is precisely the presumption conveyed through the word hierarchy when the social stratum within the *polis* is
arranged to be in harmonious with the sacred order. Hierarchy, as a matter of fact, is a combination of hieros and arkhein, where the former means sacred and the latter means to lead, rule. Thus, hierarchy signifies that a reliable starting point to organize, namely to separate and lead, human bodies is deducible from the order of the kosmos.

Another point worthy of attention common to both accounts is that the question of order is rendered as a matter of justice. Hesiod, in the Theogony, celebrates the triumph of Zeus over the gods and thereby his control over the universe. What is at stake here is the manifestation and dispensation of justice as Zeus manages to subdue violence swaying over life, namely hybris. That is why the primary responsibility one must take on is to reinforce the reign of justice by acting accordingly. To that end, in the Works and Days, Hesiod renders what is proper to justice as commitment to labor, which ultimately intimates the manner in which one should partake in the communal affairs of the polis.

Similarly, in the Timaeus, there is a self-evident reference to the existence of order as a matter of justice since Plato construes the order imposed by the Demiurge as the constitution of acknowledgeable forms of what is essentially beautiful and good, and therefore principally just. However, in the Republic, Plato prominently presents this reference as an argument to institute a just order within the polis. Plato, in a way resembling Hesiod, interprets justice in relation to labor and holds the opinion that justice requires everyone to be occupied with a best fitted role and function in the polis so as not to abstain from violence but, first and foremost, to be subordinated by the highest principle of the kosmos, the good. The Demiurge’s function is correspondingly not only to craft the elements of kosmos and to bring order to it, but also to stimulate humans to imitate the order manifested in the kosmos.

Both Hesiod and Plato, despite the difference in their motives, the one between the question of violence and good, have recourse to justice. They both narrate that justice is achievable on the condition that strict correspondences between
labor and bodies are actualized in line with the order available in the sacred work of the *kosmos*. The very deployment of justice here is linked to a certain promise; it promises a harmony analogous to that of the *kosmos*. This promise evinces the tantalizing aura stemming from the lack of foundation. The argument of justice, in this respect, is presented as the best possible solution towards the radical contingency of any order. The signification of justice is then to be well-ordered and thereby well-founded. It is the overcoming of the primordial turmoil and the affirmation of the *kosmos* as the overarching principle; naturally, the *polis* as well must be subsumed under this principle. The organization of the *polis*, for this reason, is tantamount to an attempt to suppress the initial trauma emanating from the sheer absence of any *arkhē*. In this sense, the disorder of *khaos* and the prime crisis of politics are referential to each other just as the order of the *kosmos* and the *polis* are. What is commanded in this referential structure is that just as Zeus and the Demiurge act in the modality of *poiesis* for the ordering of the *kosmos*, there is a need to think and act in the same modality for the formulation of a parallel narrative through which an ideal order for the *polis* can be sieved and decided among possibilities. Therefore, the central task in the prime scene of politics is to be engaged simultaneously with the acts of *poiein* and *krinein* so as to put an end to disorder.

The prime crisis of politics then corresponds to a particular state of in-between embedded in the stark opposition between the chaos of uncultivated nature and the cosmos of cultivated nature. Both Hesiod and Plato principally confirm this in-between situation by thinking more highly of the *kosmos*; further, the political manifestation of this confirmation is fundamentally linked with the organization of the *polis*. Especially with Plato’s endeavor, the *polis* becomes a question of order wherein the harmony of the *kosmos* must prevail against the abyss of *khaos*.

In this regard, Plato’s cosmogenical account, if there is to be value of it, ought to be regarded as a sort of fabrication which ultimately enables his ethico-political project to underpin the rationale of the ideal *polis*, the *kallipolis*. This leads Rancière to problematize Plato’s ethico-political project by coining the term *archipolitics*:
The good city is one in which the order of the cosmos [...] that rules the movement of the divine stars, manifests itself as the temperament of a social body, in which the citizen acts not according to the law but according to the spirit of the law, the vital breath that gives it life. It is a city in which the citizen is won over by a story rather than restrained by a law, in which the legislator writing the laws is able to tightly work into them the admonitions necessary to citizens as well as ‘his opinion of what is beautiful and what is ugly.’ [...] Archipolitics is the complete achievement of phusis as nomos, community law’s complete and tangible coming into being.\textsuperscript{12}

Archipolitics, as the rationale of the ideal police, hints at the idea that human bodies must constitute entirety within which they are ordered with respect to the law inherent in the kosmos. In this regard, Plato fills in the gap arising out of the lack of arkhē to form a community by ascribing the status of law to the narrative of the kosmos. In this way, the kosmos becomes the law through which individual and collective modes of action in the community, namely the ethos of the community, is determined. In other words, Plato’s attempt is the absolute reduction of communal matters, in fact political matters, into ethical matters that are insistently appointed by the question of conformability to the kosmos narrative.

The merging of the question of conformability and the polis, for Rancière, is tied to a specific logic that “requires everyone to be in their proper place, partaking in their proper affairs”.\textsuperscript{13} It is what Rancière calls the logic of the proper. The logic of the proper alludes to a division between the pre-designation of what is proper and improper via the archaic claim pivoted on the antagonism between the kosmos and khaos, and the transference of this pre-designative schema into practice in the polis. This naturally bears on a split in the meaning of arkhē as that which inaugurates an organization and commands to abide by that. More precisely, the logic of the proper, on the one hand, operates as an originary concept which identifies the dispersal of the proper and improper for the right ordering of bodies; on the other hand, it functions as an imperative concept which calls on bodies to comply
with that pre-proposed order. This double movement intrinsic to archipolitics is ostensibly what disposes of the prime crisis of politics. The former move is what paves the way for the production of identities between the proper and bodies; the latter is what ensures that each and every body acts in accordance with those assigned identities.

Therefore, the term police in Rancière’s political parlance stands for neither a state apparatus aimed at the prevention and investigation of crimes to free public space from disorder, nor an engagement in the institution of disciplinary techniques for the monitoring of society; instead, it is a particular configuration of bodies which, as Rancière puts, “defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task”.14 The police is a system which divides people to affix by name its bodies to best fitting places and functions so that the narrative of the proper, or the ethos of the community, can be effectuated; that is, each and every body in the police, both collectively and individually, is obliged to inhabit the common area in highly determined manners.15 Another articulation of the double gesture of archē is then the division of the community; yet, the police logic still discerns the conduction of bodies as “a totality comprised of groups performing specific functions and occupying determined spaces”.16 The policing is the calculation of bodies as one, despite dividing up.

What the police organization offers is then a particular logic in the form of narrative for the well-ordered and thus well-founded regulation of bodies. Rancière points out that the very operativity of the police is conditional upon those who believe in the logos of the order as well as perceive the actuality thereof:

The logos must be presented as a story. And the story, Plato says, has to be believed. [...] Obviously, Plato does not demand that the workers have the inner conviction that a deity truly mixed iron in their soul and gold in the soul of the rulers. It is enough that they sense it: that is, that they use their arms, their eyes, and their minds as if it were true. And they do so even
more so as this lie about ‘fitting’ actually fits the reality of their condition. The ordering of social ‘occupations’ works out in the mode of this as if which ties it to a ‘belief’.17

What is at stake in this as if modality is a particular mode of belief that which is destined to bring off what is supposed to be believed in its very materiality through multiple projections that incorporate bodies into certain occupations in the fabric of the community. In this vein, the police, as Rancière delicately encapsulates, is “a matrix that defines a set of relations between sense and sense: that is, between a form of sensory experience and an interpretation which makes sense of it”.18 The police, in a sense, is a space wherein the field of sensory experiences are predicated upon the logos of the order. Whereas the former alludes to a system in which the boundaries of sensible experiences of those who are allocated with certain occupations are delineated, the latter is what provides a set of arguments in the narrative form which accounts for why this system is better for the participation of those bodies. Thus, the logos of the order refers to a fiction that comprises, as Rancière notes, “a set of imaginary constructions allowing a system to a function” and the very of outcome of this functioning is a certain spatial and temporal particularization of bodies, for which Rancière inaugurates the term the partition (or the distribution) of the sensible.19

The partition of the sensible primarily refers to the configuration of sensible experiences within the police; in a sense, it is a concept which, first and foremost, draws attention to the aisthēsis of the collective and individual ethos enacted by means of the assignation of bodies into certain places and functions.20 Rancière, precisely for this reason, portrays the police as a decisive process wherein the partition of sensible experiences of those who are properly distributed to particular spatio-temporalities refers to an injection of specific senses between what is visible and invisible, sayable and unsayable, audible and inaudible, doable and undoable within the order; this is ultimately what demarcates the sensible boundaries between what is possible and impossible to be experienced both individually and collectively within the common sensorium constituted by the

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ordering of bodies. In doing so, the police logic ensures that each and every part of the order is well-partitioned and well-placed. What is at stake here is the division of the common place hypothetically consonant with the common good, which in turn permits bodies to take place and role in the nexus of relations. That is why Rancière suggests that the partition of the sensible must be apprehended in the double sense: “on the one hand, as that which separates and excludes; on the other, as that which allows participation”. Therefore, the manner the police logic configures the field of sensible is constantly engaged with procedures of division and inclusion, separation and integration, segregation and aggregation so as to set and hold the modes of perception as well as the range of sensible experience.

Furthermore, the police logic is consistently disposed to execute these inherently spatio-temporal procedures to such an extent that “there can be no time out, no empty space in the fabric of the community”. Rancière, in his seventh thesis on politics, addresses the fully condensed realm of the sensible throughout the police in a more distinctive manner:

The essence of the police lies in a partition of the sensible that is characterized by the absence of void and of supplement: society here is made up of groups tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which these occupations are exercised, and to modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these places. In this matching of functions, places and ways of being, there is no place for any void. It is this exclusion of what ‘is not’ that constitutes the police-principle at the core of statist practices.

The police, from the outset, is capable of ordering its bodies insofar as it is strictly tied to an incessant allergy towards any void or gap within the order. It is the order whose actualization is almost entirely indebted to a certain hostile stance towards what might be inefficacious or improper in the organizational fabric. Then, as Rancière points out, there is a certain principle of saturation at the heart of the police, which renders the partition of the sensible as “a mode [...] that recognizes neither lack nor supplement”. The principle of saturation embedded
in the narrative of the proper is precisely what lays the way in which the common realm of the sensible is partitioned and distributed by dint of inclusionary and exclusionary practices over bodies; what is achieved as well as secured in return is the void-free partition of the sensible and thereby the stability thereof.

Accordingly, Rancière problematizes the police as the impossibility of politics; in other words, the problematique inherent in the archipolitics is the reduction of politics to the police. What is at stake in this reduction is the enforcement of bodies to partake in the sensible order as a natural result of “an immediate identity between the political constitution of the community and the physical and moral [ethical] constitution of a population”.

That is why the police logic, both hypothetically and practically, cannot compromise with the fact that there might be misplaced and misfunctioned parts within the sensible realm it configures. It constantly and incessantly marks the absence of void and the impossibility of supplementation concerning its order; there cannot be any residual and peripheral subject of its right calculation. This is the point where Rancière readjusts the political meaning of consensus in a way which radically differs from either one referring to a peaceful atmosphere for conciliatory discussions or one referring to an activity of raising plausible arguments to eschew any kind of conflict or conflict-based violence:

Consensus means the sharing of a common and non-litigious experience: its essence is the affirmation of the preconditions that determine political choice as objective and univocal. ‘Consensus discourse’ in political thought asserts that political action is circumscribed by a series of large-scale economic, financial, demographic, and geostrategic equivalences. Under this rubric, politics—conceived as the action of governments—consists in the adoption of the constraints of these large equivalences along with an attitude of arbitration directed at the residual and marginal possibilities left behind. [...] The ideal of consensus affirms that what is essential to a life in common depends on objective equilibriums toward which we may all orient ourselves.
The fundamental proclivity of consensual politics is thus towards the construction and maintenance of a specific state of equilibrium within which each and every part of the order deploys its role and function in line with the equivalences between the proper and bodies. The police is an organization which insists upon a consensus over its distribution of places and roles as well as its narrative as what justifies that distribution; it demands agreement on the common sensory experiences of bodies who are objectified and stratified in accordance with a fiction. Consensus is the affirmation of a predesignated *topos* which constitutes the embodiment of the police’s distribution of the sensible; it is the validity of a particular regime of the sensible defined by the assimilation of politics to the point where it is identical to the police.

It is now relatively more convenient to situate the political significance of crisis regarding the perspective of Rancière, which is fundamentally ill-disposed as is articulated to a certain extent before. Indeed, Rancière’s relentless struggle with what he calls archipolitics provides a possibility to clarify more his negative attitude towards the effectuation of crisis in the field of conventional politics. In this vein, I would like to examine the effectivity of the term crisis in the police order in two fundamental aspects.

Firstly, the police logic is radically inclined to render the existence of any crisis within its order as, to speak medico-metaphorically, a sort of malady for which there is no cure except its obliteration. It is because any crisis concerning the ordering of the police is essentially a call for re-ordering; it blurs the right ordering of bodies as well as interferes with the univocal functioning of the order. It basically jeopardizes the police order. Also, the police logic strictly assumes that the proper order of bodies has already been accomplished. This is the assumption that the initial crisis stemming from the contingency of any proper *arkhê*, thus of any order, has already been reached to resolution once and for all. The signification of crisis for the police logic is the reintroduction of chaos, namely disorder. Mythically, any crisis resets an in-between stage where the *kosmos* and *khaos* confrontationally exists. For this reason, the police logic constantly tends to equate the meaning...
of crisis with chaos, as though crisis is an event in which there is no possibility to derive order; however, this is bare and intentional neglection, or abuse, of the genuine meaning of crisis because crisis, in point of fact, is an event wherein the very convertibility of what seems impossible into possible is still contained.

At bottom, the very modality in which the police is suggested is linked with a certain mode of crisis. It is suggested as the best possible way out of the impossibility of any proper archē; nonetheless, its logic paradoxically insists upon the obfuscation of the fact that it is order that arises out of the prime crisis of politics. Since any crisis concerning the order carries potentiality for the re-speculation of its properness, the police logic commands to efface any possible effectivity of which and, for this reason, vulgarly reduces crisis to a mere disease or a state of disequilibrium. Though the event of crisis characteristically signifies the possibility to make a new beginning, it is compelled to become an event predestined to a particular banality within the police; it is the banality in the sense of the lack of originality, of impossibility to begin afresh, of the lack of archē. Crisis, in the eyes of the police logic, is an impossible event; it is an event already precluded in the prime scene of politics. The police logic is allergic to any possible return of the prime crisis as it might pave the way for further speculations, supplementations or polemics concerning its organization; it is an organization on the ground of the impossibility of supplementation and lack. As Rancière writes, the police is “the dismissal of politics as a polemical configuration of the common world”. What is at stake here is the presumption that the police is a well-saturated configuration such that there is no gap for any further decision concerning the common; by extension, it proposes the redundancy of any other simultaneous performance of poiein and krinein for such performance must be left to those who are privileged to act and decide on behalf and instead of others. In this way, the police logic alludes to inequality between those who are privileged, allegedly expert, to distribute roles and functions and those who are supposed to do nothing but fulfil their duty in this distribution. Those who constitute the police logic, precisely via this inegalitarian logic, remain in control over not only the possible but also the
impossible; thus, what is imposed as a vision in relation to any crisis that marks a wrong in the order is its impossibility.

The other aspect is the inculpatory and intimidatory meaning of crisis attributed by the police logic. The source of such attribution resides in the principle of exclusion operated throughout the police. The very functioning of this principle is to keep out what is excessive to the order. The existence of any crisis in and about the functioning of the order is already an excess as it is already an impossible disclosure of a certain wrong in the distribution of roles and functions. The wrong here is employed by those who enunciate a misplacement and demand a better placement within the order. Then, the occurrence of such crisis sets a paradoxical stage in which the impossibility of the improper is presented as a sheer lie. It is a failure of the narrative of the proper, a void within the void-free partition of the sensible, an abyss dividing the unity of the order, an instability within the stable order or a nullification of the consensus over the distribution of roles for a particular problem. It is an event wherein the seemingly unshakeable foundation of the police is forced to be dislodged and, by that means, the reliability of its claims is tested.

On the other hand, the best effective tool possessed by the police logic against such crises is the principle of exclusion which is always and already at work in the partition of the sensible. It is the principle which decides not only those who must stay out of the decision-making mechanism concerning the common but also those who must be excluded from the organization as a mere dysfunction. Whereas the former signifies the implicit exclusion of those who are dispossessed of the possibility to decide for themselves while remaining a part of the order, the latter is what makes explicit this implicit exclusion and signifies the exclusion of the included. Rancière, for the exclusion of the included, occasionally uses the term the part that has no part. It is the part which deploys a wrong concerning its share in the partition; it is an impossible part. It is, by definition, a paradoxical part but the implication of this paradoxicality also subsumes the ones previously defined in relation to the prime crisis of politics. The part having no part is what
leads to crisis in and about the police; thus, it is the primary actor of crisis which inaugurates the improper and requests for the correction of what is wrong. Yet, it is the part culpable for revealing its position as a misplacement or miscalculation and contaminating the pure functioning of the proper; it is an excess that needs to be eliminated from the police to perpetuate the solid distribution. The very signification of crisis in this regard is inculpatory to conceal the fact that those who give rise to crisis within the order are actually victims. The police logic, through this inculpatory effectivity, deploys the term crisis as a mean to intimidate those who are implicitly or explicitly excluded. It points out that whomever excessive to the distribution is regarded as an outsider and consequently cannot claim a share; in this way, the term crisis becomes a tool for blackmailing at the hands of the police logic.

Although Rancière tackles the signification of crisis as a term whose meaning constantly generated by the police logic, he shows almost no interest in thinking of crisis anew; however, it is my contention that Rancière's peculiar understanding of politics is already convenient to derive a novel approach of the term crisis. Specifically, I argue that politics for Rancière, in fact, is a certain event which already insists upon a certain theme of crisis.

The aim now is to hold a befitting grasp of politics with regard to the question of crisis in a Rancièrian manner. To that end, it would be suitable to draw attention to Rancière’s idiosyncratic diagnosis about the existence of order:

There is order in society because some people command and others obey, but in order to obey an order at least two things are required: you must understand the order and you must understand that you must obey it. And to do that, you must already be the equal of the person who is ordering you.29

In this vital passage, Rancière identifies that ordering of any kind is contingent upon the presupposition of equality between those who command and those
understand that and obey; otherwise, any ordering cannot become operative. Then, the crisis at the prime of politics is surmounted precisely because of this presuppositional equality; that is, any ordering is contingent insofar as the equal capacity of speaking beings is presupposed to form an organization wherein some of them command and the rest obey.

Rancière carefully distinguishes the police from politics in terms of the deployment of this principal equality. The police logic is not utterly ignorant to the principle of equality; rather, it deliberately suspends the effectivity of which to a great extent once the order is established through the mechanism of commanding and obey. It suspends because its narrative emphasizes the adequacy of equal speaking beings in a way limited to the understanding of the order and the need thereof. It precludes further possibilities of ordering and debars those who obey from the possibility of commanding for themselves. The police, for this reason, is also a distribution of speaking bodies on the presupposition of the principal equality; however, this initial equality converts into a non-egalitarian logic due to the production of people who are dispossessed of the possibility of making another decision concerning their part in the distribution and reconfiguring their individual and collective experiences in the common sensible area. That is why Rancière argues the problem of equality depending on the fact that “policy [the police] wrongs equality” rather than that “policy denies equality”.

Rancière notes that the political takes place where “the verification of equality is obliged to turn into the handling of a wrong”. In other words, politics exists insofar as those who obey deploy their equal capacity with those who order so as to undo a particular wrong concerning their part in the distribution. Politics is an emancipatory process where the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being is authenticated to form and reform order. For this reason, politics, first and foremost, must ensure the undoing of the wrong that is done to equality. This specific modality of undoing requires “an enunciative and demonstrative capacity to reconfigure the relation between the visible and the sayable, the relation between words and bodies”. For Rancière, this is also the
modality of political subjectivity which suspends the non-egalitarian logic of the
police and creates a supplementary part excessive to any consensual calculation
of the parts of the community, the part of those having no part. This is surely
antithetical to the narrative of the proper that recognizes neither a wrong nor a
supplement, and what makes politics quarrelling and emancipatory.

Politics is then essentially what disrupts a series of assignations of bodies employed
in line with the logic of the proper. It disturbs the ordering of bodies within the
police. The political, as a contrary logic to the police, is an activity engaged in,
as Rancière points out, “seeking a way of doing what we are not supposed to do,
to be where we are not supposed to be”. It is the setting of a stage wherein a
certain contest between the proper and the improper occurs. The political is thus
what confuses the fictive properness of the police by contentiously introducing
the improper: the improper as a counter-narrative that speculates ways in which a
set of relations that ties bodies to certain occupations can be established different
than the ones designated by the police. Further, the political marks a new
beginning that could be generalized as a point in which one no longer believes in
the narrative of the proper and consequently refuses to act in alignment with it; in
a sense, it is the rejection of what is injected by the logic of the proper.

In this respect, Rancière’s understanding of politics appears to be haunted by the
structural analogy between the kosmos and the polis speculated by Plato. What is
political for Rancière correspondingly pertains to creating a possible way out of
the effectivity of this analogy: a breach of the purportedly harmonious relation
between the kosmos and the polis. As Rancière puts it:

It [politics] is the introduction of an incommensurable [improper] at the
heart of the distribution of speaking bodies. This incommensurable breaks
not only with the equality of profits and losses; it also ruins in advance the
project of the city ordered according to the proportion of the cosmos and
based of the archē of the community.
If politics is to deviate from the measure of the *kosmos*, then it marks a void within the void-free partition of bodies, a paradoxical rupture within the continuity of the police, an unsaturated residual place in conflict with the narrative of the proper, a state of disequilibrium. If politics is to dissent from archaic claims that fundamentally shape the police, then it is the reaffirmation of the sheer absence of any regulative *archē* for the reconfiguration of the sensible. By extension, politics, as Rancière writes, is an “intervention that reassert decision making over public affairs as anyone’s concern, and as the expression of anyone’s equal capacity”.

What characterizes such an intervention is then the simultaneous reperformance of *poiein* and *krinein* within the void where the power of those who are allegedly privileged to order is neutralized by the power of the one more, of anyone, of those who are dispossessed of the power of speaking and deciding for and on behalf of themselves. It is in this sense that politics is not only “witnessing to the exclusion of the included” but also “claiming for the inclusion of the excluded”.

In this respect, the political for Rancière is an event where the prime crisis of politics is verified as that which returns. What is at stake in this specific modality of return is nothing short of the reintroduction of the sheer absence of *archē*. In other words, politics occurs when the problem of beginning unexpectedly and intrudingly arrives on the consensual scene of the police order. This opens the police order to polemics once again, thus brings about a split within the order. Accordingly, I propose to characterize Rancière’s politics of disagreement on the ground of the *return of the prime crisis of politics*.

However, it should be noted that the return of the prime crisis does not mean a total collapse of the police order; rather, it refers to a local collapse that invalidates the narrative of the proper and reveals a specific misplacement within the order. It is the return due to the emergence of a paradoxical part, the part that has no part. In this respect, the part having no part does not constitute an absolute gap as it is still a part. Nor does it concordantly participate in the purported harmony of the police as it has no part. It stages an in-between scene in a way falling in line with the very notion of crisis. What is at stake here is not only the in-between status of
the part having no part but also the in-between status of the community due to
the disclosure thereof. This happens through the enunciative and demonstrative
activity of those who are misplaced, which eventually turns on the initial equality
of speaking beings and claims an equal part in the poietic process of deciding with
ones already privileged according to the mythopoetic solution of archipolitics.

In relation to the in-between status of politics, Rancière defines the political
community as “a community of interruptions, fractures, irregular and local,
through which egalitarian logic comes and divides the police community”.
It is in this manner that the return of the prime crisis ruptures the validity of identities
between the proper and bodies by signifying an unsaturated place within the
topos of relations designated by words. The elaboration of the political community
of Rancière thus continues: “It is a community of worlds in community that are
intervals of subjectification: intervals constructed between identities, between
spaces and places. Political being-together is a being-between: between identities,
between worlds [...] between several names, several identities.”

What returns in politics as a matter of crisis is then the in-between stage at the
prime of politics. What arrives as a matter of crisis is the necessity of making
a new beginning. The genuine exigency of such crises is, in general terms, the
designation of a new part for those who are misplaced in the order. For this reason,
politics is what embraces possible returns of the prime crisis in its ever-changing
local forms. It is to build a critical scene upon which those who are dispossessed
of the possibility to speak and decide for themselves may hold a claim to speak
and decide for themselves to reset the coordinates of their spatio-temporal
experiences, to redesignate the limits between the visible and the sayable, namely
the relation between words and bodies. If it is borne in mind that crisis is an
event where the very convertibility of what is impossible to possible is pursued
for recovery and resolution, then politics is ultimately an event of crisis for what
is impossible to be experienced within the strict configuration of the sensible is
converted into possible. That is why the genuine political significance of crisis is
neither a bare impasse in which no progress is possible nor a sheer withdrawal

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from the issue at stake; instead, it signifies a political event in which there is still possibility to undertake an action. In this sense, Rancière proposes a specific form of critical activity that is definitely not foreign to the genuine meaning of crisis: a poietic process of deciding where bodies who are subjected to a wrong in the police engage simultaneously in the acts of *poiein* and *krinein* for the restructuring of the sensible fabric, hopefully without a wrong.

In the contemporary realm of politics, the use of the term crisis sharply deviates from those that can be conceived in the plane spanned by the acts of *poiein* and *krinein*. What we have got instead is the reduced meaning of crisis in a way especially pertaining to chaos in the sense of complete disorder. This underpins the perception of politics as an activity oriented towards the development and employment of techniques through which genuine exigencies of crises could be concealed. It is in this sense that there exist political technicians whose ultimate duty is to eliminate crises and keep the order as it is. This, as might be expected, paves the way for the negligence of genuine needs and demands of crises when they arise through the enunciative and demonstrative activity of those who are subjected to a wrong within the structure of the community. Therefore, Rancière’s critical stance towards the term crisis stems from its oppressive deployment in alignment with the police logic.

The remaining question is, however, whether or not we truly think of crisis as a matter of politics. Even if Rancière shows us how the police logic fails to acknowledge the necessity of such thinking, he does not specifically frame the question of crisis in a manner compatible with his political framework. In fact, his peculiar understanding of politics on the basis of disagreement and equality is already available to derive a line of thinking by dint of which politics may become an activity specifically responsive to genuine needs and demands of crises. In this way, the political significance of crisis corresponds to a climacteric in which the people decide their future without any suppressive political expertise. If politics is to be an emancipatory project, the unbinding of the term crisis from its constraints established through the social edifice of policing perhaps requires the utmost attention.
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NOTES


2. Rancière, starting from his early works and also with augmenting sophistication, places the question of equality into the heart of his contemplation on politics. In this respect, the *Althusser’s Lessons* perhaps provides a striking emphasis on equality. In this work, Rancière, as a dissenting disciple of Louis Althusser, proclaims that the manner Althusser conceives of politics is not that of equality but of inequality. The reason is that Althusser’s project proposes a type of politics built upon a deceitful assumption about those who strive for the transformation of their working conditions; that is, it assumes that workers are in need of the accumulated knowledge of intellectuals, namely political practitioners, to alter their conditions. This ultimately yields a sort of politics which consolidates the status of those making decisions in the name and on behalf of workers. It also deliberately neglects the capacity of workers to be emancipated from their existing conditions. Rancière, in this vein, publishes *Proletarian Nights* to restore the neglected capacity of workers against the overwhelming status of political practitioners. In an analogical way, Rancière, in *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, for instance, discusses the pedagogical drama between the schoolmaster and his disciples, and thereby draws attention to the underestimated capacity of disciples. Accordingly, Rancière is strictly committed to the presupposition of equality, of speaking beings or of intelligences, as a principle which enables people to engage with emancipatory practices as he notes in the preface of *Althusser’s Lessons*: “All revolutionary thought must be founded on the inverse presupposition [the equality of speaking beings], that of the capacity of the dominated”. See Jacques Rancière, *Althusser’s Lessons*. Trans. Emiliano Battista. London and New York: Continuum, 2011; and Jacques Rancière, *Proletarian Nights: The Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-Century France*. Trans. by John Drury. London, Brooklyn: Verso, 2012; and Jacques Rancière, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation*. Trans. Kristin Ross. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991.


7. It must be noted that there are different variations on the interpretation of chaos and the cosmos which survive from the world of the ancients. Due to these variations, it seems not possible to precisely determine what the ancient Greeks believed in this context; yet, for the sake of this article, I prefer to pay attention to the ones belonging to Hesiod and Plato as they are crucial to accentuate the fundamental difference with regard to the ambiguous deployment of *muthos* and *logos*. Hesiod’s *Theogony* provides perhaps the earliest systematic treatment of the drama between chaos and the cosmos, which is speculated by the Pre-Socratics, Plato, Aristotle and many others later on primarily in terms of the philosophy of nature. Theogony literally means ‘the birth of the gods’; however, it also bears on cosmogony, meaning ‘the birth of the universe’, by which the interplay between chaos and the cosmos is unfolded because the question concerning the creation of the universe for Hesiod is hinged upon the genealogy of the gods. In the *Theogony*,

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Chaos is the first of the primordial gods that emerges as an abyss or opening which makes the universe possible. Accordingly, the Greek word *khaos*, from the mythological point of view of Hesiod, refers to neither a muddle of unformed matter nor a kind of impasse; instead, it refers to a gap to which no property can be attributed. Furthermore, for Hesiod, while the reign of Chaos marks the primordial stage of the evolution of the universe, in Greek the *kosmos*, the sovereignty of Zeus, after a series of conflicts and struggles among the gods lasting throughout the generations, marks the stage wherein the universe has finally been evolved into its immutable and everlasting order. Plato's *Timaeus* also constitutes a prominent place in the Greek cosmogonical thought after Hesiod. What is striking in the *Timaeus* is the arrival of the *Demiurge*, which literally means 'craftsman', on the cosmogonical scene. This radically transforms the way *khaos* and the *kosmos* is conceived in the *Theogony*. In the *Timaeus*, the *Demiurge* is the supreme god who is essentially good and just, and entirely outside the domain of the gods designated by *muthos* in that the manner in which the *Demiurge* acts, unlike the gods appearing in the *Theogony*, is solely based on rational principles, ones compatible with mathematics, geometry and harmony. Moreover, for Plato, the *Demiurge* is the god who intervenes in the evolutionary process of the *kosmos* to not only bring order to it but also craft components of it; accordingly, before this intervention, there was *khaos* as a state wherein there is no possibility of progress, a kind of impasse, unlike the signification of *khaos* in Hesiod's *Theogony*. See Hesiod, *Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia*. Trans. Glenn W. Most. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006; and Plato, *Timaeus and Critias*. Trans. Robin Waterfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

10. Plato also preserves the authenticity in the meaning of the word *demiurge*; it means 'a skilled man working for people' for it is combined by the word *dēmos*, meaning common people, and *ergos*, meaning work. Accordingly, in Plato's framework, there is, on the one hand, a divine duty attributed to the *Demiurge* concerning the *kosmos*, on the other, a public duty concerning the *polis*. Perhaps, it ought to be noted that Hesiod's Zeus and Plato's Demiurge share the same epithet *poiētēs*, meaning maker, as they are both engaged with the act of *poiesis* while bringing order to the universe.
15. It ought to be noted that Plato supplements the transferal of the *kosmos* to the *polis* with another narrative which speculates how bodies must be detailed to particular tasks. Each person in the *polis*, for Plato, must be engaged with an occupation suitable to his soul; to that end, he invents a tripartite schema which rigidly stratifies the community. According to that, those who have gold in their souls are fitting to rule, those whose souls blended by silver are fitting to auxiliary roles, and those whose souls blended by bronze or iron are fitting to produce and supply the needs of the *polis*. Furthermore, Plato specifies this fictive arrangement as a useful lie for the betterment of the order. See especially Book III in Plato, *The Republic*.
20. It should be noted that Rancière deploys the term aesthetics in a way compatible with its etymological source aisthēsis which enables the articulation of either ‘perceiving by the senses’ or ‘perceptible’; however, in the aesthetico-political framework of Rancière, this generality rooted in the term aesthetics culminates in the distribution of the sensible as that which refers to individual and collective forms of what is perceptible proceeded from the (re-)ordering of bodies within the police.
22. Rancière, Disagreement, 68.
23. Rancière, Dissensus, 36.
25. Rancière, Dissensus, 100.
26. Rancière, Dissensus, 42.
28. Rancière, “Comment and Responses.”
29. Rancière, Disagreement, 16.
30. Rancière, “Comment and Responses.”
37. Rancière, Moments Politiques, 158.
39. What I mean by the return of the prime crisis of politics should not be confused with the return of politics which Rancière criticizes his 10th thesis on politics. Rancière criticizes the return of politics as an argument that marks a return to the ordinary state of things formulated through the police logic. Rancière, through the homonymy of the word ‘end’, argues that the very end of such return is to put an end to polemics concerning the sensible configuration and thus to politics. In this way, he equates the return of politics with the end of politics. On the other hand, I deploy the return of the prime crisis of politics as diametrically opposed to the elimination of such a polemical space. See Rancière, Dissensus, 42-44; and Rancière, Disagreement, 61-93.
40. Rancière, Disagreement, 137.
41. Rancière, Disagreement, 137.