

**the sensational event after-
the-event: on bernard
stiegler's "technology and
media"**

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This article serves as an introduction to one of Bernard Stiegler's earliest papers in his academic career, "Technology and Media: The Press of Sensations" ("Technologie et media: la presse à sensations"). I will focus here on three key statements in this text that were developed in Stiegler's subsequent writing: first, that all media are sensational; second, that writing, as the first "new technology," inaugurated the history of human society; and finally, that modern technology, by transforming the way events occur, must be understood as our non-predestined destiny. Readers may notice moments of rupture in the unfolding argument of "Technology and Media." These ruptures, I suggest, open up the threads that lead

toward broader thematic analyses present in his late-1980s writings—(including the doctoral dissertation he had started writing and would eventually be published in the series *Technics and Time*). Accordingly, my interpretive work here does not focus on main lines of philosophical inquiry engaged by Stiegler in this essay (i.e. critique of cybernetics, Lyotardian notion of performativity, Heideggerian notion of *Gestell*, etc.¹); rather, it will be more like flying a kite along a drawstring (a gesture that allows for two possibilities: when tightened, it brings the kite closer; when released, it sends the kite farther away). By doing so, I aim to offer appropriate supplementary reflections here. These lines of inquiry are themselves non-predestined—reflecting the undetermined state of Stiegler’s academic work at that time. It is therefore necessary to begin by situating Stiegler’s writing within the context of 1980s.

STIEGLER IN THE 1980S: A DEFAULT OF ORIGIN

Stiegler’s research work in the 1980s began after his release from prison and expanded year by year in an interlocking manner—as if guided by an irretrievable thread leading to a series of unfolding consequences, or, in the term he would later theorize, a *quasi-causal* series. Stiegler draws on Deleuze’s conception of quasi-causality in *The Logic of Sense*, where events are conceived as incorporeal effects immanent to one’s experience. In this sense, Stiegler comes to view accidents as necessary—they are “defaults” without essence that nevertheless constitutes a life. Imprisonment,² for Stiegler, was such an event: the necessary episode in his philosophical life that, “from its origin until today, is the question of accident, and the acting out [*passage à l’acte*] as accident. I have called this accident ever since 1983, my first interpretation of the myth of Epimetheus, the *default of origin*.”³

Two years after his release, at the earliest stage of his formative 1980s period, Stiegler writes “Technology and Media.” Although Stiegler would formalize many of the notions central to his philosophy in subsequent works—particularly the series *Technics and Time* (first volume published in 1994) and his later *Symbolic*

Misery series (first volume published in 2004)—their conceptual structure is already implicit in this 1985 text. My analysis therefore makes occasional use of his later vocabulary (e.g., tertiary retention, ex-clamation, etc.) to clarify what is at stake here and to highlight the coherence of Stiegler’s thinking over time. Formulated directly from his early seminars at the Collège international de philosophie (CIPh), this early text gathers together the conceptual threads with which he was then working: the technical condition of memory, aesthetics, and knowledge.

“Technology and Media,” published in *Le Cahier*,⁴ was written during Stiegler’s time at the Collège international de philosophie (CIPh), which was founded in 1983 by Jacques Derrida and three other scholars.⁵ During 1984–1985, Jean-François Lyotard, then president of CIPh, recruited Stiegler,⁶ who had just been released from prison in February 1983. At CIPh, Stiegler secured a six-year position as a director of research. For him, this was a stable role that allowed him to reintegrate into social life and to present and discuss his research with other scholars.⁷ He conducted seminars fortnightly, focusing on the themes including the “change of epoch” and the “end of the Book” in the first year.⁸ Around August 1984, Thierry Gaudin, then director of the Centre de prospective et d’évaluation at the Ministry of Research, invited Stiegler to undertake a research project on the theoretical and practical issues surrounding the so-called “new technologies,” after attending the latter’s seminars.⁹ Co-funded by the Ministry of Research and the Ministry of Culture, Stiegler worked for a year on the project entitled “The Philosophical Challenges of New Information Technologies,” and presented a series of reports in 1985 before a committee that included Derrida, Lyotard, Michel Deguy, Jean-Luc Godard and Pierre-Jean Labarrière.¹⁰ Following this, Stiegler received further research commissions. From 1985 to 1987, he was commissioned by the Centre Pompidou to curate an exhibition based on these reports, titled *Memoires du futur: Bibliothèques et technologies*, which opened in October 1987.¹¹ In 1988, in response to President Mitterrand’s proposal to construct a new library (the “Tres Grande Bibliotheque” [TGB])¹² integrating digital technologies, an idea partly

inspired by Stiegler's exhibition, Michel Melot,¹³ director of the Bibliothèque publique d'information at the Centre Pompidou, asked him to write a section entitled "Reading Stations" [*postes de lecture*] for the official report.¹⁴ In 1989, to implement this computer-assisted reading station project as part of the TGB initiative, Stiegler began working for the Établissement public de la Bibliothèque de France.¹⁵ Taken together, this series of events formed the quasi-causal process through which Stiegler's early philosophical work took shape. Each step, often triggered by encounters arising from the previous one.

As his visibility in French academia increased, however, the biographical event at the origin of this trajectory—his imprisonment—remained little known.¹⁶ Stiegler avoided discussing it in interviews on public media channels, because, in his view, the *sensational* reactions it tends to provoke would make such a singular event inappropriate.¹⁷

"THE PRESS OF SENSATION"

What does Stiegler mean by "sensational"? The adjective directly references the "sensational press" [*presse à sensations*], as indicated by the subtitle of "Technology and media." The sensational press (or tabloid press) refers to newspapers that emphasize scandals and the private lives of public figures, using exaggerated narration to incite and excite audiences. *Ici-Paris* and *Minute* are contemporaneous examples mentioned by Stiegler: "The press of sensations is Proust and *Ici-Paris*, *Minute* and *Capital*." This type of 'news media' media, according to historian Pierre Nora, contains a structural redundancy that drives it to continuously fabricate new things, producing sensational stories to satisfy the desire of audiences for "events."¹⁸

But why does Stiegler juxtapose Proust and *Capital* with these notorious French tabloids? Certainly, he does not intend to analyse their differences stylistically. We know Proust and *Capital* through reading the books—they are printed media that

mediates knowledge and, as Stiegler emphasizes here, our sensations. Stiegler's approach to these media are decidedly Kantian, emphasizing sensation as the impression [*Wirkung*] produced by an object given to us, in mediated form, affecting our mind by means of sensibility.¹⁹ Sensibility is structured by the intuitional unity of time and space, a synthesis Kant calls the "synthesis of apprehension," the first of three syntheses.²⁰ Following Kant, Edmund Husserl analyses the system of inner time-consciousness, in which a sensation (primal impression or now-perception), as the present experience of the temporal object, is retained in the memory flow as a just-past impression (primary retention), forming a continuum of sensation.²¹ One of the most important claims Stiegler later develops from Husserl in *Technics and Time*, 1 and 2, is that this mechanism of retention is always already filtered in recollection (secondary retention), which functions as a selection criteria—and this selection is itself conditioned by a memory support (tertiary retention).²² A book or a journal is such a support—in the technical form—exterior to our mind. Whether it be a story of Proust's recollection or news in a tabloid press, an object of sensibility is given to us through the mediation of printed material. This givenness, which Stiegler understands in a Heideggerian sense as the feeling or the impression through which Dasein is disclosed, can only occur through the medium as the already-there. These technical supports of memory reactivate our own past memories, inside of our mind, through which sensations are selected and a stream of consciousness is constituted. In this sense, all press—which is to say, all media—is sensational.

The press of sensation can only be understood beyond the opposition between the intelligible and the sensible, the soul and the body, the inside and the outside—that is, beyond the metaphysical tradition. For Stiegler, the human faculty of sensation is "noetic *through and through*, trans-formed by the fact that it is a sensitivity *of the noetic*: it is the *power* of the noetic, and that it is noetic means that it is inscribed in *logic*."²³ That is to say, the sensitivity of the noetic is not equivalent to the simple sensitivity which characterizes the sensitive soul of the animal, as described in Aristotle's *On the Soul*, but rather contains this animal

sensitivity *inside* as its potential.²⁴ What characterizes the noetic soul is that its sensitivity is sensational—it can move from potential to action, that is, to act *outside* of itself, to *ex-press*:

All sensibility in act becomes, for a noetic soul, the support of an *expression*. This expression (discernment, *krinein*, judgement, *making-a-difference*) is a *logos* [...] which only is in the course of its being ex-pressed, is what I call an *ex-clamation*: the *noetic* experience of the sensible is *exclamatory*. It exclaims itself before the sensible insofar as it is *sensational*, that is, experience of a *singularity* that is *incommensurable*, and *always in excess*. The exclamatory soul, that is, sensational and not only sensitive, *enlarges* its sense by exclaiming it symbolically.²⁵

Ex-expression, or ex-clamation, unfolds within a logical and symbolic horizon that is always technical. Whether the sensational takes the literal form of tabloid press or classical literature, its originary technicity “opens the social circuit of sense,” wherein “the noetic soul inherits a memory which it has not lived but by which it is constituted.”²⁶ Finite memory becomes accessible only after being exteriorized into technical supports, and becomes intelligible to a broader social group only after being literalized within the development of linear writing.

HISTORY WRITTEN AND THE SOCIAL BODY

Stiegler states in “Technology and Media” that linear writing is the first “new technology.” First designates the beginning, and for Hegel, it is with the becoming of written history that the veritable and objective history of the people begins.²⁷ Linear writing enables the inscription, dissemination and interpretation of the past, allowing the collective past—the already-there of the people—to take form as a social body.²⁸ Two centrally important political forms have arisen on the basis of this technical condition, first the Greek polis, and later as the nation-state. The

emergence of political space thus presupposes a specific relationship between the past and the present, a relationship conditioned by writing, which is both a historical and a political condition.²⁹ Writing constitutes the “traditional system” of a society, in which historical time is shaped by its means of recording—the literal technics of memory.³⁰

Linear writing makes the past repeatable and thus accessible to other readers even the writer is no longer present. Husserl’s analysis in “The Origin of Geometry” offers a compelling elaboration: it is literal recording that makes geometric knowledge intelligible as it is transmitted from generation to generation, thereby forming the community of geometers—a process of communitization.³¹ Husserl states that “the writing-down effects a transformation of the original mode of being of the meaning-structure,” since geometric knowledge continues to make sense across its long history because “the reader can make it self-evident again, can reactivate the self-evidence.”³² Reactivation, as Derrida emphasizes, is considered by Husserl to be finite: there are always interruptions in time, such that a total, immediate reactivation with absolute univocity is impossible—otherwise it “would paralyze the internal history of geometry.”³³ It belongs to the essence of geometry that “no piece of the geometrical edifice is self-sufficient.”³⁴ The finitude of reactivation, therefore, opens the possibility of interpretation, which creates differences.

This is how a social body emerges as “the site of history [*Geschichte*],” where multiple political sites and actors appear, each possessing the right to interpret the law that remains readable.³⁵ Reading consists in a form of comprehension that is both passive and active: passive, because it is possible only insofar as the reader already understands within geometric terms and “has already, through the application of written language, acquired an analytic access to that language”; and active, because it re-activates, resumes and recovers after “producing a new articulation of geometry, a difference within the *différance* opened out through the instrument of geometry.”³⁶ Since the past becomes comprehensible and re-

interpretable through linear writing, the history of a social body is itself a form of *hermēneia*: “the sending of Hermes also forms the (techno-logical) opening to the book of History.”³⁷ There is always a delay—a deferral in time—between the occurrence of an event, its inscription, and its eventual interpretation. Stiegler concludes that the Hegelian notion of the event becomes a historical event only when it is captured by writing in a retroactive fashion.³⁸ It is historians—the writers of history—who “produce” events that constitute the history of a society by “retrospecting and thus retroacting (an) ‘us’ [...] in deferred time, as after-effect [*après-coup*].”³⁹

This is a significant position that is established with Stiegler’s early work. It opens up the theme of delay and deferred reaction, discussed with reference to the Greek myth⁴⁰ of Hermes, in “Technology and Media,” which is then intertwined with the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus. As the messenger god, the god of interpretation, Hermes is sent out into the tension between Prometheus and Epimetheus—the god of foresight and the god of hindsight, or, in other words, between the anticipatory thought of *promētheia* and the after thought [*méditation après coup*] of *ēpimētheia*.⁴¹ This tension forms the temporal structure: “promētheia, advance, whose truth is the return after the event [*après-coup*], the delay, *ēpimētheia*; [...] promētheia as advance presupposes hermeneutics (related itself to the technics of writing), which lies at the very basis of temporality.”⁴² What Hermes brings is the feeling of shame (*aidō*) and the feeling of justice (*dikē*), which lack meaning thus must be interpreted.⁴³ These feelings are necessary for a social body to cohere—that is to say, to have its own history, which is, in this sense, techno-logical.

“READ TIME” AS THE NON-PREDESTINED DESTINY

Today, the issue of media, as Stiegler reveals in “Technology and Media,” is the industrial development of “new technologies” that attempt to eliminate deferral. They process information in what is called “real time”⁴⁴—a hallmark

of contemporary media—reaching the speed of light. Speed is the experience of difference in time and space, it had long been the aim of human being to master its potential for mobility by inventing tools.⁴⁵ In other words, the quest for speed has always lain at the very heart of the evolution of technics in human history: to save time, space and energy.⁴⁶ Put differently, the pursuit of speed is the destiny of humans, whose being is *by default* oriented toward securing and preserving life externally through tools that supplement retentional finitude—the predestined *default* of mortals.

But this “enterprise” of memory has been pushed to an extreme since the beginning of the twentieth century, when new technologies—from radio, television to computational devices—enabled sending and receiving to occur increasingly without delay. This situation has resulted in a profound transformation of the conditions of any event: “when memory is produced at a speed near that of light it is no longer possible [...] to distinguish an ‘event’ from its ‘input’ or its ‘input’ from its ‘reception’ or reading.”⁴⁷ This is the issue of “event-ization [événementialisation]⁴⁸”: such events are no longer reflective knowledge arriving in delay and projected forward (that is, within the temporal structure composed of *promētheia* and *ēpimētheia*), but instead become events *immediately* when the *media* proceeds to disseminate. An event must be selected by media to merit the name “event,” which is in some respects analogous to the selection mechanism of secondary retention within the system of memory—no past impression can be retained as perception in consciousness without such selection. However, all selection criteria in the contemporary context have been industrialized: the broader the diffusion and the newer the news story, the greater the “plus-value” for mass media.⁴⁹ Therefore, it is more accurate to say that the events are “co-produced” by media industries rather than simply selected from “history.”

As Stiegler notes, citing Nora’s statement, mass media have now monopolized history, since we are all sensationally struck [*frappe*] by events co-produced by them and only by them, leaving us no chance to escape.⁵⁰ An event’s intellectual

signification, which consists in the hermeneutics of history, is replaced by its emotional virtuality.⁵¹ Events without history are constituted by the merely affective participation of the public, who engage in public life solely through mass media.⁵² This is no longer the participation of the writer (the historian, in Nora's sense) and the reader within a traditional system, where participation is "a passage from potential to act," rather, it is the loss of participation, "a regression from act to potential."⁵³ This is why, in "Technology and Media," Stiegler calls for a careful rereading of Aristotle's theory of the soul, who already shows that the noetic soul acts intermittently from its potential. This means it can always regress into the inert, passive state of sensitivity characteristic of the animal soul. When this intermittent trait of the noetic soul is captured and exploited by the sensational press, it can trigger more frequent and massive "regression towards the reactive and herdish behaviour of sensitive souls, where the sensational engenders the panic behaviour of crowds."⁵⁴ This sensationalist effect causes sensitive memory to conceal, erase and even make impossible the inscriptions that Stiegler calls noetic.⁵⁵ Ultimately, the elimination of delay and deferral—which is also the elimination of historical temporality—short-circuits the cohering process of the social body in a destructive way.

However, Stiegler's critique of mass media does not lead to a condemnation or rejection of "new technologies." Instead, he calls for a new politics—the politics of memory—to invent the future of historical temporality. As the technical origin in the fault of Prometheus and Epimetheus indicates, the human being is a "race" not predestined to be what it is, but one that originally has no inherent qualities: "it must invent, realize, produce qualities," and these qualities are those of technics.⁵⁶ Qualities consist, for example, in the quasi-causality of the series of accidents running from Stiegler's own life to his participation in institutions in the 1980s; the communitization of geometers transmitting and reactivating geometric knowledge; and the cohesion of the social body constituted through historians' selection, writing and interpretation of events. All of these are necessarily composed of events after-the-event—that is, they must be reflected upon within

the temporal delay created by the tension of *promētheia* and *ēpimētheia*. Stiegler's conclusion in "Technology and Media" is that "new technologies" condition new forms of memory, and therefore open a new epoch of interpretation: an epoch, as he puts it, of "(re)readings which are as much unprecedented writings." This new epoch, in any case, is possible only by reinventing the reciprocity between the writer and the reader (the sender and the receiver)—that is, by acting out through the mediation of new technologies to achieve a kind of sensational exclamation, which is the potential that inhabits the non-predestined destiny of the noetic soul.

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NOTES

1. Suppletar references to these lines of inquiry are provided in the translator endnotes of “Technology and Media.”
2. It was in 1979, in Saint-Michel prison, that Stiegler first read *The Logic of Sense* and discovered the story of Joë Bousquet, who, after being shot, became bedridden for life and turned to writing. Stiegler was deeply influenced by Deleuze’s discussion of the wound as a pure event—particularly the question “of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the quasi-cause of what is produced within us” (Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester and Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 148). See Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption*, 58.
3. Stiegler, *Philosophizing by Accident*, 42, n2.
4. The journal series was established as the first step in the Collège International de Philosophie’s publishing project, aimed at expanding the audience for its work. This volume, as the inaugural issue, seeks to provide the public—as well as the program directors of CIPh interested in following each other’s work—with insight into the structure and outcomes of the seminars held over the past four semesters (1984–1985). See “[Introduction].” *Le Cahier* (Collège International de Philosophie), no. 1 (1985): 5–8. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40972346>.
5. The other co-founders are François Châtelet, Jean-Pierre Faye, and Dominique Lecourt. In September 1982, they submitted a report to Jean-Pierre Chevènement, then Minister of Research and Industry, who had entrusted them with the task of proposing a new institution for philosophical education. Although supported by government funding, CIPh’s organizational and pedagogical structures enjoy a high degree of autonomy. It imposes no specific prerequisites regarding diploma, nationality, or age for applying as a program director. All activities organized by CIPh are free and open to the public. It also offers long-term research training programs and a doctoral path similar to those at universities, but without requiring prior academic degrees. See François Châtelet, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Pierre Faye, and Dominique Lecourt, *Le Rapport bleu* (Nanterre: Presses universitaires de Paris Nanterre, 2019).
6. Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), x.
7. For example, François Laruelle, who met Stiegler at CIPh in 1986, recommended him to read the work of Gilbert Simondon—prompting Stiegler to begin exploring the concept of individuation and other Simondonian theories. Likewise, Patrice Vermeren later referred him for a teaching position at the University of Technology of Compiègne. See Bernard Stiegler and Mehdi Belhaj Kacem, *Philosophies singulières. Conversation avec Michaël Crevoisier* (Paris: Diaphanes, 2021), 95; Bernard Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption: Technology and Madness in Computational Capitalism*, trans. Daniel Ross (Cambridge: Polity, 2019), 61 and 64.
8. Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption*, 62.
9. Stiegler, *The Age of Disruption*, 62.
10. Bernard Stiegler, *Philosophizing by Accident: Interviews with Élie During*, ed. and trans. Benoît Dillet (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 116. This collection of reports were published in an abridged version as “Technologies de la mémoire et de l’imagination,” *Réseaux* vol. 4, no. 16 (1986): 61–87. It was translated into English by Ashley Woodward and Amélie Berger Soraruff as “Technologies of memory and imagination,” *Parrhesia* 29, (2018): 25–76.
11. Stiegler, *Philosophizing by Accident*, 116. The exhibition explored how libraries might become with the development of information and communication technologies. See the exhibition introduction by Centre Pompidou, available at: <https://www.centrepompidou.fr/fr/programme/>

agenda/evenement/cgiBE7k.

12. President Mitterrand first announced his plan to construct a “very large library of an entirely new kind” [très grande bibliothèque d’un genre entièrement nouveau] during his televised address on July 14, 1988. Following this, government officials and the public began referring to the project as the Très Grande Bibliothèque, abbreviated as TGB. See Gaëlle Béquet, *Trois bibliothèques européennes face à Google* (Paris: Publications de l’École nationale des chartes, 2015).
13. Before this, Melot had been commissioned by Mitterrand’s advisor Jacques Attali to serve as an external curator for the exhibition *Mémoires du futur*, and, in Stiegler’s own words, as the latter’s “line manager.” It was also Attali who played the key role in suggesting the idea of the TGB to Mitterrand. See Stiegler, *Philosophizing by Accident*, 116.
14. Stiegler, *Philosophizing by Accident*, 116. The report was published as Patrice Cahart and Michel Melot, *Propositions pour une grande bibliothèque. Rapport au Premier ministre* (Paris: La Documentation française, 1989).
15. Stiegler, *Philosophizing by Accident*, 116–117. Stiegler originally planned to carry out the project with Minster of Research, but the Ministry could only fund it if integrated into the TGB. Therefore, Stiegler joined the Etablissement public de la Bibliothèque de France (EPBF) established in October 1989. On January 1, 1990, Alain Giffard, the director of Information Technology and New Technologies, established the planning group “Postes de Lectures Assistées par Ordinateurs” (PLAO), where Stiegler was the group leader. See also Béquet, *Trois bibliothèques*, 59–61.
16. The publication of Stiegler’s autobiographical work *Passer à l’acte* (Paris: Galilée, 2003) and the collected radio interviews *Philosopher par accident: Entretiens avec Élie During* (Paris: Galilée, 2004) brought this story into the public domain. During the initial stages of the interview project with Élie During in 2002, Stiegler had refused to speak about it. However, in the course of their discussions, he came to realize that “it seemed impossible not to talk about it, and I also did not hesitate to share this information given the trust that he showed me” (Stiegler, *Philosophizing by Accident*, 42, n2.).
17. Stiegler, *Philosophizing by Accident*, 42, n2.
18. Pierre Nora, “L’événement monstre,” *Communications*, 18 (1972): 162–172, at 164.
19. Emmanuel Kant, *Critique de la raison pure*, trad. André Tremesaygues and Bernard Pacaud (Paris: Félix Alcan éditeur, 1905), 63.
20. Kant, *Critique de la raison pure*, 131–132.
21. Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time*, trans. John B. Brough (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990).
22. Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 2: Disorientation*, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 224–225.
23. Bernard Stiegler, *The Decadence of Industrial Democracies*, trans. Daniel Ross and Suzanne Arnold (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 133.
24. Bernard Stiegler, *Acting Out*, trans. David Barison, Daniel Ross, and Patrick Crogan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 13.
25. Stiegler, *The Decadence of Industrial Democracies*, 133.
26. Bernard Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery, Volume 2: The Catastrophe of the Sensible*, trans. Barnaby Norman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 31.
27. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *La Raison dans l’Histoire : Introduction à la philosophie de l’Histoire*, trad. Kostas Papaioannou (Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1965), 25.
28. Although Stiegler had not read Simondon before Laruelle’s recommendation in 1986, we can already see complimentary themes emerging in his reflections on the individual-social relation

in “Technology and Media,” where he repeatedly uses the phrases “social body [corps social]” together with “to cohere [faire corps]” to indicate the dynamic process by which a society is formed throughout human history.

29. Bernard Stiegler, “Une insensible incertitude. Technique et facticité du temps,” *Cahiers de Fontenay*, n°51-52 (1988), 143-164.

30. Stiegler, “Une insensible incertitude,” 156.

31. See Jacques Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, trans. John P. Leavey Jr. and Stony Brook (New York: N. Hays, 1978).

32. Edmund Husserl, “The Origin of Geometry,” trans. David Carr, in *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction*, by Jacques Derrida, trans. John P. Leavey Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 164.

33. Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, 105.

34. Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry*, 105.

35. Stiegler, *Technics and Time 2*, 38-40.

36. Stiegler, *Technics and Time 2*, 40.

37. Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1*, 200.

38. Stiegler, “Une insensible incertitude,” 153.

39. Stiegler, *Technics and Time 2*, 120.

40. In *Technics and Time 1*, Stiegler refers to Protagoras’s version written in Plato’s *Protagoras* (320d–322d), starting from the “the first moment” when “there was the first fault, Epimetheus’s forgetting, then the second fault, Prometheus’s theft, as a result of which appeared the disappearing nudity of mortals, the advance of their prematurity that is their eternal delay.” (192) The second moment is that Zeus sent Hermes to give human *tekhnai* of justice [*dikē*] and shame [*aidō*], the *technics* of politics, forming the polis, “the community of those who have no community,” the lack stems from the faults of Epimetheus and Prometheus. (200-202)

41. Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1*, 184.

42. Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1*, 202.

43. Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1*, 201.

44. Although Stiegler had not applied this term in “Technology and Media,” it is precisely what he intends to address when he speaks about the “enterprise” of cybernetics, which is clear in *Technics and Time 2*, that new information and communication technologies employs “the cybernetic tool called ‘real time’.” (141) Although the usage of this term around 1984 was not “popularized,” it still can be seen in the same context as Paul Virilio (an important colleague of Stiegler’s within CIPh), who was writing about the application of micro-computing to a “real time of emission and of the reception” of messages. See Paul Virilio, *L’espace critique : essai* (Paris : Christian Bourgois Editeur, 1984), 95-97. Also note, Stiegler wrote an essay published in 1987 putting the issue of “real time” media effects in the center, see Bernard Stiegler, “Réseaux et communauté : À l’époque du temps réel et industriel,” *Les Annales de la recherche urbaine*, N°34 (1987): 5-14.

45. It is what Stiegler developed from Leroi-Gourhan’s paleoanthropological analysis of human inventions of tools to conquer time and space, which is precisely what invents the human being—the process of hominization. See André Leroi-Gourhan, *Gesture and Speech*, trans. Anna Bostock Berger (Cambridge, Mass. And London: MIT Press, 1993), 25-48; and Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1*, 134-150.

46. See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 287-288.

47. Stiegler, *Technics and Time* 2, 116.
48. See Stiegler, *Technics and Time* 1, 280, n11, that the translators “coin the neologism ‘event-ization’ to translate the Stieglerian term *événementialisation* (the taking place and time of events).”
49. Stiegler, *Technics and Time* 2, 112.
50. Pierre Nora, “L’événement monstre,” 162.
51. Pierre Nora, “L’événement monstre,” 164-165.
52. Pierre Nora, “L’événement monstre,” 166.
53. Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery*, Volume 2, 25.
54. Stiegler, *The Decadence of Industrial Democracies*, 133-134.
55. Stiegler, “Une insensible incertitude,” 157.
56. Stiegler, *Technics and Time* 1, 193.