INTRODUCTION

Shortly before he died at the age of fifty-seven, Michel Foucault spoke of his efforts to alter his “way of looking at things … [and] to change the boundaries” of what he knew.1 After thirty-five years of philosophical labour, during which he always sought to go astray from himself, Foucault wondered if in the end he had found his orientation in thinking. Instead, he reminisced, he had merely come to think differently, albeit “from a new vantage point;” despite the impression of progress, the irony is one ends up “looking down on oneself from above.”2

If Foucault is right and the philosopher’s vocation remains an askēsis, or the exercise of oneself in the activity of thought, the longer one practices thinking, the higher and wider one’s perspective becomes. With few exceptions, the rule for philosophers is to become profound, not monarchs. Similarly for Foucault, whose voyage in thought ended in mid-ocean, though not too late for him to clarify that what he had been trying to articulate—from the day he left the École Normale Supérieure in 1951 until his death in 1984 as professor at the Collège de France—was a critical history of thought. As Foucault entered what would also be the last months of his life, he left us in no doubt about his serendipitous philosophical journey. From the perspective afforded by hindsight—and even though it metamorphosed in a “somewhat confused fashion”3—he outlined a unique philosophical method. Insofar as it is Kantian derived and Nietzschean inspired, it is both critical and historical. Yet it is definitively Foucauldian too, in as much as critique targets thought in its historicity.4 Hence Foucault’s analytical focus on the games of truth and their inextricable relation to power, as well as the modes of self-formation they constitute.5

An articulation of Foucault’s œuvre of a critical history of thought defines the purpose here. To begin with, the first section gestures at a concept of the œuvre wherein its form is defined by the establishment of a field
of inquiry, while its content is characterised by disjunctions and multiplicity. In section two the criticisms of Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor are examined. Their insistence on defining the form of an œuvre by the unity and continuity of its content means they reject Foucault’s endeavour outright. As a consequence, they are unable to fathom how Foucault can both critique and draw upon enlightenment thought at the same time. Section three then traces the origins of Foucault’s œuvre of a critical history in Immanuel Kant’s project for a philosophical history of reason, which Foucault recycles through Nietzsche’s critique of Western metaphysics and subjectivity. Subsequently, in section four we analyse how Foucault both rejects and incorporates key elements of enlightenment into his thinking, while section five delineates the essence of critical history and its focus on self-formation. Finally, in the conclusion we consider the relevance for critique today of a Foucauldian œuvre.

FOUCAULT AND THE CONCEPT OF THE ŒUVRE

The question that first comes to mind from these introductory remarks is why advocate a Foucauldian œuvre? For a start, several other commentators discern a common thread in Foucault’s writings, whether John Rajchman’s “ethic of free thought,” Hubert Dreyfus’ and Paul Rabinow’s “interpretive analytics,” Stuart Elden’s “mapping of the present,” or Alan Sheridan’s “political anatomy.” Other writers, however, are more explicit in discerning an œuvre. In its highly topical choice of sexuality or the techniques of normalisation, Foucault’s work coheres around what Todd May calls “histories of the present.” Akin to Michael Mahon’s idea of the “genealogical problematic” that informs Foucault’s writings, these genealogical histories are fuelled by a “philosophical ethos,” which itself is indicative of an œuvre and might be situated within a larger corpus of enlightenment thought. In this sense Foucault’s effort to deploy critique as a means to articulate an ethics relevant for today defines a consistent œuvre. For Johanna Oksala, it amounts to a “nominalist political ontology” of the social practices that define our present reality. Nonetheless, these thinkers do not develop Foucault’s œuvre in terms of the philosophical method of a critical history of thought, nor for that matter do they address its very possibility.

In fact, before we can elaborate any content, we must first deal with the objection to the form of this endeavour. Foucault himself could be said to oppose any attempt to articulate an œuvre, with his riposte to those who detected an affinity between archaeology and structuralism a case in point. As a reaction against the “Author-God” (or “author-generator”), Foucault lays down a ‘labyrinth’ as his condition of possibility for writing. His methodological reason is authorial effacement, such that the explanatory power of the episteme comes to the fore and we cease demanding that Foucault remain the same. We can therefore ask if an œuvre sans auteur—from, to boot, a chameleonic author who is a consummate academic wheeler dealer, and with a “sardonic laughter” that haunts even Gilles Deleuze—is possible?

To be sure, the purpose here is not a retroactive Whig interpretation of Foucault’s work, which as Roger Deacon argues would simply violate his thought. Instead, we can initially distinguish between an author and an individual. As the former, one’s writings are presented for public consumption. It requires one’s work to display continuity and a minimum level of coherence, which eventually translates into a “neo-identity.” However, as an individual the author enjoys the same right to privacy as any other citizen. There is no obligation to stay the same, or duty to be publicly accountable for who one is. With echoes of the ad hominem fallacy, Foucault refuses an explanation of an œuvre—the author’s publicly mediated neo-identity—with reference to a person’s private life.

Secondly, he rejects the valorisation of an œuvre due to the political preferences of the writer and her intellectual lineage. It fuels a cult of the author and its associated vicissitudes of style, which is no more acute than in Paris where intellectual affinity is as fickle as that of fashion. Such a reduction of author to engagement spurs the hagiographer to impute magic into texts, and to deploy them for the causes the author might have championed. Instead, the value of a text resides in the extent to which it serves a strategic purpose. For this to occur, an author’s words must be released from the texts in which they originate, as well as from the academic rigours
that accompany their interpretation. Finally, Foucault readily acknowledges the link between the individual, a neo-identity and an œuvre. If to change how one thinks is a game with oneself, which is constitutive of who one is, then it cannot be kept from one’s public in the shape of what one produces, or the texts that one publishes for consumption in return for self-affirmation.21

It is this oscillation between a right to privacy vis-à-vis one’s œuvre as it enters the public domain, the demand to evaluate a text in terms of its critical purpose rather than the engagement of its producer, and the centrality in his life of the transformation of himself by thought, such that he wears his mind on his sleeve,22 which accounts for the confusion in how to interpret Foucault.23 It also fuels scepticism about the very possibility of an œuvre and his association with it. If we are to have any hope of filling out its content with (Foucauldian) critical history, therefore, we must articulate the form the requisite œuvre might take.

A point of entry is Foucault’s “founder of discursivity.” It develops out of the politics of doing philosophy in 1960s France, which inheres in Foucault’s comments above in the preface to The Archaeology of Knowledge and his methodological injunction to privilege the text over the author. The politics concerns relieving the author of responsibility by dissipating the ordering of spoken things into discourse, which allays the anxiety inherent to any act of writing and allows it to begin anew.24 Here, Raymond Barthes’ “book of Logothetes” is useful, wherein he lauds Sade, Fourier and Loyola as inventors of language.25 By first rejecting the dominant language and its distortions of thinking, the logothete goes on to ground their own linguistic register, which takes shape in a self-contained œuvre. However, the logothete’s text is characterised by an infinite variety of strategies, approaches, problematisations and perspectives. As a “series of bits and pieces, a baroque fabric of odds and ends,” the œuvre qua text constitutes a continuum, yet without any logical order, teleological rationale or organic coherence.26 Within a baroque œuvre, therefore, the author is a heuristic device, rather than the “ontological principle” of the text.27

Foucault in fact intimates as much. During a debate at the Société française de philosophie in 1969 (published as Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?), he says his aim in The Order of Things had been to excavate the episteme, or those discursive layers that stand outside the categories “of the book … [or] author.”28 To get beyond the anthropocentric reductionism implied by the latter, Foucault speaks of the “transdiscursive” author, who constructs a house of writing in which other authors find their home. The “founders of discursivity,” whether Freud and Marx (and their discourses of psychoanalysis and Marxism, respectively) or Nietzsche, Marx and Freud (and their constitution of the field of hermeneutics), establish the framework and norms that give birth to future texts. These authors have an “inaugurative value.” They force, within the Kuhnesque paradigm they give birth to, a constant return to the origin. However, this is not out of any obligation to be faithful to the founder, but an act of homage and a point of departure for modifying the field of discursivity.29

Foucault, I want to argue along with Paul Rabinow and Edward Saïd,30 is one such founder of discursivity. His field is philosophical method, which many of us work with or against, but rarely without reference to. Typically, we deploy it in our everyday practice of thought, which is an amalgam of askēsis, or training, and mathēsis, or theoretical knowledge.31 In this respect, the form of his œuvre is critical history, while its content is knowledge, power and ethics. It suggests the œuvre is neither the exclusive product of the author, nor the arbitrary construction of the reader. It is the co-constructed effect of the constitution of the author’s interpretative horizons by the episteme, and the product of the dynamic inherent to the field of discursivity that is grounded by the author.32 Although initially the outcome of the author’s comprehension of the episteme, the œuvre ultimately detaches itself from any authorial subject. While an œuvre endures as a discursive field, the author is merely its home ground. Authorship is a hostage of the historical and reactive, as it must be when the graphē insinuates itself into the bios.33
THOUGHT WITHOUT REASON

With this understanding of the form of a Foucauldian œuvre, why advocate a content of the practice of critique in respect of the imbroglio of truth, power and subjectivity? One approach is to consider the question in terms of its origins. Why, that is, do Foucault’s foes go to such lengths to emphasise the fact that, because his trajectory of critique was characterised by frequent oscillations between knowledge, power and self-formation, it is impossible to assign value to his thought, let alone talk about it in their vocabulary of an œuvre?

The answer lies in what is unsaid, yet implied and taken for granted. From the perspective of “auteurist criticism,” thinkers without an underlying unity and continuity are rarely taken seriously. To be fair, even Foucault’s friends differ in their taxonomies. Is he a philosopher, social critic or political theorist—an historian—in which case, of knowledge, institutions, power, social structures, the human sciences, ethical practices, or perhaps all of these at the same time—or, as he himself implied, a critical historian of thought whose work is political because empirical and oriented toward the present? To paraphrase Foucault, we might say that for his foes the absence of a stable authorial subject behind his œuvre makes it tantamount to madness, or “thought without reason.”

Let me home in on the arguments against Foucault’s folly, where his detractors focus on the status of truth as an effect of the apparatuses of power/knowledge and the contradiction it lands him in when it comes to advocating critique. For Habermas, Foucault’s aversion to truth means that neither the archaeologist’s stoic gaze that freezes history into an iceberg, nor the cynical gaze of the genealogist who defrosts and remoulds it, move us beyond a subjectless will to power. Genealogical historiography, which assumes power has a transcendental status that usurps reason’s claim to objectivity, suffers from the same illusions Foucault detects in the human sciences. According to Habermas, Foucault’s Nietzschean treatment of power as the historical a priori—that “border of time that surrounds our present … [and] outside ourselves, delimits us”—eliminates any trace of subjectivity, which lands him in “contradictory self-thematizations.” Ultimately, Habermas despair, Foucault is unable to adjudicate the all-pervasive power circulating in the social body. If he is to convince Habermas that he is more than a young conservative whose critique of modernity does not turn in on itself—if Foucault is to do more than aestheticise politics into a transfiguring play of freedom with reality—he must assuage Habermas’ skepticism. Why, Habermas exasperates, ought we to resist apparatuses of power/knowledge?

In line with Habermas, Charles Taylor denounces the monolithic relativism of Foucault’s apparatuses of power/knowledge and the impotence of his critique. This is linked to Taylor’s concern with Foucault’s analysis of power, in which there is no place for freedom or truth. Rather than follow Taylor by articulating a community’s moral ontology and its importance to the constitution of identity, especially the underlying image of the self who enjoys the power to will, Foucault opts for the hermetic “critic-in-small.” His neo-Nietzschean arbitrariness of interpretation, and interpretation as an imposition of domination, means that Foucault’s construction of the subject as a self-centred work of art is difficult to accept in the face of his rejection of modern thought. In answer to his question about a conceptualisation of power without associated notions of truth and freedom, Taylor laments that Foucault is doubly relativistic. He cannot differentiate various frameworks of “life/thought/valuation,” nor judge between the different forms of power they imply.

In this light, my intention is to meet Foucault’s critics on their own terms by arguing that he incorporates and goes beyond the philosophical legacy of enlightenment thought. For his critics, certain concepts, such as power and knowledge, and many core values—truth and freedom prime among them—are the sole preserve of an enlightenment inspired mode of thinking, which also includes an exclusive practice of critique. This is why Habermas, most tellingly, wants to interrogate Foucault’s desire to bring “off a radical critique of reason.” If Foucault fails, then so too does his Nietzschean laundering of Kant and the effort to discern from within enlightenment an alternative mode of critique. Similarly, as Taylor says, Foucault’s account of power/knowledge is empty in respect of truth and liberation and silent about their causal relation. Because, in Taylor’s interpretation of enlightenment, any talk of power must include its nemesis, truth qua means to
freedom, Foucault simply does not “speak coherently.” For Habermas and Taylor, philosophical incoherence and political danger infiltrate Foucault’s Nietzschean attempt to have his Kantian cake and eat it. One simply cannot reject the value legacy of enlightenment, yet at the same time both claim a share of the inheritance of its concepts, such as truth and freedom, and argue for an alternative language of critique—critical history—through which to think them. For Habermas and Taylor, philosophical incoherence and political danger infiltrate Foucault’s Nietzschean attempt to have his Kantian cake and eat it. One simply cannot reject the value legacy of enlightenment, yet at the same time both claim a share of the inheritance of its concepts, such as truth and freedom, and argue for an alternative language of critique—critical history—through which to think them.

KANT, NIETZSCHE, FOUCALUT

The above criticisms personify the negative reception of Foucault beyond the Gallic context that nurtured him. His bad press is largely due to mutually exclusive interpretations in post-war France and Germany of Kant’s call to take up pens around a history of reason. In France, it produced various philosophies of the subject, which eventually defined the positivist remit of the human sciences. Amongst others, Foucault spearheaded the attack against humanism in The Order of Things, especially against the dominance of positivism that relied on a Kantian transcendental subject. To be sure, there were other critical alternatives available, whether Alexandre Kojève’s and Jean Hyppolite’s Marxist rendition of Hegel’s dialectic of history, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology or Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism, yet Foucault’s concern was to resuscitate—rather than reject—Kant. Meanwhile, in Germany the history of reason was taken up by Karl Marx and carried forward by Max Weber and the Frankfurt School in the form of a history of social rationality, which defers to a critical theory to reconcile reason to its moments of social diremption. Habermas is one of the leading heirs of this tradition, and has steered the philosophical discourse of modernity away from the subject into communicative action and the capacity of language for world disclosure, albeit at the expense of foreclosing any discussion around whether his interpretation of our inheritance—the responsibility to provide an endogenous normative foundation for modernity—is actually a viable avenue.

In contrast to both the French and German heeding of Kant’s call, Foucault worked in the French tradition of the philosophy of science called epistemological history. With echoes of the sociology of scientific knowledge and its explanation of the content of knowledge through its context, critique is a matter of analysing the social and political conditions of possibility (savoir) for scientific knowledge (connaissance). A critical history of thought follows in the footsteps of Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, who were successive occupants of the chair in the history and philosophy of science at the Sorbonne. Foucault not only acknowledges his debt to Bachelard for épistémocritique, which investigates the truth and falsity of statements that constitute a scientific discourse, but he extends his gratitude to Canguilhem for épistémologiques, or the analysis of scientific knowledge in terms of its discursive practice and the rules for its use. Most importantly, Foucault learns from Canguilhem that the “history of a concept … [depends on] its various fields of constitution and validity… [rather than] its progressive refinement.” On this understanding, Foucault’s encounter with Kant corresponds with the attempt in France to properly understand him at the turn of the twentieth century, when it becomes possible to distinguish the “doctrine” of the Kantian system from the “idea” of criticism. Although both implicate one in an “attitude” of thinking, Foucault aligns himself with the “idea.” It requires that we cut ourselves off from Kant’s linking of criticism to metaphysics “in order to release the purity of the idea of criticism.”

It is within this nationally specific intellectual heritage that Foucault develops his life-long quest to salvage Kant’s concept of critique from any metaphysical doctrine through the voice of Nietzsche. In his petite thèse on Kant’s Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique, we see the first mention of an “archaeology of the text” as a vehicle to dethrone anthropocentrism and facilitate the birth of “homo criticus.” However, of most importance for the purposes here is Foucault’s sudden change of tack at the end of his complementary thesis, where he calls forth Nietzsche to rescue us from Kant’s anthropocentrism. The question of Was ist der Mensch?, Foucault writes, has finally found its answer in der Übermensch.

Foucault’s attempt to release the purity of Kant’s critical potential is manifest in his interest in “philosophische Archäologie,” which in the tradition of Bachelard and Canguilhem mentioned earlier proffers a method for
excavating the socio-political and discursive conditions that render scientific knowledge possible. With echoes of what Foucault would undertake in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Kant yearns for a history of reason not in terms of its transcendental or phenomenological conditions, but of its concrete manifestation in the historical *a priori*. As Kant outlines in *Fortschritte der Metaphysik*, a *philosophische Archäologie* excavates “the facticity of reason” from the “nature [or rationality or episteme] of reason” itself.65

To be sure, Kant’s *philosophische Archäologie* and Foucault’s archaeology differ in more than name. Most obviously, for the former reason is always potentially transcendental. However, for Foucault, who follows Nietzsche to “the threshold beyond which contemporary philosophy” can start thinking again, reason is resolutely historical due to the ontological priority of power.66 The fundamental influence of Kant on Foucault, as well as Foucault’s attempt to resuscitate critical philosophy by purging it of transcendental aspirations, is further evident in terms of critique’s purpose.67 As is well known, Kant aligns philosophy and modernity by assigning the former the responsibility for answering four questions that are crucial to the attempt to ground the latter: what can I know?; what ought I to do?; what may I hope for?; and what is man?68 But in *The Order of Things* Foucault demonstrates that humanism subordinates the epistemological and moral questions to the anthropological, whence various foundational philosophies of the subject. Kant the philosopher of *Aufklärung* must be rescued from Kant the inadvertent founder of humanism’s transcendental subject, for although he paved the way for the advance of critical thought, Kant “ultimately relegated all critical investigations to an anthropological question.”69

Although Foucault acknowledges that Heidegger determined his philosophical development, he recognizes as we saw earlier that Nietzsche’s influence ultimately prevailed.70 In his definitive turn from Heidegger to Nietzsche, which is key for the purposes of rescuing Kant from the philosophy of the empirico-transcendental *doublet*, the focus of Foucault’s critique broadens from knowledge to apparatuses of power/knowledge, the episteme to the *dispositif d’ensemble* or apparatus.71 Nonetheless, Dreyfus and Rainbow are correct to insist that there is “no pre- and post-archaeology or genealogy in Foucault.”72 Instead, after 1968 the analysis of systems of thought, which organise and regulate how the subject experiences herself, is subsumed by the problematic of how such systems come into existence through contingent historical processes that are manifested as events.73 Foucault’s Nietzschean turn is, as John Rajchman argues, a natural outcome of his desire to make Heidegger’s philosophical anti-humanism political.74 The result is critique with a “double gaze.”75 Archaeology discerns the nominalist ontological premises within the field of the apparatus qua grid of intelligibility,76 while the “politicisation effected” by genealogy concerns an analysis of the event within it.77 Archaeology is the methodological framework and genealogy the weapon that targets discourses. Foucault hereby wants to show how discursive events constitute the present and “ourselves—either our knowledge, our practices, our type of rationality, our relationship to ourselves or to others….”78

FOUCAULT’S ETHOS: KANT AND NIETZSCHE AGAIN

The importance of Nietzsche is not solely in terms of genealogy as a method to humble the transcendental aspirations of Kantian metaphysics. Foucault is also able to deploy Nietzsche to find an exit for Kant’s Third Antinomy, in which the only way *homo phenomenon* can be free of natural causes is to posit *homo noumenon*, or “man,” who stands outside time and space and whose will is determined by pure practical reason.79 While Kant’s antinomy of (noumenal) freedom and (phenomenal) necessity is caught in a dualist spatial relationship, for Nietzsche the solution involves a non-dualist temporal relationship. Therein, necessity belongs to the realm of the past and freedom to that of the future. Their confluence in the present gives rise to a subjectivity that is simultaneously one of being (necessity) and becoming (freedom).80 Kantian maturity of self-legislated obedience to the moral law, where *der Mensch* is the outcome of self-actualisation, issubsumed into Nietzschean maturity where *der Übermensch* dissociates autonomy from any universalisable moral law in a process of perpetual self-overcoming. Autonomy becomes goal-directed agency that is manifest in the world, rather than agency directed at transcendental goals.
In this light, it is obvious why Foucault’s critique is a double wager: in the first place, he stands to gain the erasure, like the now famous face drawn at the edge of the sea, of humanism’s condition of possibility, “man”; secondly, if successful, Foucault can claim a part of the inheritance of Kantian Aufklärung, and the right to redefine critique and rethink autonomy. By inaugurating the return of critical philosophy “in the void left by man’s disappearance,” Foucault writes a critical history of thought from three very Kantian points of departure, yet which proceed along a very Nietzschean road: how have my questions been produced and the path of my knowing determined (versus what can I know?); how have I been situated to experience the real and how does exclusion operate in delineating the realm of obligation for me (versus what ought I to do?); and what are the struggles in which I am engaged and how have the parameters for my aspirations been defined (versus what may I hope for?)? In short, on the understanding that reason is internal to discursive practices, Foucault’s œuvre is a critical history that analyses how subjects are articulated vis-à-vis limits that are inherently contingent in nature due to power, but which are typically experienced as necessary because of a truth effect.

Indeed, this baroque œuvre, which Foucault speaks of in terms of his “project,” is pieced together in a short summary of his work for the Dictionnaire des philosophes in 1984. Although the synopsis is signed Maurice Florence, the author is unquestionably Foucault. In keeping with the French tradition of these brief intellectual biographies written under a pseudonym, he speaks about Maurice Florence’s œuvre as a “critical history of thought.” It suggests that Foucault’s quest to build a bridge between Kantian critique and Nietzschean genealogy finally started to make sense through his analytical focus on ethical self-formation and its relation to contemporary conceptions of freedom. This in turn obliged Foucault to take up Kant from another angle, that of Aufklärung. What intrigues Foucault here is how the “idea” rather than the “metaphysics” of critique is upheld by Kant, which is evident in the way he speaks of an age of enlightenment in terms of a Nietzschean “Ausgang” that we are continually having to locate.

Foucault’s fascination is with Kant’s conception of enlightenment as a mode of thinking “difference” in the present. To discern it requires a certain ethos, and in his reflections on enlightenment (or really Kant’s interpretation of it) Foucault turns to Baudelaire. The ethos contains, firstly, a will to appropriate the present, or at least to tease out the eternal within the ephemeral. Secondly, the ethos allows us to treat the present with irony, precisely in order “to imagine it otherwise than it is, and to transform it but by grasping it in what it is.” The modern ethos attuned to the present in this way is clearly taking its cue once again from the Nietzschean injunction to live in the “Augenblick,” or that moment when one is liberated from the seriality of time and affirmative of it through an aesthetic articulation of autonomy by a self-overcoming subject. Foucault’s ethos is the weapon that makes living with amor fati bearable, while the philosophy that attends to this task has “attitude,” which is expressed as “a permanent critique of our historical era.”

It is in Qu’est-ce que la critique? [Critique et Aufklärung] that Foucault first outlines this “critical attitude,” which is coterminous with any act of government, or more precisely the governmentality through which the subject, power and truth find their historical articulation (typically, the obedience of the subject via a discourse of truth). As such, the offspring of governmentality is resistance, which Foucault describes as a “critical attitude.” It is manifest as a simple refusal to submit to various modes of governing at specific historical junctures, which is definitive of Aufklärung as an Ausgang. Following Frédéric Gros, therefore, there are three axes in Foucault’s relation to enlightenment: firstly, the insistence on the non-necessity of philosophy, in the sense of the lack of any internal legitimation of it, such that its only justification can be found externally in an attitude of the permanent questioning of the present; secondly, the subject’s relation to truth is through an ethical act of courage—an ethos—rather than via a moral gymnastics in tune with an epistemology; and, thirdly, the refusal to obey, or resistance, is the condition for the opening up of a theoretical field, such as mental illness or sexuality, and an historical inquiry into its contingent moments of construction with a view to deflating the perception of their necessity.

Critique, as David Owen tells us, pursues “maturity through reflection on modernity, where this reflection is articulated via a historical reconstruction of our being in the present.” From this perspective, critique is akin...
to a sentry on duty that keeps watch for the impending dark, which always threatens to envelope agonistically derived spaces of freedom. In the event that it does, critique discloses the contingent nature of power/knowledge and hereby acts as a “solvent” of domination that allows us to seek an Ausgang. It is as a radical skeptic of the necessary—or a critical historian of the contingent—that, after his numerous sojourns in America during the 1970s, Foucault attempted a rapprochement between the divergent trajectories of critique that emanate from the enlightenment. To some extent, Thomas McCarthy demonstrates it is feasible in terms of a shared heritage of socio-historical analysis that seeks to gain “critical distance from … rational beliefs.” Similarly, Allen rejects the spurious opposition between Foucault’s contextualism and Habermas’s commitment to a mode of reason that can transcend practices. Instead, she conjoins them in a “principled form of contextualism” that turns on how context-transcending ideals are in constant need of an unmasking of their status as semblances of power.

Nonetheless, the particularities of Foucault’s approach should not be underestimated. In this respect, Paul Veyne writes that Foucault’s critical history shows that gestures, even those of inclusion and integration, always fail to “fulfil the universalism of a reason” and hereby leave emptiness outside. A task of philosophy is thus to make the insatiable human appetite for knowledge aware of the concomitant forms of domination that it engenders. It is a tradition that can be traced back to Nietzsche, who writes in the Genealogy of Morals: “what sense would our entire existence have, if not this that in ourselves this will to truth has become conscious of itself as a problem?” Foucault’s insight is to marry the will to power with the will to truth, whence the notion of apparatuses of power/knowledge and the ethico-political axis of any critical philosophy today: “How is it possible to exist as rational beings, who are fortunately destined to practice a rationality that is unfortunately shot through with intrinsic dangers?”

A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THOUGHT

So how is critique to proceed in its ambition to inform reason that, because it is neither unequivocally universal in its remit nor transcendental in its representations, its practices are destined to oscillate between those in which subjectivity is mired in immaturity (Unmündigkeit) and practices that enable the conditions for maturity (Mündigkeit)? Foucault’s critical history proceeds on the basis of two interrelated moments of ideal criticism and real transformation. The former is less a question of pronouncing on what is wrong than highlighting the familiar, yet unchallenged, ways of thought on which the practices we accept rest. To be sure, ideal criticism presupposes that we resist the tendency to prioritise the social as the sole reality and, relatedly, that we rehabilitate thought as an independent entity that merits a history of its own. Ideal critique allows us to re-appropriate the world by deconstructing the processes that have shaped it. It is “the means to think the world as it is and as it could be,” which in the first instance requires a demonstration that things are not as self-evident as they may seem. Because the task of criticism is to make facile gestures difficult, ideal criticism succeeds to the extent that it ushers in—if not implores from those concerned—the second moment of critique, that of real transformation, “[for] as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes ... quite possible.”

Critical history’s twin components, which can never be separated and so engender a continuous criticism, proceed against the backdrop of a modification of enlightenment values. It targets the limits of the necessary on behalf of the “constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects.” Here, critical history can initially be contrasted with philosophical critique. Foucault’s ideal criticism is indebted to Kantian philosophical criticism. However, on the proviso that the possibility of a legislative judgement premised on an analytic of truth is jettisoned, critical history delegates the concrete political moment of transformation to those implicated. Instead of being transcendental and concerned with the very possibility of metaphysics, critical history is archaeological and concerned with giving impetus via genealogy to the undefined work of freedom as incessant self-overcoming. Rather than a formal critique undertaken to necessarily limit the remit of reason, critical history is a practical critique preoccupied with the possibility of transgression, in particular of those limits that are a product of the contingent and the arbitrary and which define what we are, do and think.
**CRITICAL HISTORY**

Insofar as the immanent critical theory of the Frankfurt School is concerned—which takes its cue from Marx’s clarion call to philosophers to stop interpreting the world and to start transforming it, while its Kantian purpose is to democratise the “conditions of social life that are controllable by human beings”—the key points of difference with Foucauldian transformative critique are epistemological and political. As we have already seen, Foucault does not entertain a privileged, transcendental perspective for truth. The critical historian assumes the role of a specific intellectual, who is situated inside practice and thus unable to speak on behalf of others from a perspective outside of it, which is in contrast to the universal intellectual whose critical theory strives to “align theory and practice” by being transversal, effective and pragmatic. Further, the domain of the political is as much intra- as extra-state, not least because Foucault is analysing, firstly, the sovereign power targeted by the critical theorist, as well as its inextricable relation to knowledge, and, secondly, the bio-power that critical history reveals to be coterminous with its sovereign sibling, whence Foucault’s plea to cut off the King’s head.

Critical history is therefore nominalist, which is not to deny that a thing exists. Rather, in order to know what it is, it is necessary to understand how it came into being. For the purposes of apprehending the historicity of forms of experience via their reduction to the domain of thought, one steps back from one’s conduct and presents it to oneself as an object for questioning. A nominalist critical history of thought depicts how experience is formed, reformed and transformed. For Foucault, it is not the contractual, transcendental, phenomenological or interpretive capacities of self-consciousness that act as the conditions of possibility for experience, nor anything else akin to an authentic being who stands before, outside or over against the apparatuses of power/knowledge. Instead, experience is simply the process of rationalisation of existence that produces subjects or subjectivities, which is simply one of the possible ways to organise self-consciousness. Because it is historical in character and determined by reason that is at best ambivalent, the process of rationalisation demands a critical history of thought that analyses its objective, normative and subjective axes of truth that have formed, and continue to constitute, who we are in the *actual passé*, or present past.

In his role as a critical historian who is engaged in a perpetual test of the limits of experience within the domain of thought, Foucault accepts Kant’s invitation to participate personally and collectively in the ongoing activity of enlightenment on condition that Nietzsche accompanies him. Critical history articulates how apparatuses of power/knowledge structure and modify who we are, with the focus on the relations of subjectivation and objectivation. The question, Foucault says:

> is to determine that which has to be the subject, on what conditions it is subjected, the status it must have, and the position it must occupy in reality or the mind in order to be a legitimate subject of this or that discourse—in brief, it is a question of determining its mode of subjectivation;…. But the question is also, and at the same time, to establish under what conditions a thing becomes an object of discourse, how it is problematised as an object to be known, by what procedures of division it is subjected, and the precise aspect of it which is considered relevant. This is a matter of ascertaining its mode of objectivation.

By enunciating the relations of subjectivation and objectivation that constitute discursive subjects and objects, Foucault actualises in thought the games of truth in respect of which we experience ourselves. Intrigued by the fact that the course of history only offers valorisations that are neither true nor false, they simply are, critical history analyses the emergence of games of truth in their manifestation as apparatuses of power/knowledge. Foucault limits his focus to scientific, political and ethico-moral games of truth, where through the relations of subjectivation and objectivation human beings are posited as subjects and objects of bodies of discourse—most obviously, of knowledge, power and freedom—which produce our objective, normative and subjective experience.

Anticipating his critics, Foucault wonders if it is possible to pose a more classical philosophical question than that which examines the relation between our experience of knowledge, power and ethico-morality as each
manifests itself in our modern corpus of thought. Moreover, he asks if there is a more systematic way to answer it than to research each independently of the other—as well as in their correlation in the historical discourses of sex through which being is constituted—for the purposes of a critique that rethinks the subject’s relation to experience in which one is simultaneously an object and a subject?²¹²

CONCLUSION

In order to demonstrate the existence of a Foucauldian œuvre, the concept itself was first rearticulated. Insofar as its form is concerned, the œuvre is a co-construction between the author and the episteme, which is manifest as a field of discursivity. Further, this structural aspect of the œuvre, which is only tangentially linked to the author, enables us to think of its content as a “baroque” heterogeneous ensemble that is the product of the lifetime reflections of an individual. Specifically, the content of the Foucauldian œuvre is knowledge, power and ethics, while its form is the philosophical method of critical history.

To establish the latter, the focus in the remainder of the article has been on two key figures. When, through the figure of Foucault, Kant, the philosopher of knowledge, meets Nietzsche, the philosopher of power,¹¹³ we discover a method called critical history that targets the systems of thought in which the historicity of how we experience ourselves resides. On the basis of a shift beyond Kant and Nietzsche, Foucault’s critique of how apparatuses of power/knowledge constitute the ethico-moral and political games of truth through which subjectivity is experienced. It is tantamount to what Heidegger termed Kant’s “critical ontology,”¹¹⁴ albeit with the key difference of the substitution of the transcendental by the historical in furtherance of a transgressive limit-attitude. Given this consistent concern for the subject that is developed through a critical history of who we are, we might reconsider the question of why Foucault’s foes deny such an œuvre.

Perhaps the reasons for which he has been vilified in Anglo-Saxon political philosophy are twofold. Firstly, because Foucault’s critique is initially negative, in the sense of a clearing away of the dogmatism associated with a philosophy of the subject, and only subsequently positive in terms of a reconceptualisation of subjectivity through its articulation by apparatuses of power/knowledge, his critics read the former as a wayward deviation from their idea of what it is to do philosophy, while the latter is taken as a sign that he suddenly sees the light towards the end of his life and, jettisoning a “great deal of (mostly French) [Continental] humbug,”¹¹⁵ adopts a more analytic theoretical posture. Secondly, Foucault’s tendency to grate is no doubt due to critical history’s top-down approach to the subject, which is anathema to the bottom-up foundational approach of his critics. Here, the issue is primarily one of methodological priority between structure and agency, but it is also a fundamentally political question of how to conceptualise who we are as modern subjects, or what Allen calls a “politics of our selves” in which processes of self-formation that gesture at autonomy are articulated through power, which harbours the potential to undermine it.¹¹⁶

In other words, is it the case, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously proclaimed, that “[m]an is born free; and everywhere he is in chains,”¹¹⁷ such that freedom is always being taken away from us by power, with critique sandwiched in between to arbitrate a David versus Goliath zero-sum game? Or is it rather the case, as Foucault sees it, that “man does not begin with liberty, but with limits and insuperable horizons,”¹¹⁸ such that freedom only comes into existence through power? In this case, critique is a “patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty,” which because its perspective is also internal to apparatuses of power/knowledge, is nothing less, and can certainly be nothing more, than a toolkit for transformation.¹¹⁹

If the latter, then in reply to Habermas and Taylor a critical history of thought is a deliberately foundationless project that discloses apparatuses of power/knowledge in their capacity as the midwife that gives birth to freedom. Resistance is not about reclaiming freedom that is stolen by power, but of revealing the strategies of power that articulate freedom. The lacuna of Foucault’s critics is their inability to entertain any notion of power other than in its sovereign form, which is construed as a Leviathan that upholds the conditions for autonomy at the same time as it threatens to dispossess individuals of their freedom. Similarly, their blind spot
is the underside of juridical power, or the microphysics of disciplinary bio-power that envelopes subjects and transforms them into docile bodies. It is for this reason that power must be conceived as “a complex strategical situation in a particular society.” Of course, this is never to deny the existence of bureaucratic institutions, structures of inequality or state violence, which is the exercise of power without any recourse to resistance. Instead, it is to argue that power or, more accurately, relations of bio-power are, like the air we breathe, everywhere. Without it, life is impossible. Similarly, life worth living is only possible in power relations, which are co-existent with, as well as productive of, freedom. In fact, freedom is nothing other than the effect of power, for at “the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.”

Finally, therefore, it is important to resist the efforts of Foucault’s detractors “to impose closure” on the form of critique and to once again “re-open the question.” From its location in the space between history and philosophy, which makes Foucault at one and the same time a historical philosopher and a philosophical historian, critical history can be seen as a vital resource for critique today, especially against the backdrop of globalisation and its extra-territorial rearticulation of locally situated strategies of power, which though they have always been everywhere, really now come from everywhere, too.

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NOTES

4. Because I argue that Foucault produces a Kantian derived and Nietzschean inspired œuvre of critical history, some chronology to lend support to this claim is necessary. Foucault (DEIV, 439), for instance, says he was already using Friedrich Nietzsche as early as 1953 to think beyond phenomenology and Marxism. Of course, Foucault [DEIV, 703 and 780] also admits that “if I had not read Heidegger [in 1951 or 1952], I would not have read Nietzsche;” nevertheless, even if Heidegger “for me [was] the essential philosopher … Nietzsche outweighed him” and “transformed my life.” (Although some commentators prioritise the influence of Heidegger on Foucault, notably Stuart Elden, Mapping the present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the mapping of spatial history. London: Continuum, 2001, and Hubert L. Dreyfus, “On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and Foucault.” Michel Foucault Philosopher. Ed. T. K. Armstrong. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992, in this article I assume, along with Gilles Deleuze, that Foucault could only appreciate Heidegger “by way of Nietzsche and alongside Nietzsche [and not the other way round].” Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, Trans. Seán Hand. London: Athlone Press, 1988, 113. Others who share Deleuze’s opinion include Thomas Dumm, Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996, and Charles E. Scott, The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.) Similarly, Foucault’s early engagement with Immanuel Kant was actually as a lecturer in 1953-54, when he taught a course on the transcendental subject and Kant’s Anthropology at the École Normale Supérieure (Michel Foucault, Dits et Écrits 1954-1988, Tome I: 1954-1969. Dir. D. Defert et F. Ewald. Collaboration J. Lagrange. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1994, 14-23 [hereafter DEI]). Finally, one of the first places Foucault runs Kant and Nietzsche together is the preface to Naissance de la Clinique, where he paraphrases the former and claims we “belong to an age of criticism”. Foucault then mentions Kant’s attempt to link criticism to metaphysics, before bringing in Nietzsche and his account of language, which reveals how believing we can tie criticism to (a subject of) knowledge is merely a ruse of language. Michel Foucault, Naissance de la Clinique. Paris: PUF, 1963, xi.
5. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Foucault pursued “a history of the different modes [of objectification, namely, knowledge, power and ethics] by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.” “The Subject and Power.” Michel Foucault. Eds Dreyfus and Rabinow, 208. Also see Foucault, DEIV, 631-632 and 442-443.
8. Todd May, “Foucault Now?” Foucault Studies 3 (2005), 70.
13. According to Sean Burke, Foucault is part of the French “anti-authorialism” of the 1960s. Upon the death of man, the theme of the death of the author emerged in reaction against the “Author-God,” or “the unitary cause, source and master to whom the chain of textual effects must be traced, and in whom they find their genesis, meaning, goal and justification.” Sean Burke, The Death and Return of the Author: Criticism and Subjectivity in Barthes, Foucault and Derrida (2nd Edition). Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996, 16 and 23.
15. Indeed, only the moral majority’s representatives, the “bureaucrats and police,” would dismiss the episteme and impose unity and coherence on Foucault’s writings. Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. London: Routledge, 1994, 18.


21. Foucault, DEII, 785.

22. Foucault, DEIV, 777.

23. Even Foucault’s biographers resist tying him to his work. With the exception of James Miller, who reads his œuvre as a mirror of his personality, the biographies of David Macey and Didier Eribon interpret Foucault against the background of developments in twentieth century French politics and philosophy, respectively. See James Miller, La Passion Foucault. Trad. H. Leroy. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1995; David Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault: A Biography. New York: Pantheon Books, 1993; and Eribon, Michel Foucault.


26. Barthes, Sade Fourier Loyola, 140.


28. Foucault, DEII, 791.


30. Foucault, “What is an Author?.” 157.


33. I borrow the idea of “co-construction” from a collection of essays that deploy this concept in respect of technology and modernity, technology and culture, or technology and subjectivity. Co-construction suggests the relationship between these pairs is that of “mutual influence, substantial uncertainty, and historical ambiguity.” T. J. Misa, “The Compelling Tangle of Modernity and Technology.” Modernity and Technology. Eds Thomas J. Misa, Philip Brey and Andrew Feenberg. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003, 3. As Andrew Feenberg sees it, while “the evolution of technologies [by analogy, the episteme] depends on the interpretative practices of their users[,] … human beings [by analogy, the author] are essentially interpreters shaped by world-disclosing technologies.” “Modernity Theory and Technology Studies: Reflections on Bridging the Gap.” Modernity and Technology. Eds Misa, Brey and Feenberg, 95.

34. Burke, The Death and Return of the Author, 32.


38. Foucault claimed that he was neither a philosopher nor a writer, but someone who does historical and political research. He thus had no need for an overarching theory or methodology. Rather, he operated across various fields of (politico-personal) interest, out of and in respect of which he developed relevant analytical tools. See Foucault DEII, 156-158; DEIII, 404-405. However, if we put aside these elusive musings so beloved of philosophers in Paris, we can note that as part of the application for election to a chair at the Collège de France candidates are invited to define the academic domain to which they seek nomination. To this end—and no doubt in tribute to Jean Hyppolite, who had held a chair in the “history of philosophical thought” (1962-1968)—Foucault designated the “history of systems of thought” as the title of the professorship that he was eventually elected to in 1970.


40. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 131.

41. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures. Trans. F. Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, 294-295. For Habermas, genealogy is presentistic, in that every time it tries to undertake an objective analysis of the past it originates from a hermeneutic point of departure in the present; secondly, in its reduction of normative judgements to the effects of power, Foucault’s criticism is relativistic; and, thirdly, genealogy mirrors the cryptonormative perspective of the human sciences by substituting their drive for objectivism with a naive subjectivism. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 242-256 and 276-284.


43. Some commentators argue the Habermas–Foucault debate results from the former’s inability to distinguish archaeology from genealogy and their opposing interpretations of Nietzsche. Thomas Biebricher, “Habermas, Foucault and Nietzsche: A Double Misunderstanding.” Foucault Studies 3 (2005), 1-26. Others are more hostile towards Habermas and his refusal to accept interpretations of Kant and the task of critique other than his own. See the essays in Samantha Ashenden and David Owen (eds.), Foucault contra Habermas. London: Sage; David Owen, Maturity and Modernity: Nietzsche, Weber, Foucault and the ambivalence of reason. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.


48. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 247.

49. Taylor, “Foucault on freedom and truth,” 177.

50. Amy Allen argues that, once we understand the common concern of Habermas and Foucault with critique, the differences in their projects appear “seriously overstated.” However, it might be said that once we understand the divergence in their respective modes of critique—and given Habermas (and Taylor) cannot entertain alternatives that do not demarcate truth from power—the differences should not be understated, as Thomas McCarthy argues. Amy Allen, The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008, 42; Thomas McCarthy, “The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault and the Frankfurt School.” Political Theory 18:3 (1990), 441-442.

51. On how differences in perspective, conceptual language and philosophical traditions foster cross-purposes between Foucault and his Anglo-Saxon critics, see Devereaux Kennedy, “Michel Foucault: The Archaeology and Sociology of Knowledge.” Theory and Society 8:2 (1979), 269-290; Colin Gordon, “Foucault in Britain.” Foucault and political reason.
52. Recently, some commentators have sought to situate Foucault within a tradition of philosophical phenomenology. However, as Colin Koopman argues, this endeavour turns a blind eye to the explicit influence of Kant (and, as I argue here, Nietzsche, which Koopman in turn is silent about) and hence is highly questionable. Colin Koopman, “Historical Critique or Transcendental Critique in Foucault: Two Kantian Lineages.” Foucault Studies 8 (2010), 100-121.
55. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 7.
57. It is useful to distinguish savoir from connaissance, both of which translate as knowledge. Ian Hacking calls the former depth knowledge, while Macey describes connaissance as scientific knowledge. These interpretations tally with what Foucault has in mind: “By connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated.” Savoir is then the background which frames connaissance, with Kant having oriented Foucault to the former and Nietzsche to the question of power within the Heideggerian act of the framing of connaissance. Ian Hacking, “The Archaeology of Foucault.” Foucault, ed. Hoy, 27-40; Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault; Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 15.
60. Leon Brunschvicg, “L’idée critique et le systeme kantien.” Quoted in Djaballah, Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience, 2.
61. Foucault submitted Histoire de la Folie as his thèse d’état in 1960, which was accompanied by an obligatory petite thèse of a translation and extended introduction of Kant’s Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique. Upon publication of the thèse d’état and his successful defence of it before a jury, Foucault was awarded the title of doctorats ès lettres in 1961. Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, 103-104 and 233-236.
64. Foucault, Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology, 125.
65. Kant, quoted in Foucault, DEIV, 221.
68. For Kant, the common thread in these questions is that they reveal who we are as human beings, for while the “first question is answered by Metaphysics, the second by Morals, the third by Religion, and the fourth by Anthropology… [they all] might be reckoned under anthropology, since the first three questions refer to the last.” Immanuel Kant, Introduction to Logic, Trans. T. Kingsmill Abbot. Westport, Connec.: Greenwood Press, 1963, 15.
72. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault, 104.
74. Rajchman, Michel Foucault, 114-116.
75. Owen, Maturity and Modernity, 6.
76. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault, 121.
77. Oksala, “Foucault’s politicization of ontology,” 450.
78. Foucault quoted in Michael Mahon, “Michel Foucault’s archaeology, enlightenment, and critique.” Human Studies 16 (1993), 129-141.
80. Owen, Maturity and Modernity, 66.
84. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 34.
85. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 41.
87. Foucault, The Foucault Reader, 42.
90. Owen, Maturity and Modernity, 1.


100. Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*, 154.


107. On Foucault’s nominalism, see Pascal Pasquino, “Michel Foucault (1926-84): The Will to Knowledge.” *Foucault’s New Domains*, eds. Gane and Johnson, 36-48; Rajchman, *Michel Foucault*, 54-59; Oksala, “Foucault’s politicization of ontology.”


109. Foucault, *DEIV*, 37. A note on Foucault’s notion of modernity is in order here. In *Madness and Civilization* he speaks of the renaissance epoch, which follows mediaeval Christianity and runs to the mid-seventeenth century, as well as the classical (1656-1789) and post-1789 epochs. Similarly, in *The Order of Things* Foucault refers to renaissance humanism, classical rationalism and the post-kantian epoch, which he defines by their episteme. He largely maintains this chronology in *Discipline and Punish*, albeit in terms of the technologies of monarchical power (renaissance epoch), juridico-sovereign power (classical epoch of 1760-1840) and disciplinary bio-power (the epoch after the mid-nineteenth century). The one inconsistency is the divide between the renaissance and classical epochs. In *Discipline and Punish*, it is the mid-eighteenth (1760), rather than the mid-seventeenth (1656), century that one finds in *Madness and Civilization*.


118. Foucault, *DEIV*, 415.


120. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume One*, 93.

121. Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 222.


123. Foucault, *DEIV*, 778. As Todd May perceptively notes: “If Foucault is a philosopher, it is because he is a historian [for whom] the question of who we are is … historical … rather [than] transcendental…. If Foucault is a historian, it is because he is a philosopher [whose] studies are reflections on who we are, even as they shift the ground for asking that question from the realm of the eternal and immutable to that of the contingent and changeable.” May, “Foucault Now?,” 69.