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waltende souveränität: prevailing, swaying, sovereignty. heidegger, heraclitus, derrida

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Vom Walten der Physis
Prevailing, Swaying, Physis
Heidegger and Sovereignty

I believe you are all [...] relatives and fellow citizens by nature [φύσις], not by law; for by nature like is akin to like, but law is a tyrant of mankind and forces many things contrary to nature. Now, it would be shameful in us to know the nature of things and yet [...] (Plato, *Protagoras*, 337d-c)

nature [φύσις] loves to hide (Heraclitus, *Fragments*, XD. 123, M. 8)

INTRODUCTION

The following pages call for an interrogation of the status of sovereignty as it appears (albeit implicitly) in Heidegger's metaphysical lectures[1]. This appearance marks a historical event in Heidegger's thinking, one that implicates a subtle destabilization of ontological difference. In the wake of ungovernable difference, Heidegger establishes the figure or the modality of sovereignty. Perhaps more critically, this marks a transition in ontological grounding: while initially rooted in Aristotelian notions of time and *physis*, it now gravitates towards Heraclitus' concept of polemos. These vacillations can be traced to the 1929/30 lecture: *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (*The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*), and the 1935 lecture: *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (*Introduction to Metaphysics*), supplemented by 1957's *Identität und Differenz* (*Identity and Difference*). While the existing literature[2] has covered most of these elements in isolation, work is yet to be done in drawing these elements together across the historical trajectory of Heidegger's lectures. To this end, I focus on the notion of *Walten* which becomes particularly prevalent in Heidegger's most extensive reflections on metaphysics. *Walten*, translated as "prevailing" or "holding sway", circumscribes conflictual and violent movement, shaping existence or rather, physis itself. *Walten* prevails in Heidegger's contemplation of originary (*ursprüngliche*) ontological modalities. Considering the decisive legacy of his own *Destruktion*, this kind of metaphysical inquiry might seem anachronous. However, it is precisely Heidegger's theoretical insistence that cautions us against a hasty vindication of the metaphysical register[3].

Heidegger's discussion of metaphysics gestures towards the conceptual dominance of something we could provisionally assess as proto-sovereignty, or rather, its modality. Heidegger's lectures on metaphysics confront the reader with an originary iteration of the metaphysical sovereign (or the sovereign status of metaphysics). *The task suggested here is to attempt to philosophize against sovereignty, from within its own metaphysical entanglements*[4]. Formulated differently: the ontological difference, the *causa prima* of Heidegger's philosophy, seems to favour

conflictual deferral. However, such deferral is ultimately curtailed by a relatively vulgar frame of power. What then is it that establishes a conceptual connection between difference, sovereignty and violence?

As a prelude, I will attend to *Walten's* lexical status and some brief comments on translation. The first section addresses the notional development of Heidegger's *Walten* and develops its conceptual tie to ontological difference. As I suggest, *Walten* does not only enclose or vindicate the differential relation between Being and beings, but also seems to occupy a privileged position regarding the question of ontological or structural origination. Furthermore, Heidegger's *Walten* illustrates the originating *sway* of *physis* which henceforth can no longer be accurately translated as "nature" but as *growth*. However, a *prevailing* of physis cannot but summon the undertones of a dominant, violent modality. This modality indicates the form of a relatively vulgar notion of the sovereign. Thus Heidegger's *Walten* should ~~not~~ be perceived as an way to think about the vicissitudes of sovereignty per se. The first section of this paper thus closes with an outline of the conceptual dimensions of a sovereign modality. In section two I reconstruct Heidegger's more general metaphysical trajectory, as constituted by the discrepancies and shared terrain of Heraclitus and Aristotle. As these lectures progress, it becomes clear that the divergence between pre- and post-Socratic ontology informs Heidegger's ontological assessment of *Walten*. Heraclitus's emphasis on *polemos* now appears, in light of Heidegger, to elaborate *a conflictual aperture of the ontological*. Discontented with the conflictual sway of an originary force, Aristotle seeks to accommodate it within the authoritative command of a unified metaphysical agency, expressed via the prime mover. Heraclitus, however, is not himself conceptually obliged to resort to a moving agent for his account of an originary, not-yet metaphysical, tension. In an ontological connection of matter and motion that formally parallels a dissolving of ontological difference, Heraclitus finally prevails over Aristotle. Nevertheless, despite this shift, Heidegger's *Walten* remains informed by both tendencies and cannot be aligned neatly with either. *Walten* attests to a much broader metaphysical idea of sovereignty than either position can concede. This

insistence seems to vindicate transcendentally the conflictual within existence. While Being becomes synonymous with a conflictual aperture or dispersal, beings are still thrown [*geworfen*] into a conflictual horizon. As the final section concludes then, Heidegger not only accepts the Heraclitean *polemos* as an incipient ontological event, but ascribes an ontological *telos*—which is not to be found among the pre-Socratics. This article argues that Heidegger's discussion of metaphysics, with or without an explicit rendering of the metapolitical, ontologically employs *Walten* qua *Gewalt* This theoretical approach hints at the conceptual dominance of what might tentatively be identified as proto-sovereignty, or more specifically, an originary ontological modality proclaimed as sovereignty.

LEXICAL PRELUDE

The *Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon* defines *prevailing* (*Walten*), as:

> the self-moving power bestowed by being onto entities. Through the power of this prevailing, entities are able to come to be as themselves. As the force which takes hold between being [Being] and entities [beings], prevailing thus serves as a significant element in Heidegger's later conception of ontological difference."[5]

While it seems counterintuitive to assess the philosopher of *Destruktion* within a lexicological system, I will, for the sake of exposition, provisionally accept this definition of prevailing (*Walten*). As with many attempts at definition, such an assessment fails to grasp the metonymic breadth of a term that a philosophy, stressing its refusal to regard language as a mere *logical* vehicle, has to consider. Yet, as the *Lexicon* entry suggests, one common interpretation designates *Walten* as a "significant element in Heidegger's later conception of ontological difference." However, let us first consider another aspect.

Upon initial observation, the "self-moving power" of an entity echoes what

is typically understood as sovereign agency: acting unimpeded or undirected by externalities. *Energeia* (actuality) and *dynamis* (*potentiality*), if we define sovereignty via an Aristotelian dictum, must always already be unified within an entelechy. Self-referential governance moves within its own remit, "decides" for itself[6]. Within a more politico-theoretical frame, this assessment seems to accord with a received understanding of sovereign imposition. The sovereign does not need to consult anything or anyone, and it is (if we listen to Carl Schmitt) the status of the exception that founds, magnifies or propels self-sufficiency[7]. Heidegger's *Walten* will inscribe such a(n) (exceptionally) sovereign sway within *physis* itself. And as I will later discuss, he will assess *physis* (φύσις) as the "self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole" [*das Walten des Seienden im Ganzen*] [8]. His conceptual choice strays from the usual translation of φύσις as nature. Unlike the substantiating, and thus more static, notion of the "natural", Heidegger proposes to read it as *growth*[9]. This growth is later associated with the differential assessment of Being and beings. As we shall see it is the "governance" (or rather, the primacy) of this growth that will, among other things, be associated with what is yet to be introduced as *Walten*, prevailing, holding sway.

Preceding the notional separation of *physis*/*tékhnē*/*nomos*, Heidegger's use of *Walten* ontologically circumscribes sovereign privilege. Despite its critical potential, *Walten* becomes a substantiating notional placeholder, retroactively paving the way for everything that is to follow conceptually. To think with and through *Walten* therefore implies a modality which precedes (ontological) divisibility itself. *Walten* might still fall under the remit of differentiation, but it nevertheless obliges us to think a condition which anticipates difference.

THE SWAY OF BEING AND BEINGS AND THE PREVALENCE OF A SOVEREIGN DICTUM

Before attending more closely to Heidegger's text, it is important to provide a brief terminological analysis of the German *Walten*. This term finds itself unsurprisingly close to *Gewalt* (violence). What is sometimes acerbically translated as "governing",

"ruling", or "power" tout court tends to diminish its violent connotations. In *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Derrida underlines the recurring insistence of *Walten* in Heidegger's oeuvre, while simultaneously criticising the French translations, which he argues "abandon" the term to "neutrality" and "non-violence"[10]. An exemplary section from the *Introduction to Metaphysics* elucidates how similar obstacles arise in the shift from German to English.

> *Wie soll der Mensch das ihn Durchwaltende, auf Grund dessen er selbst als Mensch überhaupt sein kann, je erfinden*?[11]

> How could man ever have invented the power which pervades him, which alone enables him to *be* a man?[12]
> How is humanity ever supposed to have invented that which pervades it in its sway, due to which humanity itself can *be* as humanity in the first place?[13]

The first translation, aside from its reductive translation of the collective *Mensch* (human), chooses "power", power which pervades. The second, more recent citation favours *sway* as a more adequate translation of (*Durch-*)*Walten*. Upon closer inspection, "holding sway" seems to recuperate some of the German inflections of *Walten*. Power alone, by contrast, is misleading: all the more so since the German provides several substantives to designate power—*Macht*, *Vermögen*, *Kraft*, to name but a few. We are therefore left to contend with the *sway*. *Holding sway* seems partially adequate. However, the movement, the pendular swing, which it entails indicates a minimal notion of repetition, which counteracts the singularity of *Walten*. *Prevailing*, and its tie to the Latin *valere*, allows for a subtler emphasis of power. Moreover, *prae-valere*, implies a certain temporal primacy, anticipating the metaphysical subtleties of Heidegger's account of *Walten*. Reading Aquinas, or Kierkegaard, an unassuming reader might, at times, be impressed by another prevalence within the register of *Walten*—the emphasis of love, holding

sway[14]. All these connotations underscore the need to acknowledge the polysemic instability of Walten. Bearing these complexities in mind, we can return to the second translation of Heidegger's text:

> How is humanity ever supposed to have invented that which pervades it in its sway, due to which humanity itself can *be* as humanity in the first place?[15]

Rearticulated with the present query in mind, Heidegger's question[16] could be read as 'how are we to understand a reference to sovereignty which itself lacks a referent?' For Heidegger, *Walten* suggests two paths. First, a form of prevailing which concerns beings:

> In the age of the first and definitive unfolding of Western philosophy among the Greeks, when questioning about beings[17] as such and as a whole received its true inception, beings were called *phusis* [*physis*, φύσις]. This fundamental Greek word for beings is usually translated as "nature." [...] Now what does the word *phusis* say? It says what emerges from itself (for example, the emergence, the blossoming, of a rose), the unfolding that opens itself up, the coming-into-appearance in such unfolding, and holding itself and persisting in appearance—in short, the emerging-abiding sway.[18]

As already mentioned, this passage proposes a decisive re-reading of φύσις. No longer translated as nature, *physis* is now to be grasped as growth[19]. The "first and definitive unfolding" is, according to Heidegger, situated in the pre-Socratic register. Growth, as *physis*, is not solely the transitive, or intermediary stage of a process that is yet to reach its finality, the emphasis lies rather on the procedural dimension itself. *Physis* encompasses all of this in the form of an "emerging-abiding sway"[20] ["*aufgehend-verweilende*[*s*] *Walten*"][21]. *Physis* refers to the prevailing of this

process. Via its prevalence—its process of "pure" emerging—everything appears and "is" through or within this appearance. *Physis* can, henceforth, no longer solely be read as the potential hypostasis that "nature" implies. This is what Heidegger's reluctance, concerning its translation, calls on: to recalibrate and to focus on growth, *Wachstum*, to consider a certain equation between growth and φύσις. *Walten* itself is still schematically associated with this process of processes, this proto-procedure.

Now, we might need to inquire what it is that constitutes the difference along the sequence from proto-, to pre-, to the procedure itself. So far, *physis* has become a procedural nexus of growth, something we could coin the ecstatic horizon of beings. Beings are to be found within it, are brought forth by it. If we conditionally accept the proposed reading, what does this imply for Heidegger's elusive notion(s) of Being?

> We shall now translate φύσις more clearly and closer to the originally intended sense [*ursprünglich gemeinter Sinn*] not so much by growth, but by the 'self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole [*sich selbst bildendes Walten des Seienden im Ganzen*]'. [...] We must bring this quite broad concept of φύσις closer to us in order to understand this word in that meaning in which the philosophers of antiquity used it, who are wrongly called 'philosophers of nature'. [...] that which prevails, beings, beings as a whole. I emphasize once more that φύσις as beings as a whole is not meant in the modern, late sense of nature, as the conceptual counterpart to history for instance. Rather it is intended more originally than both of these concepts[*ursprünglicher als beide Begriffe*], in an originary meaning [*ursprüngliche Bedeutung*] which, prior to nature and history, encompasses both, and even in a certain way includes divine beings.[22]

As Derrida remarks, φύσις is "not yet objective nature"[23]. The passage through Latin (*physis* becoming *natura*), denounced by Heidegger, has inevitably appeared in the succeeding translations, and hence inflects the understandings of the

term. However, if φύσις persists within the opaque terrain of incessant growth and movement, its "originary meaning" seems to be comprised of nothing but its constant flux. Such conceptual fluidity implies a toll, for it only results from the absolute primacy, the "originary" quality of φύσις. In the cited passage, Heidegger insists –three separate times– on such origination, such *Urspriünglichkeit*.[24]

What is the metaphysical context[25]? Heidegger implicitly stresses his well-known alliance with the pre-Socratics; they shall not be designated as "philosophers of nature". Processes of nature and φύσις are not equivocal. Attempting to place them within the same modality would be false. This drastic recalibration of "nature" aside, how does φύσις prevail?

> But phusis [φύσις], the emerging sway [*das aufgehende Walten*], is not synonymous with these processes, which we still today count as part of 'nature.' This emerging and standing-out-in-itself-from-itself may not be taken as just one process [*Vorgang*] among others that we observe in beings. Phusis is Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable.[26]

Walten and, Being as φύσις, become identified with one another: φύσις wields some undeniable primacy for Heidegger. What we observe in "nature" is, presumably, detrimental to our understanding of *Walten*. Ontologically, we are not solely dealing with one "process among others". But this *Vor*-gang (process), I might need to caution, seems to insist on its prefix[27]. It is a step before others, a step before further movement sets in[28]. The procedurality of emergence prevails and, according to Heidegger, it constitutively shapes the terrain of the observable. Hence, we cannot regard it as a circular movement where the procedure would proceed from itself, rather, Being (via beings) manifests its procedural horizon.

So far, both Heidegger's *Introduction to Metaphysics* and his *Fundamental Concepts* engage in a similar exposition of the extent to which φύσις is to be conceptually privileged. First, it is φύσις as the totality of beings and, secondly, φύσις as Being

itself or rather (accepting Heidegger's scruple to approach Being "directly"), φύσις as the essentiality (Wesenheit) of Being, its οὐσία (ousia). In both lectures, Heidegger's Walten illustrates the singular character of all ontological processes. Simultaneously, Walten expresses the swaying violence of emergence. Nominally, Walten concerns the resistance against an objectifiable telos, while formally it shapes governance. Metaphysically, Heidegger's *Walten* implies a *Vorgang* without *Vorgänger*, but also without *Vorgehendes* (a process without a predecessor and without preceding; a process without anything but its procedurality). Within a more sober dictum: Walten or prevailing are liminally equated with physis. Physis contains the differential, and hence seems to enclose but also to curtail difference.

The procedural character of φύσις evades its own governance. Growth therefore becomes a performance that itself is not governed by any performative iteration. The "emerging-abiding sway"[29] is that which allows us to read, to inscribe, and to cite in the first place. Without it not only legibility would be in question but much more fundamentally beings themselves. However, and it is important to insist on this, there is no agency which precedes such procedurality of emergence. Heidegger does not recapitulate an Idea or a positive infinity beyond our sensual grasp. Heidegger's physis does not point towards the divine. As a result, *Walten* attempts to frame that which emerges from itself while simultaneously containing such self-emergence within the register of its own sway. And so, we seem to conceptually pivot around the point at which ontological difference sets forth.

Several years after the lectures on metaphysics, Heidegger insisted in *Identity and Difference* that the differential itself cannot be questioned as it always already differentiates. It would thus be in to ask for difference . In light of this, the reader might feel compelled to question what it is that governs such a claim? Where is it that such an ontological premise, concerning origination, is to be situated? In turn, what is it that gives rise to its possibility in the first place? Until now, we have been confronted with a modality and a performance which governs without being governed: a meta-sovereign moment[30] which concerns both, the "structural dispersal"[31] of being into beings and the "hermeneutic dissipation"[32] shaping our

horizon. Thus Heidegger's notion of *Walten* needs to be apprehended as a spatial and temporal starting point. To recapitulate: the ontological fundament not only privileges difference but inscribes it within a violent sway. In Heidegger's *Fundamental Terms of Metaphysics*, he reserves a parenthesis to outline that "initially" metaphysics denotes the entirety of ontology, which is simultaneously theology[33]. In *Identity and Difference* he illustrates the different orders of (ontological) origination more thoroughly:

> Because Being appears as ground, beings are what is grounded; the highest being, however, is what accounts in the sense of giving the first cause. When metaphysics thinks of beings with respect to the ground that is common to all beings as such, then it is logic as onto-logic. When metaphysics thinks of beings as such as a whole [*Seiendes als solches im Ganzen*], that is, with respect to the highest being which accounts for everything, then it is logic as theo-logic. Because the thinking of metaphysics remains involved in the difference which as such is unthought, metaphysics is both ontology and theology in a unified way, by virtue of the unifying unity of perdurance [*Austrag*, also translated as "disposition"[34]]. The onto-theological constitution of metaphysics stems from the prevalence of that difference [dem Walten der Differenz][35].

Apart from a contextualization of metaphysics itself, Heidegger asks us to perceive the modality of *Walten* with "respect to the ground that is common to all beings". Similarly, we shall question how a notion holds sway that: "with respect to the highest being [...] accounts for everything". The "prevalence [*Walten*] of that difference" is the ground/terrain of/for the "onto-theological constitution of metaphysics". Metaphysics, at this stage, is, concurrently, "logic as onto-logic" and "logic as theo-logic".

Years after the lectures on metaphysics, the *Austrag*, the 'perdurance' or 'disposition,' is one way that enables us to think this "*Vorort*" of difference[36]. However, as Derrida asks, what does a notion of *Walten* imply, "which is, as if all

at once, the event, the origin, the power, the force, the source, the movement, the process, the meaning [...] of the ontological difference, the becoming-ontological-difference of the ontological difference"[37]? Bearing this question in mind, let me focus more on this exemplary moment: the disposition (*Austrag*) of ontological difference.

> The perdurance [*Austrag*, disposition] results in and gives Being as the generative ground. This ground itself needs to be properly accounted for by that for which it accounts, that is, by the causation through the supremely original matter - [*ursprünglichste Sache*] and that is the cause as *causa sui*. This is the right name for the god of philosophy. Man [*Mensch*] can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god.[38]

What is exchanged for the divine is the notion of "causa sui", a motive which can only collapse into—and grow out of—itself. Such a cause is presumably removed from anything that is relatable to faith. While this might seem like a considerable shift, the causa-sui responds to Heidegger's earlier metaphysical query on physis. The causa-sui, we could say, is deployed to ontologically assess that which "prior to nature and history, encompasses both, and even in a certain way includes divine beings"[39]. Heidegger's (implicit) position is that the fundament of metaphysics is grounded in a question of priority or origination. As Paul North reminds us, we are confronted with the existential issue of a "rather than", "something rather than nothing"[40], Heidegger's ontological questioning concerns the apriori[41]. How such a query can unfold without anticipating its ontological response is a question that *Walten* (partially) answers at the cost of its violent dominance.

As I move to consider *Walten* in the context of Heraclitus and Aristotle, we need to first address where Heidegger's *Walten* is ontologically situated:

> The interweaving of the distinctions themselves, and the way in which this interweaving oppresses and sustains us, is, as this prevailing, the primordial [*ist als dieses Walten die Urgesetzlichkeit*] lawfulness out of which

> we first comprehend the specific constitution of being pertaining to those beings standing before us or even those beings that have been made the object of scientific theory. [...] The ontological difference is that distinction that concerns the being of beings, or more precisely the distinction within which everything ontological moves and which it presupposes, as it were, for its own possibility. [...] We have seen that this distinction is never at hand, but refers to something that occurs.[42]

For Heidegger, ontological difference holds sway. Only within the prevailing of such difference can we apprehend the elusive dimension of Being as it pertains to beings; while remembering that, within the Heideggerian corpus, such an assertion would already be unacceptable. Being never *is*, it pertains to nothing. Being can only be studied through the conditionality of the subject or event. This is why it does not seem to be misleading to speak of *Walten* as a (proto-)modality. It concerns both "structural dispersal" and "hermeneutic dissipation"[43], without hypostatizing their procedural character.

Ontology presupposes static Being, while remaining, according to Heidegger, most often incapable of overcoming its negligence towards Being. The distinction, opened via the ontological difference, is "never at hand but refers to something that occurs". The specific prerogative bestowed on/through this difference is itself that which does not cease to hold sway: "The interweaving of the distinctions themselves [...] is, as this prevailing, the primordial lawfulness". The initial "definition" of prevailing already pointed towards the connection of *Walten*, and the ontological difference. By now it has become increasingly difficult to disentangle one from the other. Ontological difference itself seems to prevail. If we were to accept such prevalence, we would need to ask what the consequences for Heidegger's entire project are. Obviously such a question exceeds the confines of this article.

To reiterate where we have come to: after recapitulating how the sway of *Walten*

delineates both Being and beings, I have signalled the conceptual repercussions of associating such prevalence with a foundational notion of sovereignty. . This underscored Heidegger's emphasis on the non-presence of the swaying register of difference. However, it proved necessary to concede the difficulty of accepting his emphasis while being confronted with what he frames as a "primordial lawfulness". Such primordiality, Heidegger's "*Urgesetzlichkeit*", sets—governs or regulates (*verwaltet*)—the conditions for ontological progression. It thus seems appropriate to assess Heidegger's persistent use of *Walten* as formally indicative of a sovereign modality, situated at the outset of his ontology. In the following section of the paper, I develop the metaphysical context of Heidegger's *Walten* and underline its connection to such a modality.

CONFLICTUAL MATTER, (PRIME-) MOVEMENT

Having indicated the conceptual link that informs *Walten* and the ontological difference, I will now endeavour to clarify how Heidegger's *Walten* draws from a sovereign register. As noted above, φύσις can be read as growth, meaning that it implies the simultaneity of matter and movement. Walten prevails in growth. In the next section I briefly consider Aristotle's and Heraclitus's metaphysics in order to contextualize Heidegger's *Walten*, showing how it is informed by both thinkers' ontological premises. Here both matter and movement are shown as ontologically primary. These originary notions are then mobilized to theorize an ontological origin, a notion of *physis*, which dominates through its conflictual sway.

The backdrop to this juxtaposition is a larger ontological schism that Heidegger does not mention. In the context of the pre-Socratics, as Kōjin Karatani reminds us, matter and movement are still theorized in unison[44]. Thus, Heraclitus is not conceptually required to resort to a moving agent for his account of an originary tension. By contrast, Aristotle, even if he—unlike Plato—refuses to radically divest matter of its implicit flux, insists on the agency of a prime mover to animate the material world. While the pre-Socratics accept matter's self-movement without the need for a telos, Aristotle, through his theory of causes, introduces

such an end. Thus, it appears as if Aristotle's amendment could be considered as an attempt to curtail the seemingly ungovernable proliferation of movement. Heidegger's *Walten* is informed by both tendencies, and cannot be aligned neatly with either one. *Walten* attests to a much broader metaphysical idea of sovereignty than either position acknowledges. Such an insistence seems to transcendently vindicate the conflictual within existence.

Heidegger's lectures fluctuate between Aristotle and Heraclitus. The following passage, taken from the *Fundamental Concepts*, describes the scope of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* –

> Questions are asked concerning what life itself is, what the soul is [...] what movement, position, and time are, what the emptiness is in which that which is moved moves, what that which moves itself [das Sichbewegende] is as a whole and what the Prime Mover is. [...] The questioning proper to these sciences dealing with φύσις is the supreme question of the Prime Mover [*die höchste Frage nach dem Ersten Beweger*], of what this whole of φύσις is in itself as this whole. Aristotle designates this ultimate determinant [...] as the divine, without yet associating this with any particular religious view [*bestimmte religiöse Auffassung*]. [...] Insofar as the fundamental character of these beings and their being is movement, the original question concerning them goes back to the first mover[45].

"The questioning proper" of metaphysics is the question of the "Prime Mover". Before looking to Heidegger's summary of Aristotle's metaphysical efforts, a comment is required on the relation of growth, *Walten* (φύσις) and prime movement. As a process, growth might be theorized as autonomous, while simultaneously being situated in a relational nexus. Indeed, it is arguable that it constitutes this nexus. As growth holds sway, it defies impulses that seek to stop or modulate its movement. Certainly, if violence prevails, modulations can occur,

both in relation to concepts and to beings. The processivity of growth can be read through its unity of movement and matter. Aristotle's prime movement partially defies such unity, as it is that which moves the (un-) movable. Conceptually then prime movement stalls the autonomy of growth. The notion of the prime mover marks a specific difference in relation to the pre-Socratics, who are, according to Heidegger, wrongly perceived as "philosophers of nature"[46].

In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle insists that: "the science of the natural philosophers deals with the things that have in themselves a principle of movement."[47]. But what is it that results from the separation of matter and movement? Such separation obliges us to think of an agent or an agency that propels movement[48]. Heidegger's passage cited above already demonstrates the extent to which Aristotle "designates this ultimate determinant [...] as the divine". According to the *Fundamental Concepts*, this shall not be read in association "with any particular religious view"[49]. A causa-sui is nothing that one can pray to[50] but rather forms part of the metaphysical terrain of which it is composed; namely, it is both theo-logic and onto-logic[51]. However, this causa-sui constitutes a decisive *Vor*-gang[52] (proto-procedure) and, as signalled above, it is not inaccurate to define such primacy using a vocabulary related to sovereignty.

The self-referential character of a sovereign act commonly seeks to define itself through the constitutive absence of external interference[53]. One could theorize such a premise via Schmitt's exception[54]. However, in the light of the present purpose, it seems equally legitimate to defer such a comparison. As already noted, within a more metaphysical frame, and an even more archaic dictum, it is not ambiguous to theorize sovereignty as the promise of a frictionless actualization (*energeia*) of the potential (*dynamis*). If a sovereign act is to hold sway, it needs to prevail without any consultation: it must solely rely on its movement. The prime mover and the sovereign share the conceptual emphasis of the "ultimate determinant [*Letztbestimmendes*]"[55].

In the first section of this paper, I illustrated how *Walten* sways through and via

beings, showing how Being, as inflected through φύσις, becomes the generative ground on and through which existence is theorized. What thus becomes apparent is that both the ontological foundation and the epistemological frame—two horizons that Heidegger would hardly want to separate—prevail, govern (*verwalten*) over thought. The prevalence or the violent governance of *Walten* can hardly be discounted in such a consideration (not only, but also, considering the "metapolitical" context of the time[56]). The lectures on *Identity and Difference* do not necessarily change such an outlook. Being, as the generative ground, grounding beings is still held sway by difference ("*dem Walten der Differenz*"). Indeed, why would Heidegger have abandoned the prevalence of ontological difference? However, at present, it is not so much a question of asserting the continuity of said difference but of insisting on the conceptual dominance, the sovereign sway, that it instates and on which it relies ontologically. We are yet to encounter, however, how a subtle instability of the ontological difference announces itself. To develop this, I need to return to the metaphysical background.

In regard to "ultimate determination" (*Letztbestimmung*) and prime movement, let us ask how *Walten*, as φύσις, circumscribes both becoming and Being:

> This emerging, abiding sway includes both 'becoming' as well as 'Being' [*In diesem aufgehend verweilenden Walten liegen 'Werden' sowohl wie 'Sein'*] [...] In opposition to becoming, it [*Walten*] shows itself as constancy, constant presence.[57]

Becoming (*Werden*) is for Heidegger always constituted by the simultaneity of "coming-into-presence and going-out of it"[58]. This simultaneity prevails, i.e., it is *Walten*. Unlike the process of becoming, *Walten* is present. It is here that Heidegger bestows his notion of *Walten* with an ominous emphasis of presence. In a way, he seems to provisionally accord (an accordance refused at other stages) with the Aristotelian understanding of time, propounded in his *Physics*. Here,

the now forms the (present) vantage point from which the movement of time is to be determined. Simultaneously, the position of the finite being, "witnessing" time, is removed from the temporal flux[59]. Otherwise, the passage (one now, to the other) could not be analysed. Rather it would constitute an indecipherable passage. Hence, Heidegger grants that the movement of becoming, is inscribed within the wider (constant) presence of *Walten*. While we are never confronted with the ontological difference (nor the now), difference already holds sway. What is the status of Aristotle's prime movement in this sway of becoming?

> the things that are nearer the first mover are prior [...] and the prime mover also is a beginning absolutely. [...] if the prior does not set in motion the other does not move[60].

Following Aristotle, we rely on the constitutive movement of the prime mover. Not only is prime movement originary, but there is also a hierarchy of origination, determined by the distance to the prime mover. Prime movement itself is removed from time. This is how Heidegger's concession of presence, located in his *Introduction to Metaphysics* (where commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* shifts to a reading of Heraclitus's *Fragments*) can be understood. Without it, prime movement would have to be renounced as it relies on presence, outside time. *Walten, anders als Werden und Sein, ist anwesend—Walten*, unlike becoming and Being, is present[61]. I hasten to add that such a comment requires a much larger assessment of how *Walten* shapes our being-in-the-world, our ecstatic horizon. Since such a task exceeds the present limitations, we return to Aristotle and Heraclitus.

It is as yet unclear how Aristotle transforms the pre-Socratic uniformity of matter and motion. According to Karatani, Aristotle accepted that motion is immanent in matter but introduces the causes to assess such immanence. Material and efficient cause, which are both to be found in the pre-Socratics, are complemented with

the formal and the final cause. As it posits a telos (purpose/end) of movement, it is especially decisive, [62]. These comments contextualize Aristotle's claim that: "if the prior does not set in motion the other does not move". Nevertheless, prime movement still appears to be commensurable with the "Heraclitean doctrine", which asserts:

> that all sensible things are ever passing away, so that if knowledge or thought is to have an object, there must be some other and permanent entities, apart from those which are sensible; for there can be no knowledge of things which are in a state of flux.[63]

Both, Aristotle and Heraclitus articulate the need for an immovable entity to render movement intelligible. However, as remains to be seen Heraclitus, unlike Aristotle, proposes a conflicting kosmos which frames movement and matter. Heidegger submits a reading of φύσις via Heraclitus' kosmos[64]. While Heidegger's translation of *Fragment 30* might be disputable, its relation to the proposed notion of φύσις as the sovereign modality of growth, remains to be further developed:

> This kosmos [...] is always the same throughout everything, and neither a god nor any human being created it, rather this φύσις always was, always is, and always will be an ever-flaming fire, flaring up according to measure and extinguishing according to measure [Maß, metron, μέτρα].[65]

Be it perpetual fire, as in Heraclitus' case, or Aristotle's prime mover moving the unmovable, both originary causes identify, and account for, the same structural necessity. Heidegger inscribes *Walten* somewhere between these procedural notions of origination. In Heidegger's translation, the *metron* becomes decisive as he identifies within it the sway of physis[66]. I mention these perspectives in an attempt to demonstrate how Heidegger proposes the violent sway of an originary ontological frame, thereby closing the possibility of theorizing the prevalence of growth along a less governable (*verwaltete*) axis. Heidegger, derives the "constant

presence" (*Anwesenheit*) of φύσις from Heraclitus' notion of the kosmos[67]. The kosmos sways metrically, not inconstant:

> 'everything flows'. If this saying stems from Heraclitus at all, then it does not mean that everything is mere change that runs on and runs astray, pure inconstancy [*reine Unständigkeit*], but instead it means: the whole of beings in its Being is always thrown from one opposite to the other, thrown over here and over there– Being is the gatheredness of this conflicting unrest.[68]

Heidegger seems to advance a notion of Heraclitus which favours the Aristotelian imposition of causes. Prime movement has already been decisively associated with a notion of *Walten*, and yet, we should not solely read *Walten*'s sovereign modality as akin to that of Aristotle's prime mover. As Heidegger proposes, Being itself collects, gathering this swaying tendency through which beings are thrown "from one opposite to the other"[69]. This is another one of Heidegger's Aristotelian refractions of Heraclitus. Heidegger seems to keep "pure inconstancy" in check. Such a regulatory (*verwaltender*) impulse even drives the concession of the "constant presence"[70] of *Walten*. The sway of *physis* is undeniable, but it must be consolidated via a minimal *telos*. Hence, this is where the "pure inconstancy" of a differentiating ontological opening is abandoned for the violent gathering, dominated by Being, or rather, φύσις. As noted already, a problematic sovereign resonance arises through that operation. This resonance relates to principles of sovereign movement. Such movement is self-propelled and falls exclusively under the remit of its own sway. Heidegger's onto-logic underscores the regulatory telos of Aristotle's prime mover. Likewise, Heidegger prefers the Heraclitean emphasis of a "conflicting unrest"[71]. While Heraclitus's *kosmos* emphasizes the fluidity of growth, Heidegger's translation aims to restrain it. Looking to this impasse by way of conclusion, I want to suggest that growth might itself be further removed from *Walten*'s sovereign imposition than Heidegger's conceptual insistence seems to imply.

In the quote above, the swaying of φύσις flares up, and extinguishes, according to

"measure". Where is this *metron* derived from? To answer this, we have to consider what Heraclitus indicates by polemos (strife[72]/confrontation). As Heidegger recapitulates in the *Introduction*, an initial separation, which, differentiates "gods" from "human beings"[73], results of the "irruption [disjunction, *Auseinandertreten*] of Being itself" which is to be situated "in the polemos [Πόλεμος]"[74]. Heidegger reads Heraclitus's polemos as a differentiating struggle, a setting-apart[75], or a con-frontation [*Aus-einander-setzung*]:

> Con-frontation [setting-apart; *Aus-einander-setzung*]—that is not mere quarrelling and feuding [*Gezänk und Hader*], but the strife of the striving [...] [that] makes them manifest.[76]

Like the disposition (*Austrag*) propounded in *Identity and Difference*, *polemos* performs as an additional modality of disjunction which assists in the assessment of ontological difference[77]. *Polemos* accounts for both, a structural dispersal and a hermeneutic horizon. Hence, the disposition is another prevailing modality which should not be considered without having *Walten*'s sovereign connotations in mind. Heidegger's notion of an ontological origination—as prevailing in and via our existence—moves closer towards Heraclitus' understanding of an originating conflict, shaping physis, growth, or Being. That being said, the Aristotelian telos of prime movement is not abandoned altogether. How does Heidegger outline the relation of *polemos* and *Walten*?

> In this sway [*dieses Walten*], rest and movement are closed and opened up from an originary unity. This sway is the overwhelming coming-to-presence that has not yet been surmounted in thinking, and within which that which comes to presence essentially unfolds as being. But this sway first steps forth from concealment– that is, in Greek, alethēia [ἀλήθεια] (unconcealment) happens– insofar as the sway struggles itself forth as a world. [...] Confrontation is indeed for all (that comes to presence) the sire

> (who lets emerge), but (also) for all the preserver that holds sway [*waltender Bewahrer*]. [...] The polemos [Πόλεμος] named here is a strife that holds sway before everything divine and human, not war in the human sense.[78]

Walten "has not yet been surmounted in thinking". Of course, if we read *Walten* as a metonym of ontological difference, it proves to be insurmountable. Difference itself, according to *Identity and Difference*, cannot be thought but is only ever to be encountered differentially. What would it mean to regard the *ontological difference* as a *prevalent modality*? Arguably, Heidegger seeks a way to "think about transcendence within existence" without operating via the conceptual need for a "beyond"[79]. Hence, the sway of the differential is inscribed within existence. Thus, existence as necessarily situated within the *prevalence* of physis, relies on the conflictual and violent dimension of this *polemic sway*, shaping the ontological grounding. In both of Heidegger's metaphysical lectures, being or φύσις disperses itself and commands over a violent sway. What will later be called *Austrag*, is the regulatory frame, the ontological apriori, which operates along the terminology of *Walten*. As developed in section two, Heidegger not only borrows Heraclitus's polemos but simultaneously resorts to the telos of the prime mover to contain its potentially chaotic sway. *Walten*'s metonymy with sovereignty as self-movement, prime-movement, or procedural exceptionality is present in Heidegger. Polemos as the prevalent ground of difference, is the ontological frame in which difference holds sway and from which its onset is to be read[80].

CONCLUSIVE AND PROSPECTIVE REMARKS

Adopting the language of Heidegger's *Identity and Difference*, the disposition (*Austrag*) is not solely[81] the circular movement of Being and beings. It also gives rise to this movement or sway. At the same time, such flux is not solely conflictual but also governed by a sovereign telos. Both, Heidegger's "structural dispersal" and the "hermeneutic dissipation"[82] are inscribed in (and according to Heidegger, necessarily inscribed by), the dominance of *Walten*. The question of an apriori,

in this case, of an originary outset (outset and out-setting) has to remain self-identical if it is to retain its sovereignty and thus its conceptual coherence. It is, at the same time, to be perceived as a fluctuating primal outset. For now, it remains uncertain if we can avoid this conceptual circularity that seems to prevail in Heidegger's writings[83].

Walten propels differential growth, setting the condition of such difference. It also harbours primacy, and thus, pre-vails. As we have witnessed, Heidegger circumscribes his notion of *Walten* through a reading of Heraclitus and Aristotle. *Walten* serves to metaphysically assess the conundrum of growth. The growth of *physis*, from within a Heraclitean perspective, resists control, by only unfolding according to its "own measure"[84]. Heidegger seems eager to conceive of such a measure along an Aristotelian line. In accordance with the concept of prime movement, *Walten* has a minimal *telos*. It assures a differential (and violent) economy. Of course, by accepting Heidegger's insistence, such an economy is not directly considered through the question of Being but only thought in its light. *Walten* could then be read as ontological difference. Deciding to read it in this way implies that the metaphysical assessment of ontological difference is something which is itself governed: whether by a notion of a conflicting unrest or by the telos of prime movement. Via *Walten*, Heidegger theorizes an "ontological fundament"[85], from which we are dispersed, violently thrown into *Dasein*. Hence, *physis* forces itself into existence, into the presence of its there (*da*). Such an understanding of ontological difference conceptually advances conflictual deferral. However, such deferral is ultimately curtailed by a relatively vulgar frame of power: the differentiated renders something conceivable that moves without being moved[86].

Conclusively, we can assert that Heidegger's conceptual rupture, his move towards the pre-Socratics, remains defined by an Aristotelian tendency. To conceive of *Walten* as causally determined movement, implies the problematic spectre of a sovereign modality that precedes difference. Walten might be read as the primary origin (Urgrund), the primary leap (*Ursprung*) of sovereignty. The uniformity of matter and movement and thus a reading which sways towards Heraclitus, instead

of Aristotle, also advances a notion of sovereignty which destabilizes the primacy of the Aristotelian inflected notion.

If one desires to mobilize such ontological predicaments against sovereignty, it is crucial to contemplate the ungovernable dimension of growth, which Heidegger ignores. Such a prospective critique would need to focus on pre-difference which otherwise risks becoming in-difference to, metaphysically secured, sovereign imposition[87]. The nexus of growth could thus be mobilized against its own sway. Relying on (pre-) determination and vacillation, any procedure of growth follows its exceptional configuration while providing the potential to supersede such determination. Heidegger's *Walten* might also concern this interplay. Positioned at the outset of ontological difference, *Walten* governs (*ver-waltet*) its own unfolding. Metaphysics, presumably pure in its distance from the political[88], is held sway by a notion of the sovereign. However, and this is what should eventually be attended to: growth or φύσις might prevail—but it might equally well outgrow its prevalence.

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NOTES

1. In a 1934 note from the black notebooks, Heidegger sketched the obligation of working towards the finalization—the end—of philosophy in pursuit of what he termed "metapolitics". Considering that he did little to curtail the NS-resonances of his work, such a metapolitical announcement seems all-too ominous. Heidegger's containment efforts only marginally increased after his resignation from the Freiburg rectorate position and thus the end of his role as a representative of the German state. Certainly, the emphasis shifted. Volk, a privileged form of Mitsein in Sein und Zeit, was now to be defined via other means. And yet, despite such a cautionary preamble, this article will not examine Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazis and ponder the stale question if such a thinker deserves to occupy a privileged position. „Das Ende der ‚Philosophie'—Wir müssen sie zum Ende bringen und damit das völlig Andere—Metapolitik—vorbereiten. Demgemäß auch der Wandel der Wissenschaft."„The end of ‚philosophy'—We must bring it to an end and thereby prepare what is wholly other– metapolitics. Accordingly also the transformation of science.". Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe. IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnungen. Band 94. Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938). Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2014, 115. Martin Heidegger, Ponderings II-VI. Black Notebooks 1931-1938. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Studies in Continental Thought. Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2016, 85.
2. Derrida's final lecture, The Beast and the Sovereign, lends recurring attention to Heidegger's Walten, likening it to sovereignty: "Walten is dominant, governing power, as self-formed sovereignty, as autonomous, autarcic force, commanding and forming itself". Said power permeates, according to Derrida's reading of Heidegger, through beings who are: "seized, gripped, durchwalte[t] by the Gewalt [violence] of this Walten". Furthermore, and this is a thread that my reading will follow, Derrida likens Walten to the ontological difference. Gregory Fried's Polemos and Heraclitus: From Being to Politics reads Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus' polemos as indicative of a larger ontological conception, shaping Heidegger's work. As Fried argues, Heidegger's confrontation (Fried's translation of Heidegger's Aus-einander-setzung), must be understood as: "an interpretative struggle with the meaning of the world– and with the meaning of Being itself.". The hermeneutic constitution of the human being is defined by a call to confront the own history. Such a confrontation, shaped by polemos, is obliged to operate through a reconstruction and a deconstruction. Only such a dual strategy resists "nihilistic destructiveness" as Fried insists. Paul North's: Dissipation–Power–Transcendence focuses on Heidegger's dissipation or Zerstreuung which, according to his analysis, functions as the "fundament of fundamental ontology". Being disperses itself as time, and it becomes the obligation of Heidegger's philosophy to inform a reorientation towards this initiating dispersal. Hence, similar to this article's understanding of Walten, North perceives Zerstreuung as a "structural dispersal" and a "hermeneutic dissipation". Jacques Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign. Volume II. Eds. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 2017, 39f; 256; 288. Gregory Fried, Heidegger's Polemos: From Being to Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, 4; 42; 246. Paul North, Dissipation–Power–Transcendence. In: The Problem of Distraction. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012, 112; 121.
3. Heidegger's comments on metaphysics will, in the coming pages, be regarded as metaphysical commentary. Thus, this article does not anticipate the purview of a metaphysical critique, which, via its "Destruktion", establishes a non-metaphysical dictum.
4. Arguably, this is an operation that deconstruction has long been confronted with.

5. Adam Knowles, The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon. Ed. Mark Wrathall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, 163.
6. Such a decision seems to precede what we understand as a decision. The frictionless link between energeia and dynamis would not need to resort to it. The entelechy has an intrinsic end, preceding the need to decide. If actuality and potentiality are not in unison, unified via their "soul", we are confronted with something "equivocal". Aristotle, On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On Breath. With an English Translation by W.S. Hett. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press/William Heinemann LTD. 1986, 212b.
7. Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. 2015, 13f.
8. Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude. Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, 25. Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit. Frankfurt/Main: Rote Reihe. Klostermann. 2018, 38.
9. As a dear friend would have it: "At the edge of the ontological difference as that being for whom its being is an issue for itself, Dasein has an undecidable horizon of inexhaustible Seinkönnen, and this finitude in the context of decision and being-guilty, is related to the ripening of growing fruit".
10. Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign. Volume II, 21.
11. Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1998, 120.
12. Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976, 156.
13. Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Gregory Fried, Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, 167.
14. It is perhaps not surprising that such a "rule of love" prevails within the confines of faith. Moreover, I leave it to the reader to decide if a notion of the "rule of love" is not similarly informed by violence, albeit, of another kind. Thomas Aquinas, Die katholische Wahrheit oder die theologische Summa. Trans. Schneider. Regensburg: Verlags-Anstalt, 1885, XLVI; Sören Kierkegaard, Leben und Walten der Liebe. Trans. Dorner. Leipzig: Franz Richter, 1890.
15. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 167.
16. In 1946, Heidegger will borrow Rilke's Urgrund to speak of such an orginary, or originating, cause. Martin Heidegger, Wozu Dichter? Gesamtausgabe. I. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte Schriften 1914-1970. Band 5. Holzwege. Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2003.
17. The 1976 translation follows the older transfer of Seiendes as essent (meanwhile, Seiendes is often translated as entity/entities/existent/s, Sein as being, without capitalization; I will choose Being-Sein, beings-Seiendes). In addition, it neglects the direct reference of Walten. Both ignore Heidegger's reluctance to translate φύσις. On the ensuing pages, I shall limit myself to the direct citation of one source, but will, sometimes, point out the problems that I encounter.
18. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 14f.
19. Strictly considered, the translation of growth, phuein, refers to the verbal noun, while physis itself might be considered the horizon of such growth. Heidegger speaks of "Aufgehen", "emerging", and "aufgehendes Walten", "emerging sway", Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 11; Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 15.
20. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 14f.
21. Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 10f.
22. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 25f; Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der

Metaphysik, 38f.
23. Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign. Volume II, 12.
24. His primal leap, or Ur-sprung, is itself a dubious occurrence, as it tends to discount contingency for the sake of mystified determination.
25. Metaphysics, according to the "originary meaning" summoned by Heidegger, has to examine physis. As a result, the metaphysical register also labours a pre-differential domain. Pre-difference is contained in that which gives rise to difference. The "self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole" is not solely the totality of different processes of form-giving, and growth, but there also seems to be the spectre of something which unites, and regulates, these tendencies in a larger sway. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 25f; Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, 38f.
26. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 15; Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 11.
27. The catachresis, indicated by the hyphenation of Vor-gang, illustrate Heidegger's insistence on the study of originary moments. Physis might be considered a proto-procedural ontological horizon.
28. As Derrida cautions, physis prevails and thus depends, "as Walten, only on itself", it "forms itself sovereignly [...] receiving its image, its figure of domination, from itself". Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign. Volume II, 39.
29. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 14f.
30. If prevailing, as Heidegger insists, wields sovereign privilege, can we then still hope to eventually overcome such ontological primacy? Heidegger's persistence is performative on more than one account. Foremost, the terminological insistence does not solely rely on a constative dimension. As portrayed before, the terminology of Walten, and its associated translations, implicitly mobilizes several (violent) connotations. Furthermore, the conception(s) mobilize a performative function within the edifice of Heidegger's theory. His notion of ontological difference prevails. (Ver-) Waltung operates through a swaying metonymical register.
31. North, The Problem of Distraction,121.
32. cf. ibid.
33. At this stage, we cannot elaborate how Heidegger perceives his effort as one of overcoming the onto-theological tendency that effaces difference. It suffices to assert that this "overcoming" does not curtail the problematic status of Walten. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 41; Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, 63.
34. Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York/Evanston/London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969, 70f.
35. Martin, Heidegger, Identität und Differenz. Gesamtausgabe. I. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte Schriften 1910-1976. Band 11. Identität und Differenz. Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006, 76.
36. "perdurance is a circling, the circling of Being and beings around each other [...] of which we think at first as the approach to the active nature of the difference between Being and beings [den wir zunächst als den Vorort des Wesens der Differenz von Sein und Seiendem denken]", Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 69ff; Heidegger, Identität und Differenz, 75ff.
37. Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign. Volume II, 256.
38. Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign. Volume II, 215.
39. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 25f.
40. North develops this in the context of Heidegger's assessment of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. North, The Problem of Distraction, 138f.

41. cf. ibid.
42. “without heeding the difference as difference [ohne auf die Differenz als Differenz zu achten]”. “Whenever we come to the place [Wir treffen dort] to which we were supposedly first bringing difference along as an alleged contribution, we always find that Being and beings in their difference are already there.” Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 70; 62; Heidegger, Identität und Differenz, 70; 69.
43. North, The Problem of Distraction, 138f.
44. Kōjin Karatani, Isonomia and the Origins of Philosophy. Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2017, 59.
45. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 32f; Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, 49.
46. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 34.
47. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XI (K) 1064a28-1681.
48. Karatani, Isonomia, 59
49. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 32f; Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, 49.
50. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 77; Heidegger, Identität und Differenz, 77.
51. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 70f; Heidegger, Identität und Differenz, 76.
52. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 15; Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 11.
53. Certainly, via such a definition, one enters into an aporetic realm. After all, it is often the outside that prompts the presumed need for a sovereign act. The search for an originary moment of sovereignty then becomes a tautological pursuit. Arguably, the same verdict could be applied to any such quest.
54. Schmitt, Politische Theologie, 13f.
55. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 32f; Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, 49.
56. This is not a pledge for a historicizing contextualization but a response to Heidegger’s own insistence, regarding the need for a philosophy responding to its time.
57. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 132; Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 96.
58. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 121.
59. Aristotle, Physics. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1991, IV, § 11f
60. Aristotle, Metaphysics, V (Δ) 1018b9-1018b29.
61. Thus, we can speak of a substantiation of Walten. The modality is turned into something akin to a governing force.
62. Karatani, Isonomia, 59.
63. Aristotle, Metaphysics, XIII (M) 1078b32-1705.
64. Capobianco, in a more recent discussion of Heidegger’s Heraclitus, follows the following syntagmatic chain: “Being as physis as kosmos”, leaving polemos’ conflictual tendency behind. Richard Capobianco, Heidegger on Heraclitus: Kosmos/World as Being Itself. In: Epoché, Volume 20, Issue 2, 2016, 475.
65. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 31; Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, 47.
66. In his lectures on metaphysics, it is not entirely obvious if Heidegger privileges Heraclitus or Aristotle, or if his readings transform both. He seems to advance a notion of Heraclitus which still favours the Aristotelian imposition of causes.

67. Through Karatani, we already developed how the notion of the kosmos does not allow the conceptual separation of matter and motion. "For Heraclitus, the One [kosmos] does not exist beyond materiality and motion but comes to be realized through motion." Karatani, Isonomia, 84.
68. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 142.
69. Ibid.
70. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 132; Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 96.
71. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 142; Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 102.
72. ἔρις
73. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149.
74. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 149; Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 107.
75. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 113f.
76. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 120; Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 87. In Heidegger's Polemos, Fried reads the "Auseinandersetzung" as indicative of Heidegger's method: "Not only does polemos set forth beings into the 'boundaries' of their Being so that Dasein can make sense of them, it also governs what looks almost like the beginnings of an ethic for interpreting the thinking of other Dasein." Fried, Heidegger's Polemos: From Being to Politics, 39.
77. Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 64f; Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, 47.
78. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 69ff; Heidegger, Identität und Differenz, 75ff.
79. North, The Problem of Distraction, 138f.
80. "One can talk endlessly about its possibility without ever coming close to the thing itself in its coming. It may be, then, that the order is other—it may well be—and that only the coming of the event allows, after the event [après coup], perhaps, what will previously have made possible to be thought." Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship. Translated by George Collins. London/New York: Verso, 2020, 18.
81. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 31; Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, 47.
82. North, The Problem of Distraction, 121.
83. Such (im-) possibility cannot be conclusively proposed. Rather, we should probably conceive this as a call to think (with and against) this repetitive—albeit always singular—procedurality within the sovereign sway.
84. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 287.
85. North, The Problem of Distraction, 111, 121.
86. In the light of such premises, we can either accept Heidegger's sovereign decision on ontological origination, or we have to depart from it. Such a predicament applies to any ontological foundation.
87. Derrida, The Beast & the Sovereign. Volume II, 191.
88. This is a distance that Heidegger's 1934 note undermines.